Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

A Bridge Too Far? Bridge Transfers at the Court of Arbitration for Sport. By Antoine Duval and Luis Torres.

FIFA’s freshly adopted TPO ban entered into force on 1 May (see our Blog symposium). Though it is difficult to anticipate to what extent FIFA will be able to enforce the ban, it is likely that many of the third-party investors will try to have recourse to alternative solutions to pursue their commercial involvement in the football transfer market. One potential way to circumvent the FIFA ban is to use the proxy of what has been coined “bridge transfers”. A bridge transfer occurs when a club is used as an intermediary bridge in the transfer of a player from one club to another. The fictitious passage through this club is used to circumscribe, for example, the payment of training compensation or to whitewash a third-party ownership by transforming it into a classical employment relationship. This is a legal construction that has gained currency especially in South American football, but not only. On 5 May 2015, in the Racing Club v. FIFA case, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rendered its first award involving directly a bridge transfer. As this practice could become prevalent in the coming years we think that this case deserves a close look.


I. Facts and procedure

Fernando Ortiz is an Argentine professional football player who entered into an employment contract with Vélez Sarsfield, valid until 30 June 2012. After the expiration of the contract, Ortiz signed an employment contract with the Uruguayan team, Institución Atlética Sud América on 11 July 2012, valid until 30 June 2017. Institución was playing in the Second Division in Uruguay at that time. A week later, on 20 July 2012, Ortiz was transferred from Institución back to Argentina. Institución and Racing Club, Ortiz’ new club, agreed a transfer fee (which was not disclosed). The first instalment should be made before 24 July 2012. Ortiz’ new employment contract was valid until 30 June 2014. Both transfers were duly registered in the FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS). First, on 23 July 2012, the Argentine Federation (AFA) provided the Uruguayan Federation (AUF) the International Transfer Certificate (ITC). After the transfer from Institución to Racing, the AUF sent the same paperwork to the AFA on 3 August 2012. At that time, no payments were made.

Meanwhile, in view of the number of similar transfers, AFA and the Argentine Tax Authorities agreed that the players concerned would not be allowed to play in the Argentine league. This resulted in the parties (Institución, Ortiz and Racing) concluding a Rescission Agreement of the transfer contract, stating that they had “nothing to claim from each other”.[1] This agreement was not uploaded at that time in the TMS. On 23 November 2012, the FIFA TMS body sent a letter[2] to Racing asserting that they were not aware of any proof of payment of the transfer fee, and that this transfer could constitute an infringement of the TMS rules. Racing replied[3] by enclosing the rescission agreement and confirming that no payments were to be made. On June 2013, FIFA TMS opened disciplinary proceedings against Racing, claiming a violation of articles 3 and 9.1 of Annexe 3 RSTP[AD1] . In response Racing blamed Ortiz for trying to benefit himself from such operation and argued that the club had a true sporting interest in signing Ortiz and did not receive any economic benefit out of the transfer. On 14 August 2013, the FIFA TMS body submitted the disciplinary proceeding to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (FIFA DC) for a proper investigation of the facts.

In its decision of 5 March 2014, the FIFA DC analysed the two transfers and concluded that they lacked a sporting objective. Even if, from a formal point of view, the first of the two transfers did not involve Racing directly, the FIFA DC considered, taking into account the chronological unfolding of the transfers, that the transfer of Ortiz to Institución would not make sense (according to the playing level of Institución and Ortiz), if his subsequent transfer to another club, in this case Racing Club, was not already planned. Accordingly, the FIFA DC found that the two “parts of the operation” cannot be considered separate. Hence, the whole bridge transfer scheme was deemed known to all parties involved. Thus, the FIFA DC concluded that Racing was involved in the operations carried out and therefore liable to face sanctions.[4]

Moreover, the FIFA DC drew attention to the effects the rescission agreement should have had in a rational context. Indeed, in a normal constellation, one would have expected Ortiz to return to Institución, instead the fact that he stayed on to play at Racing corroborated the non-sporting interest of the transfer. The FIFA DC considered that the aim of the TMS rules is to create transparency (Article 1 Annexe 3 RSTP) in players’ international transfers. In the view of the FIFA DC, Racing, however, used the TMS fraudulently to give a sporting appearance to such a transfer. Therefore, Racing is found to have infringed Articles 3(1)[5] and 9.1(2)[6] Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP, since the transfer was conducted through the TMS for illegitimate purposes and it did not act in good faith. As a consequence of this infringement, the Argentine club was fined CHF 15,000 and warned in accordance with the FIFA Disciplinary Code.[7] In the same proceedings, the Uruguayan club was sanctioned with a transfer ban for two complete and consecutive transfer periods and a fine of CHF 40,000.

