Editor's note: Saverio Paolo Spera is an Italian qualified attorney-at-law. He holds an LL.M. in international business law from King’s College London. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law, a Zurich based international sports law firm. Jacques Blondin is an Italian qualified attorney, who held different roles at FIFA, including Head of FIFA TMS and Head of FIFA Regulatory Enforcement. He is the co-founder of SP.IN Law. The Authors wish to disclaim that they have represented Ms. Nayoka Clunis before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne in the context of the proceedings which led to the Award of 31 July 2024.

Every four years since more than a century,[1] a spectacular display of sportsmanship takes place over the course of a few weeks during the summer: the Olympic Games.[2]

         For thousands of athletes around the globe, the Olympic Games are “the pinnacle of success and the ultimate goal of athletic competition”.[3] In their quest to compete in the most important stage of their sport, they endure demanding and time-consuming efforts (often including considerable financial sacrifices). These endeavours occasionally lead to everlasting glory (the exploits of athletes of the calibre of Carl Lewis, or more recently, Usain Bolt[4] still resonate among sports’ observers), more often to a shorter gratification. Whether their gestures end up going down the sport’s history books or last the span of a few competitions, athletes are always the key actors of a magnificent event that continues to feed the imagination of generations of sports fans. 

And yet, situations may occur when athletes find themselves at the mercy of their respective federations in the selection process for the Olympic Games and, should the federations fail them (for whatever reason), face an insurmountable jurisdictional obstacle to have their voice heard by the only arbitral tribunal appointed to safeguard their rights in a swift and specialised manner: the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”).[5]

This is the story of Nayoka Clunis, a Jamaican world class hammer throw athlete who had qualified for the Olympic Games of Paris 2024 and yet, due to no fault of her own, could not participate in the pinnacle of competitions in her sport. Though eligible in light of her world ranking, she was failed by her own federation[6] [AD1] [SPS2] and ultimately found herself in the unfortunate – but legally unescapable – vacuum whereby neither the CAS Ad Hoc Division in Paris nor the ‘regular’ CAS division in Lausanne had jurisdiction to entertain her claim.  

The aim of this paper is not to discuss whether Ms. Clunis would have had a chance to successfully prove her claims and compete in Paris had her case been heard on the merits, nor to debate about the appropriateness of a national federation’s selection process (also because Ms. Clunis never challenged it, having been eligible ‘from day one’).[7] Retracing the story of a sportswoman’s dramatic misfortune, this paper aims at providing an opportunity to reflect on how effective the safeguard of athletes’ rights in the context of the Olympic Games actually is. 

1.  The CAS Ad Hoc Division and its jurisdiction

Since the Olympic Games of Atlanta 1996, the CAS has established an Ad Hoc division for the summer and winter Olympic Games.[8]

The idea of having a specialised dispute resolution avenue in loco capable of rendering specialised and extremely fast-paced decisions, thus guaranteeing the integrity of the competition and athletes’ rights, was praised by the Swiss Federal Tribunal since the early days.[9] The Ad Hoc Division was elegantly defined as “a fruitful, albeit challenging avenue to resolve in a denationalized process […] highly emotional controversies”.[10]

Its success lies in the technical preparation of the appointed arbitrators and the promptness of its decision-making. It is structured in a way that allows panels (of expert arbitrators) to render decisions in a matter of days, sometimes hours.[11] In order to facilitate the start of the procedure, considering the urgency of the matters, a pre-established application form is published on the CAS website.[12] Immediately upon receipt of the application, the President of the Ad Hoc Division (appointed by the ICAS, as the rest of the arbitrators) appoints the panel and designate the president (or appoints a sole arbitrator, as deemed fit).[13] In cases of extreme urgency, the panel can order the stay of the challenged decision inaudita altera partem.[14]

Many cases filed at the Ad Hoc Division, however, never reach the stage of a discussion on their merits.[15] This is due to the fact that the Ad Hoc Division has jurisdiction only insofar as the prerequisites established at Article 61(2) Olympic Charter[16] and Article 1 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games[17] are met. The two rules combined provide that in order for the Ad Hoc Division to have jurisdiction: (i) the dispute must have arisen during the Olympic Games or in connection with the Olympic Games, as long as it is during the 10 days preceding the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, and (ii) the applicant must have exhausted the internal remedies available, unless doing so would render the appeal ineffective. 

On more than one instance over the years, the so called ’10-day rule’ revealed to be “a vexing issue”.[18] Indeed, it is not always easy for a panel to identify when a dispute arises. This is particularly true for eligibility matters, which can sometimes comprise a number of steps and communications (or resolutions) from national and international federations, each potentially identifiable as giving cause to the dispute.[19] Moreover, these disputes sometimes originate a few weeks prior to the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games[20] and they can cause protracted exchanges of correspondences between the parties involved, the last of which might end up inside the 10-day limit.[21]

The fact that the most problematic jurisdictional issue arises precisely in what are considered to be the most delicate matters brought before the attention of Ad Hoc panels[22] is somewhat troublesome. 

As will be seen, the one concerning Ms. Clunis was a case in point. 

2. The selection process which led to Ms. Clunis’ exclusion 

The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. On 20 December 2022, World Athletics (“WA”) published its qualifying system for the Paris 2024 Olympic Games pursuant to which, inter alia, the hammer throw event would have 32 entries each for men’s and women’s categories. The qualification for these spots were assigned by Entry Standard or World Ranking. On 19 June 2024, WA informed Member Federations, inter alia, that (i) athletes not included in the Event Entry System (the “EES”) would not be considered for Paris 2024, setting 4 July 2024 midnight Monaco time as deadline for the entries and (ii) unused quotas would be reallocated to the next best available athletes by world ranking.

On 1 July 2024, the Jamaica Athletic Administrative Association (the “JAAA”) made 89 pre-entries. The day after, WA confirmed the list of athletes who qualified by Entry Standard and World Ranking. Due to her ranking (23^rd in the world), Ms. Clunis was identified as eligible for nomination. At the same time, WA reminded the Member Federations to submit the pre-entries through the EES by the 4 July deadline.

