Editor's note: Mark James is Professor of Sports Law at Manchester Metropolitan University and the author of a leading Sports Law textbook.

The opening days of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 have already resulted in a number of issues of interest to sports lawyers and human rights lawyers, with FARE’s Piara Powar claiming that this is the most political major sporting event that he has attended. Both FIFA and the local organisers have been active in their suppression of expressions of support for LGBTQIA+ rights by players, fans and journalists alike, calling into question once again the legality of restricting free speech by sporting rules and regulations.

There have been two major flashpoints to date. First, seven European federations had asked FIFA for permission for their captains to wear armbands supporting the ‘OneLove’ campaign. FIFA’s response was to refuse, resulting in the German players covering their mouths for their pre-match photographs in protest at their being silenced. There are several grounds on which FIFA would seek to support its position:

•  Law 4.5 of the Laws of the Game prohibits any playing equipment from carrying any political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images.
• Regulation 4.3.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations and Regulation 27.1 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits clothing or equipment that includes political, religious, or personal slogans, statements, or images, or otherwise does not comply in full with the Laws of the Game.
• Regulation 33.3 of the FIFA World Cup 2022 Regulations prohibits the display of political, religious or personal messages or slogans of any nature in any language or form by players and officials.
• Regulation 13.8.1 of FIFA’s Equipment Regulations states that for FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA (all Regulations available in the FIFA Legal Handbook 2022).

Although the DFB is considering a challenge to FIFA’s refusal to allow its captain to wear the OneLove armband, which would ultimately be heard before CAS, it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the strict requirements of the above Laws and Regulations. However, what could cause more difficulty for both FIFA and CAS is if the DFB frames its case as a challenge to the compliance of the rules that restrict players’ freedom of expression with Article 3 of FIFA’s Statutes, which states that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights.’ Article 3, together with the additional detail provided by FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, ensures that freedom of expression as defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are limitative rules that can be applied directly to FIFA’s activities, as has been argued by Bützler and Schöddert. Further, if the affected players and associations can define themselves as human rights defenders, then Article 11 of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy states that, ‘FIFA will respect and not interfere with the work of … human rights defenders who voice concerns about adverse human rights impacts relating to FIFA.’ Any challenge using this approach would be the first real test of the enforceability of the human rights protections to which FIFA claims to be committed. It would also be a test of CAS’s ability to require adherence to the human rights commitments made by ISFs and to prove that they are more than simple window-dressing.

Secondly, members of The Rainbow Wall, a contingent of LGBTQIA+ rights-supporting Welsh fans, were prevented from entering the Ahmed bin Ali stadium whilst wearing bucket hats incorporating a rainbow into its design. No explanation for why was given, however, FIFA and the local organisers would argue that openly supporting LGBTQIA+ rights with the aim of promoting legal change in a country where homosexuality is illegal is a political statement on apparel and therefore entry into the stadium wearing the rainbow hat is in breach of the Regulation 3.1.23 of the Stadium Code of Conduct. A similar argument could be used to justify preventing US journalist Grant Wahl from entering the stadium wearing a t-shirt incorporating a rainbow into its design and Danish journalist Jon Pagh from wearing the OneLove armband. However, it must be stressed that no such explanation for the prohibitions applied to these garments was provided to any of the affected fans or journalists. It must also be recognised that the opinion that promoting LGBTQIA+ rights is a political expression is highly contested. In a statement from FIFPRO, the opposing view was stated succinctly: ‘We maintain that a rainbow flag is not a political statement but an endorsement of equality and thus a universal human right.’

It is clear that, as with Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, the chilling effect that FIFA’s Regulations have on players’ and fans’ freedom of expression is likely to be unlawful, as has been discussed at length both on this blog and on the Verfassungsblog Debate on Freedom of Expression in the Olympic Movement. Instead of revisiting these arguments, which are taken to apply to FIFA’s actions at Qatar 2022, two additional issues related to the FIFA Statutes are explored here.

Articles 3 and 4 of FIFA’s Statutes state that:

3 Human rights

FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.

4 Non-discrimination, equality and neutrality

4.1 Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.

FIFA is a long-time supporter of pride events and in its press release for Pride Month 2022 stated:

[The] FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ will be a celebration of unity and diversity – a joining of people from all walks of life – regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression – everybody will be welcome.

Claims that all staff involved in the Qatar 2022 including public and private security forces, would be trained on how to accomplish their tasks in a non-discriminatory manner, seem not to have been operationalised effectively.

This begs the question whether FIFA is in breach of its own Statutes by refusing to allow players to express themselves freely on armbands and failing to protect fans’ freedom of expression by wearing rainbows. At the very least, FIFA should have ensured that a protective LGBTQIA+ regime in the stadiums and the fan zones during the World Cup was implemented to enable the ‘celebration of unity and diversity’ it claims that Qatar 2022 should be. FIFA’s actions in Qatar call into question its claims to be an inclusive and supportive leader on anti-discrimination and human rights, and is likely to see a backlash from the LGBTQIA+ community that it claims to support when it engages with Pride 2023; accusations of hypocrisy and virtue signalling are guaranteed.

