[Interview] What US sanctions against the ICC mean for international justice

Published 21 September 2026

US sanctions targeting the International Criminal Court are raising wider questions about the resilience of international criminal justice and international law. Asser Institute researchers James Patrick Sexton and Christophe Paulussen discuss what the sanctions mean, why they reach far beyond the US, and what happens when states themselves weaken the system they are meant to uphold. “The main issue today is that states often fail to realise they are the enforcement backbone of international law. Through their action or inaction, they either uphold the system or erode it.” An interview.  

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James, as a sanctions expert, can you briefly describe the new round of sanctions against the ICC?  

“It is reported that the US is currently preparing sanctions against the ICC as an institution, which could come into effect any day now. This would be a massive escalation as part of the US’ ongoing campaign to ‘dismantle’ the ICC. But let me clarify that the US sanctions imposed so far do not target the ICC itself, but individuals working for or associated with it.  

The most recent sanctions target the ICC’s president and a senior trial lawyer. These are known as ‘targeted sanctions’. Such measures ban targeted individuals from entering US territory. They further require the freezing of any of that person’s assets held within US jurisdiction. This means that houses or apartments, as well as funds held in bank accounts, cannot be transferred or otherwise used, with some very limited exceptions. Finally, all persons within US jurisdiction are banned from transacting with or providing services to the sanctioned person. If, for instance, a company or a person subject to US jurisdiction violates these measures, they can be liable for severe civil and criminal penalties, including imprisonment of up to twenty years.”  

If the sanctions are created by the US, and the US is not a member of the ICC, then why are they so impactful for these professionals working and living in Europe? 

“Well, all US-based companies and persons are obliged to comply with the sanctions. Therefore, if any of these sanctioned persons has a Microsoft account, for example, then it will likely be closed or suspended. If they own property in the US, the impact is even higher. A prime example is Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, who was sanctioned in July 2025. From her family’s ongoing challenges to the sanctions, we know that the Washington D.C. property owned by Albanese and her husband is currently frozen. While US authorities granted them an exemption to the sanctions to allow them to sell the property, any proceeds from the sale would likewise be frozen.  

Even for targeted people that have no real connection to the US, the sanctions are still very damaging. The first problem is the US’ expansive and highly criticised interpretation of its sanctions jurisdiction. Simply put: the US asserts that any transaction that uses US dollars ‘triggers’ US jurisdiction, and therefore US sanctions apply. What many people do not realise is that, owing to the strength of the US dollar, a huge proportion of global transactions briefly enters US jurisdiction, particularly when exchanging between currencies. Therefore, these sanctions reach far beyond the US’ physical borders. 

Then we see the related problem of ‘overcompliance’. As the US has such economic and financial strength, many financial institutions such as banks simply prefer to ‘de-risk’ by following US sanctions even when they are not obliged to do so. For these banks, it is a cost-benefit calculation, and the risk of being excluded from the US financial system typically outweighs all other considerations. This all contributes to a ‘chilling effect’, where a range of actors from banks, to academics, to victims’ groups may consider reducing their cooperation with the ICC from fear of being caught up in the sanctions. In my view, this chilling effect is the most dangerous impact for the ICC, and the hardest to measure.” 

It seems that sanctions are typically only used in contexts like countering terrorism or illegal uses of force, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Is it normal for sanctions to instead be used to undermine an international court? 

“The short answer is no: this is not normal. The US sanctions targeting the ICC represent an inversion of how sanctions are typically used in this context. Historically, states and international organisations have used sanctions to pursue a wide range of policy objectives. In recent years, they have increasingly been used in response to alleged violations of international law, although it is important to recognise that controversial (and likely illegal) sanctions still exist, such as the US embargo against Cuba. 

The US sanctions used to undermine the ICC, however, are so patently ridiculous and contrary to international law that they seriously weaken the United States’ credibility as a sanctions actor. The contradiction is particularly stark given the leading role the US has previously played in imposing sanctions on those suspected of serious human rights violations and international crimes.”  

Could you elaborate on how the United States has used sanctions to support international criminal justice?  

