The Norwegian Transparency Act 2021 – An important step towards human rights responsibilities for corporations - By Nora Kenan

Editor’s note: Nora Kenan has been an intern at the Asser Institute for the past five months and is about to complete her LL.B. in International & European Law at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. Upon graduating, she will proceed with a Master’s in human rights at the University of Utrecht.

 

The Norwegian Transparency Act [1](‘Åpenhetsloven’), also known as the ‘Act on Business Transparency and Work with Fundamental Human Rights and Decent Work’ was proposed in April 2021. Now, two months later, the Act has officially been adopted by the Norwegian government and represents yet another mandatory due diligence initiative which has been trending across various jurisdiction in the recent years. The Act will require all large and medium-size corporations in Norway to disclose the measures taken to ensure the respect for human rights throughout their entire supply chain.

Various Norwegian organizations have been campaigning for years in favor of such a law. The official preparations began in 2017, when the Parliament (‘Regjeringen’) requested the Government (‘Stortinget’) to explore the possibility of introducing a law that would oblige companies to inform consumers about the steps that they take to follow up on various human rights responsibilities. The Government appointed a law firm as well as a group of experts, the Ethics Information Committee, to conduct thorough research on the matter, and to investigate whether there were any other legal obligations standing in the way of a proposal of this kind, such as for example EEA-obligations or bilateral/multilateral agreements. As a result of this research, it was concluded that there was indeed room for imposing human rights obligations on corporations. Shortly after, the Ethics Information Committee published a report in which they proposed the introduction of a due diligence legislation – more specifically, the Transparency Act. The Act consists of fifteen paragraphs (§)[2], and each paragraph has a commentary which further describes how it should be interpreted and applied.[3]

The objective of the law is essentially to promote corporate respect of human rights and decent working conditions in the production of goods and provision of services, as well as to ensure public access to information on the steps taken by corporations to safeguard these goals (§1). By making this information public, individuals and stakeholders in general are given the chance to directly question the activities of a company. More...

Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights Due Diligence - Part 2: Subjecting AI to the HRDD Process - By Samuel Brobby

Editor's note: Samuel Brobby graduated from Maastricht University's Globalisation and Law LLM specialising in Human Rights in September 2020. A special interest in HRDD carries his research through various topics such as: the intersection between AI and HRDD, the French Devoir de Vigilance or mHRDD at the EU level. Since April 2021 he has joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.

I am not convinced that inherently evil technology exists, rather, bad business models perpetuate and accentuate existing problems. AI is no exception to this phenomenon and diligent discussion is required to ensure that the negative impacts of artificial intelligence are meticulously scrutinised. In the end, transparency, responsibility and accountability must be ensured around technology that has the power to be an important tool for Human Rights and to provide support for development across every sector of society.  Given that this very same technology, if used irresponsibly, has the power to compound and accelerate the very issues we would like it to help solve, it is the intention of this blog to raise further questions and continue to provide discussion surrounding AI and responsibility. In the first part of this publication, I discussed how AI has the potential to contribute to HRDD by being technologically integrated into the process. However, before AI will even be considered as a possible tool to aid in the HRDD process, it will play a large part in making businesses more profitable. It will also be used by civil society, States and State-backed institutions in the pursuit of their respective goals.

AI and its declinations are, and will, continue to be deployed in a number of sectors including, marketing, healthcare, social media, recruitment, armed conflicts and many more. Thus, given that AI has the potential for contributing negatively to Human Rights and the environment, it is important to discuss the risks and potential legal challenges surrounding AI and responsibility. Identifying these is crucial to the goal of taming AI in an attempt to mitigate some of the potential negative impacts it may have on Human Rights. The pervasive nature of this technology along with the particular place AI developers hold in supply chains warrants some attention. As such, this section aims at analysing the HRDD obligations of AI developing businesses. To do so, we will illustrate some of the Human Rights (and environmental) risks linked to the creation of these AI agents before looking at the manner through which ex ante responsibility through HRDD can be applied to AI developing businesses in the creation and commercialisation of AI algorithms. More...

Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights Due Diligence – Part 1. Integrating AI into the HRDD process - By Samuel Brobby

Editor's note: Samuel Brobby graduated from Maastricht University's Globalisation and Law LLM specialising in Human Rights in September 2020. A special interest in HRDD carries his research through various topics such as: the intersection between AI and HRDD, the French Devoir de Vigilance or mHRDD at the EU level. Since April 2021 he has joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.


