Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

1.     Introduction

To many it may seem obvious that athletes in a national championship should only be able to participate if they have the nationality of the relevant state. The Dutch Road Cycling National Championships should have Dutch cyclists, and the German Athletics Championships should have German athletes and so forth. However, in reality, foreign competitors are allowed to participate in many national championships in the EU, and there is a wide discrepancy between the rules of national sport governing bodies on this issue. There is no unified practice when investigating this point by country or by sport, and rules on participation range from a complete ban on foreign competitors to absolutely no mention of foreign athletes.[1] Thus, the question arises: should foreign athletes be able to participate in national sport championships?

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will soon be required to provide an, at least partial, answer to this dilemma as a result of an application for a preliminary ruling.  A German Court has referred three questions to the CJEU on the case TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. (DLV) which in essence ask whether EU citizenship rights and in particular, the requirement of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, should be applied to non-nationals wishing to participate in an athletics national championship in Germany. In the meantime, the Advocate General (AG), who provides a non-binding opinion to the Court before a decision is delivered, Evgeni Tanchev has delivered an interesting opinion on the case. It addresses the claims from the applicants based on EU citizenship rights and urges the CJEU to instead review the case on the basis of the freedom of establishment.

This blog will dissect the AG’s opinion to assess the main arguments put forward in relation to freedom of establishment and EU citizenship. Furthermore, it will weigh the ramifications this case may have on the boundaries of EU law in relation to sport. To fully appreciate the AG’s opinion, it is necessary to first discuss the intriguing factual and legal background colouring this case. After all, this will not be the first time the CJEU faces thorny issues concerning discrimination on the basis of nationality and sport.

2.     Factual Background of TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. (DLV)

The second applicant in this case, Mr. Biffi, is an Italian resident in Germany since 2003. He works professionally as a personal trainer and coach and has a website which advertises his services. He has been a member of the Berlin-based athletics club TopFit (the first applicant) and has competed in athletics competitions including German national championships within the senior category of athletes above the age of 35. In these national competitions, he had his placings recorded and published his results on his website. In 2016, the DLV changed its rules on non-nationals participating in national championships across all age categories without notice or transitional period. The rules were changed to only allow German nationals to compete for the national title while non-nationals could only participate outside classification with the permission of the organisers. As a result, Mr. Biffi was even denied the ability to participate in one of the championships in which he previously participated without raising a brow. The applicants challenged the DLV rule on the basis that it is in contravention to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality under EU citizenship. 

3.     European Sports Law and Nationality Based Discrimination

Generally, sport governing bodies aim to have the maximum autonomy possible to formulate and apply their rules. In the EU, they have attempted and ultimately failed at securing an absolute autonomy.[2] The current relationship between the sport governing bodies and the EU has been described as a ‘conditional autonomy’ where sport governing bodies may exercise their discretion in formulating and applying their rules so long as they do not conflict with EU law.[3] It should be noted that the CJEU has mainly scrutinized rules from sport governing bodies which affect economic interests of the parties in the context of free movement and competition law. Evidently, this relationship has resulted in a struggle between sport governing bodies and the EU over a number of topics including non-discrimination on the basis of nationality.

Traditionally, the CJEU has addressed issues of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in sports cases from a free movement perspective in ensuring that sport rules do not disrupt the EU’s internal market. For example, when a rule from the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) required that a pacemaker be the same nationality as the cyclist in the UCI Motor-paced World Championships, the CJEU rendered its ruling on the basis of the provisions establishing the free movement of workers and service providers. Moreover, the Union of European Football Associations’ (UEFA) 3 plus 2 rule which allowed football clubs to limit the number of foreign players who could play in a match to three players plus two more players who had been ‘assimilated’ by having played a certain amount of years in the concerned national football association were found in the famous Bosman case to be in contravention of the free movement of workers provisions.

In the present case, the parties have argued the case on the basis of the prohibition on the discrimination of nationality flowing from EU citizenship rights. Based on Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union, all nationals of an EU member state automatically have EU citizenship. However, these rights are only triggered when other more specific rights, such as free movement rights, are not activated first. Put differently, if the facts of a case fall within a free movement right, then the case can only be inspected in light of the relevant free movement provision; hence, EU citizenship rights may only be invoked where free movement rights are not applicable.

