Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Call for Papers - How football changed Qatar (or not): Transnational legal struggles in the shadow of the FIFA World Cup 2022 - Deadline 6 January 2023

The FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar is now well under way, yet the relentless public debates around Qatar’s human rights record, be it regarding the rights of LGBTQ+ or the rights of migrant workers who built the infrastructure that underpin the competition, is not dying down. In fact, the whole build-up towards the event has been defined by an intense public scrutiny of Qatar, with civil society organizations and international labor unions engaging in continuous advocacy to report on and improve the living and working conditions of migrant workers active on Qatar’s many building sites. This issue also attracted attention and critique from both the international media and public authorities all around the globe. In fact, the question of Qatar’s (lack of) compliance with internationally recognized human rights and core labor standards caused so much negative publicity and external pressure that a number of legislative and institutional reforms were initiated, officially aimed at improving the rights and standing of migrant workers in Qatar. While it is highly disputed whether these reforms have led to actual changes on the ground or should be seen only as window-dressing, it remains clear that the global public attention brought to Qatar by its hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 has forced the Qatari authorities to engage legislative reforms and pay at least lip service to the concerns raised.

In spite of the fact that this issue continues to play a major role in the transnational public discourse, it received until now relatively scant attention in the academic literature, specifically in the international/transnational legal field. Yet, the debates around the Qatar 2022 World Cup are in practice mobilizing a range of legal arguments connected to the interpretation and application of international human rights law and international labor law, as well as activating international (at the ILO) or transnational (at the Swiss OECD National Contact Point) legal processes. Furthermore, they raise well-known questions regarding the compliance of states with international legal commitments and connect with debates on the universality of human rights and their translation in particular social contexts. In short, we believe there is room for a multi-disciplinary engagement with the legal processes and social mobilizations triggered by Qatar’s successful bid to host the FIFA World Cup 2022 and their impacts on local social and legal rules and institutions. Hence, Qatar’s journey towards the FIFA World Cup 2022 constitutes an interesting case study to investigate more generally the transnational social and legal mechanisms which underpin the concretization of international (human rights/labor) law in a particular context and give it a specific reality.

We invite paper submissions from different methodological backgrounds (e.g. law, anthropology, sociology, history, public policy) which engage with the many entanglements of Qatar with international (human rights and labor) law in the context of the organizing and hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022. The papers will be first discussed in a digital workshop that will take place on 15 and 16 February 2023. Please note that we have an agreement with the German Law Journal (Open access journal on comparative, European and international law published by Cambridge University Press) to publish a selection of the papers.

If you wish to participate in the workshop and the ensuing publications, please send an abstract of max. 300 words and a CV to a.duval@asser.nl by 6 January 2023. The selected participants will be informed by 9 January 2023. Extended abstracts (2000 words) will be due on 6 February 2023.


Supported by German Law Journal

 

Time to focus on freedom of expression: Rainbows, armbands, and FIFA’s commitment to human rights - By Prof. Mark James (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Editor's note: Mark James is Professor of Sports Law at Manchester Metropolitan University and the author of a leading Sports Law textbook.


The opening days of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 have already resulted in a number of issues of interest to sports lawyers and human rights lawyers, with FARE’s Piara Powar claiming that this is the most political major sporting event that he has attended. Both FIFA and the local organisers have been active in their suppression of expressions of support for LGBTQIA+ rights by players, fans and journalists alike, calling into question once again the legality of restricting free speech by sporting rules and regulations.

There have been two major flashpoints to date. First, seven European federations had asked FIFA for permission for their captains to wear armbands supporting the ‘OneLove’ campaign. FIFA’s response was to refuse, resulting in the German players covering their mouths for their pre-match photographs in protest at their being silenced. There are several grounds on which FIFA would seek to support its position:

  •  Law 4.5 of the Laws of the Game prohibits any playing equipment from carrying any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images.
  • Regulation 4.3.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations and Regulation 27.1 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits clothing or equipment that includes political, religious, or personal slogans, statements, or images, or otherwise does not comply in full with the Laws of the Game.
  • Regulation 33.3 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits the display of political, religious or personal messages or slogans of any nature in any language or form by players and officials.
  • Regulation 13.8.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations states that for FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA (all Regulations available in the FIFA Legal Handbook 2022).

Although the DFB is considering a challenge to FIFA’s refusal to allow its captain to wear the OneLove armband, which would ultimately be heard before CAS, it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the strict requirements of the above Laws and Regulations. However, what could cause more difficulty for both FIFA and CAS is if the DFB frames its case as a challenge to the compliance of the rules that restrict players’ freedom of expression with Article 3 of FIFA’s Statutes, which states that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights.’ Article 3, together with the additional detail provided by FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, ensures that freedom of expression as defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are limitative rules that can be applied directly to FIFA’s activities, as has been argued by Bützler and Schöddert. Further, if the affected players and associations can define themselves as human rights defenders, then Article 11 of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy states that, ‘FIFA will respect and not interfere with the work of … human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA.’ Any challenge using this approach would be the first real test of the enforceability of the human rights protections to which FIFA claims to be committed. It would also be a test of CAS’s ability to require adherence to the human rights commitments made by ISFs and to prove that they are more than simple window-dressing.