Racing Club decided to appeal the decision to the CAS. The Argentine club based its appeal[8] on the grounds that there is no legal basis in the FIFA Regulations to sanction the club for correctly registering a transfer without a sporting reason in the FIFA TMS system.  


II. Commentary

First, we need to explicate in greater details the functioning and purposes of bridge transfers. Before, tackling the substance of the award rendered by the CAS.


A.    What is a bridge transfer?

As explained by Ariel Reck[9] (who was Racing’s lawyer in the present case), a bridge transfer has three main characteristics:

  • A bridge transfer is made for no apparent sporting reason, there is a non-sporting purpose underlying the move.

  • Secondly, there are three clubs involved in this triangular structure: on the one hand the club where the player was firstly registered (club of origin); secondly, the so-called ‘bridge club’, which will usually be a club of a lower level than the player involved and the final club of destination, i.e. the club where the player was intended to play for from the beginning. The lack of balance between the player and the bridge club is usually evident.

  • The last feature is the short period of time that the player is engaged with the bridge club. Frequently, such a player does not play any game at all with this club.

There are three important reasons why football clubs enter into a triangular agreement that constitutes a bridge transfer:

  1. The bridge transfer helps to reduce the cost of training compensation or payments to be made under FIFA’s solidarity contribution mechanism.

  2. The bridge transfer allows the use of a club to circumvent the FIFA rule that prohibits TPO.[10]

  3. The bridge transfer is used to evade taxes.


1.   Reducing training compensation

As far as the reduction of the value of the training compensation is concerned, it should be noted that there is already an award dealing with this matter, though without making an explicit reference to the notion of “bridge transfer”. In 2009, CAS rendered an award in a dispute between MTK Budapest and FC Internazionale. In this case, Inter was interested in signing a Hungarian player from MTK Budapest. After negotiations between the two clubs broke down, the player entered into a professional contract with a Maltese club. Yet, after nine days at the Maltese club, the player was transferred to Inter. According to the FIFA’s training compensation rules[11], if the player would have been transferred directly from MTK Budapest to the Italian club, the payable amount to the Hungarian team, for the three seasons that the player was trained by MTK Budapest, would have been €160,000.[12] The Panel, found this transfer to be irrational and considered that the training efforts of MTK Budapest should in any case be rewarded. Therefore, it decided that Inter should pay a training compensation to the Hungarian team.

On the other hand, by means of a comparable manoeuvre, the solidarity mechanism can also be manipulated. The RSTP provisions on the solidarity mechanism are only applicable to international transfers (Article 1(1) RSTP). The transfers between two clubs of the same association are “governed by specific regulations issued by the association concerned” (Article 1(2) RSTP). Thus, one can reduce the amount of the solidarity contribution via a bridge construction. The first (international) transfer is concluded for a low amount, which would be subject to the solidarity contribution. Later, a second (national) transfer is concluded for the real amount.[13]


2.   Circumventing the FIFA TPO ban

Another purpose for the use of bridge transfers is to circumvent the FIFA rules prohibiting agents (or intermediaries) or other third parties to acquire economic rights from players. This is “a way to anchor a players economic rights to a club”[14] instead of a mere third party (agent or a company). By controlling a club, the former third-party owners are able to continue investing in players while making sure that this investment is at least formally in conformity with the RSTP. With this mechanism, a third party, who controls a club (a bridge club), also enjoys the legal protection awarded by the FIFA RSTP to clubs, for example, in case of breach of the contract without just cause (17 RSTP).


