Editor's note: This is the fourth part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio.

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu
• Act II: On being implicated 
• Act III: On being sufficiently tested

Act IV: On Bringing a sport into disrepute

Paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision: “The IFs will also have to apply their respective rules in relation to the sanctioning of entire NFs.” 

In paragraph 2 of its Decision, the IOC mentioned the possibility for IFs to “apply their respective rules in relation to the sanctioning of entire NF's”.This is exactly what the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) did when it decided on 29 July 2016 to exclude the whole Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) from the Rio Olympics for having brought the sport into disrepute. Indeed, Article 12. 4 of the IWF Anti-doping Policy, foresees that:

“If any Member federation or members or officials thereof, by reason of conduct connected with or associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations, brings the sport of weightlifting into disrepute, the IWF Executive Board may, in its discretion, take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport.”

The Russian Federation first disputed, to no avail, that there was sufficient legal basis in the IWF regulations for such a blanket ban. The Panel found that “Article 12.4 ADP constitutes a sufficient legal basis”.[1] Moreover, it added that the “power of the IWF Executive Board, in its discretion, to take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport, was not challenged by RWF”.[2]

There were subsequently two main questions related to application of Article 12.4 ADP to be discussed:

• Based on the information available, could the IWF reasonably conclude that there was a “conduct connected with or associated with doping”?
• And, was it sufficient to “bring the sport of weightlifting into disrepute”?

First, the CAS Panel notes that in assessing whether there was a “conduct connected with or associated with doping”, IWF “referred to various sources of information”.[3] It relied on the IP Report that “submits that 117 Russian weightlifters were included in this centrally dictated program”[4] and “on the results from the retesting of the London and Beijing Olympics”[5], which “turned out nine AAFs for Russian weightlifters”.[6] The Panel held that this “information constitutes "conduct connected with or associated with doping"” that “on its face is sufficiently reliable”.[7] Indeed, it reminds that the IP Report applied a standard of proof of “beyond reasonable doubt”. Furthermore, the Panel adds that “the findings of the McLaren Report were taken seriously by the IOC and lead to the IOC Executive Board's decision dated 24 July 216 that enacted eligibility criteria specifically for Russian athletes, which is unique in the history of the Olympic Games”[8] and “were endorsed by WADA, the supreme authority in the world of sport to lead and coordinate the fight against doping and by other international federations, such as the IAAF”.[9] Finally, “the information contained in the Mclaren Report is also corroborated by the reanalysis of the athlete's samples at the London and Beijing Olympics”.[10] The fact that all nine Russian athletes retested were all positive for the same substance, Turniabol, is deemed “a strong indication that they were part of a centrally dictated program”.[11]

Are these findings enough to bring weightlifting into disrepute? For the Panel, disrepute “refers to loss of reputation or dishonour”.[12] It concluded that “the IWF's conclusion that the above facts bring the sport of weightlifting in disrepute is neither incompatible with the applicable provisions nor arbitrary”.[13] The Russian doping scandal is “one of the biggest doping scandals in sports history”, and “paired with the findings from the retesting of samples led the IWF to consider that the actions of the RWF and the Russian weightlifters brought the sport of weightlifting into disrepute, because it draws a picture of this sport as being doping infested”.[14] Thus, the CAS arbitrators consider that “the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the IWF's conclusion that, based on the evidence before it, the conduct of the RWF brought the sport of weightlifting in disrepute, was unreasonable”.[15]

Lastly, the RWF brought forward the much-used ‘we were not the only ones!’ argument. Indeed, it highlighted that the “retesting of the London and Beijing samples has not only resulted in AAFs [Adverse Analytical Findings or positive doping test] for Russian athletes, but also revealed AAFs for other member federations”.[16] Yet, the Panel rebuked this argument by stating “that the situation in Russian weightlifting is - apparently - of a different dimension”, as it “has not been reported nor submitted that other member federations are involved in a centrally dictated and managed doping program”.[17] In this regard, it notes “the impressive number of 61 Russian weightlifters benefitted from the Disappearing Positive Methodology” and the fact “that the whole Russian delegation for the London Olympics was - according to the information provided - involved in doping”.[18]

Once again, an IF taking a strong stance and barring the whole Russian team to participate in the Rio Olympics is vindicated by the CAS.

[1] CAS OG 16/09 RWF v. IWF, para. 7.5.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., para. 7.10.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.11.

[8] Ibid., para. 7.12.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.13.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi recently completed a Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and a Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.