Secondly, members of The Rainbow Wall, a contingent of LGBTQIA+ rights-supporting Welsh fans, were prevented from entering the Ahmed bin Ali stadium whilst wearing bucket hats incorporating a rainbow into its design. No explanation for why was given, however, FIFA and the local organisers would argue that openly supporting LGBTQIA+ rights with the aim of promoting legal change in a country where homosexuality is illegal is a political statement on apparel and therefore entry into the stadium wearing the rainbow hat is in breach of the Regulation 3.1.23 of the Stadium Code of Conduct. A similar argument could be used to justify preventing US journalist Grant Wahl from entering the stadium wearing a t-shirt incorporating a rainbow into its design and Danish journalist Jon Pagh from wearing the OneLove armband. However, it must be stressed that no such explanation for the prohibitions applied to these garments was provided to any of the affected fans or journalists. It must also be recognised that the opinion that promoting LGBTQIA+ rights is a political expression is highly contested. In a statement from FIFPRO, the opposing view was stated succinctly: ‘We maintain that a rainbow flag is not a political statement but an endorsement of equality and thus a universal human right.’

It is clear that, as with Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, the chilling effect that FIFA’s Regulations have on players’ and fans’ freedom of expression is likely to be unlawful, as has been discussed at length both on this blog and on the Verfassungsblog Debate on Freedom of Expression in the Olympic Movement. Instead of revisiting these arguments, which are taken to apply to FIFA’s actions at Qatar 2022, two additional issues related to the FIFA Statutes are explored here.

Articles 3 and 4 of FIFA’s Statutes state that:

3 Human rights

FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.

4 Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

4.1 Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.

FIFA is a long-time supporter of pride events and in its press release for Pride Month 2022 stated:

[The] FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ will be a celebration of unity and diversity – a joining of people from all walks of life – regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression – everybody will be welcome.

Claims that all staff involved in the Qatar 2022 including public and private security forces, would be trained on how to accomplish their tasks in a non-discriminatory manner, seem not to have been operationalised effectively.

This begs the question whether FIFA is in breach of its own Statutes by refusing to allow players to express themselves freely on armbands and failing to protect fans’ freedom of expression by wearing rainbows. At the very least, FIFA should have ensured that a protective LGBTQIA+ regime in the stadiums and the fan zones during the World Cup was implemented to enable the ‘celebration of unity and diversity’ it claims that Qatar 2022 should be. FIFA’s actions in Qatar call into question its claims to be an inclusive and supportive leader on anti-discrimination and human rights, and is likely to see a backlash from the LGBTQIA+ community that it claims to support when it engages with Pride 2023; accusations of hypocrisy and virtue signalling are guaranteed.

With no resolution to the debate at the time of writing, Articles 3 and 4 could provide players and fans with the opportunity to demonstrate their support for human rights and anti-discrimination causes. At the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Athlete Ally developed the ‘Principle 6 Campaign.’ Instead of criticising directly Russia's so called anti-gay laws, which are currently in the process of being extended, athletes promoted Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, which at the time stated that, ‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ The eventual outcome of this campaign was the addition of sexual orientation to the list of characteristics protected by Principle 6. Unlike at Sochi 2014, there is no need to campaign for a change to either of Articles 3 or 4 of the FIFA Statutes; instead, activists want to ensure that they are being applied. An immediate response for both players and fans would be for them to quote specifically from Articles 3 and 4, as it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to claim that they are making political or personal statements when promoting FIFA’s own foundational values. A creative reminder of what FIFA claims to stand for could enable player and fan activism to continue throughout the tournament, and beyond, whilst affected players and associations can develop a compelling case for the restrictions on freedom of expression to be struck out by CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal and/or the European Court of Human Rights.

New Event - Zoom In - Sports Governing Bodies and the Russian invasion of Ukraine - The end of neutrality? - 12 October - 16.00-17.30 CET

Sport is often presented by Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and in particular the International Olympic Committee, as apolitical. A neutral endeavor, which ignores the whims of politics and keeps national governments at arm’s length. In short, it is thought of as an autonomous sphere of transnational society wishing to remain unaffected by the political turbulences out there. In fact, many SGBs enforce strict rules banning political speech by individuals, and in the spaces, subjected to their contractual power. Moreover, FIFA, for example, regularly issues effective sanctions against states which are perceived as threatening the autonomy of the governance of football on their territory. Hence, this apolitical ideal of international sports is not only a founding myth of the Olympic Movement, it is actively pursued by SGBs through their private regulatory powers and has hard consequences for athletes, clubs, sport officials alike.