 3.   Reducing Taxes

Bridge transfers are also designed to reduce taxes or hide the financial beneficiary of the amounts.[15] Bridge clubs, in these cases, are based in “tax heavens”. Consequently, two transfers need to be concluded: One from the team of origin to the bridge club, and the other one from the bridge club to the club of destination. If the bridge transfer is made with the sole purpose of reducing taxes, the fee for the first transfer would be low because this transfer fee is highly taxed. The second transfer would be concluded for a higher amount and the fee will be taxed at a low rate.

Secondly, a bridge transfer could also be used to disguise a compensation for a player (this mechanism is generally used by free agents) or payments to third parties. Usually, players who move to a new club as free agents tend to receive higher salaries than players who have been transferred to another club while still on a contract with their old club. In order to prevent the payment of high income taxes, a player and a bridge club agree to share the transfer payment made by the club of destination. Thus, the bridge club is rewarded for taking part in the bridge transfer; this reward is usually limited to a small share of the total transfer sum.[16]

The third alternative is the configuration at play in the Racing case. In Uruguay, clubs are considered cultural institutions and according to the Article 69 ‘Constitución Nacional’ (National Constitution), they are exempted from paying taxes, even on transfers of players. The clubs take the legal form of either ‘Sports Association’ or ‘Sociedad Anónima Deportiva (Public limited sports company), the latter being considered a cultural institution as well. A recent Uruguayan judgment[17] extended the tax exemption to the ‘Socidades Anónimas Deportivas’. However, since bridge transfers have no sporting interest and are aimed at an economic profit derived from reducing the tax burden, the Uruguayan court also held that bridge transfers are not to be tax exempted.  


B.    The Racing case: FIFA’s interpretative bridge too far

1.     The argument of the parties

Racing Club argued in front of CAS that neither Article 3(1), nor Article 9.1(2) of Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP could constitute a sufficient legal basis to impose sanctions in case of a bridge transfer. Basically, “neither the Regulations nor the TMS generates a new substantive law”.[18] No provision states that transfers with a purely economic purpose violate any FIFA provision, which “precludes any sanction based on such concept”.[19] Racing Club also pleaded the ‘principle of estoppel’. As neither FIFA nor the FIFA TMS have sanctioned bridge transfers in the past, Racing Club is of the opinion that the FIFA DC is estopped from sanctioning them in the case at hand.

FIFA recognises that “although (the FIFA regulations) are not applicable to the present matter, (they) present an unambiguous view of what falls within the scope of the Regulations in general terms”.[20] The body argues that this loophole might be covered by the association’s usual practice or, if not, by the rules that they would lay down if they were acting as legislators. Also, FIFA argues that the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FDC) has to be read in accordance with the language used, the grammar and syntax of the provisions, the historical background and the regulatory context. In other words, FIFA pleads that the Panel must sanction the club interpreting the FIFA rules by analogy, if the wording of articles 76 FDC[21] and 62 FIFA Statutes[22] in connection with the TMS rules invoked is not sufficient to ground the decision of the FIFA DC.


2.     The decision of the Panel

In the view of the Panel, the FIFA DC was competent to render a decision in this matter. However, this decision must be grounded on a legal basis found in the FIFA regulations. The key question in the present case is whether Articles 3(1) and 9.1(2) Annexe 3 FIFA RSTP can constitute such a legal basis.

Therefore, taking into account that Racing was sanctioned for having violated the provisions of Annexe 3 by having entered untrue or false data and/or having misused the TMS for illegitimate purposes in bad faith by concluding a “bridge transfer”, the Panel must decide whether the transfer breached these provisions, and if it did so, whether the sanction is proportionate according the TMS rules.

