Yesterday, 18 May 2016, the licensing committee of the Dutch football federation (KNVB) announced its decision to sanction FC Twente with relegation to the Netherland’s second (and lowest) professional league. The press release also included a link to a document outlining the reasons underlying the decision. For those following the saga surrounding Dutch football club FC Twente, an unconditional sanction by the licensing committee appeared to be only a matter of time. Yet, it is the sanction itself, as well as its reasoning, that will be the primary focus of this short blog.

Background

By way of reminder, FC Twente is the typical example of a professional football club who had been “punching above its weight” for years. After taking over the club in 2003, president Joop Munsterman and his fellow associates took extreme financial risks in order to overtake clubs like PSV and Ajax as the best club in the Netherlands. At first they were successful, but winning the Dutch league in 2010 did not prove enough for the overambitious executives of FC Twente. The club started spending more money than ever on the transfer marker and new massive loans were taken to upgrade the stadium to Champion League standards. Unfortunately, all this extra spending did not materialize in extra sporting successes. Furthermore, the money derived from selling players was not sufficient to service the debt incurred in the process.

Yet, the scope of FC Twente’s financial trouble did not become apparent until November 2015. It was then that footballleaks released the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA), or TPO agreement, the club had signed with the Maltese investment company Doyen. The fine prints of the ERPA, explained in our blog of 2 December, took everyone by surprise, including the KNVB’s licensing committee. More than the precarious state of the club’s finances, it was the fact that FC Twente had deliberately mislead the KNVB regarding its relationship with Doyen that shocked the Dutch federation.[1]

As an immediate reaction to Twente’s omissions, on 15 December, the licensing committee decided to conditionally withdraw FC Twente’s license, unless the club collaborates fully to an independent internal investigation into its structure and governance. Moreover, the licensing committee sanctioned FC Twente with a €45,250 fine and a three-year exclusion from participating in European competitions. The report of the internal investigation, published on 1 March 2016, highlighted the complete lack of transparency in transfer matters, i.e. all the transfers and their financing were taken care of by vice-president Van der Laan without the involvement of other board members. The ‘Additional Agreement’ signed with Doyen, for example, was never mentioned in any of the board meetings. The report also brought to light a fresh case of deliberate deceit of the licensing committee in the transfer of Dusan Tadic to Southampton the summer of 2014. According to FC Twente’s original disclosure to the KNVB, Tadic’s agent would receive €1.8 million, which was 15% of the transfer amount. However, in January 2016, a month after FC Twente promised full collaboration in the investigation, it suddenly turned out that Tadic’s agent still had a claim of €1.8 million based on a second agreement between him and the club regarding the same transfer. Not only was this second agreement never notified to the licensing committee, it was also never mentioned to the investigators during several meetings held in December 2015. 

The licensing committee’s decision

In a nutshell, the licensing committee decided to unconditionally withdraw FC Twente’s license, but to simultaneously grant it a new license so that it is permitted to play in the Dutch second professional league. The committee held that:

“The Dutch licensing system was repeatedly, deliberately and systematically undermined by FC Twente and the licensing committee was repeatedly, intentionally and purposely misled. This behavior undermines the functioning of the licensing system, contributes to an unfair competition between professional football clubs, creates income for FC Twente it would not have obtained under fair conditions (e.g. income from the selling of TV rights) and leads to player transfers that possibly would not have taken place had the club behaved ethically.”[2]

It added that it had already considered an unconditional withdrawal of the license in December 2015, but decided against it because it needed more information, such as an independent report. The licensing committee’s conclusions drawn from the report was twofold. On the one hand, the licensing committee praised the fact that FC Twente collaborated with the investigation, that it promised to continue with the reorganization of the club’s governance structure after  a new license was granted[3] and that it will not ask for a UEFA license for the next three seasons.[4]

On the other hand, the licensing committee felt it needed to act as a consequence of the new information regarding the Tadic transfer. The committee determined that the “Doyen Gate” was not an isolated incident, but that it fitted in a pattern of systematic unethical behavior by FC Twente’s management. Consequently, it concluded that FC Twente had breached Article 9 of the Dutch license regulation, which requires a license holder (i.e. a professional football club) to timely provide the licensing committee all the relevant information and documents regarding the club’s financial situation, transfer details, etc. Interestingly enough, the license regulation offers only two sanction possibilities for breaching Article 9: A fine of maximum €45.250 under Article 11(1); or the complete withdrawal of the license under Article 12(2)c). The option to sanction a club with a relegation to the lower divisions is currently not an option, as stipulated by the license committee in paragraph 9 of its decision.

