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Blurred Nationalities: The list of the “23” and the eligibility rules at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. A guest Post by Yann Hafner (Université de Neuchâtel)

In 2009, Sepp Blatter expressed his concerns that half of the players participating in the 2014 FIFA World Cup would be Brazilians naturalized by other countries. The Official list of Players released a few weeks ago tends to prove him wrong[1]. However, some players have changed their eligibility in the past and will even be playing against their own country of origin[2]. This post aims at explaining the key legal aspects in changes of national affiliation and to discuss the regulations pertaining to the constitution of national sides in general[3].

The 32 national associations engaged in the final competition are bound by two sets of rules, namely the Regulations of the 2014 World Cup – Brazil and the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes 2013[4]. Their common purpose is to ensure that players have a genuine, close and credible link with the national association which selects them on its roster[5]. This is primarily ensured by the permanent holding of the nationality of the country of the national association in question[6]. It means that nationality must not be pegged to the residence of the player in a certain country[7]. Naturally, sanctions may apply in the case of a breach of these stipulations[8].

The global race to secure talent meeting this nationality requirement is not new. It appears that it has however reached a new level in light of the Diego Costa case since FIFA regulations do not prevent nor address the issue of dual call-up[9]. Many players, such as Manchester United midfield Adnan Janujaz (who actually just elected to play for Belgium a few weeks ago)[10], are placed in a difficult if not untenable position. They are indeed denied the right to refuse an international selection according to FIFA regulations even if they are called-up by both national teams they are affiliated to[11].

The recent Diego Costa saga put this issue under intense media scrutiny[12]. To summarize the issue, the Brazilian-born player had gained very few international appearances in the preliminary phase, playing exclusively friendlies for his country of birth, before acquiring Spanish nationality and moving to represent Spain at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. His choice was portrayed as traitorous by some officials of the Brazilian football federation. In light of this, imagine for one second the headlines of the worldwide press if Diego Costa had defeated Brazil during the knockout phase (28 or 29 June) or the grand final on 13 July 2014, if both teams had qualified for the second phase of the tournament. In the eyes of many, FIFA is responsible for allowing Diego Costa to play against his country of birth. However, this is overlooking that the acquisition of a new nationality and change of national associations are strictly regulated, and that such regulations are actually decided collectively by the members of FIFA. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the Brazilian Football Federation has not made any official move to modify the rules so far[13].


Acquisition of a new nationality

Article 7 of the 2013 FIFA Regulations reads as follow: “Any Player who refers to art. 5 par. 1 to assume a new nationality and who has not played international football in accordance with art. 5 par. 2 shall be eligible to play for the new representative team only if he fulfils one of the following conditions: a) He was born on the territory of the relevant Association; b) His biological mother or biological father was born on the territory of the relevant Association; c) His grandmother or grandfather was born on the territory of the relevant Association; d) He has lived continuously for at least five years after reaching the age of 18 on the territory of the relevant Association”.

Under this article, the acquisition of a new nationality must be distinguished with double nationality. Dual nationals by birth may elect to represent the national association of their choice. This is notably the case of football players born in Northern Ireland for instance[14]. They can play for the Irish Football Association (Northern Ireland) or the Football Association of Ireland (Ireland) as they can claim British and Irish nationalities at birth[15]. Of note, this article applies only to player who have acquired a new nationality before their first international appearance. If this is not the case, they will not be allowed to play for their new country. 

The “granny rule” and the five-year waiting period are the most controversial eligibility regulations. Some authors find indeed that gaining eligibility through a grandparent does not offer a link close enough with the country that the player wishes to represent. Consequently, they advocate that this provision be deleted from the FIFA regulations[16]. The waiting rule was introduced in order to protect national identity and young players[17] and thus, to prevent expedited naturalization of football players. It institutes a de facto prohibition to play at international level before the age of 23 years old when naturalized. This rule was challenged twice since its coming into force in 2008. First, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Federation and the Australian Federation sought laxer rules in order to include immigrant players in their national side. The FIFA Congress rejected this bid by 153 to 42 votes and the second submission for a change was even withdrawn before being put to vote[18]. This landslide vote shows that FIFA members are favoring the status quo.