In September 2018, the Football Stakeholders Committee endorsed the idea of a Clearing House that was subsequently approved in October of the same year by the FIFA Council. A tender process commenced in July 2019 for bidders to propose jurisdiction, operation and establishment. Whilst many questions go unanswered, it is clear that the Clearing House will be aimed at closing the significant gap between what is owed and what is actually paid, in respect to training compensation and solidarity payments. The Clearing House will have other functions, perhaps in regard to agents’ fees and other transfer related business, though those other operations are for another blog. It will hence act as an intermediary of sorts, receiving funds from a signing and therefore owing club (“new” club) and then moving that money on to training clubs. Whilst separate to FIFA, to what extent is unclear.

I have landed at the position of it being important to include a section in this blog series on the soon to commence Clearing House, given it appears to be FIFA’s (perhaps main) attempt to improve the training compensation and solidarity mechanisms. As will be expanded upon below, I fear it will create more issues than it will solve. Perhaps one should remain patient and optimistic until it is in operation, and one should be charitable in that there will undoubtedly be teething problems. However, it is of course not just the function of the Clearing House that is of interest, but also what moving forward with the project of the Clearing House represents and leaves unaddressed, namely, the issues I have identified in this blog series.

1. Operation and Function of the Clearing House

The Clearing House will apparently work in the following ways:

When a player is registered as a professional for the first time, or, in the case an international transfer becomes known via TMS (Transfer Matching System), a Preliminary Player Passport will be created. This will contain the information acquired by FIFA from the relevant national associations and money owing will be calculated, per the FIFA redistributive mechanisms (enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism; see Blog 1 for a comprehensive overview). Aforesaid calculation will be undertaken by FIFA and not the Clearing House, and the Preliminary Passport will be reviewed, then given the green light or conversely disputed by the relevant member associations, rather than the training clubs supposedly due compensation. Payment directions, including bank accounts and official contact details of clubs and national associations connected to the redistribution will then be communicated by FIFA to the Clearing House. An invoice may then be issued to the new club and the obligation of that club is to pay accordingly, to the Clearing House. The Clearing House will then distribute to the training clubs, though its mandate extends to confirming and ensuring the amounts and details are correct, and the money makes it to its destination. FIFA will be made aware of which payment obligations have been fulfilled, and which have not. It is FIFA and not the Clearing House then who may sanction non-compliant clubs.

For a more comprehensive overview of the Clearing House, please see Toni Roca’s piece on the LawInSport website; FIFA’s Clearing House: The Future Of Solidarity Mechanism & Training Compensation.

2. Potential Positives & Success of a Kind

One can see the positive side of modernising, centralising and digitising the transfer system, so as to improve compliance and efficiency in accordance with the regulations as they stand and the payment obligations that arise from those regulations. If achieved, FIFA can say it has ticked that box and many stakeholders will be pleased.

As mentioned in the second blog of this series, “In 2018, it was reported that just USD$67.7m of the USD$351.5m due to be distributed in solidarity contributions, was actually paid. That is a mere 19.3% of what should have trickled down and perhaps just as alarming is that this percentage has been worsening”. If FIFA does in fact close the gap between what is owed and what is paid by way of the Clearing House, that would indeed be success of kind. Hundreds of millions of dollars might make it to training clubs, some of those undoubtedly do not need the compensation, but a large share of those that might benefit are the kind of club I have referred to throughout this series as nurseries and/or victims of the so-called muscle drain. If achieved, one would then have to take their hats off to FIFA, as a specific objective would have been accomplished.

Success in the way imagined above would just be solving one issue, however. I appreciate that hundreds of millions of dollars can go a long way in achieving some form of redistributive solidarity and the fruits of that redistribution could potentially be far-reaching. Though lingering behind this hypothetical success would of course be, what proceeding with the Clearing House ignores.

3. Cause for Concern

Whilst one has to applaud FIFA’s efforts towards improvements, there appears a myriad of questions left unanswered not only about the Clearing House but additionally about the redistributive mechanisms themselves. To proceed under the guise that all is well with these systems and that all that needs to be remedied is the gap between what is owed and what is actually paid, is to ignore much of what I have raised in this blog series.

The following excerpt from a relevant FIFA webpage captures the organisations’ position.

“The original objectives and principles of the transfer rules remain sound: the protection of contractual stability; encouragement of training; solidarity between the elite and grassroots; protection of minors; competitive balance; and ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions”. 