With no resolution to the debate at the time of writing, Articles 3 and 4 could provide players and fans with the opportunity to demonstrate their support for human rights and anti-discrimination causes. At the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Athlete Ally developed the ‘Principle 6 Campaign.’ Instead of criticising directly Russia's so called anti-gay laws, which are currently in the process of being extended, athletes promoted Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, which at the time stated that, ‘Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ The eventual outcome of this campaign was the addition of sexual orientation to the list of characteristics protected by Principle 6. Unlike at Sochi 2014, there is no need to campaign for a change to either of Articles 3 or 4 of the FIFA Statutes; instead, activists want to ensure that they are being applied. An immediate response for both players and fans would be for them to quote specifically from Articles 3 and 4, as it would be extremely difficult for FIFA to claim that they are making political or personal statements when promoting FIFA’s own foundational values. A creative reminder of what FIFA claims to stand for could enable player and fan activism to continue throughout the tournament, and beyond, whilst affected players and associations can develop a compelling case for the restrictions on freedom of expression to be struck out by CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal and/or the European Court of Human Rights.

On the 24^th June 2014 the Spanish Audiencia Nacional issued its ruling on a hotly debated sports law topic: The whereabouts requirements imposed to athletes in the fight against doping. This blog aims to go beyond the existing commentaries (here and here) of the case, by putting it in the wider context of a discussion on the legality of the whereabouts requirements.                                                                          

I.              The Facts

In 2013, the Spanish High Council for Sports (Consejo Superior de Deportes) adopted resolution 1648/2013 providing two forms (Annex I and Annex II) for athletes to complete in order to fulfil their whereabouts requirements, in the view of implementing the existing Spanish laws against doping.[1]

The key legal provisions underlying this resolution read as follows (translation ASSER[2]):

Article  5 of Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte.

3. In the view of conducting the controls referred to in the first paragraph with the greatest efficiency possible, the athletes, the teams, trainers (coaches) and managers should facilitate, in accordance with the established regulations, the gathering of the data necessary for the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes, in a way that permits to carry out the doping tests. 

Article 43 of 641/2009 Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje y los laboratorios de análisis autorizados, y por el que se establecen medidas complementarias de prevención del dopaje y de protección de la salud en el deporte.

1. The athletes with a licence enabling them to participate in official competition on national level should, in accordance with the following paragraphs, facilitate the transmission of the data that permit the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes through completion of the specific form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

3. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have a specific duty to complete the form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

Article 45 of 641/2009 Real Decreto

1. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have to provide trimestral information on their habitual whereabouts, to this end they should complete the form approved by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes, including in any case the following minimum information:

a) A postal address where the athlete can receive correspondence for notification purposes related to doping tests.

b) A clause signed by the athlete, by which he agrees to communicate the data provided to other anti-doping organizations, pursuant to article 36 de la Ley Orgánica 7/2006.

c) For each trimester, in case of an absence longer than 3 days from the habitual residence, the athlete must provide the full address of his residence or whereabouts.

d) The details, including the name and address, of the training locations of the athlete, as well as his training calendar for the trimester, and the minimum schedule of availability necessary for conducting the doping controls.

e) The trimestral competition calendar, specifying the locations, dates and types of competitions in which he is due to compete.

Spanish athletes are thus divided into two categories: those subjected to an individualized plan under article 45 of the Real decreto and those not subjected to an individualized plan. Accordingly, the Council’s resolution provides two types of obligatory forms, one for athletes not included in the individualized plan covering only the usual place(s) of training (Annex I) and one for athletes included in the individualized plan covering the usual place(s) of training but also the unusual places of training (Annex II). Those forms must be completed and communicated to the national anti-doping agency before the beginning of each trimester.

It is the legality of this resolution, which was challenged by the Spanish Association of Professional Cyclists in front of the Audiencia Nacional , that lead to the ruling adopted 24 June 2014.  

II.            The Ruling

As a preamble, the judges recognized that “the efficiency of the fight against doping would be seriously impeded if no adequate mechanism existed to monitor effectively the whereabouts obligation of the athletes”. However, the Court also considered that “both legal texts refer to the habitual localization of the athlete in order to enable the testing”. Annex I does not go beyond what is necessary to assert this usual localization. Annex II, reserved for athletes subjected to an individualized plan, however, “besides indicating the location of the habitual training whereabouts, also include the request to provide information that should facilitate the ‘occasional localization’… which means that the athletes subject to this annex are (also) subject to a permanent localization obligation”.

The judges considered that this “permanent localization duty” is “submitting the athlete to a permanent control during all the days and hours of the year, thereby exceeding what can be considered “habitual or frequent”. The measure is disproportionate and contrary to the right to privacy, and is not mandated by law, even when considering the special duties that an athlete bears as holder of a sporting licence. It is especially so when subjected to a differentiated plan, since it could be analogized to a measure of penal character requiring a permanent localization that can only be imposed as a consequence of a criminal offence. Therefore, such a permanent localization duty entails an interference that is contrary to the essence of the right to privacy”. 

Thus, the Court considered that the resolution was contrary to the right to privacy and was going beyond the wording enshrined in article 5.3 of the Ley Orgánica. Hence, it is to be considered null and void and a new resolution needs to be devised.

III.           Whereabouts Requirements in the World Anti-Doping Code

So, is this just a Spanish case, relevant only to the national context, or does it reveal a wider problem with the whereabouts requirements imposed by the World anti-doping Code?

Surely, this is first and foremost a national case. However, the laws at stake were all adopted to transpose the World Anti-Doping Code at the national level and to conform to the UNESCO Convention on Doping.[3] Consequently, grasping the scope of the requirements imposed in this regard by the WADA Code is crucial to assessing the potential wider impact of this decision.  

Article 2.4 of the WADA Code 2009 foresees that the following constitutes an anti-doping rule violation:

2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out-of-Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation.  

