Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Right to Privacy 1:0 Whereabouts Requirement - A Case Note on a Recent Decision by the Spanish Audiencia Nacional

On the 24th June 2014 the Spanish Audiencia Nacional issued its ruling on a hotly debated sports law topic: The whereabouts requirements imposed to athletes in the fight against doping. This blog aims to go beyond the existing commentaries (here and here) of the case, by putting it in the wider context of a discussion on the legality of the whereabouts requirements.                                                                          


I.              The Facts

In 2013, the Spanish High Council for Sports (Consejo Superior de Deportes) adopted resolution 1648/2013 providing two forms (Annex I and Annex II) for athletes to complete in order to fulfil their whereabouts requirements, in the view of implementing the existing Spanish laws against doping.[1]

The key legal provisions underlying this resolution read as follows (translation ASSER[2]):

Article  5 of Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte.

3. In the view of conducting the controls referred to in the first paragraph with the greatest efficiency possible, the athletes, the teams, trainers (coaches) and managers should facilitate, in accordance with the established regulations, the gathering of the data necessary for the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes, in a way that permits to carry out the doping tests. 

Article 43 of 641/2009 Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje y los laboratorios de análisis autorizados, y por el que se establecen medidas complementarias de prevención del dopaje y de protección de la salud en el deporte.

1. The athletes with a licence enabling them to participate in official competition on national level should, in accordance with the following paragraphs, facilitate the transmission of the data that permit the localisation of the habitual whereabouts of the athletes through completion of the specific form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

3. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have a specific duty to complete the form established by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes.

Article 45 of 641/2009 Real Decreto

1. The athletes subjected to the Individualized Plan have to provide trimestral information on their habitual whereabouts, to this end they should complete the form approved by Resolution of el Presidente del Consejo Superior de Deportes, including in any case the following minimum information:

a) A postal address where the athlete can receive correspondence for notification purposes related to doping tests.

b) A clause signed by the athlete, by which he agrees to communicate the data provided to other anti-doping organizations, pursuant to article 36 de la Ley Orgánica 7/2006.

c) For each trimester, in case of an absence longer than 3 days from the habitual residence, the athlete must provide the full address of his residence or whereabouts.

d) The details, including the name and address, of the training locations of the athlete, as well as his training calendar for the trimester, and the minimum schedule of availability necessary for conducting the doping controls.

e) The trimestral competition calendar, specifying the locations, dates and types of competitions in which he is due to compete.

Spanish athletes are thus divided into two categories: those subjected to an individualized plan under article 45 of the Real decreto and those not subjected to an individualized plan. Accordingly, the Council’s resolution provides two types of obligatory forms, one for athletes not included in the individualized plan covering only the usual place(s) of training (Annex I) and one for athletes included in the individualized plan covering the usual place(s) of training but also the unusual places of training (Annex II). Those forms must be completed and communicated to the national anti-doping agency before the beginning of each trimester.

It is the legality of this resolution, which was challenged by the Spanish Association of Professional Cyclists in front of the Audiencia Nacional , that lead to the ruling adopted 24 June 2014.  


II.            The Ruling

As a preamble, the judges recognized that “the efficiency of the fight against doping would be seriously impeded if no adequate mechanism existed to monitor effectively the whereabouts obligation of the athletes”. However, the Court also considered that both legal texts refer to the habitual localization of the athlete in order to enable the testing”. Annex I does not go beyond what is necessary to assert this usual localization. Annex II, reserved for athletes subjected to an individualized plan, however, “besides indicating the location of the habitual training whereabouts, also include the request to provide information that should facilitate the ‘occasional localization’… which means that the athletes subject to this annex are (also) subject to a permanent localization obligation”.

The judges considered that this “permanent localization duty” is “submitting the athlete to a permanent control during all the days and hours of the year, thereby exceeding what can be considered “habitual or frequent”. The measure is disproportionate and contrary to the right to privacy, and is not mandated by law, even when considering the special duties that an athlete bears as holder of a sporting licence. It is especially so when subjected to a differentiated plan, since it could be analogized to a measure of penal character requiring a permanent localization that can only be imposed as a consequence of a criminal offence. Therefore, such a permanent localization duty entails an interference that is contrary to the essence of the right to privacy”. 