Yet, on 24 February, Russia decided to invade Ukraine, in what has become the most important land war in Europe since the implosion of ex-Yugoslavia. This invasion was quickly followed by condemnations from the IOC and many other SGBs, leading in many cases, most prominently by UEFA and FIFA, to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from international sporting competitions. This reaction is difficult to square with the neutrality and autonomy of sport so vigorously defended by the international SGBs until recently. It raises also many questions of double standards: why did this illegal invasion lead to sporting consequences and not others? Furthermore, the Court of Arbitration of Sport recently released two orders (available here and here) concerning UEFA and FIFA’s decisions to exclude Russian national teams and clubs from their football competitions, which outline the legal strategies pursued by the SGBs to reconcile the public urge to exclude Russia(ns) from international sporting competitions, and their commitments to political neutrality.

We are very happy to welcome three outstanding scholars to discuss these issues with us from different methodological perspectives.

Speakers:

  • Prof. Carmen Pérez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), who wrote a blog on the reactions of SGBs to Russia’s invasion
  • Dr. Daniela Heerdt (Asser Institute and Centre for Sports and Human Rights), who is the co-author of a blog mapping the reactions of SGBs to Russia’s invasion
  • Carole Gomez (University of Lausanne and Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques), who has been interviewed numerous times by international media on the issue (see here and here)

Moderators:

Register for free HERE!


ISLJ Conference 2022 - Transnational sports law and governance in turbulent times - Early Bird Registration Ends Tomorrow!

On 25 and 26 October 2022, the Asser Institute in The Hague will host the 2022 edition of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference. The ISLJ is the leading academic journal in transnational sports law and governance and is proud to provide a platform for transnational debates on the state of the field. 2022 has put a number of complex issues and disputes on the top of the transnational sports law agenda, which will be at the heart of the conference.


Sports governing bodies react to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
First, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February triggered a swift and decisive reaction by a wide range of international sports governing bodies (SGBs), leading in particular to the exclusion of Russian teams and athletes from many international sporting competitions, including most prominently the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar. These reactions have shown, once again, that sport is far from immune from the turbulences of international relations and raise the question of its alleged neutrality and apolitical nature. To engage with these issues, we have invited Prof. Jonathan Grix (Metropolitan Manchester University) to deliver a keynote speech and will dedicate a specific panel to discussing the intersection between transnational sports law and international law/relations.

Monopoly of sports governing bodies
Second, the organization of international sports is also currently threatened by challenges to the traditional monopoly position of international SGBs raised under EU antitrust law. Early July 2022, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union heard two crucial cases (International Skating Union and Superleague) concerning the compatibility of the rules of international SGBs aimed at sanctioning athletes and clubs who participate in unauthorized third-party competitions. Dr. Van Rompuy (Leiden University), the driving force behind the ISU case, will be discussing with us the potential impact of competition law on the governance of sport and what to expect from the pending decisions of the CJEU. Additionally, we will host two panels dedicated to the application of competition law to sports governance, both at an international and national level.

Human rights and mega-sporting events
Third, with both Beijing and Qatar hosting mega-sporting events this year, it is difficult to ignore the human rights issues raised by international sporting competitions. A fast-growing social movement aimed at urging the SGBs to abide by their human rights responsibilities has been developing around the activism of some NGOs and the creation of the Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR). The CEO of the CSHR, Mary Harvey, will be joining us to share her thoughts on the role of sports lawyers and sports law academics in this discussion. Her intervention will be followed by a panel dedicated to the intersections between human rights and transnational sports law and governance.

Trans and queer participation in sporting competitions
Finally, the question of the participation of transgender athletes in sporting competitions has become an extremely contentious issue of debate in recent years, especially in the United States. Furthermore, International SGBs, such as FINA recently, have started to impose specific requirements to the participation of trans athlete in international competitions. Our closing panel will take a fresh look at this question by foregrounding the way in which trans and queer participation in sporting competitions has been accommodated in South Asia.

Online participation available
For the first time this year, we will allow online participation to the conference for an affordable price. Our aim is to internationalise and diversify further our audience and to reach people who in light of the current challenges, be it Covid-19 or climate change, are not in a position to come in person to The Hague.

Programme
Download the full programme.

Register HERE! (Early Bird Registration is available only until 1 October, 23:59CET)

A personal reflection on the Summer Programme on Sports Governance and Human Rights - By Pedro José Mercado Jaén

Editor’s note:Pedro is an intern at the Asser Institute and currently studying the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in Sports Ethics and Integrity (KU Leuven et al.) He was one of the participants of the first edition of the Summer Programme on Sports Governance and Human Rights.