“In 2012, the US was celebrated as a front-runner in sanctions policy. This came after creating the world’s first sanctions regime specifically designed to target individuals and entities allegedly involved in serious human rights violations. Several other states, particularly Western states, as well as the European Union, subsequently introduced similar regimes.  

These measures, particularly the US Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016,  were widely regarded as groundbreaking. They made it possible to impose targeted sanctions on individuals accused of the same crimes that the ICC investigates, regardless of where they are located;  including in situations where a veto in the UN Security Council prevents the adoption of UN sanctions, or where the ICC lacks jurisdiction. One commentator even suggested that such sanctions could serve as a “Plan B” for international criminal justice, replacing the perceived limitations and ineffectiveness of the ICC.  

However, in my view, the US sanctions targeting the ICC raise more fundamental questions about relying on sanctions as a “Plan B”. Sanctions regimes are typically highly deferential to executive decision-makers; politics, in many ways, is baked into sanctions policy. That makes them fundamentally political instruments, capable of being used selectively and, potentially, abused. 

Although international crimes demand a strong response from states, I worry about the normalisation of states’ use of targeted sanctions as a tool to respond to an ever-growing list of ‘threats’ or ‘problems’. The US sanctions against the ICC illustrate this danger clearly: a mechanism recently adapted to target alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations and international crimes is now being used to undermine an international court created to prosecute precisely those crimes. The irony here is plain to see.  

This is not to say that sanctions have no role in responding to international crimes. Indeed, I have written that states may in certain contexts even be obliged to use them. But the widespread criticism of the US sanctions against the ICC offers us an opportunity to fundamentally rethink the contemporary use of sanctions more broadly, and to address their long-recognised deficiencies concerning human rights, due process, and legitimacy. It shows that we cannot simply rely on the goodwill of states to ‘do the right thing’ with sanctions. The sanctions themselves need to be de-politicised.”  

What has the response been from the international community, as well as those targeted, to these sanctions? 

“Since February 2025, when  the first of this ‘wave’ of sanctions against the ICC began, we’ve seen both a limited public defence of the ICC by its states parties, and a stronger, more consistent and creative response from civil society, as well as from those people targeted themselves.  

Regarding the ICC states parties: in the current geopolitical moment, it is perhaps understandable that there might be hesitation to respond openly against the US, and instead opt for a more ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomatic approach. However, from a principled position, one would expect to see a much stronger response, including the potential triggering of the EU ‘blocking statute’.  

While arguably the ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy may have prevented or delayed the sanctioning of the ICC as an institution – which would likely be fatal to its functioning – it is unclear how much longer this back and forth can continue. I completely second our academic director Machiko Kanetake’s call for a much stronger multilateral response to this “political and financial bullying” of the ICC. 

In the meantime, I am hoping that the ongoing challenges to individual sanctions listings and the public campaign against these measures will have some impact. For example, several of the judges have challenged the measures. So did the family members of the UN Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, as well as several human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch. Even though individual challenges to sanctions within the US system are notoriously difficult to navigate and win – a speaker in a recent sanctions webinar compared the process to ‘hell’ – documenting the negative impacts of sanctions through litigation and reporting has had some success in improving, or at least lessening the negative impact, of some sanctions regimes in the past.”

Christophe, moving a bit away from the technicalities of sanctions and taking a broader perspective on the state of international criminal justice: we have recently seen several states, such as Niger and Burkina Faso, announcing their withdrawal from the ICC. Do you think that international criminal justice in general, and the ICC in particular, is in a dangerous position?  

“It is clear that the ICC, international criminal justice, and international law more generally, are facing serious and unprecedented challenges. States are being invaded or threatened to be invaded, we are watching a genocide – about which we once said ‘never again’ – being committed in real time, and aid workers, for a long time sacrosanct, are increasingly being targeted during armed conflict.  

At the same time, institutions meant to uphold the international rule of law are paralysed, such as the UN Security Council, or are under attack, such as the ICC. So, we are witnessing a dangerous shift towards realpolitik and the idea by some powerful states that ‘might is right’; an idea that has, in the past, led to immeasurable suffering. Frankly, the lack of historical awareness among contemporary global leaders is deeply concerning.  