Thus, the Court considered that the resolution was contrary to the right to privacy and was going beyond the wording enshrined in article 5.3 of the Ley Orgánica. Hence, it is to be considered null and void and a new resolution needs to be devised.


III.           Whereabouts Requirements in the World Anti-Doping Code

So, is this just a Spanish case, relevant only to the national context, or does it reveal a wider problem with the whereabouts requirements imposed by the World anti-doping Code?

Surely, this is first and foremost a national case. However, the laws at stake were all adopted to transpose the World Anti-Doping Code at the national level and to conform to the UNESCO Convention on Doping.[3] Consequently, grasping the scope of the requirements imposed in this regard by the WADA Code is crucial to assessing the potential wider impact of this decision.  


Article 2.4 of the WADA Code 2009 foresees that the following constitutes an anti-doping rule violation:

2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out-of-Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation.  

To this end article 5.1.1 of the WADA Code 2009 provides that each Anti-Doping Organization shall:

5.1.1 Plan and conduct an effective number of In- Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on Athletes over whom they have jurisdiction, including but not limited to Athletes in their respective Registered Testing Pools. Each International Federation shall establish a Registered Testing Pool for International-Level Athletes in its sport, and each National Anti- Doping Organization shall establish a national Registered Testing Pool for Athletes who are present in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country or who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations of that country. In accordance with Article 14.3, any Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to the whereabouts requirements set out in the International Standard for Testing.

Finally article 14.3. of the WADA Code 2009 indicates that:

14.3 Athlete Whereabouts Information

As further provided in the International Standard for Testing, Athletes who have been identified by their International Federation or National Anti-Doping Organization for inclusion in a Registered Testing Pool shall provide accurate, current location information. The International Federations and National Anti- Doping Organizations shall coordinate the identification of Athletes and the collecting of current location information and shall submit these to WADA. This information will be accessible, through ADAMS where reasonably feasible, to other Anti-Doping Organizations having jurisdiction to test the Athlete as provided in Article 15. This information shall be maintained in strict confidence at all times; shall be used exclusively for purposes of planning, coordinating or conducting Testing; and shall be destroyed after it is no longer relevant for these purposes. 

These whereabouts requirements are further fleshed out in the International Standard for Testing 2012. Article 11.3 of the Standard deals with the Whereabouts Filing Requirements and foresees that: 

11.3.1 On a date specified by the Responsible ADO that is prior to the first day of each quarter (i.e. 1 January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October, respectively), an Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool must file a Whereabouts Filing with his/her IF (if the Athlete has been included in its international Registered Testing Pool) or his/her NADO (if the Athlete has been included in its national Registered Testing Pool) that contains at least the following information:

a. complete mailing address where correspondence may be sent to the Athlete for formal notice purposes. Any notice or other item mailed to that address will be deemed to have been received by the Athlete five working days after it was deposited in the mail;

[…]

d. for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place
where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc);

e. for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities; and

f. the Athlete’s competition schedule for the following quarter, including the name and address of each location where the Athlete is scheduled to compete during the quarter and the date(s) on which he/she is scheduled to compete at such location(s).

11.3.2 The Whereabouts Filing must also include, for each day during the following quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day where the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location. 

The question whether a specific type of information is to be included in the Whereabouts Filing is key to the Spanish ruling. The WADA Standard mentions only the “the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity (e.g. school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities”. This is further broken down in the comment to article 11.3.1(e) of the Standard, where it is specified that “[T]his requirement applies only to regular activities, i.e. activities that are part of the Athlete’s regular routine. Furthermore, the WADA Guidelines for implementing an effective athlete whereabouts program provide at article 3.5 (p.19) that “an activity is only ‘regular’ if it is done as part of a standard schedule/in accordance with a routine pattern or practice”.