To this end article 5.1.1 of the WADA Code 2009 provides that each Anti-Doping Organization shall:

5.1.1 Plan and conduct an effective number of In- Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on Athletes over whom they have jurisdiction, including but not limited to Athletes in their respective Registered Testing Pools. Each International Federation shall establish a Registered Testing Pool for International-Level Athletes in its sport, and each National Anti- Doping Organization shall establish a national Registered Testing Pool for Athletes who are present in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country or who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations of that country. In accordance with Article 14.3, any Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to the whereabouts requirements set out in the International Standard for Testing.

Finally article 14.3. of the WADA Code 2009 indicates that:

14.3 Athlete Whereabouts Information

As further provided in the International Standard for Testing, Athletes who have been identified by their International Federation or National Anti-Doping Organization for inclusion in a Registered Testing Pool shall provide accurate, current location information. The International Federations and National Anti- Doping Organizations shall coordinate the identification of Athletes and the collecting of current location information and shall submit these to WADA. This information will be accessible, through ADAMS where reasonably feasible, to other Anti-Doping Organizations having jurisdiction to test the Athlete as provided in Article 15. This information shall be maintained in strict confidence at all times; shall be used exclusively for purposes of planning, coordinating or conducting Testing; and shall be destroyed after it is no longer relevant for these purposes. 

These whereabouts requirements are further fleshed out in the International Standard for Testing 2012. Article 11.3 of the Standard deals with the Whereabouts Filing Requirements and foresees that: 

11.3.1 On a date specified by the Responsible ADO that is prior to the first day of each quarter (i.e. 1 January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October, respectively), an Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool must file a Whereabouts Filing with his/her IF (if the Athlete has been included in its international Registered Testing Pool) or his/her NADO (if the Athlete has been included in its national Registered Testing Pool) that contains at least the following information:

a. complete mailing address where correspondence may be sent to the Athlete for formal notice purposes. Any notice or other item mailed to that address will be deemed to have been received by the Athlete five working days after it was deposited in the mail;

[…]

d. for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place
where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc);

e. for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities; and

f. the Athlete’s competition schedule for the following quarter, including the name and address of each location where the Athlete is scheduled to compete during the quarter and the date(s) on which he/she is scheduled to compete at such location(s).

11.3.2 The Whereabouts Filing must also include, for each day during the following quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day where the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location. 

The question whether a specific type of information is to be included in the Whereabouts Filing is key to the Spanish ruling. The WADA Standard mentions only the “the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities”. This is further broken down in the comment to article 11.3.1(e) of the Standard, where it is specified that “[T]his requirement applies only to regular activities, i.e. activities that are part of the Athlete’s regular routine”. Furthermore, the WADA Guidelines for implementing an effective athlete whereabouts program provide at article 3.5 (p.19) that “an activity is only ‘regular’ if it is done as part of a standard schedule/in accordance with a routine pattern or practice”.

One can deduce from the above review of the WADA provisions that the Spanish system was even going beyond what WADA requires in terms of information to be communicated in the framework of the whereabouts requirements. Accordingly, the Court considered that the incriminated Annex II goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the objective of the anti-doping fight, if the global anti-doping watchdog is not confident that such information is needed. It would be a stretch, therefore, to interpret this judgment as an immediate threat for the WADA Code. Its wording seems rather to be in line with the Code’s own provisions.  

IV.          The Controversy Over Whereabouts Requirements

Anyhow, this case fuels the on-going controversy over the conciliation of whereabouts requirements with the right to privacy of athletes. The Court’s view that submitting an athlete to a permanent control of his whereabouts is contrary to her right to privacy might speak against a requirement to provide “for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc)” or “for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school)”. The proportionality of such, little less intruding, requirements could be put to the test as well. In fact, in its second opinion on the WADA Code, Article 29 Data Protection working party of the EU, specified that “the information to be provided concerning the whereabouts and the time slots for controls should be clearly determined by taking into account the requirements of the principles of necessity and proportionality with respect to the purposes of out of competition testing, and avoiding the collection of information that might lead to undue interference in athletes’ private lives or reveal sensitive data on athletes and/or third parties”. In this regard, it “considers it to be proportionate to require personal data regards to the specific 60-minute time slot and to require filling in the name and address of each location where the athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity”. But, it called onto WADA to “reconsider requesting that the residence on each day of the following quarter (even temporary lodging) should be filled in (article 11.3.1 under d. of the International Standard for Testing) as this would appear to be questionable”.[4]

This controversy also has a philosophical flavor as scores of legal and social science scholars have been discussing the issue over the years. Some laments the “lack of concern given to athletes’ privacy”[5], the fact that “athletes are now just as likely to be punished for taking prohibited substances as they are for being bad at paperwork”[6], or “a State of Exception”[7] for elite athletes. Leading them to wonder: “[W]ith respect to the ‘whereabouts’ policy we must ask whether human rights are genuinely violated?”[8]

Undeniably, WADA’s Athlete Committee is supporting staunchly the whereabouts requirements[9], but its members do not represent in any democratic, nor legitimate, way the affected athlete population. However, in the face of the impossible task of enforcing a harmonized global surveillance of the implementation of the whereabouts requirements[10], recent social-science surveys have shown that athletes doubt the necessity, proportionality and efficacy of such controls.[11]

The case at hand is a great opportunity to reflect on the foucauldian turn of the anti-doping fight. In practice it is looking more and more like a panopticon, devised to optimize the surveillance of athletes, while irremediably failing to do so.[12] In turn, each new failure triggers calls for a reinforcement of the surveillance’s means and scope, thus, overlooking the deeper socio-economic roots of doping. In this context, the judgement of the Spanish High Court is reaffirming a healthy, and reasonable, limit to a potential disciplinary overreach. An overreach, which, in many eyes, raises a more fundamental question: “is it worth the cost?”[13]

[1] Especially the Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte and the Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje

[2] I thank Oskar Van Maren for his translating skills.