On 3 July 2024, the JAAA informed Ms. Clunis that, based on her ranking, she had been selected to compete at the Paris Olympic Games. On the same day, Hurricane Beryl hit Jamaica.[23] On 4 July 2024, the JAAA submitted the pre-entries on the EES, however without including Ms. Clunis. 

On 5 July 2024, WA reallocated and offered the unused quota to the next best ranked athlete for hammer throw, Ms Iryna Klymets from Ukraine, who accepted. On the same day, WA informed Member Federations and the IOC of the athletes ultimately considered for Paris. The list did not include Ms. Clunis. 

On 6 July 20224, the JAAA President contacted WA “seeking assistance in adding hammer thrower Nayoka Clunis as a Quota Athlete”, explaining that her name was not inserted due to the disarray caused by Hurricane Beryl.[24] On the same day, WA published the final list of athletes who would compete at the Paris Olympic Games and Ms. Clunis was informed by her coach that she was not one of them. 

On 8 July 2024, WA submitted the list of participating athletes to the IOC, which did not include Ms. Clunis. On the same day, in reply to the request for assistance, the Director of Competitions and Events Department of WA informed the JAAA that it was no longer possible to guarantee Ms. Clunis’ participation in the upcoming games but that she would be considered before any other in case of any cancellation or withdrawal in the women’s hammer throw prior to the beginning of the games. In response, the JAAA thanked for the assistance offered and “remain[ed] hopeful that eventually she [would] be added” in case of withdrawals.[25]

On 15 July 2024, the JAAA President wrote to WA to inform about the athlete’s severe emotional distress and asking that she be included in the list of athletes even in the absence of withdrawals or cancellations. The day after, Ms. Clunis was informed that there were no updates from WA and she resolved herself to bring the matter to the CAS.

3. The jurisdictional barrier 

On 18 July 2024, Ms. Clunis filed an application at the Ad Hoc division in Paris in order to try and remedy JAAA’s mistake and get a spot at the Olympic Games. The appointed panel, however, found not to have jurisdiction to entertain her claim. 

On 25 July 2024, Ms. Clunis seized the ‘regular’ CAS division in Lausanne with the same aim, however also with the same result: the sole arbitrator found not to have jurisdiction to entertain her claim. 

3.1. The CAS Ad Hoc Division lacked jurisdiction due to the timing of the events

Ms Clunis could not avail herself of the Paris Ad Hoc Division because the decision concerning her eligibility had been issued ‘too early’. 

As explained, the Ad Hoc Division has jurisdiction to entertain disputes covered by Article 61 Olympic Charter only insofar as they arise during the Olympic Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games. 

The opening ceremony for the Paris Olympic Games was 26 July 2024. Ms Clunis’ dispute, however, arose before 16 July 2024. Though when filing her application at the Ad Hoc Division Ms Clunis had not identified the challenged decision,[26] the appointed panel determined that, whichever communication had to be intended as giving rise to the dispute, that communication did not ground the AD Hoc Division’s jurisdiction anyway as dated before 16 July 2024 (indeed, her name had been omitted from the list sent to WA on 4 July 2024; she was informed by the JAAA that her name was not on the list sent to WA by the JAAA on 7 July and WA informed the JAAA that her name could not be added to the list of competitors on 8 July 2024). 

Hence, the panel in Paris did not need to resolve the uncertainty as to when exactly the dispute arose (i.e., whether it was when Ms. Clunis became aware that her name had not been included on the list submitted by the JAAA to WA or when she first became aware that the mistake would not be rectified by the latter) as in any case it was before the 10 days prior to the Opening Ceremony of the Paris Olympic Games.[27]

As the ‘10-day rule’ had not been met, the panel did not have to assess whether there was jurisdiction under Article 61 Olympic Charter either.[28]

While fully recognising the unfairness to Ms. Clunis, and the impact on her being deprived of the opportunity to participate in the Paris Olympic Games, the panel was bound to declare that the Ad Hoc Division did not have jurisdiction to entertain her claim.[29]

3.2. The CAS ‘regular’ division did not have jurisdiction with respect to WA

In her second (and last) attempt to have her case urgently heard by an arbitral tribunal, Ms. Clunis seized the CAS ‘regular’ division in Lausanne against the decision of WA’s Director of Competitions and Events Department of 8 July 2024, proposing an ultra-expedited procedure (accepted only by the IOC and WA but not by Ms. Iryna Klymets and the Ukrainian Athletic Association). In this context, Ms. Clunis claimed that WA had the possibility to include her name in view of the exceptionality of the circumstances and that its decision not to do so severely affected her position (rather than JAAA’s). Hence, any determination that CAS lacked jurisdiction to hear her claim would amount to a denial of (access to) justice. 

The sole arbitrator appointed analysed all the pieces of WA legislation brought to his attention and concluded that the CAS had no jurisdiction ratione personae, nor ratione temporis or ratione materiae, as far as the Athlete’s position vis-à-vis WA was concerned. 

To start with, while recognising the CAS as a forum to submit claims involving WA, Article 84(2) [30] According to the WA Constitution, in other words, only the JAAA (and not Ms. Clunis) could have brought a claim to the CAS (Ordinary Division) against WA. Had the JAAA done so within 5 days from the event giving rise to the dispute,[31] the CAS would have had jurisdiction to analyse the merits of the matter.

The only piece of WA legislation which would have given the CAS jurisdiction ratione personae vis-à-vis WA was no longer applicable ratione temporis. In fact, while the 2019 edition of the WA Dispute Rules included a clause allowing athletes to seize the CAS directly,[32] the [33]

Ultimately, therefore, there was no provision in the entire WA regulatory framework providing for the jurisdiction of the CAS for the situation Ms. Clunis found herself in: an eligibility matter versus WA which arose prior to the 10 days preceding the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. 