One can deduce from the above review of the WADA provisions that the Spanish system was even going beyond what WADA requires in terms of information to be communicated in the framework of the whereabouts requirements. Accordingly, the Court considered that the incriminated Annex II goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the objective of the anti-doping fight, if the global anti-doping watchdog is not confident that such information is needed. It would be a stretch, therefore, to interpret this judgment as an immediate threat for the WADA Code. Its wording seems rather to be in line with the Code’s own provisions.  


IV.          The Controversy Over Whereabouts Requirements

Anyhow, this case fuels the on-going controversy over the conciliation of whereabouts requirements with the right to privacy of athletes. The Court’s view that submitting an athlete to a permanent control of his whereabouts is contrary to her right to privacy might speak against a requirement to provide “for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place where the Athlete will be residing (e.g. home, temporary lodgings, hotel, etc)” or “for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where the Athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular
activity (e.g. school)”. The proportionality of such, little less intruding, requirements could be put to the test as well. In fact, in its second opinion on the WADA Code, Article 29 Data Protection working party of the EU, specified that “the information to be provided concerning the whereabouts and the time slots for controls should be clearly determined by taking into account the requirements of the principles of necessity and proportionality with respect to the purposes of out of competition testing, and avoiding the collection of information that might lead to undue interference in athletes’ private lives or reveal sensitive data on athletes and/or third parties”. In this regard, it “considers it to be proportionate to require personal data regards to the specific 60-minute time slot and to require filling in the name and address of each location where the athlete will train, work or conduct any other regular activity”. But, it called onto WADA to “reconsider requesting that the residence on each day of the following quarter (even temporary lodging) should be filled in (article 11.3.1 under d. of the International Standard for Testing) as this would appear to be questionable”.[4]

This controversy also has a philosophical flavor as scores of legal and social science scholars have been discussing the issue over the years. Some laments the “lack of concern given to athletes’ privacy”[5], the fact that “athletes are now just as likely to be punished for taking prohibited substances as they are for being bad at paperwork”[6], or “a State of Exception”[7] for elite athletes. Leading them to wonder: “[W]ith respect to the ‘whereabouts’ policy we must ask whether human rights are genuinely violated?”[8]

Undeniably, WADA’s Athlete Committee is supporting staunchly the whereabouts requirements[9], but its members do not represent in any democratic, nor legitimate, way the affected athlete population. However, in the face of the impossible task of enforcing a harmonized global surveillance of the implementation of the whereabouts requirements[10], recent social-science surveys have shown that athletes doubt the necessity, proportionality and efficacy of such controls.[11]

The case at hand is a great opportunity to reflect on the foucauldian turn of the anti-doping fight. In practice it is looking more and more like a panopticon, devised to optimize the surveillance of athletes, while irremediably failing to do so.[12] In turn, each new failure triggers calls for a reinforcement of the surveillance’s means and scope, thus, overlooking the deeper socio-economic roots of doping. In this context, the judgement of the Spanish High Court is reaffirming a healthy, and reasonable, limit to a potential disciplinary overreach. An overreach, which, in many eyes, raises a more fundamental question: “is it worth the cost?”[13]



[1] Especially the Ley Orgánica 7/2006, de 21 de noviembre, de protección de la salud y de lucha contra el dopaje en el deporte and the Real Decreto 641/2009, de 17 de abril, por el que se regulan los procesos de control de dopaje

[2] I thank Oskar Van Maren for his translating skills.

[3] Here one should look specifically at the preamble of the Ley Organica 7/2006 and of Real Decreto 641/2009, 1462/2009 and 1744/2011

[4] This provision is still included in the new 2015 version of the International Standard for testing and investigations at I.3.1.(d), p.88

[5] Sarah Teetzel (2007) Respecting privacy in detecting illegitimate enhancements in athletes, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1:2, 159-170

[6] Niall Trainor, The 2009 WADA Code : A more proportionate deal for athletes ?, Entertainment and Sports law journal, June 2010, §65

[7] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18

[8] Lev Kreft (2009) The Elite Athlete – In a State of Exception?, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 3-18 p.12