Interestingly enough, as the AG points out in his opinion, the facts of this case could also be framed as a restriction to freedom of establishment. In any event, the CJEU has yet to address sport rules which concern non-discrimination on the basis of freedom of establishment or EU citizenship.

So how should the CJEU address this issue? Freedom of establishment or EU citizenship rights?

4.     Analysing AG Tanchev’s Opinion: Freedom of Establishment or EU Citizenship Rights?

4.1.Scope of the Freedom of Establishment

Very early on in the opinion, AG Tanchev unambiguously expresses his preference for analysing the present case through a free movement lens.[4] He explains that Mr. Biffi is self-employed as a personal trainer and coach on a continuous and stable manner in Germany which amounts to an economic activity connected to his sporting pursuits.[5] Therefore, AG Tanchev believes the analysis should be pursued under the freedom of establishment provisions. For this view to be endorsed, it is essential that Mr. Biffi’s economic activity is sufficiently connected to his sporting endeavours.

In this context, AG Tanchev recalls the Deliège case which concerned a Judoka, who argued that a national sport governing body’s refusal to select her for an international competition was a violation of her freedom to provide services. The Court in that case had to determine whether she was engaged in an economic activity in order for the fundamental freedom to apply. In doing so, the Court unequivocally states that simply because a sport governing body labels its athlete an amateur, it does not mean that they are automatically disengaged from economic activity, and economic activities in the context of free movement of services should not be interpreted restrictively.[6] Therefore, the Court in the Deliège case focused on the judoka’s sponsorships deals and grants to conclude that she was engaged in economic activities.[7] AG Tanchev, in examining the Deliège case’s relevance, explains that this demonstrates EU law’s flexibility in finding a link between sporting and economic activities, and that even if the DLV’s rules only have an ‘indirect impact’ on Mr. Biffi’s economic activities, it should fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment.[8]

4.2.Restriction on the Freedom of Establishment and Justifications

The opinion then goes on to find that there has been a restriction of Mr. Biffi’s freedom of establishment because the DLV rule puts Mr. Biffi ‘at a disadvantage when compared with German nationals engaged in the provision of athletic training services’ because he is unable ‘to make reference to his achievements in national sporting championships in order to attract business.’ Furthermore, he states that consumers are ‘more likely to be drawn to an athletics coach advertising on-going excellence … in the national athletics championships.’[9] Given that the DLV rule is directly discriminatory, EU law only allows justification under the express derogations enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The DLV would have had a larger window to defend their rules if they were indirectly discriminatory since the CJEU accepts both express derogations and justifications which have been developed by its own case law.

AG Tanchev readily finds that the DLV’s rules fall under the public policy derogation by aiming to ensure that the winner of the national title has a ‘sufficiently strong link’ with the country organising the championship and to ensure that the national selection of athletes for international competitions is not disrupted. It could be argued that these aims have been too easily advanced as public policy objectives. The CJEU has never accepted the former as a derogation or a justification, and concerning the latter, the CJEU has accepted objectives which ensure national representation in international competitions only as justifications. Since justifications developed by the CJEU generally are not applicable to cases of direct discrimination, such as the present case, it can be said that the opinion perhaps too quickly embraces these pursued aims as public policy objectives. This being said, sport already enjoyed a special treatment in the past as the CJEU has been open to consider justifications for directly discriminatory measures in the Bosman case.

4.3.Is the DLV’s measure proportionate?

Assuming that these aims are accepted as express derogations, the DLV measures must then pass proportionality requirements which in EU law require a measure to be suitable for the pursued aim and necessary to achieve those aims. In the sporting context, the CJEU has explained that in order for a sporting rule to be proportionate it must be limited to its proper objective and it must be inherent to the organization of the sport event.[10] AG Tanchev affirms that the measure is disproportionate because the rule disallows Mr. Biffi from competing for the national title and precludes classification in such a competition when for many years he had been allowed to compete and be classified as any other German athlete.[11] Furthermore, given he had this pre-existing right, the DLV’s failure to take any transitional measures or give sufficient notice of this change violates the legitimate expectations of Mr. Biffi who exercised his free movement in reliance of this established regime and infringes the general principle of acquired rights.[12] Thus, it can be inferred that in AG Tanchev’s view, the measure could have been proportionate had there been sufficient transitional measures in place. Such a broad interpretation of proportionality by including the non-national's right to compete for the national title, would greatly restrict the options of a sport governing body wanting to change a rule that could negatively affect the participation of non-nationals in their national competitions.