The recent surge in developments and debate surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been business centric, naturally so. The conversation has long been centred on the possible gains “digitally conscious” companies can recoup from their sizeable investments in the various forms this technology can take. The ink continues to flow as numerous articles are released daily; debating between the ultimate power of artificial intelligence (and topical subsets like machine learning) on the one hand, versus the comparatively more philistinish views regarding what these technologies can offer on the other. Our objective here is not to pick a side on the AI debate. Rather, we would like to explore the Business & Human Rights implications of the development of AI and, in particular its intersection with the human rights due diligence (HRDD) processes enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and subsequent declinations. How compatible is AI with HRDD obligations? Where does AI fit into the HRDD process? Can AI be used as a tool to further HRDD obligations? Can the HRDD process, in return, have an effect on the elaboration and progress of AI and its use in transnational business? And, to which extent will the roll out of AI be affected by HRDD obligations? These are all questions we hope to tackle in this blog.

In short, it seems two distinct shifts are occurring, rather opportunely, in close time frames. The impending mass adoption of AI in transnational business will have strong consequences for the state of Human Rights. This adoption is not only substantiated by an uptick of AI in business, but also in policy documents produced or endorsed by leading institutions such as the ILO or the OECD for instance. Inversely, we must consider that HRDD obligations elaborated by the BHR community will also have strong implications for the development and roll out of AI. These two transformations will interact increasingly as their positions are consolidated. It is these interactions that we wish to analyse in the two parts of this article. Namely, the emergence of Artificial intelligence as a tool to shape and further HRDD obligations (1) and the emergence of HRDD as a process to shape the development of AI (2). More...


Corporate (Ir)Responsibility Made in Germany - Part III: The Referentenentwurf: A Compromise à la Merkel - By Mercedes Hering

Editor’s Note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. In September 2020, she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.

 

I. What happened so far

It took Ministers Heil (Labour, SPD), Müller (Development, CSU) and Altmaier (Economy, CDU) 18 months to agree on a draft for the Lieferkettengesetz (Supply Chain Law) to be presented soon to the German Bundestag for legislative debates. For an overview of the different proposals put forward by the Ministries and NGOs, and political discussion surrounding them, please check my previous blogs, which you can find here and here. You can also watch the panel discussion on the Lieferkettengesetz that we organized in November 2020 with Cornelia Heydenreich (Germanwatch), Miriam Saage-Maaß (European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights), and Christopher Patz (European Coalition for Corporate Justice).

On 15 February 2021 the government’s “final” draft was published – the so-called “Referentenentwurf”. This initial agreement was met with relief from all parties involved, as it was preceded by a long-lasting deadlock. At first, Minister for Economic Affairs, Peter Altmaier, blocked Cabinet meetings so that the government position paper (“Eckpunkteplan”) published by Ministers Heil and Müller could not be discussed. Afterwards, Altmaier again blocked a compromise proposal brought forward by Müller and Heil in Cabinet. The matter went up to the “Koalitionsausschuss”, the committee that negotiates if members of the coalition parties cannot reach an agreement. This committee failed to come to an agreement. The issue of civil liability and the scope of application were the most controversial points. Thereafter, the matter reached the “Chefetage”, Angela Merkel. She sat down with the three ministers involved and Olaf Scholz, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Finance (SPD), and tried to mediate between the different positions. The group met twice before, eventually, an agreement was reached resulting in the Referentenentwurf of 15 February 2021. The agreement did not last for long. Peter Altmaier withdrew (again) his support for the draft just after it had been circulated.

On 28 March 2021, another “final” draft was published. Those two drafts differ in subtle but impactful aspects. This blog post was originally based on the first draft; its text has been amended to integrate the changes introduced in the second draft. The second Referentenentwurf is the one signed off by Cabinet on 3 March 2021. In this blog, I will first summarize the main points of the draft(s), and afterwards review the various critical points raised against it.More...


The unequal impact of COVID-19 in the global apparel industry - Part. II: Strategies of rebalancing – By Mercedes Hering

Editor’s note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. In September 2020 she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.


My previous blog post depicted how economic asymmetry of power translates into imbalanced contractual relationships. At the moment, supply chain contracts ensure that value is extracted while precarity is outsourced. In other words, supply chains can be described as ‘global poverty chains’. In this blog post, I will present and assess four potential way to alleviate this asymmetry and to better protect the right of the poorest garment workers in the context of the Covid-19 the pandemic. More...


The unequal impact of COVID-19 in the global apparel industry - Part I: The contractual roots - By Mercedes Hering

Editor’s note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. In September 2020 she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project.

 

The Covid-19 pandemic is straining global supply chains and exposes the inequality that underlies them. As many countries entered lockdowns, the economy was brought to a rapid halt. This caused demand for apparel goods to plummet. Global apparel brands, in turn, have begun to disengage from business relationships with their suppliers. Lead firms cancelled or even breached their contracts with suppliers (often relying on force majeure or hardship), suspended, amended or postponed orders already made. This practice had a devastating effect on suppliers.