The Panel considers that it is “undisputed that the present case involves a transfer structure which, […], is to be considered as a “bridge transfer”.[23] The Panel considers that Racing Club could not ignore that it was involved in a bridge transfer and was not acting in good faith when arguing that the transfer via Institución was conducted exclusively on the basis of a sporting interest. However, this does not imply per se that Racing acted in bad faith as far as the TMS registration of the Player’s transfer from Institución to Racing is concerned.[24] Indeed, FIFA had to satisfy its burden of proof and demonstrate to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that Racing Club had entered untrue or false data and/or misused the TMS for illegitimate purposes. In this regard, the Panel finds that “insufficient evidence is available to prove that the Appellant must be assumed not to have acted in good faith in connection with Player’s transfer registration in the TMS”, as “it has not been proven that the Appellant has registered misleading or false information in the TMS”.[25]

If FIFA is to outlaw the recourse to bridge transfers it must do so in an express fashion. In other words, “the parties involved, in conformity with the principle of legality, shall be provided with specific guidelines in order to know how to act when international transfers of players take place”.[26] Critically, “the lack of such clear and specific set of rules does not justify, in the eyes of the Panel, the “secondary use” of the TMS rules for these purposes”[27]. The principle of legality implies that a sanction must be based on a previously existing legal rule. The CAS had emphasized this principle at various instances in its earlier jurisprudence.[28] Consequently, the Panel found that the “bridge interpretation” used by the FIFA DC to sanction Racing for taking part in a transfer construct qualified as a bridge transfer was going too far and could not be followed. In short, “the current TMS rules represent neither an appropriate nor an effective tool for combating and/or sanctioning bridge transfers”.[29] Hence, the arbitrators decided to reduce the sanction imposed to a mere reprimand.

This is not to say that the Panel endorses the recourse to bridge transfers. Instead, it clearly states that it “concurs entirely with the Respondent (FIFA) that measures should be applied against bridge transfers when such transfers are conducted for the purpose of engaging in unlawful practices, such as tax evasion, or to circumvent the rules concerning, for instance, the payment of training compensation or solidarity contributions, or to assure third party's anonymity in relation to the relevant authorities”.[30]

Yet, the basic rule of law principle requiring that FIFA must first devised clearly positivized rules on the basis of which it can then adopt the required sanctions must be respected. This is a bold move by the Panel in light of the bad reputation of bridge transfers. FIFA, as any public or private authority, cannot free itself from the duty of acting in the framework of the regulations it has adopted. The decision is an important reminder of the limits faced by the discretionary power of International Sports Governing Bodies when CAS Panels review their disciplinary decisions. These Bodies do not have an absolute discretion to exercise the disciplinary power that they derive from their statutes. This power is checked by reference to the same legal principles restricting State power in a national context. Thus, it is the duty of FIFA to make sure that it disposes of an appropriate legal basis to act. Consequently, in the (near) future, instead of jumping an interpretative bridge too far, it is advisable that FIFA adopts specific rules to tackle the potential ethical and legal challenges posed by the surging use of bridge transfers.


[1] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 2.9

[2] Ibid, paragraph 2.10

[3] Ibid, paragraph 2.13

[4] Ibid, paragraph 2.19

[5]All users shall act in good faith.”

[6] “Sanctions may also be imposed on any association or club found to have entered untrue or false data into the system or for having misused TMS for illegitimate purposes.”

[7] Articles 10.c) and 15 for the fine and Articles 10.a) and 13 for the warning.

[8] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.2.2

[9] World Sports Law Report – April 2014, by Ariel Reck.

[10] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.3.2(o)

[11] Article 20 and Annexe 4 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

[12] CAS 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. Internazionale Milano, paragraph 24.

[13] Ariel Reck, “What is a ‘bridge transfer’ in football”.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16]El otro triángulo de las Bermudas: los pases fantasmas a Uruguay y Chile”, 18 August 2012, Perfil.com

[17] Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (Uruguay), fallo no. 301, 16 abril 2015.

[18] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.2.2.d)

[19] Ibid.

[20] CAS 2014/A/3536 Racing Club Asociación Civil v. FIFA, paragraph 7.3.2.k)

[21] “The FIFA Disciplinary Committee is authorised to sanction any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the jurisdiction of another body.”

[22] “1.The function of the Disciplinary Committee shall be governed by the FIFA Disciplinary Code. The committee shall pass decisions only when at least three members are present. In certain cases, the chairman may rule alone. 2. The Disciplinary Committee may pronounce the sanctions described in these Statutes and the FIFA Disciplinary Code on Members, Clubs, Officials, Players, intermediaries and licensed match agents. 3. These provisions are subject to the disciplinary powers of the Congress and Executive Committee with regard to the suspension and expulsion of Members. 4. The Executive Committee shall issue the FIFA Disciplinary Code.”