In early September, the first Summer Programme on the Governance of Sport and Human Rights took place at the Asser Institute. During one week, various experts in the field presented different lectures to a very diverse group of participants with a wide range of professional backgrounds. Being a participant myself, I would like to reflect on this one-week course and share what I learned. More...



Can Formula 1 drive to protect human rights? A case study of the Bahrain GP - By Pedro José Mercado Jaén

Editor's Note: Pedro is an intern at the Asser Institute and currently studying the Erasmus Mundus Master Degree in Sports Ethics and Integrity (KU Leuven et al.) He worked as a research fellow for the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, and his primary research interests lie in the fields of International Human Rights and sport. 


I.               Introduction

“I can’t do everything and I can’t do it alone. I need allies.” These are the words of the seven-time Formula 1 (F1) world champion, Lewis Hamilton. He was urging more support to advocate for the protection of human rights in the countries visited by Formula 1. During the last years, Hamilton together with Sebastian Vettel, have become the leaders of a movement demanding accountability and greater awareness of the impact of F1 on society.

The inclusion of the Bahrain GP on the F1 racing calendar for the first time in 2004 ignited concerns, which have grown with the inclusion of Abu Dhabi in 2007, Russia in 2014, Azerbaijan in 2017, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2021. The inability and lack of commitment of state authorities to protect and respect human rights, the ineffectiveness of judicial procedures and the systematic repression of political opposition are some of the factors that make these countries prone to human rights violations. Academics and CSOs regularly argue that F1, by signing multi-million dollar contracts with these countries, is complicit in sportswashing. Those pulling the sport’s strings deny these accusations and claim that human rights are at the centre of their agenda when they visit these countries. They claim F1 can drive the improvement of human rights standards in a particular country. However, reality tells a different story. The Bahrain GP has been running for more than a decade and the situation in the country has only worsened, without any signs of F1 contributing to the improvement of the protection of human rights there.

This blog aims to provide an overview of the human rights challenges F1 is facing when hosting a Grand Prix. For this purpose, a case study of the Bahrain GP, one of the longest-running on the modern/current F1 calendar, will be carried out. This will allow us to examine in detail the historical evolution of the GP, the complaints from civil society organisations and the reaction of the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and other stakeholders to the ongoing allegations of human rights violations.More...



Call for papers - ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law - Asser Institute - 25 and 26 October 2022

 

Call for papers

ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law

Asser Institute, The Hague

25 and 26 October 2022


The Editors of the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) invite you to submit abstracts for the ISLJ Conference on International Sports Law, which will take place on 25 and 26 October 2022 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. The ISLJ, published by Springer and TMC Asser Press, is the leading academic publication in the field of international sports law. The conference is a unique occasion to discuss the main legal issues affecting international sports and its governance with renowned academic experts.


We are delighted to announce the following confirmed keynote speakers:

  • Jonathan Grix (Professor of Sport Policy and Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University), and
  • Mary Harvey (CEO at the Centre for Sport and Human Rights),
  • Ben Van Rompuy (Assistant Professor at Leiden University).


We welcome abstracts from academics and practitioners on all issues related to international sports law and governance. We also welcome panel proposals (including a minimum of three presenters) on a specific issue. For this year’s edition, we specifically invite submissions on the following themes and subthemes:

  • International sports law and governance in times of conflict:
    • The emergence of the idea(l) of political neutrality of SGBs and its translation in legal/governance practice
    • The intersection between public international law and international sports law and governance in the context of international conflicts
    • The role of sports diplomacy/conditionality in the context of international conflicts
    • International sports law and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

  • Human rights and mega sporting events (MSEs)
    • The adverse or positive impact of MSEs on (specific) human rights
    • The influence of human rights commitments on the organisation of MSEs
    • The effects of MSEs on human rights in organising countries
    • The responsibilities and strategies of SGBs to ensure respect of human rights at MSEs
    • The role and responsibilities of states in ensuring respect of human rights in the context of MSEs

  • Competition law and challenges to the governance monopoly of SGBs
    • The impact of competition law on SGBs and their governance
    • The limits of competition law on effecting change in the governance of sport
    • The specific modalities of application of competition law to sports governance
    • The legitimacy of competition authorities in challenging SGBs


Please send your abstract of 300 words and CV no later than 1 July 2022 to a.duval@asser.nl. Selected speakers will be informed by 15 July.

The selected participants will be expected to submit a draft paper by 10 October 2022. Papers accepted and presented at the conference are eligible for publication in a special issue of the ISLJ subject to peer-review. Submissions after this date will be considered for publication in later editions of the Journal.

The Asser Institute will cover one night accommodation for the speakers and may provide a limited amount of travel grants (max. 250€). If you wish to be considered for a grant, please indicate it in your submission.