This situation again shows that the contractual structure of global supply chains is tilted towards (often) European or North American lead firms. In this blog, I will first outline the power imbalance embedded in global supply chain contracts. Secondly, I will outline how order cancellations impact suppliers and their workers. In Part II, I will go through four approaches to mitigate the distress of suppliers and their workers and to allow the parties to reach solutions which take into account their seemingly antagonistic interests. More...

Corporate (ir)responsability made in Germany – Event report - By Mercedes Hering

Editor's note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. Alongside her studies, she is working as student research assistant at the Institute for International and Foreign Private Law in Cologne. Since September 2020, she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project

On 27 November 2020, the T.M.C Asser Institute hosted an online roundtable discussion on the German Supply Chain Law (Lieferkettengesetz). The full recording of the event can be seen here:

The three panelists, Cornelia Heydenreich from Germanwatch, Miriam Saage-Maaß from the ECCHR and Christopher Patz from the ECCJ reflected on the political framework surrounding the debate, current drafts, and Germany’s role in the European discussion on binding due diligence legislation.

I. The pathway to a Lieferkettengesetz 

As Heydenreich pointed out, civil society’s role in the struggle for a Lieferkettengesetz can barely be overstated. When in 2011, the UNGPs were passed, Germany was in no rush to implement binding due diligence legislation. Instead, the German legislators waited for their European counterparts to come forward with an action plan. It was in 2013 when a new – more left-leaning – government first voiced the idea that a national action plan should be drawn up. In 2015, consultations began. The consultation process was a dialogue, the drafting process itself was not. Even though the monitoring methodology fell short of civil society’s expectations, the result of the monitoring process was shocking nonetheless: Only 13-17% of companies complied with the National Action Plan. 

It became clear that the government needed to implement binding due diligence regulation. It also became clear that the drafting process would have to begin as soon as possible for a law to be passed before the general election in September 2021. 

II. Current drafts

Saage-Maaß turned to the different proposals for a Lieferkettengesetz: The government’s position paper from the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Labour as well as civil society’s model law. Contrary to what the government currently envisages, Saage-Maaß emphasized the need to include small or medium-sized companies that operate in high-risk areas. 

The role of private international law must not be neglected. The question turns on whether or not the whole of the Lieferkettengesetz will be an overriding mandatory provision, or merely the due diligence obligation itself. 

Civil society organizations are particularly critical of so-called “safe harbor” provisions. These safe harbor provisions allow companies to be exempted from liability if they are part of certain multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). All panelists agree, however, that as of today, no MSI meets the standards set out by the OECD. In its report, the Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity (MSI Integrity) comes to the same conclusion: “MSIs are not effective tools for holding corporations accountable for abuses, protecting rights holders against human rights violations, or providing survivors and victims with access to remedy.” 

For an overview of other aspects of the legislative proposals, such as the burden of proof, please see the foregoing blog series “Corporate (Ir)responsibility Made in Germany”

III. EU-wide discussion

In April 2020, European Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, announced that the Commission commits to legislation on mandatory due diligence. Patz emphasizes the positive impact Germany’s Council Presidency, beginning July 2020, has had on the endeavor. Germany’s Council Presidency stands out because of its strong affirmative call for a supply chain law and for reforms of directors’ duties. At the beginning of December, the Council published its Conclusion on Human Rights and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, where it calls on the European Commission to launch an EU Action Plan by 2021 (n. 45) and to table a proposal for an EU legal framework on corporate due diligence (n. 46). According to Patz, this constitutes a strong political signal. This strong call is reinforced by three Committees, the Human Rights CommitteeDevelopment Committee, and the Legal Affairs Committee, that also spoke out in favor of civil liability. 

Another strong political signal was sent by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, which in its report “Business and Human Rights – Access to Remedy” called for significant changes pertaining to the reversal of the burden of proof, class actions and procedural mechanisms in order to facilitate access to justice for those affected. 

The work of German MEP Anna Cavazzini (Greens) should be highlighted, too. In the European Parliament she pushed for an additional enforcement mechanism in the form of trade restrictions. Products that benefitted from human rights abuses along the supply chain should not have access to the European single market. In order for the trade restrictions to be lifted, remediation ought to be paid. This initiative counters criticism from civil society that points out that due diligence laws often have the effect of targeting whole sectors of one particular economy. Adopting additional trade restrictions allows for a much more targeted approach. 

In her report on an anti-deforestation legal framework, Delara Burkhardt(S&D) also advocated for civil liability. Companies that exercise control over companies should be held liable, even where it was not directly them, but the other company that committed an unlawful act. In order for this liability mechanism to be effective, Burkhardt advocates for a presumption in favor of control. This helps to balance the information deficit litigants suffer because they do not have access to internal corporate documentation. 