 

Change of association

Article 8, paragraph 1, of the 2013 FIFA Regulations reads as follow: “If a Player has more than one nationality, or if a Player acquires a new nationality, or if a Player is eligible to play for several representative teams due to nationality, he may, only once, request to change the Association for which he is eligible to play international matches to the Association of another Country of which he holds nationality, subject to the following conditions: a) He has not played a match (either in full or in part) in an Official Competition at “A” international level for his current Association, and at the time of his first full or partial appearance in an international match in an Official Competition for his current Association, he already had the nationality of the representative team for which he wishes to play; b) He is not permitted to play for his new Association in any competition in which he has already played for his previous Association”

Appropriately seeking to balance the interests involved, this rule serves to monitor change of eligibility and protect the integrity of international competitions while respecting the rights of players to move from one country to another[19]. FIFA did not monitor such changes until the mid-1960s[20]. The world governing body for football introduced at that time the concept of an election of nationality and banned change of national association until 2003.


The FIFA Congress introduced a limited right to change national affiliation but it was first reserved for U-23 players only[21]. In 2008, FIFA extended this right to any player provided that they were dual nationals when they had played for their first country and had not played in an Official Competition at “A” level (i.e. with the first team of a national association)[22]. The chart indicates that the number of requests to change association increased dramatically after 2008. However, it has now stabilized at approximately 30 requests per year. In this respect, the 2014 FIFA World Cup does not seem to have had any effect compared to the 2010 edition combined with the new set of rules.

To date, 237 players have taken the opportunity to change national affiliation and 24 of them are currently participating in the 2014 FIFA World Cup. This represents approximately 10.10% of the 237 players and only 3.26% of the 736 players engaged in the competition. This figure is line with the 2004 Athens Olympics Games for instance where 2.6% of the athletes had change their sporting nationality[23]. It shows that the concerns of Sepp Blatter have not materialized and that the situation is currently under control. Therefore, there is certainly no urgent need to further strengthen the existing regulatory framework.


[1]For a mapping of ancestral and international connections between teams, see: Brazil 2014: Visualising ancestral and international connections between teams (http://codehesive.com/wc-ancestry/).

[2] If he had been fielded, Eduardo Alves da Silva would have been the first to play against his country of birth during the opening match (Brazil – Croatia: 2 – 1).

[3] This post will not address the issue of shared nationalities (art. 6 Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes 2013) and change of association due to states authorities nor its process (art. 8 par 2 and 3 Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes 2013).

[4] Available at FIFA.com.

[5] McCutcheon, National eligibility rules after Bosman, in: Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation TMC Asser Press (Den Haag) p. 127.

[6] Article 5 par. 1 Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes 2013.

[7] Article 5 par. 1 Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes 2013.

[8] Fielding an ineligible player is sanctioned by the mandatory forfeiture of the game and a CHF 6’000 fine (article 8 par. 3 the Regulations of the 2014 World Cup – Brazil and article 31 FIFA Disciplinary Code).

[9] A situation of dual call-up may occur when a player, dual national and who has not elected a sporting nationality, is called by both associations he belongs to. This raises the issue of the right to refuse an international selection.

[10] According to the project Brazil 2014: Visualising ancestral and international connections between teams, Adnan Janujaz is the most connected player.

[11] Article 3 par. 1 – Annexe 1 – Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players 2012.

[12] See for example: Páez Romero, Regulations: Player eligibility: the Diego Costa case, in: World Sports Law Report, Vol. 12 issue 1 (January 2014); Margaritis, The Dynamics of nationality and football, in: LawInSport, 28 April 2014; Lovatt, Changing nationality in football: the FIFA rules that helped Brazilian Diego Costa play for Spain, in: LawInSport, 4 November 2013.

[13] This is probably due to the fact that the Brazilian Football Federation has lost only one player to the current FIFA regulations. It should be noted that Brazilian players who have never been selected nor have played in friendlies are not cast by FIFA statistics on change of eligibility.

