Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The 2006 World Cup Tax Evasion Affair in Germany: A short guide. By Gesa Kuebek

Editor's note:

Gesa Kuebek holds an LLM and graduated from the University of Bologna, Gent and Hamburg as part of the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme in Law and Economics and now work as an intern for the Asser Instituut.


On Monday, 9 November, the German Football Association (DFB) announced in a Press Release the resignation of its head, Wolfgang Niersbach, over the 2006 World Cup Affair. In his statement, Niersbach argued that he had “no knowledge whatsoever” about any “payments flows” and is now being confronted with proceedings in which he was “never involved”. However, he is now forced to draw the “political consequences” from the situation. His resignation occurred against the backdrop of last week’s raid of the DFB’s Frankfurt headquarters and the private homes Niersbach, his predecessor Theo Zwanziger and long-standing DFB general secretary Horst R. Schmidt. The public prosecutor’s office investigates a particularly severe act of tax evasion linked to awarding the 2006 World Cup. The 2006 German “summer fairy-tale” came under pressure in mid-October 2015, after the German magazine “Der Spiegel” shocked Fußballdeutschland by claiming that it had seen concrete evidence proving that a €6.7 million loan, designated by the FIFA for a “cultural programme”, ended up on the account of Adidas CEO Robert-Louis Dreyfuß. The magazine further argued that the money was in fact a secret loan that was paid back to Dreyfuß. Allegedly, the loan was kept off the books intentionally in order to be used as bribes to win the 2006 World Cup bid. The public prosecutor now suspects the DFB of failing to register the payment in tax returns. German FA officials admit that the DFB made a “mistake” but deny all allegations of vote buying. However, the current investigations show that the issues at stakes remain far from clear, leaving many questions regarding the awarding of the 2006 World Cup unanswered.

The present blog post aims to shed a light on the matter by synthetizing what we do know about the 2006 World Cup Affair and by highlighting the legal grounds on which the German authorities investigate the tax evasion. More...




Blog Symposium: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code. By Mike Morgan

Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note
Mike Morgan is the founding partner of Morgan Sports Law LLP. His practice is focused exclusively on the sports sector. He advises on regulatory and disciplinary issues and has particular experience advising on doping and corruption disputes.

Mike acted on behalf of National Olympic Committees at three of the last four Olympic Games and has represented other sports bodies, clubs and high profile athletes in proceedings before the High Court, the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, the American Arbitration Association and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. More...






Blog Symposium: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code. By Howard L. Jacobs

Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note

Howard Jacobs is solo practitioner in the Los Angeles suburb of Westlake Village, California. Mr. Jacobs has been identified by various national newspapers and publications as one of the leading sports lawyers in the world. His law practice focuses on the representation of athletes in all types of disputes, with a particular focus on the defense of athletes charged with doping offenses.Mr. Jacobs has represented numerous professional athletes, Olympic athletes, world record holders,  and amateur athletes in disputes involving doping, endorsements, unauthorized use of name and likeness, salary issues, team selection issues, and other matters.  He is at the forefront of many cutting edge legal issues that affect athletes, winning cases that have set precedents that have benefited the athlete community. More information is available at www.athleteslawyer.com. More...





Blog Symposium: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment. By Marjolaine Viret and Emily Wisnosky

Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's Note
Marjolaine Viret: An attorney-at-law at the Geneva bar, specialising in sports and health law. Her doctoral work in anti-doping was awarded a summa cum laude by the University of Fribourg in early 2015. She gained significant experience in sports arbitration as a senior associate in one of Switzerland’s leading law firms, advising clients, including major sports federations, on all aspects of anti-doping. She also holds positions within committees in sports organisations and has been involved in a variety of roles in the implementation of the 2015 WADC. Her book “Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science & Law” is scheduled for publication in 2015.

Emily Wisnosky: An attorney-at-law admitted to the California bar, she currently participates in the WADC 2015 Commentary research project as a doctoral researcher. She also holds an LLM from the University of Geneva in International Dispute Settlement, with a focus on sports arbitration. Before studying law, she worked as a civil engineer. More...





Blog Symposium: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies. By Herman Ram

Introduction: The new WADA Code 2015
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

Editor's note
Herman Ram is the Chief Executive Officer of the Anti-Doping Authority the Netherlands, which is the National Anti-Doping Organization of the country. He has held this position since 2006. After working twelve years as a librarian, Herman Ram started his career in sport management in 1992, when he became Secretary general of the Royal Netherlands Chess Federation. In 1994, he moved on to the same position at the Netherlands Badminton Federation. He was founder and first secretary of the Foundation for the Promotion of Elite Badminton that was instrumental in the advancement of Dutch badminton. In 2000 he was appointed Secretary general of the Netherlands Ski Federation, where he focused, among other things, on the organization of large snowsports events in the Netherlands. Since his appointment as CEO of the Anti-Doping Authority, he has developed a special interest in legal, ethical and managerial aspects of anti-doping policies, on which he has delivered numerous presentations and lectures. On top of that, he acts as Spokesperson for the Doping Authority. Herman Ram holds two Master’s degrees, in Law and in Sport Management. More...