The lack of alternative options proved to be problematic for the licensing committee because it found a fine of €45.250, given the circumstances, disproportionately light, but the decision to withdraw the license disproportionately heavy.[5] A complete license withdrawal could realistically lead to the disappearance of FC Twente, a football club with (as held by the licensing committee) an important role in the Enschede region. “The licensing committee is aware that the effects (of a collapse) could be disastrous for FC Twente, its employees, financers, supporters and professional football in the region”.[6] With this statement, the licensing committee is demonstrating that it is taking into account inter alia the guarantee issued by the municipality of Enschede on a loan of €32 million for FC Twente in December 2015, under the condition that the club would obtain a license. Without this loan, FC Twente would have gone bankrupt. In the end, the licensing committee came up with the rather pragmatic solution to withdraw unconditionally FC Twente’s license, immediately followed by the granting of a new license to participate in the second professional league, “in order to limit the disproportionate consequences of the license withdrawal”.[7]

What makes the licensing committee’s decision worthy of debate is that the regulations, strictly speaking, do not provide for the option to replace a first division license with a second division license. The committee admits that it has sought the limits of the licensing regulations, but defends its decision by stating it is sanctioning FC Twente for its past actions in a proportionate manner while taking into account the interests of the club and its stakeholders.  

Aftermath

In an official statement following the decision, FC Twente declared that its currently studying all its options. Although an appeal remains one of the possibilities, one could argue that it might be too risky for FC Twente to do so. Concretely, an appeal would probably lead to a sanction that actually exists under the regulations: A fine of €45.250 or an unconditional withdrawal of a license. A more interesting issue is whether any other professional club might consider questioning this decision. Clubs who believe to have been placed in a disadvantageous position as a result of FC Twente’s deliberate and systematic deceit, could argue that the current sanction does not address the gravity of the misconduct. Moreover, the fact that the sanction is not enshrined in the KNVB’s regulations, could make it difficult for the licensing committee to uphold it in an appeal procedure.

This decision puts the final nail in FC Twente’s coffin. The surprising rise and brutal downfall of the Dutch club exemplifies the advantages and downsides of TPO. This practice (and other financial tricks linked to the transfer system) enabled Twente to leverage up and make the impossible possible (winning the Eredivisie), but at the same time strapped it with an unsustainable debt that has brought the club to its knees. Basically, fans must choose between a few seconds (or years) of glory on the one hand, or a sustainable future for their club on the other.

[1] FC Twente had not disclosed to the KNVB an Annex, called ‘Additional Agreement’, to the ERPA that insinuated far-reaching influence by Doyen in employment and transfer-related matters, thereby breaching FIFA and KNVB Regulations.

[2] The licensing committee’s decision, page 1.

[3] In this regard it should be noted that four FC Twente board members resigned in March as a result of the report. See “FC Twente geeft toelichting op onderzoeksrapport Knüppe” (http://www.fctwente.nl/blog/2016/03/fc-twente-geeft-toelichting-onderzoeksrapport-knuppe/).

[4] The licensing committee’s decision, page 3.

[5] Ibid., page 4.

[6] Ibid., page 5.

[7] Ibid.

Editor’s note: Yann Hafner is a Phd researcher at the University of Neuchâtel specialized in sports and nationality issues. He is also Legal Affairs Manager at the Fédération Internationale de Volleyball. Yann is an editor of the ASSER International Sports Law Blog and has previously published on the blog on nationality conundrums at the FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil (see here).  

This contribution aims to decipher the relationship between sporting nationality and the Olympic Games. To this end, the author will first define sporting nationality and discuss athletes’ eligibility in national team in the context of the Olympic Games. Then, selected issues in relation with sporting nationality and the Olympic Games (with an emphasis on issues related to the Rio 2016 Olympic Games) will be investigated.