Reactions of International Sport Organisations to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: An Overview - By Daniela Heerdt & Guido Battaglia

Editor's note:

Daniela is a researcher at the Asser Institute in the field of sport and human rights. She has a background in public international law and human rights law and defended her PhD project entitled “Blurred Lines of Responsibility and Accountability – Human Rights Abuses at Mega-Sporting Events” in April 2021 at Tilburg University. She also works as independent consultant in the field of sport and human rights for the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, or the European Parliament among other clients from the sports ecosystem

As Head of Policy and Outreach, Guido is in charge of the Centre for Sport & Human Rights engagement with governments, international and intergovernmental organisations and sports organisations. He represents the Centre at conferences, events and bilateral dialogues to reach new audiences and partners and raise public awareness and understanding of the Centre’s work .



On February 24, 2022, the Russian military invaded Ukrainian territory. What followed was an escalation of the war, day by day, causing thousands of victims and forcing millions of people to flee. On March 2, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution deploring "in the strongest possible terms" Russia's aggression against Ukraine by a vote of 141 to 5, with 35 abstentions. On March 29, Russian and Ukrainian representatives met in Istanbul for another round of negotiations. No ceasefire has been agreed and hostilities continue.

Many states, international organizations and corporations quickly took measures in response to this invasion. Hundreds of companies decided to withdraw from Russia. Some countries decided to strengthen economic sanctions against Russia and Belarus and to provide military and economic help to Ukraine. Many civil society actors mobilised to organize and provide humanitarian support for Ukraine. Interestingly, international sports organisations like the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), World Athletics and many other international federations, issued statements condemning the invasion and imposed bans and sanctions on Russian and Belarussian sports bodies and athletes.

This blog post provides an overview of the measures adopted by a number of international sports federations (IFs) that are part of the Olympic Movement since the beginning of the war and analyses how they relate to the statements issued by the IOC and other sanctions and measures taken by international sports organisations in reaction to (geo)political tensions and conflict.

More...





[Conference] Towards a European Social Charter for Sport Events - 1 December - 13:00-17:00 - Asser Institute

Sport events, especially when they are of a global scale, have been facing more and more questions about their impact on local communities, the environment, and human rights. 

It has become clear that their social legitimacy is not a given, but must be earned by showing that sport events can positively contribute to society. During this half-day conference, we will debate the proposal of a European Social Charter for Sport Events in order to achieve this goal. 

In January 2021, a consortium of eight partners launched a three-year project, supported by the European Commission under the Erasmus+ scheme, aimed at devising a European Social Charter for Sport Events (ESCSE). The project ambitions to develop a Charter which will contribute to ensuring that sport events taking place in the European Union are socially beneficial to the local communities concerned and, more generally, to those affected by them. The project is directly inspired by the decision of the Paris 2024 bid to commit to a social charter enforced throughout the preparation and the course of the 2024 Olympics.

This first public event in the framework of the ESCSE project, will be introducing the project to a wider public. During the event we will review the current state of the implementation of the Paris 2024 Social Charter, discuss the expectations of stakeholders and academics for a European Social Charter and present for feedback the first draft of the ESCSE (and its implementing guidelines) developed by the project members. It will be a participatory event; we welcome input from the participants.

The Asser International Sports Law Centre, powered by the Asser Institute, is contributing to the project through the drafting of a background study, which we will introduce during the conference.

Please note that we can provide some financial support (up to 100 euros)  towards travel and/or accommodation costs for a limited number of participants coming from other EU Member States or the UK. To apply for this financial support please reach out to ConferenceManager@asser.nl.  `

Register HERE

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Can a closed league in e-Sports survive EU competition law scrutiny? The case of LEC - By Thomas Terraz

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Can a closed league in e-Sports survive EU competition law scrutiny? The case of LEC - By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.


1.     Introduction

The organizational structure of sports in Europe is distinguished by its pyramid structure which is marked by an open promotion and relegation system. A truly closed system, without promotion and relegation, is unknown to Europe, while it is the main structure found in North American professional sports leagues such as the NFL, NBA and the NHL. Recently, top European football clubs along with certain members of UEFA have been debating different possibilities of introducing a more closed league system to European football. Some football clubs have even wielded the threat of forming an elite closed breakaway league. Piercing through these intimidations and rumors, the question of whether a closed league system could even survive the scrutiny of EU competition law remains. It could be argued that an agreement between clubs to create a completely closed league stifles competition and would most likely trigger the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.[1] Interestingly, a completely closed league franchise system has already permeated the European continent. As outlined in my previous blog, the League of Legends European Championship (LEC) is a European e-sports competition that has recently rebranded and restructured this year from an open promotion and relegation system to a completely closed franchise league to model its sister competition from North America, the League Championship Series. This case is an enticing opportunity to test how EU competition law could apply to such a competition structure.