[3] Here one should look specifically at the preamble of the Ley Organica 7/2006 and of Real Decreto 641/2009, 1462/2009 and 1744/2011

[4] This provision is still included in the new 2015 version of the International Standard for testing and investigations at I.3.1.(d), p.88

[5] Sarah Teetzel (2007) Respecting privacy in detecting illegitimate enhancements in athletes, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1:2, 159-170

[6] Niall Trainor, The 2009 WADA Code : A more proportionate deal for athletes ?, Entertainment and Sports law journal, June 2010, §65

[7] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18

[8] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18 p.12

[9] One example amongst many WADA Athlete Committee Meeting April 3–4, 2008, p.2

[10] See the Report to WADA Executive Committee on Lack of effectiveness of Testing Programs, 18 may 2012; Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430; Dikic N, Samardzic Markovic S, Mc Namee M, ‘On the efficacy of WADA’s Whereabouts policy: between filing failures and missed tests’ Deutsche Zeitschrift für Sportmedizin ‘Jahrgang 62, nr. 10 (2011), 324-328

[11] Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430, p.420; Diane Valkenburga, Olivier de Honb, Ivo van Hilvoordea, Doping control, providing whereabouts and the importance of privacy for elite athletes’, International Journal of Drug Policy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

[12] This logic of surveillance is highlighted by  I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74. And Hanstad, D.V., and S. Loland. ‘Elite Level Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information on their Whereabouts: Justifiable Anti-doping Work or an Indefensible Surveillance Regime?’ European Journal for Sport Sciences 9 (2009): 3–10.

[13] I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74

Editor's note: Dr Despina Mavromati is an attorney specializing in international sports law and arbitration (Sportlegis Lausanne) and a UEFA Appeals Body Member. She teaches sports arbitration and sports contracts at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

As the title indicates, this short note only deals with selected procedural issues and questions arising out of the very lengthy Semenya Judgment. In a nutshell, the SFT dismissed Semenya’s appeal to set aside the CAS Award, which had denied the request of Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) to declare unlawful the Differences of Sex Development (DSD) Regulations of World Athletics (formerly IAAF).[1]

At the outset, it has to be reminded that the CAS Award dealt with the merits of the Semenya case in a final and binding way by rendering an arbitral award according to Article R59 of the CAS Code (and Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – PILA). Therefore, the SFT did not act as an appellate court but rather as a cassatory court, entitled to review only whether the exhaustively enumerated grounds for annulment set out in Article 190 (2) PILA were met (and provided that they were properly invoked and substantiated in the motion to set aside said award).

The granting - and subsequent lifting - of the suspensive effect of the DSD Regulations

This was one of the few cases in sports arbitration where the SFT granted an urgent interim relief (mesures superprovisionnelles), by ordering World Athletics to suspend the implementation of the DSD Regulations, only to lift such relief shortly afterwards for lack of prima facie “reasonable chances of success”. The fate of the motion to set aside the CAS Award appeared to be ominous already at that stage. Another relatively recent case where the SFT granted interim relief (only to revoke it later) was the Guerrero case. 

Legal interest of a federation in order to “support” its member athletes

According to the admissibility conditions of the Law on the Federal Tribunal (LTF), the party filing a motion to set aside a CAS award must have a current interest worthy of protection. It is e.g. extremely difficult to meet this condition in a case relating to a competition that already took place. It One must also have a “personal” legal interest worthy of protection (see the SFT judgment in the matter of FIFA v. P. Guerrero & WADA). World Athletics contested the “personal” legal interest of Athletics South Africa but the SFT drew the distinction between this case and one of its previous judgments (the Guerrero case), where FIFA had contested a doping-related sanction imposed by the CAS before the SFT. Other than in the Guerrero case, the Athlete’s national federation (ASA) had not previously rendered a decision on the Athlete; moreover, national federations are directly concerned by the DSD Regulations to the extent that they need to actively collaborate with their international federation for their effective implementation (Semenya Judgment, at 4.1.3) This means that, in similar cases in the future, member federations have also standing to challenge the validity of such regulations.

Waivers to appeal to the SFT against CAS awards are invalid, full stop.

The waiver to bring the case before the CAS included in the disputed DSD Regulations was, obviously, invalid to the extent that it was not the “fruit of an explicit consent” by the Athlete. The latter had thus the right to contest the CAS Award before the SFT and this federal jurisprudence has remained unaltered since the groundbreaking Cañas SFT judgment (see the Semenya Judgment at 4.2.4).

The CAS independence revisited – even though not questioned by the parties

Unlike other athletes, Caster Semenya did not attack the CAS Award suggesting the lack of independence or impartiality of the CAS—either as an arbitral institution or as the subjective independence of its arbitrators (see the Semenya Judgment at 5.1.2). The SFT still deemed important to repeat its jurisprudence on the institutional independence and the specialized character of the CAS, to which the parties brought their dispute (see the Semenya Judgment including all references to SFT and ECtHR case law at 5.1.2).

The meaning - and limits - of the SFT leitmotiv “facts established by the CAS Panel are binding upon the SFT”

This is the reason most often invoked by the SFT when declaring inadmissible a particular grievance raised by the parties as a “criticism of appellatory nature” (see also “faits constatés dans la sentence” in the Semenya Judgment at 5.2.2). It is well-known that, unlike the de novo review by the CAS under Article R57 CAS Code, the SFT will not review the facts as they were established by the CAS Panel – save for the most exceptional circumstances (see the Semenya Judgment at 5.2.3 f.).