[14] Hafner, La qualification des joueurs en équipe représentative au regard de la réglementation de la FIFA : le cas de la Coupe du monde 2010, n° 35.

[15] Cf. CAS 2010/A/2071 Irish Football Association v/ Football Association of Ireland, Daniel Kearns and FIFA, award of 27 September 2010.

[16] For instance: Hall, Fishing for All-Stars in a Time of Global Free Agency: Understanding FIFA Eligibility Rules and the Impact on the U.S. Men’s National Team, in: Marquette Sports Law Review, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 205.

[17] FIFA Congress 2011 – Minutes, p. 64.

[18] FIFA Congress 2011 – Minutes, p. 64 and FIFA Congress 2013, Minutes, p. 85.

[19] McCutcheon, National eligibility rules after Bosman, in: Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation TMC Asser Press (Den Haag) p. 138. A general prohibition of change eligibility is likely to be deemed illegal. Cf. Oswald, First conclusions of the lecturers, in : La nationalité dans le sport : Enjeux et Problèmes, Editions CIES (Neuchâtel) 2006, p.201.

[20] Hall, Fishing for All-Stars in a Time of Global Free Agency: Understanding FIFA Eligibility Rules and the Impact on the U.S. Men’s National Team, in: Marquette Sports Law Review, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 194. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, p. 348.

[21] Hafner, La qualification des joueurs en équipe représentative au regard de la réglementation de la FIFA : le cas de la Coupe du monde 2010, n° 44.

[22] Hafner, La qualification des joueurs en équipe représentative au regard de la réglementation de la FIFA : le cas de la Coupe du monde 2010, n° 45.

[23] Poli/Gillon, La naturalisation de sportifs et fuite des muscles. Le cas des Jeux Olympiques de 2004, in : La nationalité dans le sport : Enjeux et Problèmes, Editions CIES (Neuchâtel) 2006, p. 59.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.


1. EU law and the CAS case-law

Bearing in mind these questions, it is possible to affirm that under EU law, the specificity of sport

i) refers to the inherent characteristics of sport that set it apart from other economic and social activities and which have to be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law; and

ii) under EU law these inherent characteristics of sport must be  considered on a case by case  basis, per the Wouters test as developed by the ECJ in the Meca Medina ruling.

Both aspects can be found in the CAS case-law too, although the CAS case-law shows some remarkable differences and peculiarities. From a general point of view, the application of the principle of specificity of sport in the CAS case-law represents an aspect of the more general issue related to the application of EU law by the CAS. However, the purpose of this paper is not to fully examine if and to what extent the CAS arbitrators apply EU law rules on free movement and competition; rather, the aim is to analyse the way the CAS deals with the concept of the specificity of sport, highlighting similarities and differences compared to the ECJ.

Taking for granted that ‘a CAS panel is not only allowed, but also obliged to deal with the issues involving the application of [EU] law’,[1] as far as the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law is concerned the CAS case-law shows different degrees of engagement. For instance, in the ENIC award concerning the so-called UEFA integrity rule, the CAS panel went through a complete competition-law analysis in perfect harmony with the Wouters et al. ruling by the ECJ.[2] On the contrary, in the above-quoted Mutu case, the issue of compatibility of the FIFA’s transfer regulations with EU competition law was analysed in a rather simple way, merely stating that the FIFA rules at stake were not anti-competitive under EU competition law without giving any reason to support this conclusion. More recently, in the Galatasaray and Milan A.C. awards, concerning the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations, the CAS  applied a detailed analysis of EU competition law. However, in both cases, according to the CAS the proportionate character of sanctions listed in the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations cannot affect the evaluation of the legitimacy of these regulations under Art. 101 TFEU. This conclusion represents a clear breaking point with respect to the ECJ case-law, according to which the evaluation of the restrictive effects of a rule necessarily presupposes the analysis of the proportionate character of the sanction imposed in the event of a violation of that rule as well.[3]   In regard to EU free movement, the CAS case-law tends to be less analytical in terms of the principle of proportionality. For instance, in the RFC Seraing award  which concerned both EU free movement and competition law, the CAS panel mainly focused on the legitimate objectives of the contested rule (FIFA’s ban on Third-Party Ownership – TPO), merely affirming that the restrictive measures under EU free movement were justified and inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.