IV. Conclusion 

At the beginning of the roundtable discussion, Duval pointed out that Germany’s stance on any binding due diligence regulation will be decisive. Germany’s role in the EU-wide discussion can hardly be overstated. Germany amounts to 30% of all EU exports, and to 20% of all imports. Factoring in France’s loi de vigilance, both countries together could put enough pressure on the European legislators to push for an EU-wide mandatory due diligence regulation. 

Germany is as close as it has ever been to adopting a Lieferkettengesetz. Yet, the process has come to a halt. The government position paper should have been discussed in the Cabinet at the end of last year for the law to be adopted in 2021. All ministers have to agree, afterwards the proposition will go to Parliament. Heydenreich said that the law will have to be adopted in May, or June the latest; Parliamentary session ends in July. 

At least Germany’s involvement in the EU-wide debate looks promising. Germany’s Council Presidency as well as individual German MEPs have had a tremendous impact on the adoption of an EU-wide due diligence regulation.

New Event! Corporate (ir)responsibility made in Germany - 27 November - 3pm (CET)

On 27 November, we will host a digital discussion on Germany’s approach to corporate (ir)responsibility for human rights violations and environmental harms in the supply chains of German businesses. This event aims to analyse the evolution of the business and human rights policy discussion in Germany and its influence on the wider European debates on mandatory human rights due diligence EU legislation. Germany is the EU’s economic powerhouse and a trading giant, hence its position on the (ir)responsibility of corporations for human rights risks and harms throughout their supply chains has major consequences for the EU and beyond.

Background

Currently, Germany is debating the adoption of a supply chain law or Lieferkettengesetz. This would mark the end of a long political and legal struggle, which started in 2016, when the German government adopted its National Action Plan (NAP) 2016-2020. Germany’s NAP, like many others, counted on voluntary commitments from businesses to implement human rights and environmental due diligence throughout their supply chains. Unlike other NAP’s, the German one also included a monitoring process, which tracked the progress businesses made during that four-year period.

The final report, which was published in September, showed that only roughly 13-17% of German businesses implemented the voluntary due diligence measures encouraged in the NAP. On the basis of these rather disappointing results, as required by the coalition agreement between the two governing parties, a draft for a Lieferkettengesetz should have been presented to the Cabinet this autumn. However, the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, backed by business lobby groups, strongly opposes any form of civil liability for human rights violations committed within supply chains and managed until now to delay the process.

Our discussion aims to review these developments and highlight the key drivers behind the (slow) movement towards a Lieferkettengesetz. Weaving political insights with legal know-how, our speakers will provide a comprehensive overview (in English) on Germany’s positioning in the business and human rights discussion and its potential influence on the future trajectory of a European legislation.

Speakers:

Moderator:


To register for this event, please click here. You will receive a link before the start of the event.


For enquiries, contact conferencemanager@asser.nl


Winter academy: Due diligence as a master key to responsible business conduct

On 25-29 January 2021, The Asser Institute’s ‘Doing business right’ project is organising an online winter academy on ‘Doing business right: Due diligence as a master key to responsible business conduct’.

This academy brings together students, academics and professionals from around the world and provides a deep dive into the due diligence process as a strategy to achieve responsible business conduct.

Learn more and register here. 

Call for Papers - Delocalised Justice: The transnationalisation of corporate accountability for human rights violations originating in Africa - Deadline 15 January 2021

More than twenty years ago nine local activists from the Ogoni region of Nigeria were executed by the then military dictatorship. The story of the Ogoni Nine does not stop in Nigeria; the tale of the nine men, the many lives lost, and the environmental degradation linked to the extraction of oil in the region by Shell has quite literally travelled the world. What is often commonly referred to as the Kiobel case—after the application lodged by Esther Kiobel, the widow of Dr. Barinem Kiobel—originated in Nigeria, has been heard by courts in the USA, and is currently before Dutch courts. The Kiobel case, as well as a flurry of other cases (e.g. the Bralima case before the Dutch NCP, the Nevsun case before the Canadian courts, the Vedanta case before the UK courts, or the Total case before the French courts, among others), embodies the flight of corporate accountability cases out of their original African contexts.

This transnational quest for an effective remedy by those who’s human and/or environmental rights have been violated is understandable, but it also raises serious questions about the consequences of the delocalisation of access to remedies in such cases. This conference aims to provide a forum for critical discussions of the justifications for, and consequences of, using various delocalised ‘sites of justice’ for human and environmental rights violations associated with ‘doing business’ in Africa. The aim is not to focus on Kiobel or Nigeria in particular, although contributions on this case are welcome, but to generally engage in a critical examination of cases that ‘migrate’ between different sites of justice, and the associated benefits and drawbacks of the displacement of corporate accountability out of African courts to courts or non-judicial mechanisms (such as OECD National Contact Points) based in the so-called Global North. In doing so, we strongly encourage applicants to consider a variety of (critical) theoretical perspectives in the analysis of this phenomenon.