That powerful states use international law as a ‘menu à la carte’ - picking whatever suits them and ignoring what doesn’t – is nothing new, of course. However, the normalisation of violations and the brazen manner in which international law and its institutions are attacked today seem unparalleled. 

States are also undermining the international legal system by applying double standards – protesting international law violations in one situation, but not in another. Moreover, states that claim to be supporters of international law now often offer lukewarm responses to violations, further eroding the system. As a prominent Dutch politician noted when receiving a report about aid workers in conflict situations: “Norms die in silence”.

By now, we have often heard the statement that ‘international law is dead’. This could be interpreted to mean that the rules and institutions of international law are not functioning. While they may not be perfect and we need to always remain critical also of international law’s limitations, the main issue here is not the law or the institutions themselves. The main issue today is that states often fail to realise they are the enforcement backbone of international law. Through their action or inaction, they either uphold the system or erode it.

A few months ago, here in The Hague, we organised the launch of Gregory Gordon’s wonderful book on the former Nuremberg prosecutor, international justice champion, and ICC supporter Benjamin Ferencz.

In his book, Gordon describes how a young Ferencz gathered statements from concentration camp prisoners following their liberation. These prisoner statements are truly sickening, and anyone reading them, or watching a movie like Schindler’s List, will realise we should never go back to those times. The horrors of the Second World War led to the establishment of the United Nations; the development of human rights treaties, and the creation of international criminal tribunals. I think it is vital that we keep explaining why international law was developed in the first place, why we need it, and why undermining it will eventually backfire. 

What Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, once said about the UN is also valid for international law more generally: “the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell”.  

In your view, Christophe, what steps could be taken to push back against the current hostility to the international (criminal) justice system?

“Despite the gloomy situation, I remain stubbornly hopeful (laughs). Most states still rely on international law, which extends far beyond the issues related to ICC and the UN Security Council. We must also remember that today's violations are exceptions to the rule, not a new standard. That is why it is important for states to speak out forcefully and consistently when violations of international law occur. 

Some states may still hide behind ‘silent diplomacy’, as James mentioned, arguing that they are working behind the scenes to find solutions. But as Henk Naves, Chairman of the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary, noted in a recent interview on the ICC sanctions, silent diplomacy is no longer sufficient.

I also see growing public pushback against these violations. People are increasingly saying that ‘enough is enough’. The massive Red Line demonstrations here in the Netherlands and elsewhere are one example. A global poll of 36,000 people across 34 countries also found that most people want greater international cooperation on human rights, climate change and AI. 

International law professor Göran Sluiter offered a hopeful perspective as well, noting that students today are passionate about making a positive difference. As I have highlighted before, the backlash against the ICC may itself be a sign that the Court is doing what it is supposed to do: holding powerful actors accountable. These are the signs of progress we should focus on. And as Benjamin Ferencz always said: “Never give up, never give up, never give up!”

Navigating the evolving landscape

The pressures explored in this interview also underline the need to understand how international courts operate in practice, and how their work connects to wider political and legal developments. These questions are central to the Asser Institute’s annual short course Contemporary Developments from International Courts and Tribunals, which will return for its second edition in 2027. The programme brings together practitioners and researchers to examine current developments before institutions including the ICJ and ICC. Learn more.

About James Patrick Sexton  

James Patrick Sexton is a PhD researcher in public international law at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, focusing on the relationship between sanctions and international criminal justice. He conducts research within the Asser Institute’s research strand 'In the Public Interest: Accountability of the State and the Prosecution of Crimes'. James is also a research fellow at the Amsterdam Center for Criminal Justice (ACCJ) and serves as the managing editor for the Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (T.M.C. Asser Press). 

About Christophe Paulussen  

Dr Christophe Paulussen is a senior researcher and strand coordinator at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, working on international humanitarian law, international criminal law and legal aspects of countering terrorism. He is also a research fellow at the Amsterdam Center for Criminal Justice (ACCJ). From December 2023 to March 2025, he served as the institute’s acting academic director and executive board chair.

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