In the particular circumstances of this case, the facts binding on the SFT did not prevent the latter from reviewing the legality of the DSD Regulations. The SFT could however only consider the facts as they were established in the CAS award and not in the parties’ version of facts, to the extent that these versions deviated from the CAS factual findings (see the Semenya Judgment at 6). As such, the starting point for such analysis (and obviously one of key importance) was the Panel’s factual finding that athletes subject to the DSD Regulations enjoy an “overwhelming” advantage over other female athletes that are not subject to such regulations (see the Semenya Judgment -“avantage insurmontable”- at 9.6.2, at 9.8.2 and 11.1).

Swiss law not applicable in the case at hand

With the international federation based in Monaco (an exception to the rule that international federations are based in Switzerland), the CAS Panel proceeded to the interpretation of the DSD Regulations based on the IAAF Constitution and Rules, the Olympic Charter, and Monegasque law. As such, it held that Swiss law was not applicable to the merits and the SFT confirmed such finding (See the Semenya Judgment at 5.1.1). This, however, does not seem to have any influence on the SFT’s findings to the extent that the latter is not an appellate court and should not evaluate the application of Swiss–or any other—law applied in the specific case (see the Semenya Judgment at 9.1).

Violation of the constitution of the panel for unduly limiting its (full) scope of review

The Athlete raised a—rather unusual—ground for annulment (particularly based on the ground of irregular composition of the tribunal) because the panel had allegedly refused to amend or complement the DSD Regulations, thereby unduly limiting its scope of review. The SFT dismissed the plea holding that the full power of review of the panel related to the control of the proportionality of the DSD Regulations and not their amendment. The SFT dismissed the plea as unfounded, even though it implicitly considered that this plea does not even fall within the scope of irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal under Article 190 (2) (a) PILA but could – at most – constitute a violation of the parties’ right to be heard (see the Semenya Judgment -with further references- at 7).

Violation of substantive public policy – the three pleas invoked by the Athlete

Caster Semenya’s request for annulment of the CAS Award due to a violation of substantive public policy was divided into three pleas: the violation of the principle of prohibition of discrimination, the violation of personality rights of the Athlete and the violation of the Athlete’s human dignity. In this respect, the two conflicting groups were the athletes subject to the DSD Regulations against the athletes who were not subject to the DSD Regulations.

Horizontal Application of the Prohibition of discrimination ?

The prohibition of discrimination as foreseen in Art. 8 (2) of the Swiss Constitution applies to the relation between individuals and the State and has no “horizontal” effect. Sports associations are considered “private” parties notwithstanding their size and thus discrimination resulting from such private parties does not form part of the essential values that form public policy. The “private” character of sports associations has long been an obstacle for athletes when invoking violations of their constitutional guarantees and was also mentioned in this judgment (at 9.4).

Notwithstanding its insistence on the “private” character of sports associations, the SFT does seem to hesitantly develop its jurisprudence. Similar to the principles of interpretation under Swiss law, where the SFT has held that statutes of large federations must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of interpretation of a (states’) legal acts (see e.g. the Kuwait Motorsport SFT Judgment), the SFT acknowledged in the Semenya case that the relationship between an athlete and a large (international) sports association bears similarities to the relationship between an individual and a state (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.4).

In any event, this interesting debate will have to wait for another judgment since the SFT eventually found that there was no violation of the prohibition of the principle of discrimination by following the argumentation of the CAS Panel, whereby a discriminatory measure can still be allowed if justified by a legitimate objective (in casu the principle of equality of chances). In the case at hand, the SFT relied on the assessment made by the CAS Panel which, after hearing all the arguments raised by the parties, resulted in a reasonable outcome (or at least to a “not unreasonable” outcome) (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.4 and at 9.8.3.3).

Breach of personality rights and the difference from the Matuzalem judgment

On the breach of personality rights plea, the SFT reiterated its limited scope within the public policy grievance, which requires a clear and severe violations of a fundamental right. Again, the DSD Regulations were not found to fall within the (narrow) scope of Art. 27 Swiss CO, neither from the viewpoint of physical integrity nor from the viewpoint of economic freedom (see the Semenya Judgment, at 10.1).

Other than in the Matuzalem case (the first – and only SFT judgment that annulled a CAS award for violation of substantive public policy so far), the athlete would still be capable of participating in the specified competitions after complying with the conditions set out in the DSD Regulations; moreover, there was no imminent risk of their economic existence as was in the Matuzalem case, whereas the measure was found to be able to achieve the desired goal, were necessary and proportionate (see the Semenya Judgment at 10.5).

Violation of human dignity

The SFT seemed to endorse the CAS Panel’s findings in this respect, and concluded that the impossibility to participate in specific competitions would not amount to a violation of the athlete’s human dignity.

Should the SFT broaden the scope of public policy for sports arbitration? The SFT still says “no”

The scope of substantive public policy according to well-established jurisprudence of the SFT is extremely narrow and such limited review is compatible with the ECtHR (see the Semenya Judgment with references to the Platini Judgment at 5.2.5; see also the Semenya Judgment at 9.8.3.3). The SFT, once again, refused to broaden the scope of the public policy as a ground for annulment of CAS awards. This reminds us of a somewhat different yet analogous attempt of the parties in the SFT Judgment 4A_312/2017. The SFT had reiterated its position that there should be no different notion of public policy tailored to sports arbitration.[2]

Closing remarks: The Athlete’s requests for relief and the inherent limits of arbitration in similar cases

It is interesting to note that the Athlete did not appeal to the CAS against a decision finding her ineligible to compete based on the concrete application of the DSD Regulations. She rather filed a claim with the CAS attacking the legality of the DSD Regulations– for all the reasons mentioned in the CAS award and the SFT judgment.