If this broad approach is not accepted, AG Tanchev contends the measure is still disproportionate since the DLV’s rules potentially exclude non-national participants from competing at all in the national championships. Such a measure could only be legitimate in ‘unusual circumstances.’ In this vein, the opinion suggests less restrictive rules which instead limit the number of non-classified athletes.[13]

Other alternative models have been suggested which are much more likely to pass the proportionality test. One commentator has suggested that non-nationals should be allowed to compete in national championships while perhaps only restricting their ability to actually win the title.[14] If applied to this case, this model would allow Mr. Biffi to participate with classification in the national championships, but if he (or other non-national) were to take the first place, the national title would be given to the highest classified German athlete in the competition. Another model put forward in a recent study suggests that a non-national can only compete in the national championship after having been resident or being member of a local club for a certain period of time. All of these suggestions show that there are a multitude of less restrictive ways to protect the organisation of national championships and the selection process of national athletes for international competitions. An outright ban on participation or only allowing participation outside of classification is remarkably restrictive and has very little chance of passing the necessity requirements under proportionality.

Overall, the argument that this case should be analysed from the freedom of establishment perspective is rather convincing because the economic dimension is clearly present. However, there is still a possibility that the CJEU will follow the line of arguments brought by the applicants based on EU citizenship rights addressed at the end of AG Tanchev’s opinion.

4.4.EU Citizenship Rights

AG Tanchev begins by explaining that even if non-discrimination on the basis of nationality deriving from EU citizenship are applied, the result of the case should be the same because the stated aims of the DLV simply do not meet the proportionality requirements.[15]  However, the opinion goes on to firmly oppose the application of EU citizenship rights in this context.

In its submissions, the Commission had strongly endorsed a view that access to leisure activities should always fall within the scope of EU citizenship rights. AG Tanchev disagrees with such a wide-ranging interpretation because it would be a huge ‘constitutional step’ to give Article 21 TFEU horizontal direct effect, meaning a private party could invoke this provision in a national court against another private party. He maintains that this provision is meant to only have vertical direct effect, where a private party may invoke this provision in a national court against the state. He explains that extending horizontal direct effect to this rather open-ended provision would have a capricious effect that would damage legal certainty because Article 21 TFEU ‘comes into play in the broad and unpredictable range of circumstances’ where applicants are ‘unable to show a link between what is in issue and economic activities’ or ‘fall outside of EU legislation concerning freedom of movement.’[16] On the other hand, one could argue the very purpose of this Article is to provide EU citizens with other means to dispute measures which harm their free movement, and such a restricted interpretation would damage l’effet utile of this provision.   

While it is probably the case that Mr. Biffi’s circumstances fall within the scope of his free movement rights, imagine if he did not have any economic interest, and instead of a coach and personal trainer, he was an accountant or car mechanic. If AG Tanchev’s approach were to be taken in such a case, Mr. Biffi would have absolutely no recourse under EU law to challenge such a discriminatory rule. If Article 18 and 21 TFEU were to be interpreted so restrictively, private monopolistic actors who exercise powers that resemble those of a state (such as many sport governing bodies) could make the exercise of the European citizenship less attractive by limiting the participation of non-nationals in certain leisure activities. The Commission is right in taking a broad approach on this issue, although in the end it found the DLV’s rule to be proportionate, especially since Article 18 and 21 TFEU makes no express reservations against the applicability of these provisions on private parties.[17] A wide interpretation would completely fit the ‘conditional autonomy’ model in which sport rules fall within the scope of EU law, and it is for the sport governing bodies to explain how and why the rule is necessary or ‘inherent’ to the conduct of sports.