Defining sporting nationality at the Olympic Games

Sporting nationality is in essence twofold:

• on the one hand, sporting nationality is the eligibility concept in use within the world of sport to define the participation of athletes in international competitions[1], i.e. sporting events between the members of an international federation or the National Olympic Committees in the context of the Olympic Games[2]; and

• on the other hand, sporting nationality refers to the legal relationship between an athlete and the national governing body for whom he/she is eligible according to the applicable regulations[3]. Each international federation and organizers of multisport events, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), maintain their own set of rules[4]. Consequently, an athlete may have as many sporting nationalities as there are governing bodies in his/her sport[5].

Turning now to athletes’ eligibility for national teams, one should acknowledge that this issue has not always been a primary concern for sports governing bodies[6], including for the International Olympic Committee (IOC). For instance, the first three editions of the Olympic Games foresaw the participation of transnational teams, i.e. teams composed of athletes from different countries competing under one flag[7]. This most notably occurred in track and field, rowing, football, polo, swimming and tug of war[8]. The decision of the IOC to impose the creation of one National Olympic Committee per country in order to facilitate the organization of the Olympic Games put an end to this practice as of 1908. That said, the IOC did not regulate sporting nationality at the Olympic Games before 1920[9]. Nowadays, sporting nationality is governed by Rule 41 Olympic Charter 2015 which reads as follows:

“41 Nationality of competitors

1. Any competitor in the Olympic Games must be a national of the country of the NOC which is entering such competitor.

2. All matters relating to the determination of the country which a competitor may represent in the Olympic Games shall be resolved by the IOC Executive.

Bye-law to Rule 41

1. A competitor who is a national of two or more countries at the same time may represent either one of them, as he may elect. However, after having represented one country in the Olympic Games, in continental or regional games or in world or regional championships recognised by the relevant IF, he may not represent another country unless he meets the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 below that apply to persons who have changed their nationality or acquired a new nationality.

2. A competitor who has represented one country in the Olympic Games, in continental or regional games or in world or regional championships recognised by the relevant IF, and who has changed his nationality or acquired a new nationality, may participate in the Olympic Games to represent his new country provided that at least three years have passed since the competitor last represented his former country. This period may be reduced or even cancelled, with the agreement of the NOCs and IF concerned, by the IOC Executive Board, which takes into account the circumstances of each case.

3. If an associated State, province or overseas department, a country or colony acquires independence, if a country becomes incorporated within another country by reason of a change of border, if a country merges with another country, or if a new NOC is recognised by the IOC, a competitor may continue to represent the country to which he belongs or belonged. However, he may, if he prefers, elect to represent his country or be entered in the Olympic Games by his new NOC if one exists. This particular choice may be made only once.

4. Furthermore, in all cases in which a competitor would be eligible to participate in the Olympic Games, either by representing another country than his or by having the choice as to the country which such competitor intends to represent, the IOC Executive Board may take all decisions of a general or individual nature with regard to issues resulting from nationality, citizenship, domicile or residence of any competitor, including the duration of any waiting period.”

The connecting factor between an athlete and his/her National Olympic Committee is currently rooted in nationality[10]. The French version of the Olympic Charter refers however to being a “ressortissant” of the National Olympic Committee which is entering the athlete in the Olympic Games. Unfortunately, these two concepts do not necessarily overlap; the term ressortissant may have a broader meaning than nationality[11]. To add another layer of uncertainty, a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) ad hoc Panel has adopted contradictory approaches in this respect:

•  In United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and USA Canoe/Kayak / International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Panel held that the Olympic Charter did not provide for any exception to the nationality requirement[12]; and

• In Angel Perez / International Olympic Committee (IOC), the same Panel held this time that “the word ‘nationality’ in Rule 46 and its Bye-law should be construed broadly. In so far as it is relevant to consider whether a person has lost his or her nationality, the Panel is of the view that a person may be found to have lost it both in circumstances where he or she is de jure or de facto stateless”[13]. Consequently, the Panel found that the athlete had changed his nationality for more than three years and was eligible to represent the United State Olympic Committee in the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.

To our knowledge, CAS has never discussed the distinction between nationality and “ressortissant” further. This is not to provide certainty to athletes who may enter into a dispute over eligibility in national team.