Blog Symposium: The new WADA Code 2015 - Introduction

Day 1: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies
Day 2: The “Athlete Patient” and the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code: Competing Under Medical Treatment
Day 3: Proof of intent (or lack thereof) under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code
Day 4: Ensuring proportionate sanctions under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code

On 1 January, a new version of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC or Code) entered into force. This blog symposium aims at taking stock of this development and at offering a preliminary analysis of the key legal changes introduced. The present blog will put the WADC into a more general historical and political context. It aims to briefly retrace the emergence of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and its Code. It will also reconstruct the legislative process that led to the adoption of the WADC 2015 and introduce the various contributions to the blog symposium.More...






To pay or not to pay? That is the question. The case of O’Bannon v. NCAA and the struggle of student athletes in the US. By Zlatka Koleva

Editor's note
Zlatka Koleva is a graduate from the Erasmus University Rotterdam and is currently an Intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

The decision on appeal in the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA seems, at first sight, to deliver answers right on time regarding the unpaid use of names, images and likenesses (NILs) of amateur college athletes, which has been an ongoing debate in the US after last year’s district court decision that amateur players in the college games deserve to receive compensation for their NILs.[1] The ongoing struggle for compensation in exchange for NILs used in TV broadcasts and video games in the US has reached a turning point and many have waited impatiently for the final say of the Court of Appeal for the 9th circuit. The court’s ruling on appeal for the 9th circuit, however, raises more legitimate concerns for amateur sports in general than it offers consolation to unprofessional college sportsmen. While the appellate court agreed with the district court that NCAA should provide scholarships amounting to the full cost of college attendance to student athletes, the former rejected deferred payment to students of up to 5,000 dollars for NILs rights. The conclusions reached in the case relate to the central antitrust concerns raised by NCAA, namely the preservation of consumer demand for amateur sports and how these interests can be best protected under antitrust law. More...



The European Commission’s ISU antitrust investigation explained. By Ben Van Rompuy

In June 2014, two prominent Dutch speed skaters, Mark Tuitert (Olympic Champion 1500m) and Niels Kerstholt (World Champion short track), filed a competition law complaint against the International Skating Union (ISU) with the European Commission.


ChanceToCompeteTwitter.png (50.4KB)


Today, the European Commission announced that it has opened a formal antitrust investigation into International Skating Union (ISU) rules that permanently ban skaters from competitions such as the Winter Olympics and the ISU World and European Championships if they take part in events not organised or promoted by the ISU. The Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, stated that the Commission "will investigate if such rules are being abused to enforce a monopoly over the organisation of sporting events or otherwise restrict competition. Athletes can only compete at the highest level for a limited number of years, so there must be good reasons for preventing them to take part in events."

Since the case originates from legal advice provided by the ASSER International Sports Law Centre, we thought it would be helpful to provide some clarifications on the background of the case and the main legal issues at stake. More...





Interview with Wil van Megen (Legal Director of FIFPro) on FIFPro’s EU Competition Law complaint against the FIFA Transfer System

Editor’s note
Wil is working as a lawyer since 1980. He started his legal career at Rechtshulp Rotterdam. Later on he worked for the Dutch national trade union FNV and law firm Varrolaan Advocaten. Currently he is participating in the Labour Law Section of lawfirm MHZ-advocaten in Schiedam in the Netherlands. He is also a member of a joint committee advising the government in labour issues.

Since 1991 he is dealing with the labour issues of the trade union for professional football players VVCS and cyclists’ union VVBW. Since 2002, he works for FIFPro, the worldwide union for professional football players based in Hoofddorp in the Netherlands. He is involved in many international football cases and provides legal support for FIFPro members all over the world. Wil was also involved in the FIFPro Black Book campaign on match fixing and corruption in Eastern Europe. More...


The Scala reform proposals for FIFA: Old wine in new bottles?

Rien ne va plus at FIFA. The news that FIFA’s Secretary General Jérôme Valcke was put on leave and released from his duties has been quickly overtaken by the opening of a criminal investigation targeting both Blatter and Platini.