Moreover, Article 61(2) Olympic Charter, while arguably providing for jurisdiction ratione materiae for Olympic Games-related disputes,[34] did not provide CAS jurisdiction for a dispute between Ms. Clunis and WA either (the provision being found in the governing document of the IOC).[35]

3.3. The CAS ‘regular’ division did not have jurisdiction with respect to the IOC

The situation concerning CAS jurisdiction vis-à-vis the IOC was not any different.

Due to the fault of the JAAA, Ms. Clunis had never been invited to sign the Games Participation Agreement for the Olympic Games Paris 2024, which included an arbitration agreement with the IOC in favour of the CAS.[36]

In the absence of an arbitration agreement, the existence of which must not be accepted lightly pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT),[37] the CAS could not have jurisdiction. At the same time, a systematic interpretation of Article 61(2) Olympic Charter would suggest not to construe the provision as awarding third parties the right to litigate the IOC before the CAS.[38]

4. Conclusions

Two separate CAS divisions fully recognised the injustice suffered by Ms. Clunis. 

The Ad Hoc division’s panel on 22 July 2024 appreciated “the unfairness to the Athlete of the events that have occurred and of the impact on her of being deprived of the opportunity to compete in the Paris Olympic Games”.[39] For his part, the sole arbitrator on 31 July 2024 recognised that what had been brought to his attention was “a very unfortunate case” whereby “a great injustice ha[d] been committed vis-à-vis the Appellant, a world-class, Olympic-level athlete who had qualified for the Olympic Games Paris 2024”.[40]

It was clear that Ms. Clunis suffered an incommensurable damage: she was inexplicably deprived of the recognition she had earned through years of hard work. Moreover, and this is the sad irony that prompted this paper, Ms. Clunis was an innocent victim of her federation’s negligence. 

Not only did the JAAA make the mistake of not inserting her name in the list within the prescribed deadline,[41] but, most importantly, it remained passive and let the deadline to bring a claim before the CAS expire (when it was the only entity having the possibility to do so as per the WA Constitution).[42] Ms. Clunis played no part in the events eventually causing her misfortune and yet she could not do anything about it, as she was “caught in an unfortunate legal position wherein she ha[d] no legal proximity to both WA and the IOC for her to appeal the case to the CAS and where she was not yet invited to sign the Games Participation Agreement (containing the CAS arbitration clause)”.[43]

The JAAA was the only culprit in this sad story.[44] However, what remains once the blame has been (rightfully) apportioned is a regulatory framework that cannot prevent a similar situation from occurring again. 

Indeed, the decisions of the Paris panel and the sole arbitrator were not discretionary. Their hands were tied by the rules: the existing regulatory framework and the timing of events determined that no CAS forum (neither the one in Paris nor the one in Lausanne) could possibly have jurisdiction to decide on the case and eventually remedy the injustice (were Ms. Clunis’ argumentation on the merits found to be solid, that is). Though Ms. Clunis was “bona fide endeavouring to seek meaningful recourse for an unfortunate situation that was entirely out of her control”,[45] her attempts were doomed to fail from the moment in which the deadline for the JAAA to bring a claim to the CAS had expired.

While it is true that the facts of the case were particularly exceptional (both the JAAA’s blatant mistake, possibly determined by the exceptional natural events which occurred in Jamaica prior and during the deadline day, and the timing of WA’s decision, issued too early to ground the Ad Hoc Division’s jurisdiction), it remains a regrettable state of affairs that if a dispute concerning an athlete’s eligibility arises earlier than  10 days before the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, the relevant claim against WA can only be brought to the CAS by his/her federation (within 5 days). In every such situation, in other words, the athlete is at the mercy of the negligence of his/her federation, which has to: (i) first, do its job properly during the selection process and (ii) second, bring the claim against WA to the CAS Ordinary Division in a timely fashion (if the case warrants being litigated).

Hence, regardless of the peculiarities of Ms. Clunis’ case, this issue goes beyond the specifics of this case. Is it reasonable to leave the choice to contest a life-changing decision for an athlete in the hands of a party which is only indirectly affected by it (and which might have caused the issue, for instance by gross negligence, in the first place)? 

Last year, the JAAA might have suffered a damage having lost its most prominent athlete in the female hammer throw at the Olympic Games, but it only had itself to blame. Ms. Clunis lost the chance of a lifetime to shine on a global stage without having played any part in the mishap and, to add insult to injury, without having any possibility to have the CAS review the decision of the WA. In short, she was denied access to justice to challenge one of the, if not the, most consequential decisions of her life.  

This prompts a couple of observations. 

The first is that, had her incredible misadventure occurred on the road to Tokyo 2020 instead (i.e., under the aegis of the previous edition of the WA Dispute Rules), Ms. Clunis would have likely had a chance to have her claim heard on the merits. It is not clear why the WA Dispute Rules were revised in 2023 to the effect of eliminating the possibility for athletes to seize the CAS directly against WA (Circular M35/2, which accompanied the change, does not provide an explanation).[46] But given what has happened, it is legitimate to wonder whether this was a warranted amendment and whether it would not be advisable for WA to think about a regulatory ‘revival’ in this respect. 

The second observation concerns Article 1 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games. The currently applicable version is the result of an amendment introduced following a bobsleigh case brought to the Ad Hoc Division at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics of 2002.[47] At the time, according to said provision the Ad Hoc Division had jurisdiction only in the presence of an Entry Form for the Olympic Games.[48] The panel on that occasion observed that the construction of the provision could “give rise to unfairness and hardship for athletes claiming the right to be entered as competitors in Olympic Games”.[49] The rationale of the current compromise (i.e., the matter being at least in connection with the Olympic Games and arisen at least within 10 days before the opening ceremony), then, is to avoid the hardship that concerned the panel in Salt Lake City while at the same time avoiding to flood the Ad Hoc Division with every possible eligibility dispute.