[23] Ibid, para.9.11

[24] Ibid, par. 9.14

[25] Ibid, para.9.15

[26] Ibid, par. 9.18

[27] Ibid.

[28] "In the Panel’s opinion, this provision of the Olympic Charter is to be properly read in accordance with the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité” in French), requiring that the offences and the sanctions be clearly and previously defined by the law and precluding the “adjustment” of existing rules to apply them to situations or behaviours that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize. CAS arbitrators have drawn inspiration from this general principle of law in reference to sports disciplinary issues, and have formulated and applied what has been termed as “predictability test”. Indeed, CAS awards have consistently held that sports organizations cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must be predictable. In other words, offences and sanctions must be provided by clear rules enacted beforehand." CAS 2008/A/1545 Andrea Anderson, LaTasha Colander Clark, Jearl Miles-

Clark, Torri Edwards, Chryste Gaines, Monique Hennagan, Passion Richardson v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), award of 16 July 2010, para.30. See also CAS 2011/A/2670 Masar Omeragik v. Macedonian Football Federation (FFM),  award of 25 January 2013, para.8.13.

[29] Ibid. Para.9.19

[30] Ibid, para.913


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Bailing out your local football club: The Willem II and MVV State Aid decisions as blueprint for future rescue aid (Part 1)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Bailing out your local football club: The Willem II and MVV State Aid decisions as blueprint for future rescue aid (Part 1)

The European Commission’s decisions of 4 July 2016 to order the recovery of the State aid granted to seven Spanish professional football clubs[1] were in a previous blog called historic. It was the first time that professional football clubs have been ordered to repay aid received from (local) public authorities. Less attention has been given to five other decisions also made public that day, which cleared support measures for five football clubs in the Netherlands. The clubs in question were PSV Eindhoven, MVV Maastricht, NEC Nijmegen, FC Den Bosch and Willem II.

Given the inherent political sensitivity of State aid recovery decisions, it is logical that the “Spanish decisions” were covered more widely than the “Dutch decisions”. Furthermore, clubs like Real Madrid and FC Barcelona automatically get more media attention than FC Den Bosch or Willem II. Yet, even though the “Dutch decisions” are of a lower profile, from an EU State aid law perspective, they are not necessarily less interesting.

A few days before entering the quiet month of August, the Commission published the non-confidential versions of its decisions concerning PSV Eindhoven, Willem II and MVV Maastricht (hereinafter: “MVV”). The swiftness of these publications is somewhat surprising, since it often takes at least three months to solve all the confidentiality issues. Nonetheless, nobody will complain (especially not me) about this opportunity to analyze in depth these new decisions.

In the case of PSV, the Dutch State argued successfully that the measure implemented by the city of Eindhoven was in line with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP), thereby not constituting a selective advantage to PSV. In other words, the measure did not fulfill the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and was not considered State aid. The aid measures granted by the cities of Tilburg and Maastricht to Willem II and MVV respectively were considered compatible State aid under Article 107(3)c) TFEU. Interestingly enough, in the Willem II and MVV cases, the Dutch authorities also argued that the respective measures did not confer any selective advantage to the clubs, but they failed to convince the Commission.

A comparison between the PSV decision on the one hand, and the other “Dutch” decisions on the other, taking into account the definition and operation of the MEIP in the (professional) football sector, will be left for a future blog. This two-part blog, instead, will focus on the compatibility assessment under Article 107(3)(c) done by the Commission in the Willem II and MVV cases and explain why it considered the State aid measure justified.

Part one will serve as an introduction on the two cases. It will provide background information on the compatibility assessment. In part two, the compatibility assessment conducted by the Commission in the two decisions will be analyzed. As will be argued, the conditions set out by the Commission can serve as a blueprint for all public authorities within the EU willing to grant State aid to football clubs in financial difficulties.  