With FIFA hopping from one scandal to the next, one tends to disregard the fact that it has been attempting (or rather pretending) to improve the governance of the organisation for some years now. In previous blogs (here and here), we discussed the so-called ‘FIFA Governance Reform Project’, a project carried out by the Independent Governance Committee (IGC) under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth of the Basel Institute on Governance. Their third and final report, published on 22 April 2014, listed a set of achievements made by FIFA in the area of good governance since 2011, such as establishing an Audit and Compliance Committee (A&C). However, the report also indicated the reform proposals that FIFA had not met. These proposals included the introduction of term limits for specific FIFA officials (e.g. the President) as well as introducing an integrity review procedure for all the members of the Executive Committee (ExCo) and the Standing Committees. More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | Blog Symposium: Third Party Investment from a UK Perspective. By Daniel Geey

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Blog Symposium: Third Party Investment from a UK Perspective. By Daniel Geey

Introduction: FIFA’s TPO ban and its compatibility with EU competition law.
Day 1: FIFA must regulate TPO, not ban it.
Day 2: Third-party entitlement to shares of transfer fees: problems and solutions
Day 3: The Impact of the TPO Ban on South American Football.
Day 5: Why FIFA's TPO ban is justified.

Editor's note: In this fourth part of our blog symposium on FIFA's TPO ban Daniel Geey shares his 'UK perspective' on the ban. The English Premier League being one of the first leagues to have outlawed TPO in 2010, Daniel will outline the regulatory steps taken to do so and critically assess them. Daniel is an associate in Field Fisher Waterhouse LLP's Competition and EU Regulatory Law Group. As well as being a famous 'football law' twitterer, he has also published numerous articles and blogs on the subject.

 

What is Third Party Investment?
In brief Third Party Investment (TPI) in the football industry, is where a football club does not own, or is not entitled to, 100% of the future transfer value of a player that is registered to play for that team. There are numerous models for third party player agreements but the basic premise is that companies, businesses and/or individuals provide football clubs or players with money in return for owning a percentage of a player’s future transfer value. This transfer value is also commonly referred to as a player’s economic rights. There are instances where entities will act as speculators by purchasing a percentage share in a player directly from a club in return for a lump sum that the club can then use as it wishes.

Why did the Premier League ban the practice?
The Premier League, Football League, Football Association, the Polish and French leagues have all brought in TPI bans. The original ban in the Premier League came as a result of the Tévez affair where a third party owner had the contractual right to force West Ham to sell the player if a suitable bid was received. This was against the 'material influence' regulations that were in place at the time. Previously, there was no express clause prohibiting TPI; only the act of influencing a club’s policies or performance was forbidden. Tévez’s third party contract contained a clause giving exclusive power to the third party owners, MSI and Just Sports, to facilitate the transfer of the player. West Ham did not have a veto over this right and such a stipulation breached the above Premier League rule as it meant that outside parties had material influence over the decision making of West Ham.
A common misconception throughout and after the Tévez case was that any third party player owner would have been in breach of the Premier League rules. This was not the case. It was the clause giving the owners of Tévez influence over West Ham which incurred the Premier League’s wrath (plus the non-disclosure of the agreement itself). It was for this reason that West Ham was judged to have breached the old Premier League rule Rule U18 and fined £5.5 million by the Premier League.
Subsequently, the Premier League significantly strengthened its regulations to prohibit any type of TPI. Other leagues followed as a result. The Premier League decided that from the beginning of the 2008/9 season an absolute ban on TPI was required. A spokesman stated:
“The clubs decided that third-party ownership was something they did not want to see. It raises too many issues over the integrity of competition, the development of young players and the potential impact on the football pyramid. It was felt the Premier League was in a position to take a stand on this. No one wants to see what has happened to club football in South America repeated over here”.