 

2. Art. 17 FIFA RSTP and the specificity of sport

In practice, the CAS case-law on the specificity of sport is mainly related to the application of Art. 17 (1) of the FIFA Regulations on the status and transfer of players concerning the consequences of terminating a contract without just cause.[4] According to Art. 17(1), ‘the party in breach shall pay compensation. Subject to the provisions of Art. 20 and Annexe 4 in relation to training compensation, and unless otherwise provided for in the contract, compensation for the breach shall be calculated with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, and any other objective criteria. These criteria shall include, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period’.

Although written in very general terms, from Art. 17(1) it is possible to derive that:

 i) it does not provide the legal basis for a party to freely terminate an existing contract at any time, prematurely, without just cause;

ii) the provision clarifies that  compensation is due;

iii) the amount of compensation to be awarded must necessarily take into account all of the specific circumstances of the case. It is for this reason that Art. 17.1 of the FIFA RSTP does not establish a single criterion or even a set of rigid rules, but rather provides guidelines to be applied to fix  just and fair compensation.

It is evident that Art. 17 of the FIFA RSTP involves or points to the specificity of sport. Beyond what Art. 17 implicitly states, the CAS case-law has contributed to defining the scope of the specificity of sport.

To fully understand the relevance of specificity of sport in the context of Art. 17 FIFA RSTP, it is important to investigate the rationale of this provision as well as the principle of positive interest. To expand, the rationale of the rule is to foster the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs. In the post-Bosman era, the concept of contractual stability was introduced to replace the former transfer-fee system by compensation due for the breach or undue termination of an existing agreement.[5] According to the CAS jurisprudence, Art. 17 of FIFA RSTP plays a central role: ‘the purpose of Art. 17 is basically nothing else than to reinforce contractual stability, i.e. to strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the world of international football, by acting as deterrent against unilateral contractual breaches and terminations, be it breaches committed by a club or by a player. This, because contractual stability is crucial for the well functioning of the international football. The principle pacta sunt servanda shall apply to all stakeholders, "small" and "big" clubs, unknown and top players, employees and employers, notwithstanding their importance, role or power. The deterrent effect of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations shall be achieved through the impending risk for a party to incur disciplinary sanctions, if some conditions are met (cf. Art. 17 para. 3 to 5 FIFA Regulations), and, in any event, the risk to have to pay a compensation for the damage caused by the breach or the unjustified termination. In other words, both players and club are warned: if one does breach or terminate a contract without just cause, a financial compensation is due, and such compensation is to be calculated in accordance with all those elements of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations that are applicable in the matter at stake, including all the non-exclusive criteria listed in para. 1 of said article that, based on the circumstances of the single case, the panel will consider appropriate to apply’.[6]

The concept of positive interest, is strictly linked to the way of calculating the compensation. In case of breach or unjustified termination of the contract, the judging body will have to establish the damage suffered by the injured party, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the arguments raised by the parties and the evidence produced. In so doing the judging authority shall be led by the principle of the so-called positive interest (or “expectation interest”), i.e. it will determine an amount geared towards placing the injured or aggrieved party in the position they would otherwise have been, had the contract been performed .[7] More specifically, according to the CAS case-law, ‘the principle of the “positive interest” shall apply not only in the event of an unjustified termination or a breach by a player, but also when the party in breach is the club. Accordingly, the judging authority should not satisfy itself in assessing the damage suffered by the player by only calculating the net difference between the remuneration due under the existing contract and a remuneration received by the player from a third party. Rather, the judging authority will have to apply the same degree of diligent and transparent review of all the objective criteria, including the specificity of sport, as foreseen in Art. 17 FIFA Regulations’.[8]