5.     Conclusion

If the CJEU finds this case to fall under the scope of the freedom of establishment, it is likely the DLV’s rules will fail to be justified or crumble under the proportionality requirements. Likewise, the outcome is likely to be the same in the improbable case that EU citizenship rights are applied. However, it truly would be a ‘constitutional step’, as AG Tanchev asserted, by greatly widening the possibility of using EU citizenship rights to challenge nationality discrimination in even amateur and leisure sport. Moreover, solidifying horizontal direct effect of the EU citizenship rights would have an impact way beyond sport related cases.

Regardless, even if Mr. Biffi’s case is examined from the freedom of establishment, it will be a momentous occasion for the CJEU to further elucidate the boundaries of the application of EU law to sport. In this respect, AG Tanchev’s opinion provides an excellent analysis of the legal issues arising from the free movement perspective and picks up on the most evident detail that all the parties in the case seemed to have glanced over: Mr. Biffi has an economic interest which is tied to his sporting activities. In the long run, the application of EU citizenship rights to sports seems inevitable, but TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi most likely does not provide the CJEU with a golden opportunity to express itself on this matter.

[1] T.M.C. Asser Institute Report, ‘Study on the Equal Treatment of Non-Nationals in Individual Sports Competitions’ (2010).

[2] Case 36-74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1974 –01405; Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.

[3] Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (1^st edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 71.

[4] Case C-22/18 TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:181, Opinion of AG Tanchev, para 48.

[5] ibid para 55.

[6] Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] ECR I-02549 para 46.

[7] ibid paras 51-53.

[8] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) para 62.

[9] ibid para 70.

[10] Walrave (n 2) para 9; Deliège (n 6) para 64.

[11] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) paras 80, 88.

[12] ibid para 83.

[13] ibid paras 92-93.

[14] Weatherill (n 3) 203.

[15] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) para 97.

[16] ibid para 103.

[17] ibid paras 37-40.

Editor's note: Marine Montejo is a graduate from the College of Europe in Bruges and is currently an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

The result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 took the European Union (almost) by surprise. A lot has been said and written about the impact of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. As in all other areas, the British sport sector will also face the effects of the modification of the relationship between the EU and its (probable) former Member State, the UK. It is nearly impossible to foresee all consequences as the UK has not even triggered article 50 TFEU yet to officially start the exit negotiations. However, as the UK position toward the EU will change in any case, this two-part blog aims to examine the main practical implications of such an exit for the UK, but also for the EU, in relation to the actual application of EU law in sport and the EU sport policy.

Unless stated otherwise, the use of the terms Brexit in this blog should be understood as a complete exit of the UK from the European Union. This blog focus in particular on this worst case scenario and its consequences for UK sport. However, it is highly improbable that the future Brexit negotiations with the EU will end up without some kind of special agreement between the two parties the first of which being an EEA type of agreement with full access to the internal market and applicability of EU law. 

The first part of this blog will examined the consequences for UK sport in terms of access to the EU internal market and the applicability of free movement principles. The second part is focused on specific impacts with regard of others domain of EU law for professional and grassroots UK sport. 

Part 1. EU free movement and the internal market

The EU internal market and its free movement of people declination was at the centre of the Brexit referendum. The potential consequences for the Premier League and professional footballers have been commented upon thoroughly elsewhere. Yet, Brexit’s impact is not restricted to British sport’s leading product, such as the Premier League, nor solely the freedom of movement provisions.

The controversy: free movement of sportspeople

The right to free movement is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EU to its citizens and it is at the core of EU treaties. It means that any direct or indirect discrimination based on nationality is prohibited (article 18 TFEU), leaving EU citizens free to exercise their right to move freely and reside within the territories of the 28 EU Members States (article 21 TFEU). These rights apply to both professional and amateur sportspeople, and Brexit will have consequences for them whether they are British citizens or from other Members States.

