Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 2 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.


1. EU law and the CAS case-law

Bearing in mind these questions, it is possible to affirm that under EU law, the specificity of sport

i) refers to the inherent characteristics of sport that set it apart from other economic and social activities and which have to be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law; and

ii) under EU law these inherent characteristics of sport must be  considered on a case by case  basis, per the Wouters test as developed by the ECJ in the Meca Medina ruling.

Both aspects can be found in the CAS case-law too, although the CAS case-law shows some remarkable differences and peculiarities. From a general point of view, the application of the principle of specificity of sport in the CAS case-law represents an aspect of the more general issue related to the application of EU law by the CAS. However, the purpose of this paper is not to fully examine if and to what extent the CAS arbitrators apply EU law rules on free movement and competition; rather, the aim is to analyse the way the CAS deals with the concept of the specificity of sport, highlighting similarities and differences compared to the ECJ.

Taking for granted that ‘a CAS panel is not only allowed, but also obliged to deal with the issues involving the application of [EU] law’,[1] as far as the compatibility of sporting rules with EU law is concerned the CAS case-law shows different degrees of engagement. For instance, in the ENIC award concerning the so-called UEFA integrity rule, the CAS panel went through a complete competition-law analysis in perfect harmony with the Wouters et al. ruling by the ECJ.[2] On the contrary, in the above-quoted Mutu case, the issue of compatibility of the FIFA’s transfer regulations with EU competition law was analysed in a rather simple way, merely stating that the FIFA rules at stake were not anti-competitive under EU competition law without giving any reason to support this conclusion. More recently, in the Galatasaray and Milan A.C. awards, concerning the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations, the CAS  applied a detailed analysis of EU competition law. However, in both cases, according to the CAS the proportionate character of sanctions listed in the UEFA’s financial fair-play regulations cannot affect the evaluation of the legitimacy of these regulations under Art. 101 TFEU. This conclusion represents a clear breaking point with respect to the ECJ case-law, according to which the evaluation of the restrictive effects of a rule necessarily presupposes the analysis of the proportionate character of the sanction imposed in the event of a violation of that rule as well.[3]   In regard to EU free movement, the CAS case-law tends to be less analytical in terms of the principle of proportionality. For instance, in the RFC Seraing award  which concerned both EU free movement and competition law, the CAS panel mainly focused on the legitimate objectives of the contested rule (FIFA’s ban on Third-Party Ownership – TPO), merely affirming that the restrictive measures under EU free movement were justified and inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.More...



The Specificity of Sport - Comparing the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of Arbitration for Sport - Part 1 - By Stefano Bastianon

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in EU Law and EU sports law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar.*

 

1. Introduction.

The so-called specificity of sport represents one of the most debated, if not the most debated, but still undefined issue under European Union (EU) law. A noteworthy peculiarity is that the specificity of sport is frequently mentioned in several legislative and political documents issued by EU institutions, however it is not expressly referred to in any judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).Conversely, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) case-law on Art. 17 of FIFA Regulations on status and transfer of players (RSTP) has repeatedly and expressly referred to the specificity of sport.[1] Apparently, the concept of specificity of sport has different meanings and purposes in the ECJ and CAS jurisprudence. In this blog (divided in two parts), I will try to analyse those two different meanings and to what extent the CAS case-law is consistent with the concept of specificity of sport as elaborated under EU law. More...

SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown

Editor's note: Andy Brown is a freelance journalist who has been writing about the governance of sport for over 15 years. He is the editor of The Sports Integrity Initiative where this blog appeared first.


For the last three days, I have been struggling with what to write regarding the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s (SFT) Decision to dismiss a challenge from Caster Semenya and Athletics South Africa (ASA) against the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s (CAS) Decision to dismiss a challenge to the Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development), otherwise known as the DSD Regulations. From reading World Athletics’ statement welcoming the ruling, one could be forgiven for thinking that it had won a major trial. Sports journalists, accustomed to covering events now curtailed by Covid-19, focus on the fact that Semenya has ‘lost’ her case against the DSD Regulations. Neither assertion is strictly accurate.