Background

Willem II

In 2004, the municipality of Tilburg and football club Willem II concluded a contract, by which Tilburg became the owner of Willem II’s stadium and the club obtained a lease for the use of the stadium.[2] The annual rent of the stadium was established at €1 million, based on a depreciation period of 30 years, investment costs and an interest rate of 5.5%.[3]

In May 2010, Willem II found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. The municipality was quick to realize the potential negative effects a bankruptcy could have for Tilburg. These negative effects consisted of (1) the loss of rental income; (2) the absence of a tenant for the stadium; (3) the absence of professional football in Tilburg; and (4) the necessity to demolish the stadium and all the costs it would entail.[4] As a result, on 31 May 2010 the municipality decided to lower the rent to €905,000 per year and to decrease the variable costs. Both measures were taken with retroactive effect till 1 July 2004, which resulted in Willem II receiving a total of €2.4 million from the municipality.[5]

Tilburg’s rescue operation of Willem II was never notified to the Commission.[6] Instead, a citizen informed DG Competition shortly after the measure was implemented by means of a letter. This prompted the Commission to send a request for information to the Netherlands on 14 March 2011.[7]

In response to the Commission, the Dutch authorities argued that the new rent agreement was in conformity with the current municipal calculation methods and that the basic principles of the 2004 agreement were still respected. Moreover, the costs Tilburg would suffer for letting Willem II go bankrupt would be higher than the rescue costs. Consequently, the municipality believed it acted in accordance with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP).[8] Moreover, the municipality imposed a restructuring plan that aimed at restoring the club’s long-term viability. The conditions of this plan included finding a way to clean up its balance sheet and the need to respect the national football association's norms for salaries of players.[9]

In its decision to open a formal investigation, the Commission counter argued that the depreciation of the stadium’s rent was already adjusted in 2007, and would not justify the retroactive application until 2004. Additionally, the lowering of the variable costs with retro-active effects ended up to be lower than the actual maintenance costs for that period, and should therefore be considered as State aid in accordance with Article 107(1) TFEU.[10] Finally, at the time the Commission launched the formal investigation, it nourished doubts whether the aid measure could be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant Article 107(3)(c). Having received no notification of the rescue measure, the Commission was unable to carry out a proper compatibility assessment. 


MVV

In 2010, football club MVV was facing severe financial difficulties: its total debt amounted to €6.5 million, including €1.7 million to the municipality of Maastricht. As a means of aiding its local football club, the municipality decided to waive its claim of €1.7 million and bought the stadium for €1.85 million.[11] The municipality held that the purchase was done in accordance with the MEIP and that the stadium would be used for multifunctional purposes. The parties agreed that MVV would use the €1.85 million to finance preferential claims, such as taxes and pensions.[12] 

The Commission opened a formal investigation procedure, because it was unable to conclude on the basis of the available information (the rescue measures were not notified[13]) that the behaviour of the municipality had been that of the typical creditor in a market economy.[14] Firstly, it doubted whether a total remission of the claim (€1.7 million) was entirely necessary, since other creditors transformed their claim into a claim on future income from transfer payments or “only” waived 50% of their claim. Secondly, according to the Commission, the purchase price of the stadium was estimated on the basis of replacement value rather than the real market value. It further raised doubts as to whether the municipality acted in accordance with the MEIP since investing in a football stadium depending on one captive user entails a very high risk, even when claiming that you want to make it multifunctional.[15] Similar to the Willem II case, no compatibility assessment of the aid measure in favour of MVV was carried out, because the measure was not notified.[16] 


The rules on compatibility

Pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal market. Only the Commission has the competence (subject to control by the EU Courts) to determine whether or not certain aid merits derogation from the general prohibition of Article 107(1).[17] However, it is settled case law that it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for such compatibility are met.[18] Due to its own wide discretion to assess the compatibility, the Commission has developed its own methodologies and approaches over the years, found in the decisional practice, policy documents[19] and sector specific guidelines.[20] 


The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines

The Community Guidelines of 1 October 2004 on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter: “Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines”) primarily serve as a tool for the Commission to assess similar cases in a similar way.[21] The criteria and conditions laid down in the Guidelines are mostly based on the Commission’s own experience in dealing with cases involving State aid in favour of firms in difficulty and case law by the Court of Justice of the EU. Due to the continuous developments in the area of EU State aid law, the Guidelines are regularly updated.[22] In the Guidelines, the Commission sets out the conditions under which State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty may be considered compatible with the internal market. These conditions include the notification obligation for the Member State,[23] as well as demonstrating that the firm qualifies as ‘a firm in difficulty’. As is stipulated in point 11 of the Guidelines, a firm is considered to be in difficulties where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover and mounting debt.