It can be generally considered that eligibility matters are by definition in connection with the Olympic Games.[50] But is the 10-day prior to the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games a fair limit to meet in eligibility matters, considering that they can arise before[51]and that the most prominent international federation concerned does not provide (anymore) for CAS ('regular') jurisdiction in favour of athletes?

While respecting the need not to overwhelm the Ad Hoc Division with eligibility disputes, it would advisable to extend this limit when (and only when) the regulatory framework of the international association concerned does not provide for athletes’ recourse to the CAS ‘regular’ division (or, alternatively, it could be ensured that these associations have ‘late’ eligibility procedures, i.e., falling within the 10-day limit).[52] Such an amendment would fill a ‘regulatory gap’ without endangering the sustainability of the Ad Hoc system.[53]

The Olympic Charter expressly states that ‘‘[n]obody is entitled as of right to participate in the Olympic Games”.[54]

However, should not every athlete be entitled as of right to have at least one sports arbitral tribunal (be it the CAS Ordinary, Appeals or Ad Hoc Division) adjudicate whether his/her participation was rightfully denied or not?  

On 8 and 9 December 2014, the IOC Session held in Monaco approved the Olympic Agenda 2020 containing 20+20 Recommendations to shape the future of the Olympic Movement. One of these Recommendations had the purpose of strengthening support to athletes, advising the IOC to “put [their] experience at the heart of the Olympic Games” and “further invest in supporting [them] on and off the field of play”.[55]

Thanks to the work of the Ad Hoc Division, not just the experience but also the rights of athletes are at the heart of the Olympic Games. We believe their right to have access to justice ‘on the road’ to the Olympic Games should be equally guaranteed.

[1] Following the creation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin, the first modern Olympic Games took place in Athens in 1896.

[2] Over the years, there were numerous changes to the Olympic Games. Amongst these, the introduction of the Winter Olympic Games (officially held for the first time in Chamonix 1924) and the Paralympic Games (officially held for the first time in Rome 1960 and in Seoul 1988 for the first time directly after the Summer Olympics using the same venues). 

[3] CAS 2011/O/2422, para. 40.

[4] Carl Lewis is widely recognised as one of the most accomplished Olympians of all times. He won 9 Olympic gold medals and 1 Olympic silver medals; he is one of six athletes to win a gold medal in the same individual event in four consecutive Olympic Games (long jump). Usain Bolt is widely considered the greatest sprinter of all times, having won 8 Olympic gold medals, still holding the world record in the 100m and 200m, being the only sprinter to have won the 100m and 200m distances in three consecutive Olympic Games. 

[5] The paper will refer to both the Ad Hoc Division and the Division (Ordinary or Appeals) seated in Lausanne. The latter will be referred to as the ‘regular’ division in order to differentiate it from the Ad Hoc Division.

[6] Whether due to force majeure or not was never decided by any arbitral panel and is, in any case, beyond the scope of this paper.

[7] For a comprehensive analysis of the issue, see A. DUVAL, ‘Getting to the games: the Olympic selection drama(s) at the court of arbitration for sport’, in Int Sports Law J (2016). 

[8] Since 2016, a CAS Anti-doping Division is established for each edition of the Olympic Games (i.e. also for the Winter Games).

[9] According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (case Larissa Lazutina & Olga Danilova v. CIO, FIS & CAS of 27 May 2003): “In competitive sport, particularly the Olympic Games, it is vital both for athletes and for the smooth running of events, that disputes are resolved quickly, flexibly and inexpensively by experts familiar with both legal and sports-related issues […] Thanks in particular to the creation of ad hoc divisions, [the CAS] enables the parties concerned to obtain a decision quickly, following a hearing conducted by persons with legal training and recognized expertise in the field of sport, whilst protecting their right to a fair hearing”.

[10] A. DUVAL, ‘Getting to the games: the Olympic selection drama(s) at the court of arbitration for sport’ cit.

[11] See G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Arbitration at the Olympics. Issues of Fast-Track Dispute Resolution and Sports Law, The Hague, Kluwer, 2001.

[12] Article 10 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games.

[13] Article 11 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games.

[14] Article 14 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games.

[15] From the information publicly available, in Paris 2024 the Ad Hoc Division declined jurisdiction due to the 10-day prerequisite not having been met in two cases (OG 24/01and OG 24/03).

[16] Article 61(2) Olympic Charter: “Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration”.

[17] Article 1 Arbitration Rules applicable to the CAS Ad Hoc Division for the Olympic Games: “The purpose of the present Rules is to provide, in the interests of the athletes and of sport, for the resolution by arbitration of any disputes covered by Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, insofar as they arise during the Olympic Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games. In the case of a request for arbitration against a decision pronounced by the IOC, an NOC, an International Federation or an Organising Committee for the Olympic Games, the claimant must, before filing such request, have exhausted all the internal remedies available to her/him pursuant to the statutes or regulations of the sports body concerned, unless the time needed to exhaust the internal remedies would make the appeal to the CAS Ad Hoc Division ineffective”.

[18] OG 14/03 Maria Belen Simari Birkner v. Comité Olímpico Argentino (COA) & Federación Argentina de Ski y Andinismo (FASA). The panel in that instance held that “the date when a dispute arises is in general – in fact in most cases – the date of the decision with which the Applicant disagrees (“a disagreement on a point of law or fact” as stated by the ICJ). Such a date can arise later, in some cases, if, for example, the decision is not self-explanatory and requires some explanation in order for the Parties to know with certainty that they are in disagreement. Evidence would be required to establish whether a later date than the date of the decision should apply” (para. 5.28). In OG 06/002 Andrea Schuler v. Swiss Olympic Association & Swiss-Ski, the panel, confronted with a somewhat different factual scenario, had instead adopted a particularly flexible interpretation (paras. 13 – 14: ”Ms Schuler received a written explanation of her exclusion on 1 February 2006. […] It was open to Ms Schuler to accept the Swiss Olympic’s determination or decide to appeal. Accordingly, in the Panel’s opinion, it would not be possible to say that a dispute had arisen until Ms Schuler had decided to appeal and had filed notice of her appeal”). The Panel in OG 14/03 openly expressed its disagreement with the legal reasoning adopted in the Schuler case (OG 14/03, para. 5.26). For a deeper analysis of these issues, see A. DUVAL , ‘Getting to the games: the Olympic selection drama(s) at the court of arbitration for sport’cit. 