It should finally be noted that the Olympic Charter does not mandate for the fulfillment of any other eligibility requirements, such as residency, except in the case of a change of sporting nationality. In this specific case, athletes must have to sit out for three years since they last represented their previous national team before being eligible for a second National Olympic Committee[14]. That said, the Olympic Charter stated that the Executive Board may take all decisions of a general or individual nature with regard to issues resulting from nationality, citizenship, domicile or residence of any competitor, including the duration of any waiting period. This clause aims at covering situations in which there is no National Olympic Committee to enter an athlete for instance[15].

Selected issues

The host nation syndrome:

All host nations of the Olympic Games share one common thread: the fear of not performing during “their” event. This is notably due to the fact that the country welcoming the world during the Olympic Games generally receives a certain quota of places in each sport[16], including for sports with little or no local tradition[17]. While certain nations have set up traditional talent detection and training programs in order to grow a new generation of elite athletes in time, others have chosen a completely different route; they either:

• Naturalize athletes; Italy[18], Greece and Australia have acted in such a way ahead of their Olympic Games[19]; or
• Openly advertise participation in the next Olympic Games on the (sporting) market, in particular to their diaspora.

The “Brazilian Rugby Players Wanted” campaign is the latest example of this. It was launched by the Brazilian Rugby Union (“Confederação Brasileira de Rugby”) in 2013 and aims at finding rugby players with a Brazilian passport or Brazilian descent who are currently unknown to the national governing body and who may qualify for its High Performance Program in view of the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.

The Team of Refugee Olympic Athletes:

On 2 March 2016, the IOC Executive Board decided to create a Team Refugee Olympic Athletes. The approach of the IOC was to allow athletes who had fled their country to be directly entered in the 2016 Rio Olympic Games without the need to resort to the National Olympic Committee of their nationality. To date, ten athletes meeting the relevant sporting requirements have been selected to be part of the Team Refugee Olympic Athletes.

Although portrayed as a first, the IOC Executive Board has made use of its powers on multiple occasions to allow the participation of athletes without a country or without a National Olympic Committee:

• 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games: athletes from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia participated in the Olympic Games as Independent Athletes[20]. They were not allowed to bear the colors of their country due to sanctions of the UN Security Council (i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was banned from all international competitions)[21];
• 2000 Sydney Olympic Games: Athletes from East Timor were authorised to participate under the Olympic banner due to the secession of their country from Indonesia[22];
•  2012 London Olympic Games: three athletes from the Netherland Antilles and one from South Sudan were placed under the Olympic flag[23]. The absence of a National Olympic Committee in these countries triggered the decision of the IOC. Athletes from the Netherland Antilles now compete with the Netherlands;
• 2014 Sochi Olympic Games: three Indian athletes marched under the Olympic banner during the opening Ceremony due to the suspension of their National Olympic Committee by the IOC. They were subsequently authorised to bear their own colors following the removal of the ban on their country.

The concept of a Unified Delegation:

The concept of a United Delegation is only in use for North and South Korea[24]. It is similar to a confederation of National Olympic Committees. In other words, they march together at the opening and closing Ceremonies but maintain separate sporting spheres[25]. Consequently, medalists are honored by the flag of their respective National Olympic Committee, not by their common flag. Of note, the North and South Korean National Olympic Committees are currently engaged in merger negotiations. If successful, there would be only one National Olympic Committee for two countries – and this would be unique in the Olympic Movement. The effects of such a merger on Rule 41 Olympic Charter are currently unknown.

[1] TAS 92/80 du 25 mars 1993, B. / Fédération Internationale de Basketball (FIBA), in : Reeb, Rec. I, n° 13 p. 287 ff.

[2] GARRIGUES Christian, Activités sportives et droit communautaire, Thèse (Université Robert Schuman), Strasbourg (S.I.) 1982, p. 569.

[3] “National eligibility rules confine the right to represent a national side and, thus, to participate in international competition: the criteria employed include nationality, place of birth and residence in the territory for a prescribed period of time” [MCARDLE David, Player Quotas, National Eligibility Restrictions, and Freedom of Movement under EU Law, European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Biennial Conference 2003 (8th), March 27-29, 2003, p. 14].