This resulted in the CAS Panel finding – and the SFT confirming - that the DSD Regulations could not be invalidated as such but left the door open for future challenges: the DSD Regulations may prove disproportionate in their application, if e.g. it should prove impossible to apply them, in case of a specific athlete subject to the DSD Regulations where their application proves impossible or disproportionate (see the Semenya Judgment, at 9.8.3.5).

The Athlete would thus – theoretically – be able to file a new case with the CAS, once the DSD Regulations were implemented and following a potential decision on ineligibility. This shows the difficulty in directly challenging a set of regulations in cases where the hearing authority considers that it is rather their application in a concrete case that may give rise to a specific violation of athletes’ rights. The CAS panel, as an arbitral tribunal, is inherently limited by the scope of the appeal, which in the present case was Caster Semenya’s claim to have the DSD Regulations declared invalid as such.

[1] For an insightful overview of the facts behind the judgment and the findings of the SFT, see Marjolaine Viret, Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision – in the Asser International Sports Law Blog of 9 September 2020.

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

1.     Introduction

The organizational structure of sports in Europe is distinguished by its pyramid structure which is marked by an open promotion and relegation system. A truly closed system, without promotion and relegation, is unknown to Europe, while it is the main structure found in North American professional sports leagues such as the NFL, NBA and the NHL. Recently, top European football clubs along with certain members of UEFA have been debating different possibilities of introducing a more closed league system to European football. Some football clubs have even wielded the threat of forming an elite closed breakaway league. Piercing through these intimidations and rumors, the question of whether a closed league system could even survive the scrutiny of EU competition law remains. It could be argued that an agreement between clubs to create a completely closed league stifles competition and would most likely trigger the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.[1] Interestingly, a completely closed league franchise system has already permeated the European continent. As outlined in my previous blog, the League of Legends European Championship (LEC) is a European e-sports competition that has recently rebranded and restructured this year from an open promotion and relegation system to a completely closed franchise league to model its sister competition from North America, the League Championship Series. This case is an enticing opportunity to test how EU competition law could apply to such a competition structure.

As a preliminary note, this blog does not aim to argue whether the LEC is a ‘real’ sport competition and makes the assumption that the LEC could be considered as a sports competition.[2]

2.     LEC’s Position in the League of Legends Competitive Structure

The LEC is the pinnacle of League of Legends (LoL) competition in Europe that is organized by its developer, Riot Games. Currently, the LEC is the only path to the League of Legends World Championship. Its previous name was the EU League Championship Series (EU LCS), and it featured a promotion and relegation system with the EU Challenger Series. The EU Challenger Series has been replaced with the European Masters, which is a tournament that places the top seed from European regional leagues against each other. It is important to highlight that the teams in the LEC do not compete on behalf of their region (although some of the organizations from the LEC have their second team competing in a regional leagues).

The franchise agreement between the LEC and the participant e-sport organizations required organizations to buy-in at 10.5 million euros into the LEC. The ensuing partnership lasts three years and ensures that the organization is guaranteed a spot in the LEC during this period, unless there are “consistent poor performance or disciplinary issues”. The agreement effectively prevents any other European organization/team from the regional leagues and the European Masters from accessing the highest LoL championship in Europe (the LEC) and completely cuts off any opportunity to reach the League of Legends World Championships for at least three years.

The previous system of relegation and promotion has helped foster talent and create new successful European e-sports organizations. Currently, the winners of Mid-Season Invitational 2019 (a mid-year world championship) is G2 Esports, which was able to rise to the EU LCS through the EU Challenger Series in late 2015. As a result, concerns have been expressed that by adopting the closed league model, the LEC will not be able to nurture new talent and competitive organizations. This worry goes to the heart of Article 165 TFEU’s aim to develop the ‘openness’ of sporting competitions and gives merit to analyzing the LEC under EU competition law rules.[3]

3.     EU Competition Law and its Application to Sports

Generally speaking, EU competition law seeks to ensure ‘effective’ competition between undertakings in Europe. Concerning the field of sports, the CJEU asserted that rules of sport governing bodies fall under the inspection of EU competition law even if they are purely sporting in nature.[4] However, the CJEU left room for sport governing bodies to defend their measures which fall within the scope of competition rules. Sporting rules can escape the prohibitions of EU competition law if it can be shown that the concerned measures are inherent to the objectives it seeks to achieve and that they are “proportionate to the legitimate genuine sporting interest pursued”.  In other words, the specificity of sport must be taken into account.[5] Additionally, the CJEU has recognized that the participation in sport competitions can constitute economic activity because of the exposure that participation may provide.[6] Thus, preventing other organizations and their athletes from taking part in a league competition and as a consequence, the world championships, can have detrimental economic impacts on that organization and its athletes.

For this reason, the organizational structure of sport competitions may have colossal economic ramifications and easily fall within the scope of the Treaties. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the two cornerstones of EU competition law that prima facie would be applicable to this case. Essentially, Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict competition, and Article 102 TFEU forbids an undertaking or group of undertakings (collective dominance) from abusing its dominant position on the relevant market. So when a group of undertakings hold a dominant position in the relevant market and make an agreement which abuses their dominant position, the CJEU has recognized that both Article 101 and 102 TFEU may be applied. Nevertheless, the following analysis will concentrate on Article 102 TFEU.

4.     Does LEC (and its participant organizations) have a Dominant Position?

4.1.Are the LEC (and its participant organizations) undertakings?