[19] See, inter alia, OG 14/03 cit., OG 24/01 discussed infra (this is Ms. Clunis’ case: the panel did not have to decide which communication constituted the event giving rise to the dispute as they were all outside of the limit), OG 24/02 (see footnote 21).

[20] In OG 24/03, the sole arbitrator denied jurisdiction as the application was directed against a decision of 24 May 2024 of the International Weightlifting Association, notifying the athlete that – due to his provisional suspension in relation to a previous doping violation – he had missed the mandatory event necessary to fulfill the minimum eligibility requirements (the opening ceremony being on 26 July 2024, the 10-day prerequisite had not been met by an abundant margin). 

[21] In OG 24/02, the sole arbitrator accepted jurisdiction because the international federation concerned (World Aquatics) had made it possible to meet the 10-day prerequisite by agreeing to reconsider the matter on various occasions (de facto rendering its previous decisions on the matter not final). 

[22] A. DUVAL, in ‘Getting to the games: the Olympic selection drama(s) at the court of arbitration for sport’ cit. notes that “a non-selection for the Olympic Games is often the toughest setback faced by an athlete in her career”.

[23] Hurricane Beryl was a category 5 hurricane which hit the Caribbean, the Yucatán Peninsula and the Gulf Coast of the United States between 28 June 2024 and 9 July 2024, reaching a peak of intensity on 2 July 2024 and hitting the south coast of Jamaica on 3 July 2024.  

[24] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 17.

[25] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 23.

[26] OG 24/01, para. 49.

[27] OG 24/01, para. 53.

[28] OG 24/01, para. 56.

[29] OG 24/01, para. 58.

[30] Article 84(2) WA Constitution: “In the event there is a dispute or difference between: a. a Member Federation or Member Federations and World Athletics; or b. an Area Association or Area Associations and World Athletics; that cannot be resolved as set out in Article 84.1, the matter will be submitted to arbitration before the CAS (Ordinary Arbitration Division), to the exclusion of any other court or forum, in accordance with Article 84.3, below. The CAS will resolve the dispute definitively in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration”.

[31] Article 84(3) WA Constitution : “Any dispute submitted to the CAS under Article 84.2 must be filed either within five (5) days of the date of the dispute first arising or within five (5) days of any failure to resolve the dispute in accordance with Article 84.1(whichever the case may be)”. 

[32] Article 3.1. WA Dispute Rules (2019 ed.): “This Rule 3 relates to any legal dispute of any kind whatsoever arising between World Athletics on the one hand and any Member, Area Association, athlete, athlete support personnel or other person who is subject to the Constitution and/or any of the Rules or Regulations on the other hand, in relation to the Constitution and/or any Rule or Regulation and/or any World Athletics decision or act or omission, howsoever arising, that is not covered by the dispute resolution provisions of the Constitution or any Rules or Regulations (each, a "Dispute"). Subject to, and in accordance with Article 84 of the Constitution, a Dispute shall be submitted to arbitration before the CAS (Ordinary Arbitration Division or Appeal Arbitration Division, depending on the circumstances of the case), to the exclusion of any other court or forum. The CAS will hear and determine the Dispute definitively in accordance with relevant provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration. The law governing the Dispute will be the Constitution and Rules and Regulations, with the laws of Monaco applying subsidiarily. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the arbitration proceedings before the CAS will be conducted in the English language before a Panel consisting of three arbitrators. Pending determination of the Dispute by the CAS, any provision of the Constitution or Rule or Regulation or decision or act or omission under challenge will remain in full force and effect unless the CAS orders otherwise. The ultimate decision of the CAS on the merits of the Dispute will be final and binding on all parties, and all parties waive irrevocably any rights they might otherwise have to any form of appeal, review or other challenge in respect of that decision, except as set out in Chapter 12 of Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law”.

[33] Article 9 Disciplinary and Appeals Tribunal Rules: “The Disciplinary and Appeals Tribunal and Disciplinary Panel shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide any alleged Non-Doping Violations over which jurisdiction is conferred on it by the Integrity Code of Conduct and the Integrity Unit Rules and any Preliminary Proceeding under the Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution Rules – Non-Doping”. Article 16 Disciplinary and Appeals Tribunal Rules: “16.2 Subject to Rule 16.1, a decision of the Disciplinary Panel under these Rules may be appealed to CAS by a party to the proceedings before the Disciplinary Panel, in accordance with this Rule 16. […] The deadline for filing an appeal to CAS will be 21 days from the date of receipt of the written decision in question by the appealing party. Where the appellant is a party other than World Athletics, to be a valid filing under this Rule a copy of the appeal must also be filed on the same day with the Integrity Unit. The decision being appealed will remain in full force and effect pending determination of the appeal unless CAS orders otherwise”.

[34] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 99.

[35] Article 61(2) Olympic Charter: “Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration”.

[36] Article 7(1) of the Games Participation Agreement: “The Court of Arbitration for Sport is exclusively competent to finally settle all disputes arising in connection with my participation in the Games”.

[37] According to the SFT (SFT 4A_124/2020, consid. 3.1.2), the parties’ will to resort to arbitration must be clear and unequivocal as such consent is a waiver of the right to involve otherwise competent state courts. Though beyond the scope of this paper, one might perhaps wonder whether this should be intended as applicable to arbitration tout court or whether a distinction should be made between voluntary and mandatory arbitration in the sense of Pechstein…in other words, do athletes on the road to the Olympic Games realistically waive the jurisdiction of domestic courts for urgent eligibility matters in favour of the CAS (put it differently, do they have de facto a realistic alternative to the CAS)?  