[9] One example amongst many WADA Athlete Committee Meeting April 3–4, 2008, p.2

[10] See the Report to WADA Executive Committee on Lack of effectiveness of Testing Programs, 18 may 2012; Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430; Dikic N, Samardzic Markovic S, Mc Namee M, On the efficacy of WADA’s Whereabouts policy: between filing failures and missed tests Deutsche Zeitschrift für Sportmedizin ‘Jahrgang 62, nr. 10 (2011), 324-328

[11] Dag Vidar Hanstad , Eivind Å. Skille & Sigmund Loland (2010) Harmonization of anti-doping work: myth or reality?, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 13:3, 418-430, p.420; Diane Valkenburga, Olivier de Honb, Ivo van Hilvoordea, Doping control, providing whereabouts and the importance of privacy for elite athletes’, International Journal of Drug Policy xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

[12] This logic of surveillance is highlighted by  I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74. And Hanstad, D.V., and S. Loland. ‘Elite Level Athletes’ Duty to Provide Information on their Whereabouts: Justifiable Anti-doping Work or an Indefensible Surveillance Regime?’ European Journal for Sport Sciences 9 (2009): 3–10.

[13] I. Waddington (2010), Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2: 255–74

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part.1: The historical, legal and political foundations - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Revisiting FIFA’s Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism - Part.1: The historical, legal and political foundations - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Editor’s note: Rhys Lenarduzzi is a final semester Bachelor of Law (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) student, at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. As a former professional athlete, then international sports agent and consultant, Rhys is interested in international sports law, policy and ethics. He is currently undertaking an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law.


In 2019, training compensation and solidarity contributions based on FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) amounted to US$ 75,5 million. This transfer of wealth from the clubs in the core of the football hierarchy to the clubs where the professional players originated is a peculiar arrangement unknown in other global industries. Beyond briefly pointing out or reminding the reader of how these systems work and the history behind them, this blog series aims to revisit the justifications for FIFA-imposed training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, assess their efficacy and effects through a case study of their operation in the African context, and finally analyse the potential impact of upcoming reforms of the FIFA RSTP in this context.

First, it is important to go back to the roots of this, arguably, strange practice. The current transfer system and the legal mechanisms constituting it were largely the result of a complex negotiation between European football’s main stakeholders and the European Commission dating back to 2001. The conclusion of these negotiations led to a new regulatory system enshrined in Article 20 and Annex 4 of the RSTP in the case of training compensation, and at Article 21 and Annex 5 in the case of the solidarity mechanism. Before paying some attention to the historical influences and how we arrived at these changes, as well as the justifications from the relevant bodies for their existence, let us briefly recall what training compensation and the solidarity mechanisms actually are.


1.     FIFA’s training compensation and solidarity mechanism: A very short introduction

Training compensation is the obligation of an acquiring/buying/signing/new club to compensate the training clubs of a player. A training club is considered to be the clubs of the player between the ages of 12 and 21, though the obligation to compensate continues if either of the following two instances take place, up until the season of a player’s 23rd birthday:  i) “[A] player is registered for the first time as a professional” or,  ii) “a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations…”. The obligation does not arise if a former club terminates a player’s contract without just cause, when a professional reacquires amateur status in moving clubs, or when a player transfers to a category 4 club. Regarding the categories, this is important because the amounts owed to a training club hinge on where clubs fall within four categories (For more on the four categories see HERE).

There are some regulatory differences between the EU/EEA and the rest of the football world. A significant distinction is that without sufficient justification that it is worthy of compensation, a former club will not be owed by a “new club”[1] if they have not offered a contract of equivalent value to the player in question.[2]

The Solidarity mechanism provisions stipulate that when a player moves to a new club, mid contract, for a fee agreed between the new club and former club, then 5% of that fee is designated as a solidarity contribution, and each of the player’s training clubs will receive a portion. The apportionment varies depending on what age the player was registered with the training club (further information on apportionment can be found HERE). This obligation arises when a player is transferred definitively or on loan, between clubs from different associations, as well as when a transfer takes place within the same association, but a training club of the player is affiliated to another association.