As a preliminary point, the European Commission and the CJEU has repeatedly qualified sport governing bodies as undertakings under EU competition law.[7] The key criteria to determine whether an entity is an undertaking under EU law is whether the entity is engaged in ‘economic activity’. In MOTOE, the CJEU ruled that ELPA, a body that was organizing motorcycling events, was engaged in economic activity because it entered into “sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts designed to exploit those events commercially”.[8] In the present case, there is little doubt that the League European Championship Limited, which is a private company limited by shares incorporated in the Republic of Ireland controlled by Riot Games, could be considered an undertaking since it concludes sponsorships and advertises its events.

The organizations that have signed the franchise agreement with Riot Games are mainly private limited companies.[9] These organizations enter into sponsorship agreements, and as stated earlier, the CJEU found that the participation in a sport competition could constitute economic activity. It follows that these e-sport organizations would easily be considered as undertakings.

4.2.What is the relevant market?

The next issue is determining the relevant market, including the relevant product and geographic market, the LEC and its participant organizations occupy. To identify the relevant product market, EU competition law examines the substitutability of the product or service. For example, in defining the relevant product or service market, the CJEU in MOTOE quite readily found that ELPA was “engaged ... in the organisation of motorcycling events and … their exploitation by means of sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts”.[10]

From the outset, it should be underlined that games considered as e-sports greatly differ from one another.[11] E-sports usually fall within different genres of games, such as Real-Time Strategy (RTS), First-Person Shooter (FPS), Fighting, and Sports games. LoL falls within the Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) genre. Thus, one may argue the relevant market in this case is e-sports competitions in the MOBA market. One way to test this market definition would be examining the ability of e-sports players to move from one e-sport to another.

Unfortunately, there has not been a complete study on the maneuverability of e-sport professionals between games of the same genre or of a different genre. As a result, it is difficult to have a complete view on the issue. Nevertheless, while there have been cases where certain players from e-sports of a different genre were able to move to LoL successfully (Ggoong [e-sports players are known by their own made up player names]) and others who have moved from LoL to another e-sport (Gesture, Bischu), there have been others who have attempted such moves without success (Destiny). On the other hand, when examining ‘traditional’ sports there are also many examples of athletes who have moved from one sport to another. For example, Primož Roglič was a high-level ski jumper, and even won the Junior Ski World Championship in this discipline, who then moved into professional road cycling and most recently came third in the Giro d’Italia. Ski jumping and road cycling arguably have very little in common, and it would be highly doubtful that the Commission or the CJEU would include both in the same market. Such an extreme example demonstrates that focusing on the maneuverability of e-sports athletes between e-sports may not always be the best way to define an e-sport market, and perhaps a more suitable approach would be to examine the specific features of the e-sport.

In this sense, it should be borne in mind that e-sports in the same genre, while sharing many basic characteristics and many of the fine motor skills, still diverge in terms of gameplay and strategy. If this were not the case, a professional LoL player could become a professional DOTA 2 (another MOBA e-sport) player without any extra effort. In reality, to make a transition, the professional LoL player would have to learn the intricacies and nuances of DOTA 2 compared to LoL, e.g. the champions and their builds, the pace of play, meta (the best strategies to win the game) etc. All of these differences support the argument that perhaps defining the product or service market in this case to MOBA e-sport competitions may be too broad, and it could be more appropriate to narrow the definition to LoL e-sport competitions.

Lastly, the geographic market is much more straightforward to define since the LEC Regulations define the EU Competitive Region in its 2019 Season Official Rules.[12] Therefore, the relevant geographic market would most likely be the EU Competitive Region.

4.3.Does LEC (and its participating organizations) have a dominant position in this market?

The Commission provides the most relevant criteria to ascertain whether an undertaking or undertakings hold a dominant position on the relevant market in its Guidance on enforcement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 TFEU). Pertinent benchmarks include the “position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors”, “expansion and entry” of actual or future competitors, and the “bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers” (countervailing buyer power). Usually, market shares are used to give a preliminary indication whether an undertaking occupies a dominant position in the market. The minimum threshold market share for which an undertaking or undertakings may be found to hold a dominant position is around 40-50%.[13]

If the relevant market was defined as the e-sport competitions in the MOBA market in the EU Competitive Region, one would have to examine competitive LoL in comparison to other e-sport competitions in the MOBA genre in Europe. For the purposes of this blog, there is rather limited information on the market share of LoL competitions in comparison to other MOBA e-sports in Europe. However, to at least give an idea of the size and dominance of LoL in the general MOBA market, LoL was projected to have an estimated 66% market share in 2016. When one compares this share to the second place, DOTA 2 with 14 %, it is evident that LoL generally holds a powerful position in the MOBA market and this most likely extends to its e-sports competitions.

In contrast, if the relevant market is narrowed to LoL e-sport competitions in the EU Competitive Region only, there would be an even higher chance of the LEC and its participant organizations being found to hold a dominant position. It could be argued that the European Masters (although Riot Games is a co-organizer) and the LoL regional leagues could be seen as ‘competitors’. Once more, direct information on market shares is scant. However, if one observes the viewership numbers of the LEC versus the European Masters, the LEC completely dwarfs the European Masters. The LEC in its 2019 Spring Split had a peak viewership of over 475,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of over 200,000 viewers. By comparison, the European Masters Spring 2019 competition had a peak viewership of just over 60,000 viewers and an average concurrent viewership of 32,000 viewers. From these numbers, it is evident that the LEC is overwhelmingly more popular and as a corollary, it may indicate that the LEC’s market share is likely to also reflect this.

5.     Does LEC abuse its Dominant Position?

5.1.Is the dominant position being abused and can it be justified (sporting exceptions)?