[38] In order not to have the IOC entering, de facto, “into innumerable legal relationships with an unmanageable number of persons” (CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 108).

[39] OG 24/01, para. 58.

[40] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 109.

[41] As mentioned, it is beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss whether the JAAA’s mistake could be entirely ascribed to the impact of Hurricane Beryl.

[42] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 109 : “The entity having caused the problems, the JAAA, only took belated and inefficient steps to remedy the damage caused to the Appellant”.

[43] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 109.

[44] Which, however, cannot possibly repay the damage suffered.

[45] CAS 2024/A/10760, para. 115.

[46] The Circular is not publicly available. However, it was produced in the context of the arbitral proceedings CAS 2024/A/10760 (paras. 84 – 87).

[47] OG 02/005 Troy Billington v. Fédération internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing (FIBT).

[48] The provision read as follows: “The purpose of the present Rules is to provide, in the interests of the athletes and of sport, for the resolution by arbitration of any disputes covered by Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter and by the arbitration clause inserted in the entry form for the Olympic Games (the “OG”), insofar as they arise in the host country of the OG between 1 February 2002, and 24 February 2002”

[49] OG 02/005, para. 24.

[50] A. RIGOZZI, ‘The Decisions Rendered by the CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Turin Winter Olympic Games 2006’, in Journal of International Arbitration 23(5): 453–466, 2006

[51] See footnotes 19 – 21. 

[52] Though it shall not be forgotten that a recourse to the CAS ‘regular’ division entails costs that the Ad Hoc Division does not have and that, in the ‘regular’ context, an expedited procedure is not implemented unless agreed with the counterparties. Hence, a certain inequality between athletes who can refer to the Ad Hoc Division and athletes who have only recourse to the ‘regular’ division would persist.

[53] The problem would be solved altogether if the 10-day requirement were to be interpreted in the sense that the dispute arises when the claim is submitted. This would however mean a foreseeable increase in the workload of the Ad Hoc divisions.

[54] Article 44(3) Olympic Charter. 

[55] See A. DUVAL cit.

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

1.     Introduction

The organizational structure of sports in Europe is distinguished by its pyramid structure which is marked by an open promotion and relegation system. A truly closed system, without promotion and relegation, is unknown to Europe, while it is the main structure found in North American professional sports leagues such as the NFL, NBA and the NHL. Recently, top European football clubs along with certain members of UEFA have been debating different possibilities of introducing a more closed league system to European football. Some football clubs have even wielded the threat of forming an elite closed breakaway league. Piercing through these intimidations and rumors, the question of whether a closed league system could even survive the scrutiny of EU competition law remains. It could be argued that an agreement between clubs to create a completely closed league stifles competition and would most likely trigger the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.[1] Interestingly, a completely closed league franchise system has already permeated the European continent. As outlined in my previous blog, the League of Legends European Championship (LEC) is a European e-sports competition that has recently rebranded and restructured this year from an open promotion and relegation system to a completely closed franchise league to model its sister competition from North America, the League Championship Series. This case is an enticing opportunity to test how EU competition law could apply to such a competition structure.

As a preliminary note, this blog does not aim to argue whether the LEC is a ‘real’ sport competition and makes the assumption that the LEC could be considered as a sports competition.[2]

2.     LEC’s Position in the League of Legends Competitive Structure

The LEC is the pinnacle of League of Legends (LoL) competition in Europe that is organized by its developer, Riot Games. Currently, the LEC is the only path to the League of Legends World Championship. Its previous name was the EU League Championship Series (EU LCS), and it featured a promotion and relegation system with the EU Challenger Series. The EU Challenger Series has been replaced with the European Masters, which is a tournament that places the top seed from European regional leagues against each other. It is important to highlight that the teams in the LEC do not compete on behalf of their region (although some of the organizations from the LEC have their second team competing in a regional leagues).

The franchise agreement between the LEC and the participant e-sport organizations required organizations to buy-in at 10.5 million euros into the LEC. The ensuing partnership lasts three years and ensures that the organization is guaranteed a spot in the LEC during this period, unless there are “consistent poor performance or disciplinary issues”. The agreement effectively prevents any other European organization/team from the regional leagues and the European Masters from accessing the highest LoL championship in Europe (the LEC) and completely cuts off any opportunity to reach the League of Legends World Championships for at least three years.

The previous system of relegation and promotion has helped foster talent and create new successful European e-sports organizations. Currently, the winners of Mid-Season Invitational 2019 (a mid-year world championship) is G2 Esports, which was able to rise to the EU LCS through the EU Challenger Series in late 2015. As a result, concerns have been expressed that by adopting the closed league model, the LEC will not be able to nurture new talent and competitive organizations. This worry goes to the heart of Article 165 TFEU’s aim to develop the ‘openness’ of sporting competitions and gives merit to analyzing the LEC under EU competition law rules.[3]

3.     EU Competition Law and its Application to Sports

Generally speaking, EU competition law seeks to ensure ‘effective’ competition between undertakings in Europe. Concerning the field of sports, the CJEU asserted that rules of sport governing bodies fall under the inspection of EU competition law even if they are purely sporting in nature.[4] However, the CJEU left room for sport governing bodies to defend their measures which fall within the scope of competition rules. Sporting rules can escape the prohibitions of EU competition law if it can be shown that the concerned measures are inherent to the objectives it seeks to achieve and that they are “proportionate to the legitimate genuine sporting interest pursued”.  In other words, the specificity of sport must be taken into account.[5] Additionally, the CJEU has recognized that the participation in sport competitions can constitute economic activity because of the exposure that participation may provide.[6] Thus, preventing other organizations and their athletes from taking part in a league competition and as a consequence, the world championships, can have detrimental economic impacts on that organization and its athletes.