As a preliminary note, this blog does not aim to argue whether the LEC is a ‘real’ sport competition and makes the assumption that the LEC could be considered as a sports competition.[2]



2.     LEC’s Position in the League of Legends Competitive Structure

The LEC is the pinnacle of League of Legends (LoL) competition in Europe that is organized by its developer, Riot Games. Currently, the LEC is the only path to the League of Legends World Championship. Its previous name was the EU League Championship Series (EU LCS), and it featured a promotion and relegation system with the EU Challenger Series. The EU Challenger Series has been replaced with the European Masters, which is a tournament that places the top seed from European regional leagues against each other. It is important to highlight that the teams in the LEC do not compete on behalf of their region (although some of the organizations from the LEC have their second team competing in a regional leagues).

The franchise agreement between the LEC and the participant e-sport organizations required organizations to buy-in at 10.5 million euros into the LEC. The ensuing partnership lasts three years and ensures that the organization is guaranteed a spot in the LEC during this period, unless there are “consistent poor performance or disciplinary issues”. The agreement effectively prevents any other European organization/team from the regional leagues and the European Masters from accessing the highest LoL championship in Europe (the LEC) and completely cuts off any opportunity to reach the League of Legends World Championships for at least three years.

The previous system of relegation and promotion has helped foster talent and create new successful European e-sports organizations. Currently, the winners of Mid-Season Invitational 2019 (a mid-year world championship) is G2 Esports, which was able to rise to the EU LCS through the EU Challenger Series in late 2015. As a result, concerns have been expressed that by adopting the closed league model, the LEC will not be able to nurture new talent and competitive organizations. This worry goes to the heart of Article 165 TFEU’s aim to develop the ‘openness’ of sporting competitions and gives merit to analyzing the LEC under EU competition law rules.[3]

 

3.     EU Competition Law and its Application to Sports

Generally speaking, EU competition law seeks to ensure ‘effective’ competition between undertakings in Europe. Concerning the field of sports, the CJEU asserted that rules of sport governing bodies fall under the inspection of EU competition law even if they are purely sporting in nature.[4] However, the CJEU left room for sport governing bodies to defend their measures which fall within the scope of competition rules. Sporting rules can escape the prohibitions of EU competition law if it can be shown that the concerned measures are inherent to the objectives it seeks to achieve and that they are “proportionate to the legitimate genuine sporting interest pursued”.  In other words, the specificity of sport must be taken into account.[5] Additionally, the CJEU has recognized that the participation in sport competitions can constitute economic activity because of the exposure that participation may provide.[6] Thus, preventing other organizations and their athletes from taking part in a league competition and as a consequence, the world championships, can have detrimental economic impacts on that organization and its athletes.

For this reason, the organizational structure of sport competitions may have colossal economic ramifications and easily fall within the scope of the Treaties. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the two cornerstones of EU competition law that prima facie would be applicable to this case. Essentially, Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict competition, and Article 102 TFEU forbids an undertaking or group of undertakings (collective dominance) from abusing its dominant position on the relevant market. So when a group of undertakings hold a dominant position in the relevant market and make an agreement which abuses their dominant position, the CJEU has recognized that both Article 101 and 102 TFEU may be applied. Nevertheless, the following analysis will concentrate on Article 102 TFEU.

 

4.     Does LEC (and its participant organizations) have a Dominant Position?

4.1.Are the LEC (and its participant organizations) undertakings?

As a preliminary point, the European Commission and the CJEU has repeatedly qualified sport governing bodies as undertakings under EU competition law.[7] The key criteria to determine whether an entity is an undertaking under EU law is whether the entity is engaged in ‘economic activity’. In MOTOE, the CJEU ruled that ELPA, a body that was organizing motorcycling events, was engaged in economic activity because it entered into “sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts designed to exploit those events commercially”.[8] In the present case, there is little doubt that the League European Championship Limited, which is a private company limited by shares incorporated in the Republic of Ireland controlled by Riot Games, could be considered an undertaking since it concludes sponsorships and advertises its events.

The organizations that have signed the franchise agreement with Riot Games are mainly private limited companies.[9] These organizations enter into sponsorship agreements, and as stated earlier, the CJEU found that the participation in a sport competition could constitute economic activity. It follows that these e-sport organizations would easily be considered as undertakings.

 

4.2.What is the relevant market?

The next issue is determining the relevant market, including the relevant product and geographic market, the LEC and its participant organizations occupy. To identify the relevant product market, EU competition law examines the substitutability of the product or service. For example, in defining the relevant product or service market, the CJEU in MOTOE quite readily found that ELPA was “engaged ... in the organisation of motorcycling events and … their exploitation by means of sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts”.[10]

From the outset, it should be underlined that games considered as e-sports greatly differ from one another.[11] E-sports usually fall within different genres of games, such as Real-Time Strategy (RTS), First-Person Shooter (FPS), Fighting, and Sports games. LoL falls within the Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) genre. Thus, one may argue the relevant market in this case is e-sports competitions in the MOBA market. One way to test this market definition would be examining the ability of e-sports players to move from one e-sport to another.