[4] Shachar Ayelet, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent, in : The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120 (2011), p. 2134; Siekmann Robert, Sport and Nationality : Accelerated Naturalisation for National Representative Purposes and Discrimination Issues in Individual Team Competition under EU law, in : The International Sports Law Journal, 2011/3-4, 2011, p. 87; Wollmann Anna Sabrina, Vonk Olivier, Groot Gérard-René de, Towards a sporting nationality?, in : Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Volume 22, Number 2, 2015, p. 306.

[5] GUILLAUMÉ Johanna, L’autonomie de la nationalité sportive, in : Journal du droit international, année 138, n° 2/2011, Avril-Mai-Juin 2011, p. 323 ff.

[6] Hafner Yann, La nationalité sportive et les Jeux Olympiques, in : Droit & Olympisme : Contribution à l’étude juridique d’un phénomène transnational, Actes du colloque du 4 septembre 2013, Maisonneuve Mathieu (dir.), Aix-en-Provence (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 2015, p. 81.

[7] The existence of transnational teams is however supported by the International Olympic Committee in the context of the Youth Olympic Games. See: Parry Jim, The Youth Olympic Games – Some Ethical Issues, in : Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 6, No 2, 2012, p. 144; Wong Donna, The Youth Olympic Games: Past, Present and Future, in : The International Journal of History of Sport, Vol. 28, No 13, 2011, p. 1836.

[8] Hafner Yann, La nationalité sportive et les Jeux Olympiques, in : Droit & Olympisme : Contribution à l’étude juridique d’un phénomène transnational, Actes du colloque du 4 septembre 2013, Maisonneuve Mathieu (dir.), Aix-en-Provence (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 2015, p. 81 and references.

[9] Rule 4 Olympic Charter 1920.

[10] WOLLMANN Anna Sabrina, Nationality Requirements in Olympic Sports, Oisterwijk (Wolf Legal Publishers) 2016, p. 59.

[11] Foreign nationals serving in the army of another state or persons under the protection of a sate (i.e. protected persons) are deemed ressortissant of this particular state. See: Weis Paul, Nationality and statelessness in international law, 2ème éd., Alphen an den Rijn – Germantown (Sijthoff & Noordhoff) 1979, p. 7.

[12] CAS ad hoc Division OG 2000/001 dated 13 September 2000, United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and USA Canoe/Kayak / International Olympic Committee (IOC), in : Reeb, Rec. II, p. 600 s., n° 22 ff.

[13] CAS ad hoc Division OG 2000/005 dated 19 September 2000, Angel Perez / International Olympic Committee (IOC), in : Reeb, Rec. II, p. 631, n° 27.

[14] Gillon and Poli conducted a survey during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, and found that 2,6% of the athletes registered had previously represented another country [Gillon Pascal, Poli Raffaele, La naturalisation de sportifs et fuite des muscles. Le cas des Jeux Olympiques de 2004, in : La nationalité dans le sport : Enjeux et problèmes, Actes du Congrès des 10 et 11 novembre 2005, Oswald Denis (éd.), Neuchâtel (Editions CIES) 2006, p. 59]. This figure is slightly lower than the percentage of players who have changed national affiliation before participating in the 2014 FIFA World Cup [http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/blurred-nationalities-the-list-of-the-23-and-the-eligibility-rules-at-the-2014-fifa-world-cup].

[15] Rule 44.2 Olympic Charter 2015 provides that “Only NOCs recognised by the IOC may submit entries for competitors in the Olympic Games”. Accordingly, Beloff et al. note that “[t]his would seem to exclude the possibility of the IOC independently permitting athletes to compete in the Games, but is has been argued that the IOC enjoys a residual discretion to that effect” [Beloff Michael J. QC, Kerr Tim, Demetriou Marie, Beloff Rupert, Sports law, 2^ème éd., Oxford – Portland, Oregon (Hart) 2012, n° 1.72 p. 21].

[16] Gillon Pascal, Poli Raffaele, La naturalisation de sportifs et fuite des muscles. Le cas des Jeux Olympiques de 2004, in : La nationalité dans le sport : Enjeux et problèmes, Actes du Congrès des 10 et 11 novembre 2005, Oswald Denis (éd.), Neuchâtel (Editions CIES) 2006, p. 63.