To expand, this kind of sentiment highlights FIFA’s intention to proceed without answering the fundamental questions, as though it is the position held by all that these systems are targeted at legitimate objectives and adequate to attain them. This is clearly not just a case of once the Clearing House is in operation, the systems will simply work perfectly. To put the practical critique aside momentarily, the establishment of the Clearing House is no response to a fundamental critique, the philosophical flaws in justification for the redistributive mechanisms and it appears the hindrance cause by the systems to players’ free movement will continue to be ignored. 

Additionally, and returning to a practical perspective, with the Clearing House relying on a Players Passport, the compliance or non-compliance of national associations to provide and maintain the correct information seems to be what the project hinges on. Historically, some national federations have not been so reliable in this sense, so this is likely to be another aspect that will need significant attention. There may be less disputes given the supposed streamlining of the payment process, but might this quickly be forgotten given the introduction of the Clearing House seems to simultaneously mean an increased administrative burden on FIFA and the national associations? Then let us not proceed as though there will be no disputes at all. We are yet to be made aware what the process will be in the case of a dispute over the amounts calculated, a dispute over the Preliminary Passport, or the expiry dates of outstanding payments, to point to a few issues that may arise. Afterall, the dynamics of a transfer will change with the introduction of the intermediary Clearing House and will take some getting used to. Furthermore, it looks as though the training clubs owed money will not be involved directly in the process of disputes, which is to be dealt with by the member associations. This is questionable, as not all clubs have good relationships with their national associations, nor are national associations necessarily more trustworthy or better positioned to handle a dispute. On occasions it has been found that the reason a training club has not received their training compensation or solidarity payment, was because it was being held by a national federation (see section 4. of Blog 2 for a personal anecdote of an instance as such).

4. Concluding remarks

This account of questions and concerns is not exhaustive, and yet I would emphasise the issues with training compensation and solidarity mechanism more generally. Could the establishment of the Clearing House in fact raise more questions and cause more problems than it solves, given it may just semi-solve one problem, that of the gap between what is owed and what is paid? It is reasonable to ponder whether the commencement of the Clearing House in fact houses, protects and reinforces FIFA’s commitment to systems that are ultimately flawed, when time and energy could be better spent completely overhauling them. As it stands, and if one finds themselves sympathetic to the issues I have identified throughout this series, one can be reasonably concerned that the establishment of the Clearing House prolongs the arrival of a preferable alternative system.

In my next and final blog of this series, I intend to consider alternative systems of redistribution. I will also take the opportunity to address the idea that football clubs are incentivised by training compensation and solidarity payments.

The European Commission’s decisions of 4 July 2016 to order the recovery of the State aid granted to seven Spanish professional football clubs[1] were in a previous blog called historic. It was the first time that professional football clubs have been ordered to repay aid received from (local) public authorities. Less attention has been given to five other decisions also made public that day, which cleared support measures for five football clubs in the Netherlands. The clubs in question were PSV Eindhoven, MVV Maastricht, NEC Nijmegen, FC Den Bosch and Willem II.

Given the inherent political sensitivity of State aid recovery decisions, it is logical that the “Spanish decisions” were covered more widely than the “Dutch decisions”. Furthermore, clubs like Real Madrid and FC Barcelona automatically get more media attention than FC Den Bosch or Willem II. Yet, even though the “Dutch decisions” are of a lower profile, from an EU State aid law perspective, they are not necessarily less interesting.

A few days before entering the quiet month of August, the Commission published the non-confidential versions of its decisions concerning PSV Eindhoven, Willem II and MVV Maastricht (hereinafter: “MVV”). The swiftness of these publications is somewhat surprising, since it often takes at least three months to solve all the confidentiality issues. Nonetheless, nobody will complain (especially not me) about this opportunity to analyze in depth these new decisions.

In the case of PSV, the Dutch State argued successfully that the measure implemented by the city of Eindhoven was in line with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP), thereby not constituting a selective advantage to PSV. In other words, the measure did not fulfill the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and was not considered State aid. The aid measures granted by the cities of Tilburg and Maastricht to Willem II and MVV respectively were considered compatible State aid under Article 107(3)c) TFEU. Interestingly enough, in the Willem II and MVV cases, the Dutch authorities also argued that the respective measures did not confer any selective advantage to the clubs, but they failed to convince the Commission.

A comparison between the PSV decision on the one hand, and the other “Dutch” decisions on the other, taking into account the definition and operation of the MEIP in the (professional) football sector, will be left for a future blog. This two-part blog, instead, will focus on the compatibility assessment under Article 107(3)(c) done by the Commission in the Willem II and MVV cases and explain why it considered the State aid measure justified.