Unfortunately, there has not been a complete study on the maneuverability of e-sport professionals between games of the same genre or of a different genre. As a result, it is difficult to have a complete view on the issue. Nevertheless, while there have been cases where certain players from e-sports of a different genre were able to move to LoL successfully (Ggoong [e-sports players are known by their own made up player names]) and others who have moved from LoL to another e-sport (Gesture, Bischu), there have been others who have attempted such moves without success (Destiny). On the other hand, when examining ‘traditional’ sports there are also many examples of athletes who have moved from one sport to another. For example, Primož Roglič was a high-level ski jumper, and even won the Junior Ski World Championship in this discipline, who then moved into professional road cycling and most recently came third in the Giro d’Italia. Ski jumping and road cycling arguably have very little in common, and it would be highly doubtful that the Commission or the CJEU would include both in the same market. Such an extreme example demonstrates that focusing on the maneuverability of e-sports athletes between e-sports may not always be the best way to define an e-sport market, and perhaps a more suitable approach would be to examine the specific features of the e-sport.

In this sense, it should be borne in mind that e-sports in the same genre, while sharing many basic characteristics and many of the fine motor skills, still diverge in terms of gameplay and strategy. If this were not the case, a professional LoL player could become a professional DOTA 2 (another MOBA e-sport) player without any extra effort. In reality, to make a transition, the professional LoL player would have to learn the intricacies and nuances of DOTA 2 compared to LoL, e.g. the champions and their builds, the pace of play, meta (the best strategies to win the game) etc. All of these differences support the argument that perhaps defining the product or service market in this case to MOBA e-sport competitions may be too broad, and it could be more appropriate to narrow the definition to LoL e-sport competitions.

Lastly, the geographic market is much more straightforward to define since the LEC Regulations define the EU Competitive Region in its 2019 Season Official Rules.[12] Therefore, the relevant geographic market would most likely be the EU Competitive Region.

 

4.3.Does LEC (and its participating organizations) have a dominant position in this market?

The Commission provides the most relevant criteria to ascertain whether an undertaking or undertakings hold a dominant position on the relevant market in its Guidance on enforcement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 TFEU). Pertinent benchmarks include the “position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors”, “expansion and entry” of actual or future competitors, and the “bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers” (countervailing buyer power). Usually, market shares are used to give a preliminary indication whether an undertaking occupies a dominant position in the market. The minimum threshold market share for which an undertaking or undertakings may be found to hold a dominant position is around 40-50%.[13]

If the relevant market was defined as the e-sport competitions in the MOBA market in the EU Competitive Region, one would have to examine competitive LoL in comparison to other e-sport competitions in the MOBA genre in Europe. For the purposes of this blog, there is rather limited information on the market share of LoL competitions in comparison to other MOBA e-sports in Europe. However, to at least give an idea of the size and dominance of LoL in the general MOBA market, LoL was projected to have an estimated 66% market share in 2016. When one compares this share to the second place, DOTA 2 with 14 %, it is evident that LoL generally holds a powerful position in the MOBA market and this most likely extends to its e-sports competitions.

In contrast, if the relevant market is narrowed to LoL e-sport competitions in the EU Competitive Region only, there would be an even higher chance of the LEC and its participant organizations being found to hold a dominant position. It could be argued that the European Masters (although Riot Games is a co-organizer) and the LoL regional leagues could be seen as ‘competitors’. Once more, direct information on market shares is scant. However, if one observes the viewership numbers of the LEC versus the European Masters, the LEC completely dwarfs the European Masters. The LEC in its 2019 Spring Split had a peak viewership of over 475,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of over 200,000 viewers. By comparison, the European Masters Spring 2019 competition had a peak viewership of just over 60,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of 32,000 viewers. From these numbers, it is evident that the LEC is overwhelmingly more popular and as a corollary, it may indicate that the LEC’s market share is likely to also reflect this.

 

5.     Does LEC abuse its Dominant Position?

5.1.Is the dominant position being abused and can it be justified (sporting exceptions)?

The finding of a dominant position is not enough to constitute a breach of EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU also requires that the dominant undertaking or undertakings abuse its dominant position, and it allows the dominant undertaking(s) to demonstrate how the relevant measures may be justified and proportionate. Within the sport context, the sport governing body must explain how the conduct which restricts competition pursues a legitimate objective and the anti-competitive effects must be “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives … and are proportionate to them”.[14]  There are a variety of ways an undertaking may abuse its dominant position, but in the present case, the LEC and its participant organizations agreement to seal the LEC and the LoL World Championship from any other European competitors would most likely fall under a non-price based exclusionary abuse. More specifically, exclusionary conduct must constitute ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ which according to the Commission’s Guidance Paper is “a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers” (emphasis added).[15] 

The foreclosure requirement in this case is quite evidently satisfied since the LEC and its participant organizations have effectively excluded other organizations in Europe from the highest European competition of LoL and as a result, the LoL World Championship. Actually assessing whether there has been an increase in price to the detriment of consumers is not necessary, and the CJEU has ruled that “Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as referring not only to practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through their impact on competition”.[16] Moreover, a dominant undertaking “has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the internal market” and “[Article 102 TFEU] is aimed not only at the practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on the competition structure”.[17] Therefore, it is not necessary to show direct harm to consumers, but that the foreclosure effects damage competition to a sufficient degree to their disadvantage.