There are also Football League and Football Association rules prohibiting TPI but the below analysis takes the Premier League rules by way of example. Current Premier League Rules U39-40 (which at the time were rules L34-35) govern the actual prohibition and buy-out mechanism.
Premier League Rule U39 is the exemption rule which covers scenarios where clubs are allowed to receive money or incur a liability, for example, for the player registration or transfer of a player registration. Such instances include payments or receipts of transfer fees, loan fees and sell-on fees, payments for image rights contracts, payments for agency/intermediary work and payment of training compensation and solidarity contributions as set out in the FIFA regulations.
Premier League rule U40 is the mechanism to enable a third party owned player to transfer to a Premier League club. This can occur so long as the Premier League club purchases the third party’s economic interest in the player. It states:
"In respect of a player whom it applies to register as a Contract Player, a Club is permitted to make a payment to buy out the interest of a person or entity who, not being a Club or club, nevertheless has an agreement either with the club with which the player is registered, or with the player, granting it the right to receive money from a new Club or club for which that player becomes registered. Any such payment which is not dependent on the happening of a contingent event may be made either in one lump sum or in instalments provided that all such instalments are paid on or before the expiry date of the initial contract between the Club and the player. Any such payment which is payable upon the happening of a contingent event shall be payable within 7 days of the happening of that event".
This ensures that any future transfer sums, should the player be subsequently sold, would be kept by the selling Premier League club and eliminates any third party element to any future sale transaction. Interestingly, the Premier League club who 'buys-out' the third party interest may still be paying the third party investor through installments during the period that the player is playing for his new Premier League club. Whilst the player is owned by the club and no third party interest is possible, there is still the eventuality that a club could default on the installment plan and then the third party investor could sue based on the buy-out obligations in the contract. It would be unlikely yet is unclear from the regulations whether the investment stake could be transferred back to third party investor if default occurred or what other alternative recourse that an investor may have.
Nonetheless, any player registered to play in the Premier League cannot be third party owned by a TPI company. It means that the buying Premier League club has to satisfy the football authorities that all other economic interests have been extinguished. This occurred over the summer when TPI players Markovic and Mangala were transferred to Liverpool and Manchester City respectively. Premier League clubs undertake to the football authorities that it is the only entity that owns the player’s economic rights and only then can the transfer can be completed. It is likely that Falcao had a TPI contract whilst he was at Porto but as the French league also prohibits TPI, when Monaco bought him, there may well have been a requirement in place to extinguish any third party rights. As such, when he was then loaned to Manchester United this summer, his TPI rights would certainly have been extinguished to ensure there were no major complications with his Premier League registration.

Why is it such a problem?
As the Premier League spokesman explained above, their major concerns related to integrity, youth player development and money flowing out of the game. An internal FIFA report recently concluded that TPI trapped clubs in a “vicious cycle of debt and dependence” and “posed risks to players and to the integrity of the game”.
The main concerns about TPI include:
1. Conflicts of interests can potentially occur between investors, club owners, agents and coaches. For example, what if the owner of Club A also owns an economic stake in Player B playing against his club? What if an agent of a manager who buys TPI players is also an advisor of a TPI fund? Regardless of any actual conflict, there is certainly a perceived conflict which may damage the image of the game, public confidence in integrity of competitions and even lead to potential match-fixing or insider trading concerns. Questions continue to be asked over the transparency of the TPI funds and what role they have, if any, in influencing clubs.
2. Clubs become reliant on such funding which in turn leads to dependence on external owners to continue to assist in such financing arrangements. As such, TPI encourages short-term profit making with economic owners looking to the club to sell its players to realise their ‘asset’ ahead of purely on-field sporting concerns. The consequence is that the rapid turnover of TPI players at certain clubs means fans become less loyal to the players who know they will be transferred when the right offer is received. Clubs are seen as a short term ‘speculation tools’ with the result that money leaves the football family.

Why is the practice necessary?
To counter the arguments set out above, the following points demonstrate are why TPI is so vital for many clubs around the world.
1. A growing number of clubs cannot compete with the larger commercial and broadcasting deals of the bigger European leagues. Clubs in so-called smaller European leagues, for example, need to leverage their assets and find innovative ways to find competitive advantage for playing against teams in the Champions League.
2. Purchasing players is an inherently risky business. Clubs with less money to spend would therefore usually be more risk-averse when having to invest heavily in transfers. One way of limiting such risk, is to share the financial burden. Therefore contracts are entered into between economic owners and clubs to either help the club with the purchase price for a talented individual or free up capital and ‘monetise’ a current players value whilst he still remains at the club. In either event, the club benefits from external finance that cushions the club’s position if the player is not a world beater. Both the club and the fund then benefit if the player is a success through a large transfer fee received that is shared according to the contract.
3. There are various ways to alleviate conflict of interest, integrity and transparency issues. Instead of banning TPI, many believe regulation through a transparent approach to TPI by disclosing a register of interests would alleviate a number of concerns as well as making TPI contracts available to FIFA/UEFA to ensure ‘material influence’ issues are correctly dealt with in the TPI contracts.
With FIFA regulating to ban players who are third party owned, many are questioning whether regulation of the practice rather than an outright ban would be preferable. In addition, some believe that it is not a ban but total transparency of the arrangements that is required. This could even be expanded to include a list of the owners of such transfer rights. Such transparency could allow the football family to scrutinise any potential conflicts of interest between, for example, those who own the economic rights of a player and those who also own a stake in a football club. With FIFA’s regulation governing the TPI prohibition, UEFA and FIFPro have backed such a position too.