Part one will serve as an introduction on the two cases. It will provide background information on the compatibility assessment. In part two, the compatibility assessment conducted by the Commission in the two decisions will be analyzed. As will be argued, the conditions set out by the Commission can serve as a blueprint for all public authorities within the EU willing to grant State aid to football clubs in financial difficulties.  

Background

Willem II

In 2004, the municipality of Tilburg and football club Willem II concluded a contract, by which Tilburg became the owner of Willem II’s stadium and the club obtained a lease for the use of the stadium.[2] The annual rent of the stadium was established at €1 million, based on a depreciation period of 30 years, investment costs and an interest rate of 5.5%.[3]

In May 2010, Willem II found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. The municipality was quick to realize the potential negative effects a bankruptcy could have for Tilburg. These negative effects consisted of (1) the loss of rental income; (2) the absence of a tenant for the stadium; (3) the absence of professional football in Tilburg; and (4) the necessity to demolish the stadium and all the costs it would entail.[4] As a result, on 31 May 2010 the municipality decided to lower the rent to €905,000 per year and to decrease the variable costs. Both measures were taken with retroactive effect till 1 July 2004, which resulted in Willem II receiving a total of €2.4 million from the municipality.[5]

Tilburg’s rescue operation of Willem II was never notified to the Commission.[6] Instead, a citizen informed DG Competition shortly after the measure was implemented by means of a letter. This prompted the Commission to send a request for information to the Netherlands on 14 March 2011.[7]

In response to the Commission, the Dutch authorities argued that the new rent agreement was in conformity with the current municipal calculation methods and that the basic principles of the 2004 agreement were still respected. Moreover, the costs Tilburg would suffer for letting Willem II go bankrupt would be higher than the rescue costs. Consequently, the municipality believed it acted in accordance with the so-called ‘Market Economy Investor Principle’ (MEIP).[8] Moreover, the municipality imposed a restructuring plan that aimed at restoring the club’s long-term viability. The conditions of this plan included finding a way to clean up its balance sheet and the need to respect the national football association's norms for salaries of players.[9]

In its decision to open a formal investigation, the Commission counter argued that the depreciation of the stadium’s rent was already adjusted in 2007, and would not justify the retroactive application until 2004. Additionally, the lowering of the variable costs with retro-active effects ended up to be lower than the actual maintenance costs for that period, and should therefore be considered as State aid in accordance with Article 107(1) TFEU.[10] Finally, at the time the Commission launched the formal investigation, it nourished doubts whether the aid measure could be considered compatible with the internal market pursuant Article 107(3)(c). Having received no notification of the rescue measure, the Commission was unable to carry out a proper compatibility assessment. 

MVV

In 2010, football club MVV was facing severe financial difficulties: its total debt amounted to €6.5 million, including €1.7 million to the municipality of Maastricht. As a means of aiding its local football club, the municipality decided to waive its claim of €1.7 million and bought the stadium for €1.85 million.[11] The municipality held that the purchase was done in accordance with the MEIP and that the stadium would be used for multifunctional purposes. The parties agreed that MVV would use the €1.85 million to finance preferential claims, such as taxes and pensions.[12] 

The Commission opened a formal investigation procedure, because it was unable to conclude on the basis of the available information (the rescue measures were not notified[13]) that the behaviour of the municipality had been that of the typical creditor in a market economy.[14] Firstly, it doubted whether a total remission of the claim (€1.7 million) was entirely necessary, since other creditors transformed their claim into a claim on future income from transfer payments or “only” waived 50% of their claim. Secondly, according to the Commission, the purchase price of the stadium was estimated on the basis of replacement value rather than the real market value. It further raised doubts as to whether the municipality acted in accordance with the MEIP since investing in a football stadium depending on one captive user entails a very high risk, even when claiming that you want to make it multifunctional.[15] Similar to the Willem II case, no compatibility assessment of the aid measure in favour of MVV was carried out, because the measure was not notified.[16] 

The rules on compatibility

Pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal market. Only the Commission has the competence (subject to control by the EU Courts) to determine whether or not certain aid merits derogation from the general prohibition of Article 107(1).[17] However, it is settled case law that it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for such compatibility are met.[18] Due to its own wide discretion to assess the compatibility, the Commission has developed its own methodologies and approaches over the years, found in the decisional practice, policy documents[19] and sector specific guidelines.[20] 

The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines

The Community Guidelines of 1 October 2004 on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter: “Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines”) primarily serve as a tool for the Commission to assess similar cases in a similar way.[21] The criteria and conditions laid down in the Guidelines are mostly based on the Commission’s own experience in dealing with cases involving State aid in favour of firms in difficulty and case law by the Court of Justice of the EU. Due to the continuous developments in the area of EU State aid law, the Guidelines are regularly updated.[22] In the Guidelines, the Commission sets out the conditions under which State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty may be considered compatible with the internal market. These conditions include the notification obligation for the Member State,[23] as well as demonstrating that the firm qualifies as ‘a firm in difficulty’. As is stipulated in point 11 of the Guidelines, a firm is considered to be in difficulties where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover and mounting debt.

