I think fans and journalists would benefit from a more granular understanding of how FIFA is governed. FIFA’s governance is not sufficiently scrutinised, be it by academics, journalists or the general public. As a result, the legitimacy of those who are running the organisation is insufficiently questioned. The Balogun case is an opportunity to problematize FIFA’s governance and to get people to think about the processes and the people that are at its heart. Furthermore, FIFA regularly claims to be an independent and neutral global governance body, but the Balogun case also shattered this myth. When Donald Trump called, Gianni Infantino and FIFA’s institutional machinery answered. This is not how football governance should work.
We hear the word ‘independent’ a lot when FIFA talks about its judicial committees. What does that word really mean in practice, and why should it matter to someone watching the game at home?
The main defence of Gianni Infantino and the FIFA administration when confronted with the Balogun controversy was that an independent disciplinary committee was responsible for the decision. Thus, Infantino and the FIFA administration were highlighting what they present as a separation of judicial power within the context of FIFA’s governance. While on paper and at first glance, this might look like a valid point, in practice this claim deserves serious scrutiny by observers (some journalists have indeed been looking into the composition of the Disciplinary Committee).
In fact, the Committee’s composition is directly dependent on the endorsement of the FIFA President and the FIFA Council. The members of the committee have four-year mandates, subject to the renomination by the FIFA Council and election by the FIFA Congress. In other words, the members of the Disciplinary Committee have great incentives to make sure that their decisions please FIFA top executives if they want to continue occupying their positions. In such conditions, it is hardly surprising to see that many members of the Disciplinary Committee have close links with football federations. In sum, while independence might be guaranteed on paper, the way in which the members of FIFA’s judicial bodies are selected is incompatible with an independent judiciary. This institutional dependence can explain why, out of the blue, ‘independent’ decisions are taken, which seem to be aligned with the wishes of the FIFA President.
Is reform possible? What would it look like in practice?
FIFA could be reformed, but there are inherent difficulties in doing so. Those are mostly linked to the fact that FIFA is a global body with a very diverse constituency, which has entrenched interests in the status quo. Similarly to other global bodies, such as the UN, the question of its democratic foundations is not an easy one to solve.
Nevertheless, I believe we could work on two fronts to democratise FIFA. On the one hand, reform is necessary in its political system. Basically, it is crucial to ensure that the political weight of national federations be proportionate to the number of affiliates they have. Such a ponderation of the voting power of federations inside FIFA’s Congress would put an end to the absurd symmetry between micro-federations and mega-federations, which currently dispose of the same political influence inside the organisation.
On the other hand, I think a reform would need to focus as well on strengthening counter-powers inside FIFA. To do so, judicial bodies should be completely shielded from the influence of the executive power. For example, long, non-renewable terms for FIFA judges would help limit this influence.
Finally, and this is an aspect that has not been discussed much during the World Cup, it would also be a good idea to cap the salary of FIFA’s top officials to a level commensurate with their role as transnational civil servants. They are running a monopoly, which is allowed to operate because it delivers a public good – international football competitions – hence they should be remunerated like international public servants and not corporate executives.