In this collaboration between Asser Institute’s Doing Business Right project and AfronomicsLaw, we welcome contributions from scholars working on African international law, African perspectives of international/transnational law, as well as scholars working on business and human rights more generally. The aim is to bring a plurality of voices into conversation with each other, and to generate original (and critical) engagements with the operation of transnational justice in the business and human rights space. With important developments taking place at the international level, such as the drafting of a binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights, the preparation of European legislation on mandatory human rights due diligence, as well as the emergence of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is set to foster business across African borders, such discussions are not only timely, they are also necessary.


Deadlines and requirements:

In order to increase engagement from a broader range of actors from the continent, the conference will be bilingual, English and French. The conference presentations and outputs will also be accepted in either language (2,000 word blog post as part of a special symposium on AfronomicsLaw, as well as a full-length paper for a special issue with a journal (journal tbd)).


Overview of deadlines:

  • Deadline for abstract submission: 15 January 2021
  • Draft papers due: 1 March 2021
  • Digital conference: 24-26 March 2021
  • Final contribution to blog symposium on AfronomicsLaw: 30 April 2021
  • Final papers due for special issue with journal: 1 July 2021


Please submit abstracts in English or French (250 words) accompanied by a short CV (max. 5 pages) to m.plagis@asser.nl by 23:59 CET on 15 January 2021.

Kiobel in The Hague – Holding Shell Accountable in Dutch Courts - Event Report - By Mercedes Hering

Editor's note: Mercedes is a recent graduate of the LL.B. dual-degree programme English and German Law, which is taught jointly by University College London (UCL) and the University of Cologne. She will sit the German state exam in early 2022. Alongside her studies, she is working as student research assistant at the Institute for International and Foreign Private Law in Cologne. Since September 2020, she joined the Asser Institute as a research intern for the Doing Business Right project


On 25 September 2020, the final hearings in the Kiobel case took place before the Dutch District Court in The Hague. This case dates back to 25 years ago; and the claimants embarked on a judicial journey that led them from the US to the Netherlands. On 16 October 2020, the TMC Asser Institute hosted an online roundtable discussion to present and discuss the arguments raised before the Dutch court. The three panelists, Tara Van Ho from Essex University, Tom de Boer from Prakken d’Oliveira, and Lucas Roorda from Utrecht University each provided their stance on the case and analyzed the past, the present and the main issues of the proceedings.

Depending on the outcome of the case, Kiobel could pave the way for further business human rights litigation in Europe. It raises questions ranging from jurisdiction, applicable law, parent company liability and fee arrangements to state sovereignty and the responsibility of former colonial states vis à vis countries that emerged from colonial rule. Below you will find the highlights of our discussion, you can also watch the full video on the Asser Institute’s YouTube channel.More...


Doing Business Right Blog | The Ilva Case - Part 1: The Italian Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold - By Sara Martinetto

The Ilva Case - Part 1: The Italian Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold - By Sara Martinetto

Editor's note: Sara Martinetto is a research intern at the T.M.C. Asser Institute. She has recently completed her LLM in Public International Law at the University of Amsterdam. She holds interests in Migration Law, Criminal Law, Human Rights and European Law, with a special focus on their transnational dimension.


More than 11000 deaths and 25000 hospitalisations: the numbers divulged by the prosecution expert report assessing the human consequence of the operation of Ilva industries in the Italian city of Taranto are staggering. The environmental disaster caused by the plant brought the whole area to its knees and, in spite of all the efforts made, is still on-going. This is the story of a never-ending conflict. A conflict between different rights, which need to be balanced; between public authorities, who bear responsibility for ensuring and protecting those rights; between different normative levels and powers, given the numerous infringement proceedings opened by the EU Commission and the most recent claims lodged to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the following sections I will try to shed some light on the main legal aspects of this tragic saga. For clarity, this article is divided in two posts: the first deals with the national level, while the second focuses on the supranational dimension of the case.


Factual and Legal Background

Ilva steel production has always been one of the cornerstones of Italy’s economy. The Taranto factory is the biggest steel plant in Europe and, in 2010, it counted more than 12.000 employees. It was a state-owned enterprise until 1995, when it was privatised and bought by the Riva family. It also acquired its liabilities: the negative impact of the plant on the environment had been, at the time, already acknowledged by the Italian Government. Indeed, the government had already conducted several investigations showing the existence of extensive air and water pollution, which required intervention on the sewage treatment plants. In particular, the high concentration of Dioxin was deemed to be worrisome, and extremely harmful for human health. In 1990, the Council of Ministers issued a Declaration pursuant to law 349 of 8 July 1986, stating that the Taranto area was “at risk of an environmental crisis”. Theoretically, this would have led to the drafting of a depollution plan; however, no authority meaningfully acted upon it, and the declaration was renewed in 1997. These documents have been incorporated in 1998 in a Presidential Decree which established the allocation of public and private funding for the clean-up for the plant.