For this reason, the organizational structure of sport competitions may have colossal economic ramifications and easily fall within the scope of the Treaties. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the two cornerstones of EU competition law that prima facie would be applicable to this case. Essentially, Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict competition, and Article 102 TFEU forbids an undertaking or group of undertakings (collective dominance) from abusing its dominant position on the relevant market. So when a group of undertakings hold a dominant position in the relevant market and make an agreement which abuses their dominant position, the CJEU has recognized that both Article 101 and 102 TFEU may be applied. Nevertheless, the following analysis will concentrate on Article 102 TFEU.

4.     Does LEC (and its participant organizations) have a Dominant Position?

4.1.Are the LEC (and its participant organizations) undertakings?

As a preliminary point, the European Commission and the CJEU has repeatedly qualified sport governing bodies as undertakings under EU competition law.[7] The key criteria to determine whether an entity is an undertaking under EU law is whether the entity is engaged in ‘economic activity’. In MOTOE, the CJEU ruled that ELPA, a body that was organizing motorcycling events, was engaged in economic activity because it entered into “sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts designed to exploit those events commercially”.[8] In the present case, there is little doubt that the League European Championship Limited, which is a private company limited by shares incorporated in the Republic of Ireland controlled by Riot Games, could be considered an undertaking since it concludes sponsorships and advertises its events.

The organizations that have signed the franchise agreement with Riot Games are mainly private limited companies.[9] These organizations enter into sponsorship agreements, and as stated earlier, the CJEU found that the participation in a sport competition could constitute economic activity. It follows that these e-sport organizations would easily be considered as undertakings.

4.2.What is the relevant market?

The next issue is determining the relevant market, including the relevant product and geographic market, the LEC and its participant organizations occupy. To identify the relevant product market, EU competition law examines the substitutability of the product or service. For example, in defining the relevant product or service market, the CJEU in MOTOE quite readily found that ELPA was “engaged ... in the organisation of motorcycling events and … their exploitation by means of sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts”.[10]

From the outset, it should be underlined that games considered as e-sports greatly differ from one another.[11] E-sports usually fall within different genres of games, such as Real-Time Strategy (RTS), First-Person Shooter (FPS), Fighting, and Sports games. LoL falls within the Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) genre. Thus, one may argue the relevant market in this case is e-sports competitions in the MOBA market. One way to test this market definition would be examining the ability of e-sports players to move from one e-sport to another.

Unfortunately, there has not been a complete study on the maneuverability of e-sport professionals between games of the same genre or of a different genre. As a result, it is difficult to have a complete view on the issue. Nevertheless, while there have been cases where certain players from e-sports of a different genre were able to move to LoL successfully (Ggoong [e-sports players are known by their own made up player names]) and others who have moved from LoL to another e-sport (Gesture, Bischu), there have been others who have attempted such moves without success (Destiny). On the other hand, when examining ‘traditional’ sports there are also many examples of athletes who have moved from one sport to another. For example, Primož Roglič was a high-level ski jumper, and even won the Junior Ski World Championship in this discipline, who then moved into professional road cycling and most recently came third in the Giro d’Italia. Ski jumping and road cycling arguably have very little in common, and it would be highly doubtful that the Commission or the CJEU would include both in the same market. Such an extreme example demonstrates that focusing on the maneuverability of e-sports athletes between e-sports may not always be the best way to define an e-sport market, and perhaps a more suitable approach would be to examine the specific features of the e-sport.

In this sense, it should be borne in mind that e-sports in the same genre, while sharing many basic characteristics and many of the fine motor skills, still diverge in terms of gameplay and strategy. If this were not the case, a professional LoL player could become a professional DOTA 2 (another MOBA e-sport) player without any extra effort. In reality, to make a transition, the professional LoL player would have to learn the intricacies and nuances of DOTA 2 compared to LoL, e.g. the champions and their builds, the pace of play, meta (the best strategies to win the game) etc. All of these differences support the argument that perhaps defining the product or service market in this case to MOBA e-sport competitions may be too broad, and it could be more appropriate to narrow the definition to LoL e-sport competitions.

Lastly, the geographic market is much more straightforward to define since the LEC Regulations define the EU Competitive Region in its 2019 Season Official Rules.[12] Therefore, the relevant geographic market would most likely be the EU Competitive Region.

4.3.Does LEC (and its participating organizations) have a dominant position in this market?

The Commission provides the most relevant criteria to ascertain whether an undertaking or undertakings hold a dominant position on the relevant market in its Guidance on enforcement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 TFEU). Pertinent benchmarks include the “position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors”, “expansion and entry” of actual or future competitors, and the “bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers” (countervailing buyer power). Usually, market shares are used to give a preliminary indication whether an undertaking occupies a dominant position in the market. The minimum threshold market share for which an undertaking or undertakings may be found to hold a dominant position is around 40-50%.[13]

If the relevant market was defined as the e-sport competitions in the MOBA market in the EU Competitive Region, one would have to examine competitive LoL in comparison to other e-sport competitions in the MOBA genre in Europe. For the purposes of this blog, there is rather limited information on the market share of LoL competitions in comparison to other MOBA e-sports in Europe. However, to at least give an idea of the size and dominance of LoL in the general MOBA market, LoL was projected to have an estimated 66% market share in 2016. When one compares this share to the second place, DOTA 2 with 14 %, it is evident that LoL generally holds a powerful position in the MOBA market and this most likely extends to its e-sports competitions.

In contrast, if the relevant market is narrowed to LoL e-sport competitions in the EU Competitive Region only, there would be an even higher chance of the LEC and its participant organizations being found to hold a dominant position. It could be argued that the European Masters (although Riot Games is a co-organizer) and the LoL regional leagues could be seen as ‘competitors’. Once more, direct information on market shares is scant. However, if one observes the viewership numbers of the LEC versus the European Masters, the LEC completely dwarfs the European Masters. The LEC in its 2019 Spring Split had a peak viewership of over 475,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of over 200,000 viewers. By comparison, the European Masters Spring 2019 competition had a peak viewership of just over 60,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of 32,000 viewers. From these numbers, it is evident that the LEC is overwhelmingly more popular and as a corollary, it may indicate that the LEC’s market share is likely to also reflect this.