In order to rescue a firm from bankruptcy, the Member State has to show that it limits the amount of aid provided to that which is strictly necessary to keep the firm in business.[24] Section 3.2 of the Guidelines requires that the grant of the aid must be conditional on the implementation of a restructuring plan that restores the long term viability of the firm.[25] The restructuring plan needs to be approved by the Member State concerned and communicated to the Commission.[26]

The Member States granting the restructuring aid will have to limit the amount and intensity of the aid to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the firm. This also means that the beneficiaries are expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources.[27] The Commission will normally consider the following contributions to the restructuring to be appropriate: at least 25 % in the case of small enterprises, at least 40 % for medium-sized enterprises and at least 50 % for large firms.[28]

The Guidelines also stipulate that, in case the firm in difficulty is considered a medium-sized enterprise or larger[29], compensatory measures must be taken by the Member State that grants the rescue and/or restructuring aid in order to ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects pursued outweigh the adverse ones.[30] These last two conditions (i.e. limiting the aid to what is strictly necessary and introducing compensatory measures) have the aim of ensuring that the State aid measure is proportionate to the objective tackled, namely rescuing and/or restructuring a firm in difficulty.

Last but not least, the so-called ‘one time, last time’ principle has to be applied. According to this principle, rescue aid should only be granted once.[31] 


In the coming days, the key part of the Commission’s decisions, the compatibility assessment, will be discussed in part two of this blog.



[1] Real Madrid (twice), FC Barcelona, Valencia CF, Athletic Bilbao, Atlético Osasuna, Elche and Hércules.

[2] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 10.

[3] Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Netherlands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, para. 29.

[4] Ibid, para. 30.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid, para. 67.

[7] Ibid, paras. 3-4. To find out how a citizen’s letter can instigate a preliminary State aid investigation, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[8] The essence of this principle is that when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not State aid.

[9] SA.40168, para. 12.

[10] SA.33584, paras. 29-31 and 51-53.

[11] Ibid, para. 32.

[12] Ibid, para. 57.

[13] Ibid, para. 67.

[14] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club MVV in Maastricht, para. 12.

[15] SA.33584, paras. 54-57.

[16] SA.41612, para. 11.

[17] According to settled case law, national courts do not have the power to declare a State aid measure compatible with the internal market. See e.g. C-354/90, Fédération Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des Négociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v French Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1991:440, para. 14.

[18] SA.41612, para. 42; see also Case C-364/90, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:157, point 20.

[19] See for example Communication from the Commission COM(2012) of 8 May 2012 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), para. 12.

[20] See for example the Communication from the Commission OJ C25/01 of 26 January 2013 on the EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, paras. 32-34.

[21] In July 2014, the Commission published new Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty, but they are not applicable to aid granted in 2010.

[22] The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines published in 2014 are the fourth of its sort after earlier versions published in 1994, 1999 and 2004.

[23] Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C 244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 25(c).

[24] Ibid, point 25(d).

[25] Ibid, poins 34-37.

[26] Ibid, point 59. In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission does not need to endorse the restructuring plan.

[27] By “own resources” the Commission also understands funding from external financiers at market conditions.

[28] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, points 43-44.

[29] The Commission’s definition of Small and Medium-Sized enterprises (SMEs), as stipulated in the Annex of the Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, is also used in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Pursuant to Article 2 of the SME Recommendation, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million, whereas a medium-seized enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 250 persons and which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.

[30] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 38.

[31] Ibid, point 25(e) and section 3.3. In practice, this actually means that rescue or restructuring aid can only be granted once every 10 years.

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