In the meantime, an increasing environmental awareness led to the adoption – from the 90s onwards – of several legal instruments at the international, European and national level. Among others, one can recall the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the Aarhus Protocol and the Aarhus Convention of 1998. Particularly, the latter triggered a proliferation of European legislative action. Among the EU measures Council Directive 96/61/EC is particularly important.[1] Also known as the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive, it obliged public authorities to issue an authorisation for all the activities presenting an environmental risk. The release of such a permit is conditional on whether BATs (Best Available Techniques) are applied. In Italy, the Directive has been implemented only in 2005, by mean of a legislative decree; the permit released by the government pursuant to this act is known as AIA (‘integrated environmental authorization’). 

The drafting of this new body of legislation resulted in several reforms in Italian law, such as the adoption of the Environmental Code in 2006.  However, the domestic implementation of such instruments is lagging, and characterised by delays and misinterpretations. The inadequacy of the legal framework in place will appear clearly in the ensuing sections, which give an account of the many extraordinary measures taken in this case. It will be shown how a flawed normative framework, coupled with the Italian government’s resolution to keep the plant open and its consequent undermining of the measures taken by the judiciary, have allowed the situation to deteriorate for decades without ever coming close to a solution.  


The Regional Authorities

The public authorities of the Puglia Region have played a prominent role in the Ilva case. In particular, at the end of the 90s – beginning of 2000s, the Puglia regional authorities were invested by the government with special powers to tackle the environmental crisis. Thereby, they concluded several Memoranda of Understandings with the company, aimed at giving it the means to depollute the area and to start a clean production. These agreements do not have per se legal value, but they provide for a set of programmatic guidelines aimed at reducing polluting emissions. Notwithstanding the multiple rehabilitation plans drafted, the deadlines and prescriptions included in these instruments have not been respected, making these guidelines nothing more than dead letter.

In 2008, the Puglia Council adopted Regional Law 44, also called Anti-Dioxin Law, in an attempt to implement Council Decision 2004/259/EC.[2] However, the Government strongly opposed the timeframe indicated in the Law for depollution, and it ultimately managed to extend the deadline to 2010.[3] On 24 July 2012, the Region adopted a new Law to patch the situation in the Taranto area.[4] However, the tensions between branches of the State were already simmering. The judiciary wanted to stop production in order to prevent the continuation of a suspected environmental crime. While, the government was instead deeply concerned with the detrimental effects on the economy and on employment resulting from shutting down the plant.


The Italian court cases

The main legal proceeding on the Ilva case started in 2010, and was dubbed by the media as “Ambiente svenduto[5] to stress the continuous subordination of environmental considerations in favour of business goals. The peculiar aspect of this case lies both on the number of indicted persons, and on the charges pressed against them. Albeit some initial suspects have benefitted from expedite proceedings, the indictment still includes 44 persons (one legal person and 43 natural persons). The charges do not only cover environmental crimes and crimes against public safety, but the Prosecution made its case based on the existence of an extensive network of corruption and abuses for the benefits of the indicted companies. Indicted individuals range from lawyers, to experts, to public officials, who have allegedly worked to keep the plant operational, thereby putting their profits over the health of the local population. 

Moreover, Italian judicial authorities have initiated a series of other (smaller) proceedings involving the managing board of Ilva, both prior and after the initiation of this trial. For example, in 2005, Emilio Riva (the main owner of the plant) and Luigi Capogrosso (managing director) were condemned for the emission of dangerous substances.[6] This wrongdoing, provided for in art. 674 Italian Penal Code, is considered a misdemeanour.

'Ambiente svenduto'

In 2010, the Taranto Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation on the alleged environmental damages caused by Ilva. The pre-trial phase saw the submission as evidence of two extensive expert reports (available here and here), documenting the high level of harmful emissions coming from the plant, and their correlation with the health hazards experienced by the local population. In particular, the reports show the appalling incidence of cancers, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases among Taranto citizens. 