Pursuant to the above-mentioned jurisprudence, in the joint cases FC Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine) v/ Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v/ FC Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, the Panel emphasised that ‘by asking the judging authorities, i.e. the competent FIFA bodies and, in the event of an appeal, the CAS, to duly consider a whole series of elements, including such a wide concept like "sport specificity", and asking the judging authority to even consider "any other objective criteria", the authors of Art. 17 FIFA Regulations achieved a balanced system according to which the judging body has on one side the duty to duly consider all the circumstances of the case and all the objective criteria available, and on the other side a considerable scope of discretion, so that any party should be well advised to respect an existing contract as the financial consequences of a breach or a termination without just cause would be, in their size and amount, rather unpredictable. At the end, however, the calculation made by the judging authority shall be not only just and fair, but also transparent and comprehensible’.[9]

Similarly, in the joint cases FC Sion v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club and E. v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, according to the Panel ‘Art. 17.1 of the FIFA Transfer Regulations also asks the judging body to take into due consideration the “specificity of sport”, that is the specific nature and needs of sport, so as to attain a solution which takes into account not only the interests of the player and the club, but also, more broadly, those of the whole football community (…). Based on this criterion, the judging body should therefore assess the amount of compensation payable by a party keeping duly in mind that the dispute is taking place in the somehow special world of sport. In other words, the judging body should aim at reaching a solution that is legally correct, and that is also appropriate upon an analysis of the specific nature of the sporting interests at stake, the sporting circumstances and the sporting issues inherent to the single case (…). Taking into account the specific circumstances and the course of the events, a CAS panel might consider as guidance that, under certain national laws, a judging authority is allowed to grant a certain “special indemnity” in the event of an unjustified termination. The specific circumstances of a sports case might therefore lead a panel to either increase or decrease the amount of awarded compensation because of the specificity of sport (…). However, in the Panel’s view, the concept of specificity of sport only serves the purpose of verifying the solution reached otherwise prior to assessing the final amount of compensation. In other words, the specificity of sport is subordinated, as a possible correcting factor, to the other factors’.[10]

Pursuant to such case-law, in the well-known Webster cases the CAS referred to the specificity of sport from two different perspectives:

i) based on the fact that Art. 17.1 expressly refers to the specificity of sport and that it is in the interest of football that solutions to compensation be based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law chosen by the parties led the panel to the conclusion that it was not appropriate to apply the general principles of Scottish law on damages for breach of contract;

ii) the Panel recalled that ‘in light of the history of Art. 17 (…) the specificity of sport is a reference to the goal of finding particular solutions for the football world which enable those applying the provision to strike a reasonable balance between the needs of contractual stability, on the one hand, and the needs of free movement of players, on the other hand, i.e. to find solutions that foster the good of football by reconciling in a fair manner the various and sometimes contradictory interests of clubs and players’.[11]

More specifically, in FC Pyunik Yerevan v. L., AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, the panel considered ‘that the specificity of the sport must obviously take the independent nature of the sport, the free movement of the players (…) but also the football as a market, into consideration. In the Panel's view, the specificity of the sport does not conflict with the principle of contractual stability and the right of the injured party to be compensated for all the loss and damage incurred as a consequence of the other party’s breach. This rule is valid whether the breach is by a player or a club. The criterion of specificity of sport shall be used by a panel to verify that the solution reached is just and fair not only under a strict civil (or common) law point of view, but also taking into due consideration the specific nature and needs of the football world (and of parties being stakeholders in such world) and reaching therefore a decision which can be recognised as being an appropriate evaluation of the interests at stake, and does so fit in the landscape of international football. Therefore, when weighing the specificity of the sport a panel may consider the specific nature of damages that a breach by a player of his employment contract with a club may cause. In particular, a panel may consider that in the world of football, players are the main asset of a club, both in terms of their sporting value in the service for the teams for which they play, but also from a rather economic view, like for instance in relation of their valuation in the balance sheet of a certain club, if any, their value for merchandising activities or the possible gain which can be made in the event of their transfer to another club. Taking into consideration all of the above, the asset comprised by a player is obviously an aspect which cannot be fully ignored when considering the compensation to be awarded for a breach of contract by a player’.[12]