What is the current state of play?
The current FIFA Rule Article 18bis of FIFA’s Rules on the Status and Transfer of Players states that:
“No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.”
This was not a specific ban on TPI but a ban on a third party owner from influencing a club’s employment or transfer related matters.
Throughout 2014, UEFA and FIFA made a number of public statements concerning their aim to outlaw TPI. In September FIFA’s President Sepp Blatter explained that:
“We took a firm decision that [TPI] should be banned but it cannot be banned immediately there will be a transitional period”.
FIFA then set up a working group to address the topic of TPI. At the time, in their press release there was no explicit mention of a ban but “to analyse all possible regulatory options in relation to this complex practice and to make preliminary suggestions”. It was to the surprise of many that in late December, whilst the working group was still debating several possibilities that FIFA announced that they were to ban TPI globally. It is important to set out the exact wording of the FIFA circular to grasp the wide scope of the prohibition. Specifically, a third party is defined as "a party other than the two clubs transferring a player from one to the other, or any previous club, with which the player has been registered".
"Article 18ter Third-party ownership of players' economic rights
1. No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation.
2. The interdiction as per paragraph 1 comes into force on 1 May 2015.
3. Agreements covered by paragraph 1 which predate 1 May 2015 may continue to be in place until their contractual expiration. However, their duration may not be extended.
4. The validity of any agreement covered by paragraph 1 signed between 1 January 2015 and 30 April 2015 may not have a contractual duration of more than 1 year beyond the effective date.
5. By the end of April 2015, all existing agreements covered by paragraph 1 need to be recorded within the Transfer Matching System (TMS). All clubs that have signed such agreements are required to upload them in their entirety, including possible annexes or amendments, in TMS, specifying the details of the third party concerned, the full name of the player as well as the duration of the agreement.
6. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs or players that do not observe the obligations set out in this article".
Article 18ter imposes a blanket global ban for TPI specifically forbidding any entity that is not a club from being entitled to future economic rights and/or transfer compensation. Whilst it has been explicitly considered that the prohibition only comes into force in May 2015, agreements entered into from 1 January can only be one year in length. This effectively reduces the possibility of new TPI contracts being entered into. Interestingly, Sporting Lisbon for example, recently announced that they had bought back a number of economic rights contracts from third party investors. They presumably considered that their position may well have been strengthened as a result of the new regulations.
Nonetheless, existing third party contracts will continue until expiry meaning that some players may still be subject to third party investment contracts for a number of seasons to come.  Such contracts will however be monitored through FIFA's TMS system as any club will be required to disclose a valid third party contract due to the mandatory disclosure obligations set out in paragraph 5 above. Such obligations are required to be adhered to in a relatively short time period (by the end of April 2015). The result of such disclosure may be that the contracts submitted to FIFA may themselves breach Article 18bis, for example, regarding TPI material influence clauses. Clubs will be faced with the obligation to provide all continuing TPI contracts to FIFA and will be subject to disciplinary measures if they do not. There is now an added compliance factor for clubs to adhere to under the new regulations and a variety of disciplinary cases against clubs should not be ruled out.
Lastly, the Portuguese and Spanish leagues are reported to have made a formal complaint to the European Commission, presumably assessing that Article 18ter is contrary to the free movement and competition rules. They will no doubt be arguing that the absolute ban that FIFA has imposed, is disproportionate i.e. that there are less restrictive ways of achieving the same objective.
Many have suggested that regulating TPI through transparency and disclosure obligations is a better alternative than an outright ban. It will be for the European Commission to decide whether to take the complaint forward and make a more substantive assessment or to reject the complaint. It should be noted that when the Premier League banned TPI, although there were some that argued that the prohibition breached competition law, no one actually came forward to challenge the regulation. A mere two months after FIFA announced the ban did the two Iberian associations challenge Article 18ter. That suggests, as many believe, that TPI has played an integral part in the way that clubs in those leagues use finance to 'de-risk' transfers and compete against clubs in associations with higher revenue generating capabilities. TPI has been an essential financing option.

Conclusion

Whilst the Premier League, as a reaction to the Tévez affair, made a strong policy decision to ban the practice in its league, a more fundamental shift is occurring on the global stage. Football specifically is very much in the European Commission's view with current Intermediary and TPI complaints and a previous Financial Fair Play complaint that was rejected but is now before the Belgian national courts. The TPI complaint will not be a quick process and in the meantime, unless interim relief is sought, existing TPI contracts will soon have to be lodged with FIFA and from 1 May, no new contracts can be entered into. Whether the practice is banned for good is now in the hands of the European Commission

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