On 25th July 2012, Taranto’s GIP (judge for preliminary investigations) issued a provisory order requesting the seizure of six sectors of the plant, due to the suspected environmental damage discovered. The seizure was taken as a precautionary measure and had the effect of suspending the activities carried out in those sectors. The measure was then confirmed by the Tribunale del Riesame (Review Tribunal for Precautionary Measures), which held that the installations could be used only for the purpose of facilitating the clean-up (see excerpts here). A few months later, the judge issued a new seizure on some goods produced by Ilva, since they were considered the result of illicit activity of the company. These judicial orders gave rise to conflicted opinions in the public, the company, and other political institutions. Indeed, the company was not the only actor to strongly oppose the measures: workers have been deeply torn by the issue, faced with the evidence of extensive pollution on one hand, and the fear of losing their jobs on the other. For its part, the Government took a set of measures, which will be discussed below, basically aimed at limiting the effects of such judicial acts, and at keeping the plant open. These seizure orders became a core element of contention, and made their way up to the Constitutional Court. Other seizures were upheld by lower courts, but subsequently overruled by the Corte di Cassazione (highest Italian court).[7] Thus, the Ilva plant stayed up and running, notwithstanding the damning evidence before the judges. 

Beside the controversies connected to precautionary measures, the “Ambiente svenduto” proceeding encountered several other hindrances. After the closure of the pre-trial phase, the file was passed on to the GUP (preliminary hearing judge). The Corte di Cassazione was seized again, and rejected the request to transfer the proceeding to another city, due to the intense pressure experienced in Taranto. Moreover, once the trial phase had started, the case was referred back to the GUP, due a procedural error. The trial phase has at the time of writing finally started. Nonetheless, the road to justice remains extremely lengthy and narrow. Victims have been waiting for a final judgement – and just in first instance – for seven years now.


The role of the Italian government before Opinion 85/2013

As mentioned above, the Italian government disagreed with the precautionary measures of the GIP, claiming that the judiciary was intervening in the definition of Italian industrial policy. Therefore, the Ministers of Environment, of Infrastructure, of Economic Development, together with the Heads of the Region, Province and the Mayor of Taranto signed a Memorandum of Understanding the day after the first order was issued. The idea was to find a compromise to proceed with the remediation of the site while safeguarding its employment level. Moreover, a couple of weeks later, the Government issued a Decree law, devolving funds for clean-up operations of the area.[8] Furthermore, on 26th October, the Ministry of Environment approved the new AIA, which would have practically allowed the Ilva to resume production.

The tension with the judiciary got further inflamed when the government issued the infamous “Rescuing Ilva” Decree, which was then converted into law 231/2012. Among other contentions raised by this act,[9] the content of the decree appeared to be openly against the seizure disposed by the Court. Its art. 1 provides that the plant could stay open and productive for 36 months, abiding to the prescriptions of the AIA, and in spite of the measures ordered by the courts. It thus circumvented the prohibition to use the installations, and assigned the management of the plant back to its owner. Albeit a seizure order does not hold the value of res judicata, the Decree Law possibly jeopardised legal certainty, which is of the upmost importance when criminal law measures are involved.[10] This led the Taranto Office of the Prosecutor, the GIP, and the Tribunale del Riesame to file a complaint to the Constitutional Court, which ruled on the matter in Opinion 85/2013. 


The Italian Constitutional Court and the Ilva case: Opinion 85/2013

The Constitutional Court was seized to rule on two separate issues: on one side, the Prosecutor alleged a conflict of attribution between State branches, on the other, the courts challenged the conformity of the Decree Law (and of the law which converted it) with the Italian Constitution. Though it declared inadmissible the Prosecutor’s claims, the Court did rule on constitutionality. The claims brought by the lower courts are complex and intertwined.[11] For sake of clarity, they can be summarized in two main questions: did the government strike a reasonable balance between the right to health and safe environment and the right to work? Moreover, did the government act within its constitutional powers or did it unduly interfere with the competence of the judiciary?[12]

In Opinion 85/2013, the Constitutional Court held that the Decree was in compliance with the Constitution, and that the balance it struck between different rights was not manifestly unreasonable. In particular, the Court stated that no right in the Constitution can automatically prevail on all others, and the same holds true for the right to a healthy environment (art. 32 Italian Constitution). The power to balance different rights is attributed to the legislative and administrative powers (§9). Thus, the AIA should be presumed reasonable,[13] since it adopts measures with regard to a specific situation, within the margin of discretion constitutionally given to the administrative power (§10.3). The Decree merely recalls the AIA and requires its compliance, even in situations already covered by on-going judicial proceedings. 

In practice, the consequences of this ruling by the Constitutional Court were twofold. The government has, since then, continuously issued decrees in order to tackle the Ilva problem; Ilva was able to remain open and to continue production.