As discussed earlier, the former promotion and relegation system helped promote new talent and organizations that were able to develop new fanbases, giving the opportunity for the European LoL viewers to get behind up and coming organizations. By stifling the prospects of new organizations from emerging in the LEC or the Worlds stage, market development may be hindered in contravention with Article 102 (b) TFEU at the European LoL e-sport’s expense.

Nonetheless, the LEC hopes that the closed structure “provides teams with more security to make longer investments that will strengthen and support pros, and provide better experiences for fan (sic)”, to “unlock revenue sharing” and “to focus on shaping the long-term future”. Basically, the LEC and its members seek greater financial security for themselves in order to invest more in its players and fans. The question is then whether the restrictions of competition resulting from the closed league described above are inherent to the pursuit of the aforementioned objectives.[18] While “the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams” could be a legitimate objective,[19] it is possible to envisage less restrictive means to achieve financial stability without completely excluding other European organizations from competing for the final LEC title and the LoL World Championship. For example, perhaps the LEC play-offs could give the opportunity for teams number 5 and 6 from the regular season to first face off against the top two teams of the European Masters Tournament.[20] A similar play-in format could easily be introduced for the LoL World Championships. Despite these changes, new organizations would still be precluded from joining the LEC. Perhaps this would require the LEC to come up with new creative structures that allow new organizations to join the LEC after having proven their worth. An example of such a system can be found in the top European basketball competition, EuroLeague, which issues different license/partner tiers for its participating clubs in order to provide better financial security for itself and its participants but still provides the possibility for a better performing national team to participate in the EuroLeague.[21] Based on my analysis, it is probable that the anti-competitive effects of a completely closed league will not be found to be entirely ‘inherent’ in the pursuit of financial stability.

 

6.     Conclusion

Taken altogether, the issue with EU competition law does not solely materialize because the LEC aims to provide greater financial stability for itself and its partners. Instead, the problems arise when there are no or very limited avenues for new competitors, in this case European e-sport organizations and their cyberathletes, to progress to the highest levels of competitive LoL in Europe. The closed league structure of the LEC precludes any outside organizations from playing in the LEC Playoffs and Finals, and as a result, they also may never participate in the LoL World Championship. On the other hand, it is understandable that the LEC seeks to create further financial stability for itself, the organizations and ultimately the cyberathletes. However, this should not come at the detriment of new competitors who could help elevate the level of competition in the LEC.

By extending this analysis to the wider sports world, it would be advisable for sports governing bodies who wish to create a more closed competitive league to pay close attention to the anti-competitive effects such restructuring could produce. Moreover, these effects would have to be proportionate and in the sporting context, “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives”.[22] All things considered, it does seem rather difficult to reconcile a completely closed league, as the one found in the LEC, with EU competition law.



[1] Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 282-283.

[2] See my previous blog for an analysis of whether LoL and the LEC could be a sport.

[3] Weatherill (n 1) 283.

[4] Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-06991 para. 27; White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391, 11 July 2007, 13.

[5] White Paper on Sport ibid.

[6] Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] ECR I-02549 para 57.

[7] Cases IV/33.384 and IV/33.378 FIFA-distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup [1992] European Commission, OJ L326/31; Meca-Medina (n 4); Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-04863.

[8] MOTOE (n 7) para 23.

[9] See for example: Fnatic (Private limited company), G2 Esports (GmbH) and Origen Esports (ApS).

[10] MOTOE (n 7) para 33.

[11] Cem Abanazir, ‘E-sport and the EU: the view from the English Bridge Union’ (2019) International Sports Law Journal 102.

[12] The LEC 2019 Season Official Rules Glossary defines the EU Competitive Region as: “Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), Vatican City (Holy See)”.

[13] Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 325.

[14] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; also see Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/02 para 28.

[15] Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (n 14) para 19.

[16] Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-00527 para 24.

[17] ibid; Case C-95/04 British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-02331 para 106.

[18] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; Commission Staff Working Document - The EU and Sport: Background and Context - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport (2007) COM 391 at 2.1.5.

[19] White Paper on Sport (n 4) 68.

[20] See here for the current format of the 2019 LEC Playoffs.

[21] See Chapter II and III of the EuroLeague Bylaws.

[22] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42.

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