Can you briefly sketch current developments in global extremism and terrorism since you began as UN rapporteur and how city practices have responded to these developments?
“A persistent threat from terrorism remains worldwide, including from groups listed by the United Nations Security Council such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and their affiliates, as well as various domestic terrorist groups in certain regions. That said, the terrorist threat has diminished in recent years, which is a positive development. Most countries worldwide are not significantly affected by terrorism - an important observation, as it suggests that the global response must remain proportionate. This is why the Security Council should not continue adopting ever more repressive counter-terrorism measures year after year, as it has done over the past twenty-five years.
Turning to broader trends in counter-terrorism, several negative developments are evident in terms of human rights protection and respect for international law. There has been a proliferation of new and illegal uses of armed force against terrorism under the pretext of countering narco-terrorism. This is accompanied by a decline in respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians.
A new war on narco-terrorism in the Americas is unfolding, with armed conflict in Ecuador, and targeted killings or assassinations by the United States in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Beyond these developments, the more longstanding violations of international law in the name of counter-terrorism continue unabated. These now include the abuse of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to unlawfully invade privacy; the misuse of vague counter-terrorism laws and security powers to suppress human rights defenders and civil society; and overly restrictive financial regulations that are stifling civic space and obstructing crucial humanitarian aid to civilians in conflict zones.”
Professor Saul, you have recently condemned a "new dark age of abuses" in counter-terrorism -including the misuse of laws against activists and journalists, and illegal military strikes under the guise of narcotics enforcement. How does framing drug enforcement as "narco-terrorism" affect the international legal framework, and what accountability mechanisms should apply?
“So-called ‘wars on drugs’ in the Americas are not new, dating back to at least the 1960s. What is new, however, is that organised crime groups like cartels and gangs are being listed as terrorist organisations, with the application of counter-terrorism powers leading to a range of repressive measures, including asset freezing, and, more alarmingly, to serious human rights abuses. One example is the US military's targeting of alleged narco-trafficking vessels on the high seas, some of whose occupants may have been fishermen rather than drug smugglers.
These actions are illegal on multiple grounds. Since drug gangs have not carried out an armed attack on the United States, no right to self-defence applies. Nor do these groups qualify as organised armed groups under international humanitarian law, meaning that there is no right to target them as fighters or combatants.
Under international human rights law, these killings therefore constitute arbitrary deprivations of the right to life - which permits lethal force only where a person poses an imminent threat and it is strictly necessary in defence of life. Targeting civilians on boats at sea with missiles is no different in principle from the US government killing an alleged drug dealer on the streets of Washington D.C. or New York City.
Equally concerning is the illegal aggression against Venezuela after its president Maduro was accused of being the head of a narco-trafficking cartel. This involved not only an illegal use of force and unlawful killings inside Venezuela, but also the abduction of a sitting head of state and his wife, and a subsequent trial before US courts in violation of Maduro's immunities as a head of government under international law. This is really concerning, as a significant number of populist governments across the Americas have also started listing organised crime groups as terrorists, applying emergency powers and a militarised response. This is a great cause of human rights concern in the region.”
As you mentioned the use of remote targeting, I would like to ask you how much technologies such as AI are reshaping counter-terrorism practice and what specific risks are they posing to human rights?
“There is a rapid growth of intersecting technologies. Digital and physical surveillance technologies, spyware, facial recognition software, biometrics, and lately artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms. Together, they are supercharging the capacity of governments to intrude on individual liberties and on privacy, but now on a mass scale. This is done in a way which could be indiscriminate, meaning not targeted at specific threats in a proportionate way. Another issue is that its use assumes that this technology is reliable, while we know that there are real problems with artificial intelligence, including bias and unrepresentativeness in the underlying data sets, problems of false positives, and of discrimination against certain vulnerable sub-populations and groups.
For these reasons, my office has long called for effective legal regulation of all new technologies used in national security and counter-terrorism. Specific legal frameworks, effective human control and oversight need to ensure that artificial intelligence algorithms are explainable and transparent, enabling people to complain and to seek effective remedies.
Massive regulatory exemptions for national security and counter-terrorism uses, such as those under the European Union’s AI Act - which is otherwise quite good - are really problematic. These exemptions exclude some of the most dangerous human rights uses of artificial intelligence from effective regulation. Instead, there should be rigorous human rights due diligence by both the private sector and government developers and users of artificial intelligence throughout the life cycle of the technology. While plenty of regulatory tools exist, implementing these requires political will. Unfortunately, certain states have not been responsible in their approach to developing these technologies.”
Could you give some specific examples of how states could regulate better? What type of initiatives they should be?
“Last year, we published a position paper on artificial intelligence setting out our recommendations. In addition to the measures already mentioned in the previous question, we recommend strengthening accountability. Specifically, we need independent oversight and accountability institutions - like an AI regulator, or empowered human rights bodies, or ombudspersons. These entities must have the power, resources, and expertise to effectively monitor AI deployment in counter-terrorism and national security, which often involve extremely secretive and clandestine usages.
Often, people don't even know that they are subject to intrusive surveillance or profiling at the border controls. This makes it all the more important to have efficient and independent institutions that can oversee the practices of the different intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies, making sure that the tools are being used responsibly and in accordance with law.”