[17] To avoid any embarrassment, certain international federations, such as the Fédération Internationale de Hockey (FIH), have now reviewed their Host Country Places policy. The host nation is no longer guaranteed a quota and must meet minimum sporting standards in order to enter a team: http://www.fih.ch/media/808384/2014-02-rio-2016-qualification-system-hockey-final.pdf (02.08.2016).

[18] Shachar Ayelet, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent, in : The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120 (2011), p. 2093.

[19] BAYLE Emmanuel, DURAND Christophe, Sport professionnel et représentation nationale : Quel avenir ?, in : Reflets et Perspectives de la vie économique, Volume 39 (2-3), 2000, p. 164, footnote n° 29; Gillon Pascal, Poli Raffaele, La naturalisation de sportifs et fuite des muscles. Le cas des Jeux Olympiques de 2004, in : La nationalité dans le sport : Enjeux et problèmes, Actes du Congrès des 10 et 11 novembre 2005, Oswald Denis (éd.), Neuchâtel (Editions CIES) 2006, p. 58 and 63.

[20] Chappelet Jean-Loup, L’autonomie du sport en Europe, Strasbourg (Editions du Conseil de l’Europe) 2010, p. 24.

[21] Carrard François, Sports and politics on the international scene, in : Rivista di studi polici internazionali, Vol. 78, No 1, janvier-mars 2011, p. 31.

[22] Grasso John, Mallon Bill, Heijmans Jeroen, Historical Dictionary of the Olympic Movement, 5^ème éd., Lanham (Rowman & Littlefield) 2015, p. 582.

[23] Iorwerth Hywel, Hardman Alun, Rhys Jones Carwyn, Nation, state and identity in international sport, in : National Identities, Vol. 16, n° 4, 2014, p. 330 end note n° 1.

[24] To date, there have been three Unified Delegations in 2000; 2004 and 2008 (MERKEL Udo, The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea: One Nation, Two Countries and Three Flags, in : International Review for the Sociology of Sport, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, p. 298).

[25] Hafner Yann, La nationalité sportive et les Jeux Olympiques, in : Droit & Olympisme : Contribution à l’étude juridique d’un phénomène transnational, Actes du colloque du 4 septembre 2013, Maisonneuve Mathieu (dir.), Aix-en-Provence (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 2015, p. 91.

This year’s FIFA congress in Sao Paulo should not be remembered only for the controversy surrounding the bid for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. The controversy was surely at the centre of the media coverage, but in its shadow more long-lasting decisions were taken. For example, the new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries was approved, which is probably the most important recent change to FIFA regulations. These new Regulations will supersede the Regulations on Players’ Agents when they come into force on 1 April 2015. In this blog post we compare the old and the new Regulations followed by a short analysis and prospective view on the effects this change could have. 

The Road to the New Regulations

Players’ agents, or “intermediaries” should we use FIFA’s new terminology, provide their services to football players and clubs to conclude employment contracts and transfer agreements. FIFA has been regulating this activity since it introduced the first Regulations on players’ agents on 1 January 1996. Even though the Regulations were amended several times since then, it is only during the last five years that a permanent consultation process was put in place. According to a FIFA press release, the consultation process involved member associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and professional football leagues. Surprisingly however, the press release does not mention whether agent stakeholders, such as Pro Agent were also consulted. The ultimate objective of these consultations was to propose a new system that is more transparent and simpler in its implementation and administration.[1] At the beginning of 2013, a Sub-Committee for Club Football was set up to deal exclusively with the issue of reforming the Players’ Agents Regulations. Later on that year the Committee presented a draft for the FIFA Congress 2013 based on the following three findings:

1. The current licensing system should be abandoned

2. A set of minimum standards and requirements  must be established in FIFA’s future regulatory framework

3. A registration for intermediaries must be set up [2]

The draft Regulations were finally approved by the FIFA Executive Committee on 21 March 2014 and by the FIFA Congress on 11 June 2014. Furthermore, the three objectives outlined are supposedly reflected in the new Regulations.  

A Rough Comparison of the Old and New Agents/Intermediaries Regulations

In the following flowcharts we have summarized the key requirements enshrined in both the old and the new agents/intermediaries FIFA regulations. This provides a clear comparison of the differences and similarities existing between the two regulatory frameworks.