For both training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, the regulations provide that the national association will instead receive the money when the club owed “has in the meantime ceased to participate in organised football and/ or no longer exists”.[3] In cases as such, the compensation is to be used for youth football development.

Disputes can arise when the new club does not pay on time or at all, or if there is a disagreement on the amount owed, as well as when a new club attempts to make the case that a player has already terminated his training period prior to age of 21. Given the above explanation of the systems is brief, further detail may be found within the relevant articles and annexes (see HERE for the full regulations).

2.     A brief history: From the ‘retain and transfer system’ to the FIFA RSTP 2001

Much of the current framework is the product of various events surrounding the birth of the regulations in 2001, though the ideas and concepts it captures go way back beyond this time. The English Football League’s registration system that would go on to be touted as the ‘retain and transfer system’ dates back to at least 1893.[4] Both this system and the American Baseball ‘reserve rule’ system are often mentioned in the same breath. As Sloane pointed out in 1969: “The justification for the reserve rule and the retain and transfer system lies in their alleged function in bringing about a more or less equal distribution of playing talent between clubs, whilst, their advocates argue, free competition would lead to a concentration of 'star' players into a few rich clubs.”[5]  Both systems were the target of an array of challenges over the years, though up until ‘free agency’[6] in the case of American Baseball (much earlier) and Bosman[7] in football, each system remained largely the same in existence and justification.[8] To further emphasise that the issues recognised, and in turn the ideas and justifications pertinent to the current system are hardly new, the Chester Report of 1969 on the situation regarding employment and transfers in football in England had striking similarities to much of what was raised within the European-level negotiations that lead to the changes in 2001.[9]

With the momentous Bosman case in 1995, the previously commonplace practice of an out of contract player being retained and unable to transfer (regardless of that player’s preferences) was found contrary to EU law. Importantly for the subject of this blog, the court also recognised that “encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate”[10] aim, on the basis of which the free movement rights of players could in principle be restricted. Thus, leaving an opening for a regulatory system that would support the “recruitment and training of young players”[11] and restrict free movement in a proportionate way.

In 1998, the European Commission decided to open an investigation against FIFA based on competition law concerns linked to its then applicable RSTP.  This decision brought FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro to the European Commission’s negotiating table to hammer out a compromise that would satisfy their divergent interests and be compatible with the EU’s antitrust rules. The regulations as they now stand, aside from some minor amendments, reflect the outcome of those negotiations. The final press release of the European Commission concluded that FIFA’s new regulations would have to reflect a set of principles in order to be deemed compatible with EU competition law. In particular it accepted that:

  • in the case of players aged under 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs;
  • creation of solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player, including amateur clubs; 

These are in fact quite faithfully transposed in the FIFA RSTP provisions discussed above. Since then, the Bernard[12] ruling of the CJEU further clarified that the societal significance of sport, rendered the incentivisation of training legitimate. In its ruling, the court specified that in order to comply with EU law, a training compensation system ‘must be actually capable of attaining that objective and be proportionate to it, taking due account of the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally’.[13] This remains the main benchmark that any FIFA training compensation system must meet in order to comply with EU law.

As we have shown in this section, the shape of the current FIFA training compensation system and solidarity mechanism are very much a direct result of the EU’s interventionism in the regulation of football in the aftermath of the Bosman case. In doing so, the EU institutions also recognised that the idea of redistributing funds to compensate the costs incurred by the training club in instructing a player is a legitimate one.

3.     Justifying redistribution: Sharing the costs of training

Why do football institutions want this system in place and how was it justified? As was alluded to above, these ideas are not new ideas and are rooted in tradition.[14] Football and its intricacies have been deemed in need of protection for a long time, at least from within. More importantly for this blog, there is a desire for wealth to be redistributed in the form of compensation to the training clubs, to manufacture solidarity between the different levels of football and to incentivise goals such as training, education and development. This justification for FIFA’s redistributive systems is largely connected to the recognition that sport is important for the social fabric, and that incentivising development and training clubs goes beyond football and has societal benefits.