Turning to the definitional aspect of terrorism: despite your 2006 landmark book “Defining Terrorism in International Law” (Oxford University Press), there is still no universally agreed definition. You have called this situation a ‘normative black hole’. Since becoming UN Rapporteur, you have proposed an updated model definition. In practise, what are the consequences of this definitional gap - and what prospects do you see for your model definition gaining traction?
“My greatest concern about the lack of an international definition is twofold. Firstly, there is a negative impact on human rights, as national definitions are often vague and overbroad, and they are prone to arbitrary application and abuse, including against civil society or dissidents, journalists, minorities, etc.
My second concern is that not having a common definition impedes a maximally effective international cooperation to counter-terrorism. It makes governments unable to cooperate to address the same criminal phenomenon, potentially thwarting efforts in extradition, mutual assistance, intelligence sharing and cooperation, and so on.
In my latest report to the Human Rights Council in March this year, we proposed a revised model definition of terrorism that respects human rights while allowing states to pursue effective counter-terrorism. At its core, the definition covers serious criminal acts that intentionally kill or seriously injure people in order to intimidate a population, coerce a government, or advance a political or ideological purpose. The definition also includes key exemptions to ensure that democratic protest and impartial humanitarian action in armed conflict are not criminalised, and that armed conflict remains largely regulated by international humanitarian law rather than counter-terrorism law. Separately, negotiations in the UN General Assembly's Sixth Committee on a comprehensive counter-terrorism convention have been ongoing for over twenty-five years and are set to continue later this year.”
What is the outlook for these talks? Do you see a realistic path toward adoption in the General Assembly, or do you expect continued resistance from member states?
“I would not expect any great breakthroughs in the short term. Groups of states remain stuck in their traditional positions, which has been the main blockage since the start of this negotiation in the early 2000s. And when you look at the current geopolitical environment, I think this is not a good time to negotiate that treaty. However, it is important that states are still committed to the process, and, when the political time is right, there is of course always hope for a breakthrough.”
The Ninth Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is scheduled for July 2026, marking the Strategy's 20th anniversary. You have published 17 specific recommendations for this Review. If you had to throw 16 of them away to get the world to agree on just one, which one is the non-negotiable ‘line in the sand’?
“With negotiations underway in New York and states currently far apart on some issues, the non-negotiable priority is strengthening human rights due diligence across the board - by states, regional organisations, and by the UN itself. We must ensure human rights are mainstreamed throughout all counter-terrorism programming. This means embedding human rights at the foundational level: not just in security sector reform, but in legislative drafting, technical assistance, capacity building, and border security.
Nonetheless, there are lots of problems. Earlier in this interview, I mentioned many human rights violations, and unfortunately a lot of the global strategy is focused on repressive counter-terrorism measures, which is not balanced with human rights. Some of the proposals that we are currently seeing would make that imbalance even worse on issues such as new technologies and terrorist financing.”
How can the UN global counter-terrorism strategy better ensure that victims of terrorism are meaningfully included in policy-making processes rather than being treated primarily as passive beneficiaries?
“That is an excellent question. The strategy and its review resolutions have not been particularly strong on victims; however, I am pleased that a couple of proposals are on the table now. First, there should be an increase in meaningful consultation with victims and victims' organisations. Second, there is a recommendation to states to consider the United Nations Model Legislative Provisions on Victims of Terrorism - a soft law guidance document drafted by UNODC in Vienna and UNOCT in New York, which provides detailed legislative recommendations on how states can assist, protect, and provide reparation to victims of terrorism. A third thing worth noting, is that several states have expressed concern for victims of terrorism, including some states that otherwise have poor human rights records.
Where the global strategy is considerably weaker, however, is in assisting and protecting victims of unlawful or excessive counter-terrorism measures. As this is a resolution adopted by states, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are reluctant to hold themselves rigorously accountable for their own violations, or even to admit the kinds of violations that are happening in the name of counter-terrorism. Nonetheless, human rights law expects accountability and effective remedies for every victim - whether that person is a terrorist, a suspected terrorist, or someone who is not a terrorist at all, but whose rights have been violated by state responses to terrorism. This remains a critical area that requires considerably more development.”
On a closing note, a more personal question: This summer you will join the Asser Institute for the second time as the keynote speaker on our summer programme on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law. What do you like best about teaching in this training programme?
“I always enjoy speaking at the Asser Institute’s summer programme because of the true diversity of the participants’ backgrounds and countries. The questions and comments are always very interesting, and the participants often raise issues that I haven't necessarily thought about. (smiles) So, for me, it is an extremely useful interaction, and I hope that sharing the work of my office as Special Rapporteur brings valuable insights to the participants, regardless of their specific area of work or interest in counter-terrorism.”
About Ben Saul
Since 1 November 2023, Ben Saul has been the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. He is the Challis Chair of International Law at The University of Sydney and has expertise in public international law, counter-terrorism law, human rights and refugee law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law. His book Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford, 2006) is the leading work on the topic. He has taught at Oxford, Harvard, The Hague and Xiamen Academies of International Law, and in Europe and Asia; practised in international tribunals; advised governments, NGOs and the United Nations; and worked on international law in over 35 countries.