5.     Does LEC abuse its Dominant Position?

5.1.Is the dominant position being abused and can it be justified (sporting exceptions)?

The finding of a dominant position is not enough to constitute a breach of EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU also requires that the dominant undertaking or undertakings abuse its dominant position, and it allows the dominant undertaking(s) to demonstrate how the relevant measures may be justified and proportionate. Within the sport context, the sport governing body must explain how the conduct which restricts competition pursues a legitimate objective and the anti-competitive effects must be “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives … and are proportionate to them”.[14]  There are a variety of ways an undertaking may abuse its dominant position, but in the present case, the LEC and its participant organizations agreement to seal the LEC and the LoL World Championship from any other European competitors would most likely fall under a non-price based exclusionary abuse. More specifically, exclusionary conduct must constitute ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ which according to the Commission’s Guidance Paper is “a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers” (emphasis added).[15] 

The foreclosure requirement in this case is quite evidently satisfied since the LEC and its participant organizations have effectively excluded other organizations in Europe from the highest European competition of LoL and as a result, the LoL World Championship. Actually assessing whether there has been an increase in price to the detriment of consumers is not necessary, and the CJEU has ruled that “Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as referring not only to practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through their impact on competition”.[16] Moreover, a dominant undertaking “has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the internal market” and “[Article 102 TFEU] is aimed not only at the practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on the competition structure”.[17] Therefore, it is not necessary to show direct harm to consumers, but that the foreclosure effects damage competition to a sufficient degree to their disadvantage.

As discussed earlier, the former promotion and relegation system helped promote new talent and organizations that were able to develop new fanbases, giving the opportunity for the European LoL viewers to get behind up and coming organizations. By stifling the prospects of new organizations from emerging in the LEC or the Worlds stage, market development may be hindered in contravention with Article 102 (b) TFEU at the European LoL e-sport’s expense.

Nonetheless, the LEC hopes that the closed structure “provides teams with more security to make longer investments that will strengthen and support pros, and provide better experiences for fan (sic)”, to “unlock revenue sharing” and “to focus on shaping the long-term future”. Basically, the LEC and its members seek greater financial security for themselves in order to invest more in its players and fans. The question is then whether the restrictions of competition resulting from the closed league described above are inherent to the pursuit of the aforementioned objectives.[18] While “the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams” could be a legitimate objective,[19] it is possible to envisage less restrictive means to achieve financial stability without completely excluding other European organizations from competing for the final LEC title and the LoL World Championship. For example, perhaps the LEC play-offs could give the opportunity for teams number 5 and 6 from the regular season to first face off against the top two teams of the European Masters Tournament.[20] A similar play-in format could easily be introduced for the LoL World Championships. Despite these changes, new organizations would still be precluded from joining the LEC. Perhaps this would require the LEC to come up with new creative structures that allow new organizations to join the LEC after having proven their worth. An example of such a system can be found in the top European basketball competition, EuroLeague, which issues different license/partner tiers for its participating clubs in order to provide better financial security for itself and its participants but still provides the possibility for a better performing national team to participate in the EuroLeague.[21] Based on my analysis, it is probable that the anti-competitive effects of a completely closed league will not be found to be entirely ‘inherent’ in the pursuit of financial stability.

6.     Conclusion

Taken altogether, the issue with EU competition law does not solely materialize because the LEC aims to provide greater financial stability for itself and its partners. Instead, the problems arise when there are no or very limited avenues for new competitors, in this case European e-sport organizations and their cyberathletes, to progress to the highest levels of competitive LoL in Europe. The closed league structure of the LEC precludes any outside organizations from playing in the LEC Playoffs and Finals, and as a result, they also may never participate in the LoL World Championship. On the other hand, it is understandable that the LEC seeks to create further financial stability for itself, the organizations and ultimately the cyberathletes. However, this should not come at the detriment of new competitors who could help elevate the level of competition in the LEC.

By extending this analysis to the wider sports world, it would be advisable for sports governing bodies who wish to create a more closed competitive league to pay close attention to the anti-competitive effects such restructuring could produce. Moreover, these effects would have to be proportionate and in the sporting context, “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives”.[22] All things considered, it does seem rather difficult to reconcile a completely closed league, as the one found in the LEC, with EU competition law.

[1] Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 282-283.

[2] See my previous blog for an analysis of whether LoL and the LEC could be a sport.

[3] Weatherill (n 1) 283.

[4] Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-06991 para. 27; White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391, 11 July 2007, 13.

[5] White Paper on Sport ibid.

[6] Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] ECR I-02549 para 57.

[7] Cases IV/33.384 and IV/33.378 FIFA-distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup [1992] European Commission, OJ L326/31; Meca-Medina (n 4); Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-04863.

[8] MOTOE (n 7) para 23.

[9] See for example: Fnatic (Private limited company), G2 Esports (GmbH) and Origen Esports (ApS).

[10] MOTOE (n 7) para 33.

[11] Cem Abanazir, ‘E-sport and the EU: the view from the English Bridge Union’ (2019) International Sports Law Journal 102.

[12] The LEC 2019 Season Official Rules Glossary defines the EU Competitive Region as: “Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), Vatican City (Holy See)”.

[13] Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6^th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 325.

[14] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; also see Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/02 para 28.

[15] Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (n 14) para 19.

[16] Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-00527 para 24.

[17] ibid; Case C-95/04 British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-02331 para 106.

[18] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; Commission Staff Working Document - The EU and Sport: Background and Context - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport (2007) COM 391 at 2.1.5.

[19] White Paper on Sport (n 4) 68.

[20] See here for the current format of the 2019 LEC Playoffs.

[21] See Chapter II and III of the EuroLeague Bylaws.

[22] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42.