These objectives are reflected in the compromise agreed between FIFA and the EC in 2001. The latter’s press release emphasised that training compensation was “to encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs“. Similarly, FIFA stated in Circular no. 769; “This system is designed to encourage more and better training of young football players, and to create solidarity among clubs, by awarding financial compensation to clubs which have invested in training young players.” Thus, it is clear that both the football authorities and the EU institutions recognise that the core aim of the FIFA’s training compensation and (though less obviously) its solidarity mechanism are to support the recruitment and training of young professional footballers. In fact, the CJEU’s advocate general in Bernard later recognised that training compensation rules “ensure that clubs are not discouraged from recruitment and training by the prospect of seeing their investment in training applied to the benefit of some other club, with no compensation for themselves”.[15] She went on to emphasise that “there is a broad public consensus that the training and recruitment of young players should be encouraged rather than discouraged”.[16]

At the heart of these rationalisations lies the core belief that failing to compensate the club that has helped a young player grow into a professional player is unfair and would discourage the club’s future effort to train players. Whether a training compensation system is necessary to attain such an objective is, however, far from evident. As was pointed out by advocate general Lenz in the Bosman case, such objectives could as well “be attained by a system of redistribution of a proportion of income, without the players' right to freedom of movement having to be restricted for that purpose“.[17] Nevertheless, the idea of redistribution between clubs remains the fundamental policy objective that underpins both FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism.

Concluding remarks and subsequent blogs

This blog has highlighted that FIFA’s training compensation system and solidarity mechanism were introduced, after lengthy discussions with the European Commission and relevant stakeholders, in order to create a solidarity and redistributive relationship between the club where a player was trained and the club were a player pursues his professional career. The core justification behind them is that the training clubs provide an important educational service and that their work would be discouraged if they would not be enjoying some economic returns on their investment (in time and resources) to train players that go on to play professionally for a bigger/richer club.

While this objective is certainly respectable, there are, however, questions that remain regarding the adequacy and necessity of these systems to effectively redistribute funds between clubs. First, one should always keep in mind that training compensations are restricting the players’ freedom to move between clubs. Second, as we will see in the coming blog focusing on African players and clubs, it is questionable whether the current FIFA rules are in practice achieving their main redistributive function. Third, if these mechanisms are necessary to encourage training, it is as well remarkable that they are not also introduced in the context of women professional football, as will be discussed in our third blog. Finally, my last blog will assess how the coming changes to FIFA’s RSTP will affect the structure and operation of both the training compensation system and the solidarity mechanism.


[1] “New club” is the language used in the RSTP.

[2] “[I]n writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract” per RSTP Annex 4 (6) ‘Special provisions for the EU/EEA’.

[3] RSTP - Annex 4 (3) 3; Annex 5 (2) 3.

[4] Sloane, P. J. (1969), The labour market in professional football, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7, 181-199.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Established from the decision in Curt Flood v. Bowie Kuhn, et al. 407 U.S. 258.

[7] Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, ECLI: EU: C:1995:463

[8] Gerrard, B. (2002), The Muscle drain, Coubertobin-Type Taxes and the International Transfer System in Association Football,  European Sport Management Quarterly at 50 – “High Court in England ruled in 1963 that the retain-and transfer system was a restraint of trade. This led to a progressive relaxation of the transfer system with players being given more freedom to move between teams at the end of their contracts while transfer fees remained payable”.

[9] Per Sloane (1969) – “Contracts should have a terminable date and be renewable only on the consent of both parties… The committee did, however, suggest that a special levy should be imposed by the Football League on transfer fees, in addition to the present arrangement and graded according to the size of fee at a progressive rate. This levy could be returned to clubs for the purpose of ground improvements and would thereby tend to offset the tax advantage which clubs derive by signing players, since such payments, unlike the cost of ground improvements, are tax allowable.

[10] Bosman, para 106.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI: EU: C:2010:143

[13] Ibid para 45.

[14] Pearson, G. Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, (March 2015) pp. 222.

[15] Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in CJEU case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, para 46.

[16] Ibid para 47.

[17] Opinion of Advocate General Lenz CJEU case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others, para 239.

Comments are closed