The role of the Italian government after Opinion 85/2013

After the Constitutional Court ruling, the government both renewed the AIA several times, and issued another series of Decree Law, aimed at saving and rehabilitating the plant. Among others, two interventions are worth mentioning. First, Decree Law 1/2015, which placed Ilva in temporary receivership. Its art. 2(6) provided, inter alia, functional immunity from criminal proceedings of the receiver in charge, since his duty is to implement the BAT prescribed in the new AIA. Secondly, Decree Law 92/2015 followed a new seizure decree by the GIP issued in the aftermath of a fatal incident in the plant. Promptly, its art. 3 extended the authorization to continue production “even if seizure measures have been issued with regard to industrial accidents”, subject to the creation of a depollution  plan within 30 days. This norm applies also to on-going seizures and, hence, to Ilva.[14] Notwithstanding these efforts – and in spite of the 2015 reform of the penal code, instituting environmental crimes – there is extensive evidence that Ilva has not stopped polluting, and that the AIAs were not always respected.

All in all, the analysis shows the inability of the Italian State to significantly impact on the situation. First of all, the government was not capable of delivering long-standing solutions which would have allowed retaining employment in the area without putting the population at risk. Secondly, the conflict between judicial and legislative powers, which emerged with the issuing of precautionary measures, prevented them to jointly work toward the same goal. Thirdly, all this factors concurred in lengthening both the administrative and judicial proceedings, hindering the efforts for quick and effective results. As a result, no justice has been delivered, and Taranto remains deeply at risk. In addition to the employment challenges Ilva workers have to face, and the health threats affecting the population, the environmental damages caused by Ilva had extremely negative effects on other economic sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries and tourism.[15]  The second part of this post will turn to the (positive?) role of supranational actors in the Ilva case, assessing whether they could contribute to a solution out of reach for the Italian institutions. 


[1] The content was later codified in Directive 2008/1/EC of 15 January 2008, and it has now been included in Directive 2010/75/EU of 24 November 2010.

[2] The Decision implemented the Aarhus Protocol in EU law

[3] G. Caforio, L’Ilva Di Taranto Tra Interessi Industriali E Politiche Ambientali, Thesis, University of Perugia, 2012, 65

[4] It established a new depollution plan and coordinated several Government agencies for the appraisal of the epidemiological effects of the emissions.

[5] Namely, “Sold-off environment

[6] Cass. Pen., sez. 3, n. 38936/2005

[7] Cass. Sez. III, 27427 of 20 June 2013; Cass., sez. VI, 3635 of 21 January 2014

[8] A Decree law is an act issued by the Government, which has the same legal stand as a law approved by Parliament. Pursuant to art. 77 of the Italian Constitution, the Government exercises this power just in case of extreme need and urgency. The act needs to then be converted by the Parliament into an ordinary law. In spite of the requirements of extreme need and urgency, it is common practice of Governments to make use of Decree laws, some of which have been into force for decades.

[9] As its nature of “Specific legislative act”; see, among others, Italian Constitutional Court 143/1989, 346/1991, 492/1995, 267/2007, 241/2008 e 137/2009 and CJEU, Joined Cases C‑128/09 to C‑131/09, C‑134/09 and C‑135/09, Boxus et al., 18 October 2011

[10] G. Arcorzo, Note critiche sul “decreto legge ad Ilvam”, tra legislazione provvedimentale, riserva di funzione giurisdizionale e dovere di repressione e prevenzione dei reati, 20 December 2012; A. Sperti, Alcune riflessioni sui profili costituzionali del decreto Ilva, 17 December 2012

[11] The nature of the claims raised is extremely convoluted, as they range from the actual division of competence between different branches of Government to the nature of preventive precautionary measures. On this point see D. Pulitanò, Fra Giustizia Penale E Gestione Amministrativa: Riflessioni A Margine Del Caso Ilva, 22 February 2013

[12] A. Morelli, Il decreto Ilva: un drammatico bilanciamento tra principi costituzionali, 12 December 2012

[13]As recalled by the Court (§12.6) the problem of attribution of powers in the judgement at hand lies in the problematic aspect of preventive precautionary measures. When issuing a precautionary measure, the judge is called on providing a preventive balance to stop the effects of the crime to take place. However, the discretion of the legislative power to strike a new balance remains unchanged.  R. Bin, Giurisdizione o amministrazione, chi deve prevenire i reati ambientali? Nota alla sentenza "Ilva", 2013; V. Onida, Un Conflitto Fra Poteri Sotto La Veste Di Questione Di Costituzionalità: Amministrazione E Giurisdizione Per La Tutela Dell’ambiente. Nota A Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza N. 85 Del 2013, 2013

[14] It is controversial whether the arguments of Opinion 85/2013 would hold here, since accidents in the workplace are regulated by parliamentary laws, and not by administrative acts. Indeed a new complaint has been lodged to the Constitutional Court by the GIP. See S. Zirulia, In Vigore Un Nuovo Decreto 'Salva Ilva' (E Anche Fincantieri), 2015

[15] European Parliament, The Ilva Industrial Site in Taranto, Envi Committee, 7

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