The finding of a dominant position is not enough to constitute a breach of EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU also requires that the dominant undertaking or undertakings abuse its dominant position, and it allows the dominant undertaking(s) to demonstrate how the relevant measures may be justified and proportionate. Within the sport context, the sport governing body must explain how the conduct which restricts competition pursues a legitimate objective and the anti-competitive effects must be “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives … and are proportionate to them”.[14]  There are a variety of ways an undertaking may abuse its dominant position, but in the present case, the LEC and its participant organizations agreement to seal the LEC and the LoL World Championship from any other European competitors would most likely fall under a non-price based exclusionary abuse. More specifically, exclusionary conduct must constitute ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ which according to the Commission’s Guidance Paper is “a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers” (emphasis added).[15] 

The foreclosure requirement in this case is quite evidently satisfied since the LEC and its participant organizations have effectively excluded other organizations in Europe from the highest European competition of LoL and as a result, the LoL World Championship. Actually assessing whether there has been an increase in price to the detriment of consumers is not necessary, and the CJEU has ruled that “Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as referring not only to practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through their impact on competition”.[16] Moreover, a dominant undertaking “has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the internal market” and “[Article 102 TFEU] is aimed not only at the practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on the competition structure”.[17] Therefore, it is not necessary to show direct harm to consumers, but that the foreclosure effects damage competition to a sufficient degree to their disadvantage.

As discussed earlier, the former promotion and relegation system helped promote new talent and organizations that were able to develop new fanbases, giving the opportunity for the European LoL viewers to get behind up and coming organizations. By stifling the prospects of new organizations from emerging in the LEC or the Worlds stage, market development may be hindered in contravention with Article 102 (b) TFEU at the European LoL e-sport’s expense.

Nonetheless, the LEC hopes that the closed structure “provides teams with more security to make longer investments that will strengthen and support pros, and provide better experiences for fan (sic)”, to “unlock revenue sharing” and “to focus on shaping the long-term future”. Basically, the LEC and its members seek greater financial security for themselves in order to invest more in its players and fans. The question is then whether the restrictions of competition resulting from the closed league described above are inherent to the pursuit of the aforementioned objectives.[18] While “the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams” could be a legitimate objective,[19] it is possible to envisage less restrictive means to achieve financial stability without completely excluding other European organizations from competing for the final LEC title and the LoL World Championship. For example, perhaps the LEC play-offs could give the opportunity for teams number 5 and 6 from the regular season to first face off against the top two teams of the European Masters Tournament.[20] A similar play-in format could easily be introduced for the LoL World Championships. Despite these changes, new organizations would still be precluded from joining the LEC. Perhaps this would require the LEC to come up with new creative structures that allow new organizations to join the LEC after having proven their worth. An example of such a system can be found in the top European basketball competition, EuroLeague, which issues different license/partner tiers for its participating clubs in order to provide better financial security for itself and its participants but still provides the possibility for a better performing national team to participate in the EuroLeague.[21] Based on my analysis, it is probable that the anti-competitive effects of a completely closed league will not be found to be entirely ‘inherent’ in the pursuit of financial stability.

6.     Conclusion

Taken altogether, the issue with EU competition law does not solely materialize because the LEC aims to provide greater financial stability for itself and its partners. Instead, the problems arise when there are no or very limited avenues for new competitors, in this case European e-sport organizations and their cyberathletes, to progress to the highest levels of competitive LoL in Europe. The closed league structure of the LEC precludes any outside organizations from playing in the LEC Playoffs and Finals, and as a result, they also may never participate in the LoL World Championship. On the other hand, it is understandable that the LEC seeks to create further financial stability for itself, the organizations and ultimately the cyberathletes. However, this should not come at the detriment of new competitors who could help elevate the level of competition in the LEC.

By extending this analysis to the wider sports world, it would be advisable for sports governing bodies who wish to create a more closed competitive league to pay close attention to the anti-competitive effects such restructuring could produce. Moreover, these effects would have to be proportionate and in the sporting context, “inherent in the pursuit of those objectives”.[22] All things considered, it does seem rather difficult to reconcile a completely closed league, as the one found in the LEC, with EU competition law.

[1] Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 282-283.

[2] See my previous blog for an analysis of whether LoL and the LEC could be a sport.

[3] Weatherill (n 1) 283.

[4] Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-06991 para. 27; White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391, 11 July 2007, 13.

[5] White Paper on Sport ibid.

[6] Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] ECR I-02549 para 57.

[7] Cases IV/33.384 and IV/33.378 FIFA-distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup [1992] European Commission, OJ L326/31; Meca-Medina (n 4); Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-04863.

[8] MOTOE (n 7) para 23.

[9] See for example: Fnatic (Private limited company), G2 Esports (GmbH) and Origen Esports (ApS).

[10] MOTOE (n 7) para 33.

[11] Cem Abanazir, ‘E-sport and the EU: the view from the English Bridge Union’ (2019) International Sports Law Journal 102.

[12] The LEC 2019 Season Official Rules Glossary defines the EU Competitive Region as: “Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), Vatican City (Holy See)”.

[13] Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6^th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 325.

[14] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; also see Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/02 para 28.

[15] Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (n 14) para 19.

[16] Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-00527 para 24.

[17] ibid; Case C-95/04 British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-02331 para 106.

[18] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42; Commission Staff Working Document - The EU and Sport: Background and Context - Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport (2007) COM 391 at 2.1.5.

[19] White Paper on Sport (n 4) 68.

[20] See here for the current format of the 2019 LEC Playoffs.

[21] See Chapter II and III of the EuroLeague Bylaws.

[22] Meca-Medina (n 4) para 42.