In Al Gharafa S.C. & M. Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA, the panel first identified the following basic principles:

i)  the fundamental importance to reach a solution that is legally correct and appropriate to the specific nature of the sporting interests at stake, and

ii)  the sporting circumstances and the sporting issues inherent to the single case;

The panel then underlined that ‘the “specificity of sport” is not an additional head of compensation, nor a criteria allowing to decide in ex aequo et bono, but a correcting factor which allows the Panel to take into consideration other objective elements which are not envisaged under the other criteria of Art. 17 RSTP”.[13] On that basis, the panel decided to increase the amount of compensation for  damages, taking into account the sporting importance of the player for the team and the behaviour of the player at the time of the termination. To the contrary, in FC Senica A.S. v. Vladimir Vukajlovic & FIFA, the panel referred to the specificity of sport and that neither club  or player was interested in maintaining their labour relationship, as the basis for excluding any compensation to the player.[14]

 

3. Concluding remarks

It should be rather clear that the concept of specificity of sport has different meanings and purposes in the ECJ and CAS jurisprudence. According to the ECJ case-law, ante its Meca Medina ruling, the reference to the special character of sport was a way to deal with purely sporting rules in the context of EU law; on the contrary, after the judgment in 2006, this approach seems rather questionable. Unfortunately, at present the specificity of sport looks less like a guiding principle than a concept in search of itself. Perhaps also for this reason the ECJ has always carefully avoided defining it or expressly mentioning it; at the same time, the 2011 definition by the Commission – i.e. the specificity of sport encompasses all the characteristics that make sport special – sounds rather tautological.On the contrary, in the CAS case-law the concept of specificity of sport is expressly referred to in cases of breach or unjustified termination of football contracts and amounts to a criterion, among others, to be taken into account to make the compensation just and fair not only under a strict civil law point of view but also taking into due consideration the specific nature and needs of the football world. In this context, according to the CAS jurisprudence the specificity of sport is neither an additional basis for compensation nor a criterion allowing a decision one way or the other in equity. Instead, it represents a correcting factor allowing the panel to award extra compensation in cases where the panel is not convinced that the costs so far awarded fully compensate the party entitled to compensation under Art. 17 FIFA RSTP. That said, the concept of specificity of sport remains rather unclear and vague in the CAS case-law as well.


[1] CAS 2008/A/1644 Adrian Mutu v. Chelsea Football Club Limited, award of 31 July 2009, para. 100,

[2] CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).

[3] See S. Bastianon, The proportionality test under Art. 101 (1) TFEU and the legitimacy of UEFA Financial fair-play regulations: From the Meca Medina and Majcen ruling of the European Court of Justice to the Galatasaray and AC Milan awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 14 October 2018, https://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/

[4] M. Colucci, F. Majani, The specificity of sport as a way to calculate compensation in case of breach of contract, European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, 1/2011, p. 125.

[5]M. Colucci, R. Favella, La stabilità contrattuale nei regolamenti FIFA e nella giurisprudenza rilevante, RDES, 1/2022, p. 39; K. Futtrup Kjær, Substituting at Half-Time: Contractual Stability in the World of Football, https://law.au.dk/fileadmin/Jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/Afh_2017/afh1-2017.pdf

[6] CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, para 80.

[7]Given that the compensation to be granted derives from a breach or unjustified termination of a valid contract, it will be guided in calculating the compensation due by the principle of the so-called “positive interest” or “expectation interest”… [and] accordingly… determin[e] an amount which shall basically put the injured party in the position that the same party would have had if no contractual breach had occurred’ (CAS 2009/A/1880 & 1881, at para. 80).

[8] CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, para 88

[9] CAS 2008/A/1519 and CAS 2008/A/1520, para 89.

[10] CAS 2009/A/1880 and CAS 2009/A/1881, para 109.

[11] CAS 2007/A/1298; CAS 2007/A/1299; CAS 2007/A/1300, para 40.

[12] CAS 2007/A/1358, para 40.

[13] CAS 2013/A/3411, para 118.

[14] CAS 2013/A/3089, para 83.

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