Flowchart: Becoming an Agent under the Old FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsPlayers'Agents.jpg (179.7KB) 

Flowchart: Becoming an Intermediary under the New FIFA Regulations
FlowchartRegulationsonWorkingwithIntermediaries.jpg (146.5KB)

By abandoning the old licensing system, the procedure to become an intermediary becomes much simpler than before. The applicant does not have to undergo an examination by FIFA anymore, nor does he need to conclude a professional liability insurance in his own name or provide a bank guarantee from a Swiss bank for a minimum amount of CHF 100,000. Furthermore, in contrast to the old Regulations, legal persons can now also act as intermediaries. Thus, in the near future we can expect players such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Radamel Falcao and coach Jose Mourinho to be represented by the agents’ company GestiFute rather than simply the agent Jorge Mendes. 

However, it should be noted that FIFA’s new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries are to be considered as minimum standards or requirements. In accordance with Art. 1(3), the right of associations to go beyond these minimum standards/requirements is preserved. In other words, national associations can set higher thresholds for becoming an intermediary should they wish for. In order to better understand the practical reality of the regulation of agents it is therefore necessary to analyse to what extent different associations set different standards and requirements.  

Registration

Under the new Regulations, the national associations will still be responsible for adopting a registration system regarding the intermediaries. However, several important changes between the old and the new Regulations can be deciphered, including the contractual terms between the intermediary and the player/club and the remuneration terms.  

Contractual terms

Under the old Regulations, the representation contract between the agent and the player and/or club would only be valid for a maximum period of two years. Moreover, the contract could be extended for another period of maximum two years (Art. 19(3) of the old Regulations). According to Art. 3 of the new Regulations, "intermediaries must be registered in the relevant registration system every time they are individually involved in a specific transaction". Players and clubs disclose all the details to the association when called upon. Thus, by allowing players not to be contractually bound to a specific intermediary for a specific period of time, the bargaining position of the player when engaging the services of an intermediary is likely to increase.

Remuneration terms

In both the old as well as in the new Regulations the amount of remuneration shall be calculated on the basis of the player’s basic gross income. [3] Nonetheless, where under the old Regulations the remuneration is calculated on the basis of the player’s annual income, under the new Regulations the remunerations is calculated on the basis of the player’s income for the entire duration of the contract. Moreover, as stipulated in Art. 7(3)a) of the new Regulations, the “total amount of remuneration per transaction due to intermediaries (…) should not exceed 3% of the player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the contract”. Secondly, the new Regulations prohibit any payment to intermediaries when the player is a minor.[4] With the new provisions on remuneration FIFA hopes to avoid that intermediaries exploit players. Indeed, in many countries it is still common practice for players to (unknowingly) sign contracts with their agents forcing them to pay a much higher share of their income. This was perfectly possible under the old Regulations since it did not provide a remuneration limit due to the players’ agents and there was no prohibition regarding remuneration to the agent when the player is a minor and should be way more difficult under the new Regulations.

Conclusion
With the new Regulations FIFA attempts not to regulate access to the activity anymore, but instead to shape the practice itself: players and clubs are authorised to choose any parties as intermediaries and can change intermediary at any moment since they are not bound by a contract with the intermediary. Furthermore, with the remuneration limit of 3% of the player’s income FIFA aims to limit the risk of players being exploited by their intermediaries.

Even though FIFA has explicitly stated the new Regulations will not deregulate the profession, it seems that it is placing the main responsibility to regulate onto the national associations. Not only will all the national associations be required to introduce a registration system, but they are also responsible for enforcing the rules and for imposing sanctions in case the new Regulations are breached. As we have seen, when selecting an intermediary, players and clubs shall act with due diligence. However, the definition of the interpretation of the notion of due diligence is left open and could differ from country to country.

With the game of football becoming ever more globalised and with an ever increasing amount of international transfers of players, regulating the profession of agent/intermediary at the national level is becoming increasingly difficult. In this context, FIFA has adopted a surprising orientation by delegating the responsibility to regulate the profession to the national associations.

[1] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/administration/news/newsid=2301236/

[2] http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/congress/news/newsid=2088917/

[3] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 20(1) and the Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(1)

[4] The Regulations on Players’ Agents, Art. 7(8)