In order to rescue a firm from bankruptcy, the Member State has to show that it limits the amount of aid provided to that which is strictly necessary to keep the firm in business.[24] Section 3.2 of the Guidelines requires that the grant of the aid must be conditional on the implementation of a restructuring plan that restores the long term viability of the firm.[25] The restructuring plan needs to be approved by the Member State concerned and communicated to the Commission.[26]

The Member States granting the restructuring aid will have to limit the amount and intensity of the aid to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the firm. This also means that the beneficiaries are expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources.[27] The Commission will normally consider the following contributions to the restructuring to be appropriate: at least 25 % in the case of small enterprises, at least 40 % for medium-sized enterprises and at least 50 % for large firms.[28]

The Guidelines also stipulate that, in case the firm in difficulty is considered a medium-sized enterprise or larger[29], compensatory measures must be taken by the Member State that grants the rescue and/or restructuring aid in order to ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects pursued outweigh the adverse ones.[30] These last two conditions (i.e. limiting the aid to what is strictly necessary and introducing compensatory measures) have the aim of ensuring that the State aid measure is proportionate to the objective tackled, namely rescuing and/or restructuring a firm in difficulty.

Last but not least, the so-called ‘one time, last time’ principle has to be applied. According to this principle, rescue aid should only be granted once.[31] 

In the coming days, the key part of the Commission’s decisions, the compatibility assessment, will be discussed in part two of this blog.

[1] Real Madrid (twice), FC Barcelona, Valencia CF, Athletic Bilbao, Atlético Osasuna, Elche and Hércules.

[2] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.40168 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club Willem II in Tilburg, para. 10.

[3] Commission Decision SA.33584 of 6 March 2013 – The Netherlands Alleged municipal aid to the Professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008-2011, para. 29.

[4] Ibid, para. 30.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid, para. 67.

[7] Ibid, paras. 3-4. To find out how a citizen’s letter can instigate a preliminary State aid investigation, see Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” In: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[8] The essence of this principle is that when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions, the investment is not State aid.

[9] SA.40168, para. 12.

[10] SA.33584, paras. 29-31 and 51-53.

[11] Ibid, para. 32.

[12] Ibid, para. 57.

[13] Ibid, para. 67.

[14] Commission Decision on State Aid SA.41612 of 4 July 2016 implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club MVV in Maastricht, para. 12.

[15] SA.33584, paras. 54-57.

[16] SA.41612, para. 11.

[17] According to settled case law, national courts do not have the power to declare a State aid measure compatible with the internal market. See e.g. C-354/90, Fédération Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des Négociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v French Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1991:440, para. 14.

[18] SA.41612, para. 42; see also Case C-364/90, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:157, point 20.

[19] See for example Communication from the Commission COM(2012) of 8 May 2012 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), para. 12.

[20] See for example the Communication from the Commission OJ C25/01 of 26 January 2013 on the EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, paras. 32-34.

[21] In July 2014, the Commission published new Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty, but they are not applicable to aid granted in 2010.

[22] The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines published in 2014 are the fourth of its sort after earlier versions published in 1994, 1999 and 2004.

[23] Communication from the Commission of 1 October 2004 (2004/C 244/02) Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 25(c).

[24] Ibid, point 25(d).

[25] Ibid, poins 34-37.

[26] Ibid, point 59. In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission does not need to endorse the restructuring plan.

[27] By “own resources” the Commission also understands funding from external financiers at market conditions.

[28] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, points 43-44.

[29] The Commission’s definition of Small and Medium-Sized enterprises (SMEs), as stipulated in the Annex of the Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, is also used in the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Pursuant to Article 2 of the SME Recommendation, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million, whereas a medium-seized enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 250 persons and which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.

[30] Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty, point 38.

[31] Ibid, point 25(e) and section 3.3. In practice, this actually means that rescue or restructuring aid can only be granted once every 10 years.