First, in relation to professional and semi-professional sportspeople, when looking for example at consequences of Brexit on the Premier League, it is the principle of free movement of workers (article 45 TFEU) that is at stake. It should be noted that Brexit will impact not only footballers but also all professional athletes that are considered as “workers” within the meaning of the Treaty. In this context, “workers” means those who are gainfully employed (as stated in 1976 by the European Court of Justice - ECJ - in the Donà and Mantero case, 13/76). These athletes might be rugby or basketball players in a professional clubs or cyclists in a team to give a few examples. Also, other individuals associated with sportspeople may rely on the provisions of free movement of workers, such as doctors, physiotherapists, stable staff, coaches or administrative staff. 

Free movement also currently applies to professional and semi-professional sportspeople that are not “workers”. Freedoms of establishment (article 49 TFEU) and provision of services (article 56 TFEU) apply to athletes that are self-employed (for example tennis players, sailors or horse riders) or to instructors, coaches, or physical trainers. Sports agents may also rely on both freedoms if they are established in another of the EU’s Members States and/or if they are providing their services during a player transfer for example. To illustrate these provisions with genuine practical cases, you may want to think of a UK tennis player that has established himself in France for training purposes for a long period, or of Italian professional horse rider coming to the UK to provide a couple of hours of training for a master class. These situations are much more common than one believes and Brexit might have an important impact on significant number of people working in the sport sector.

At the time of writing it is impossible to know (or even guess) how events will unfold or what the future position of the UK toward the EU will be after Brexit negotiations. The impact will have to be assessed depending on whether and, if so, how the UK will have access to the internal market. A few UK sports officials have raised their voices to recall, for example, the strong position of British football in Europe and asked for exception regimes for their players. Without intending to sound pessimistic, EU officials have already made it very clear that the UK may not pick and choose how they access the internal market and it is difficult to see how a “sport exemption” regarding free movement of athletes may be granted against any other sectors. A solution might be to implement national UK legislation giving free access to professional players to the UK labour market. A problem will however remain regarding free access to the EU market for UK players as, in that case, there is no obligation for the EU to grant reciprocity. If the professional and semi-professional sport sector in the UK (and in the EU as well for UK players) wishes to still be able to recruit athletes that are EU citizens after the exit as easily as it was before Brexit, it should advocate for an EEA agreement (“EEA type” - which seems inconsistent with the intended aims of the referendum as, in this situation, the UK would retain its access to the internal market but would give up its voting rights). 

In the worst case scenario of a complete exit from the EU, is there any good news for UK sport? British sports federations will be able to implement rules entailing direct discrimination, including introducing quotas of players based on nationality or favouring their own athletes which is, for now, completely forbidden under EU law. On the other hand, the return of visas and work permits between the UK and the EU might lessen the level of competition in national championships as it will hinder exchanges of athletes on both sides. It is quite unsure that this is the best option for British sport. Moreover, one should remember that non-discrimination is also granted to sportspeople coming from non-EU countries under the terms of agreements between the EU and third countries (Igor Simutenkov C-265/03). For example, under the terms of the Cotonou Agreements, it is impossible to impose nationality based quotas for sportsmen from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group of States provided the player entered the territory of one of the Member States legally, which is a strict condition. This principle implies that a player coming from one of the countries covered by that agreement is not considered as a “foreign” player if quotas for such players are in force in that sport (this is the case for Rugby Union for example). It also means that the UK not only has to renegotiate its relationship with the EU but with all other non-EU countries that are, for now, covered by these association or partnership agreements. British sport will need to be cautious about it.

It should also be noted that Brexit will lead to the end of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (see directive 2005/36). This principle applies in the sport sector as well whenever the possession of a diploma is legally required; Member States cannot refuse to permit EU citizens from other Member States to participate in a profession if they hold a recognised qualification from their country for working in that profession unless there are substantial differences in the level of qualification or duration of training. This applies to coaches (i.e. ski instructors) or doctors in the sport sector for example. Another very specific example is the European professional card (directive 2013/55/EU, applicable from 18 January 2016) that has been implemented for mountain guides (and physiotherapists) and allows for a simple and rapid recognition of professional qualifications. Consequences might be less important where an international sports governing body sets up its own set of qualifications (think about the UEFA Pro Licence for football coaches).

Free movement provisions likewise apply to amateur athletes. Based on a combined reading of articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU, EU citizens who participate in an amateur sporting activity by using their right to free movement should not be discriminated on grounds of nationality. It is, once more, nearly impossible to currently illustrate the impact of Brexit with tangible facts but it means that free movement of EU citizens who are amateur athletes will be affected while coming to or from the UK for competition or training purposes. Furthermore, in terms of injuries or accidents while training or competing, it should be recalled that Brexit may affect the European health insurance system. This system gives every EU citizens access to state-provided healthcare during a stay in any of the EU countries under the same conditions as people insured in that country.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Brexit may impact upon the sport sector as it has links to EU citizenship. A complete Brexit will entail that sports supporters cannot travel as freely between the UK and the EU as they used to. Again, a return to a strict visa policy seems unlikely but giving up EU citizenship will have consequences on border and passport controls and on the organisation of sport events in the UK. The UK and the EU will also no longer be entitled to the cooperation organised against violence and hooliganism within the EU (Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, security at international football matches), or, at least, not in the same terms.

The underlying problem: free movement of goods

Free movement of goods is an essential element of the single market (articles 30, 34 and 35 TFEU) and it provides for the prohibition of measures that restrict trade between Member States, including not only customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports but all equivalent measures. Sports clothing and materials are covered by these provisions. We shall probably enter a period of uncertainty but the future of trade relations between the UK and the EU will be at the top of the agenda as soon as the negotiations start. Also, in order to facilitate free movement, European standards for sporting purposes goods have been set up by the European Committee for Standardization – n°136 - (full list of standards here). This probably exposes the EU to the bureaucratic suspicion but these harmonisations are necessary to facilitate trade between the EU and to ensure a common level of consumer safety. UK/EU negotiations on Brexit will surely and primarily focus on trade agreements which hopefully will lower the risk of a return to full quotas and tariffs obligations. Nonetheless, trade between the UK and the EU will suffer as much in the sport sector as for other sectors and, again, an EEA type agreement would be welcome for both parties. 

One specific category of goods is important for the sport sector, namely the circulation of civil firearms. EU sport shooters have access to a European firearms pass under directive 91/477/EEC on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. This means that they can cross EU internal market borders without prior authorisation in order to attend competitions and trainings. Brexit will withdraw the possibility of obtaining that pass which may result in more red tape for sportspeople at the borders.

Finally, free movement also concerns horses which under EU law are qualified of “goods intended for sporting purposes”. This term is used to refer to the set of directives regulating the movement of and trade in equidae at the EU level. Three different directives are in force and may be impacted by Brexit. In turn, this will have severe consequences for the UK as the horse sector, whether for competition or horseracing, is really strong. Identification requirements – name, genealogy and victories – are established by EU law (directive 90/427/EEC and regulation 504/2008/EC) under strict animal health conditions and “regional” quarantine principles in case of disease (directive 2009/156/EEC). Trade of horses and participation in competitions within the EU is subject to non-discrimination and equal treatment principles between horses without distinction based on the Member States of origin (directive 90/428/EEC). This principle applies to the rules of competition, the judging and the prizes awarded for that competition. Some exceptions regarding specific stud-book, regional or traditional competition are possible. Finally, it should also be noted that a European Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products exists to implement the free movement of veterinary products and to prevent animal doping. Re-entry of registered horses for racing, competition and cultural events after temporary export to non-EU countries is also regulated (directive 93/195/EEC). The UK horse sector will have to change its habits (see, for example the reaction of British horseracing authority to the Brexit vote) after Brexit and the movement of horses with the EU will be more difficult as a consequence. However, as a former EU Member State, the UK will certainly negotiate a favourable agreement with the EU even though obligations concerning the arrival from and return to their home countries outside the EU of sport horses is already regulated. Additionally, it will be possible to negotiate bilateral agreements.[1]

The impact of Brexit regarding the rules of the internal market is important and goes further than just football and the Premier League. The push for a trade agreement with access to the EU internal market here has a special importance for UK sport as for the EU. Otherwise, a complete Brexit will surely end up in a difficult step backward alongside a complete reorganisation of national rules.  

[1] Such an agreement – Tripartite Agreement (TPA) – already exists between France, the United Kingdom and Ireland.