The SFT’s powers to review the CAS’s ruling are severely limited. It can only consider whether the CAS Decision violates ‘widely recognised principles of public order’ on Swiss public policy grounds. The SFT has only reversed a decision based on a a violation of Swiss public policy once in 30 years.

The SFT didn’t reconsider the evidence put forward to the CAS. ‘For there to be incompatibility with public policy, it is not enough that the evidence has been poorly assessed, that a finding of fact is manifestly false or that a rule of law has been clearly violated’, its Decision reads. ‘The only question to be resolved is in fact whether or not the verdict of the CAS renders the referred award incompatible with substantive public policy’. 

There were questions about whether the appeal from Semenya and ASA qualified to be reviewed by the SFT in the first place. World Athletics is a private organisation headquartered in Monaco, and the SFT was troubled as to whether such a complaint brought by a South African athlete against an overseas private organisation is capable of violating Swiss public policy.

‘It is doubtful whether the prohibition of discriminatory measures falls within the scope of the restrictive concept of public order when the discrimination is committed by a private person and occurs in relations between individuals’, the Decision quotes from its pervious 29 July 2019 Decision, which refused the ASA’s request to provisionally suspend the application of the DSD Regulations. ‘In any event, there is no need to examine this question further here since […] the award under appeal does not in any way establish discrimination which would be contrary to public order’

The SFT ruled that the CAS was correct to uphold conditions of participation for 46 XY DSD athletes in order to guarantee fair competition for certain disciplines in female athletics. In doing so, the SFT was ruling on whether the decision taken by the CAS violates public policy, based only on the complaints brought forward by Semenya and ASA. 

Semenya and the ASA had challenged the CAS Decision based around the idea that the DSD Regulations are discriminatory. The CAS held that they are discriminatory, but agreed with the IAAF (as World Athletics was then named) that such discrimination was necessary to protect its female category. The SFT ruled that even if the discriminatory rules of a private organisation such as the IAAF were considered able to pose a threat to public order, Semenya and the ASA had failed to demonstrate that the CAS Decision was so egregious that it posed such a threat.

‘Caster Semenya essentially alleges a violation of the prohibition of discrimination’, reads the Swiss Federal Supreme Court statement. ‘The CAS has issued a binding decision based on the unanimous opinion of the experts who were consulted that testosterone is the main factor for the different performance levels of the sexes in athletics; according to the CAS, women with the “46 XY DSD” gene variant have a testosterone level comparable to men, which gives them an insurmountable competitive advantage and enables them to beat female athletes without the “46 XY DSD” variant. Based on these findings, the CAS decision cannot be challenged. Fairness in sport is a legitimate concern and forms a central principle of sporting competition. It is one of the pillars on which competition is based. The European Court of Human Rights also attaches particular importance to the aspect of fair competition. In addition to this significant public interest, the CAS rightly considered the other relevant interests, namely the private interests of the female athletes running in the “women” category.’

Such strong support for the principle behind its DSD Regulations was rightly welcomed by World Athletics. Its statement asserted that the SFT ‘acknowledged that innate characteristics can distort the fairness of competitions’. I would argue that the SFT ruling didn’t do this, but rather found that a CAS Decision asserting this didn’t violate Swiss public policy. Semantics, perhaps.

Likewise, when World Athletics quotes the SFT Decision as confirming that ‘It is above all up to the sports federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is likely to distort competition and, if necessary, to introduce legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’, it is paraphrasing two texts quoted in the SFT Decision. The first is ‘La qualification juridique des rules autonomes des organizations sportive’ by Jérôme Jaquier, 2004. ‘Inborn characteristics specific to athletes in a particular group can also distort the fairness of competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Jaquier. ‘When they enact regulations, the objective of sports federations is to ensure fair and equitable competition’.

The context of the second quote, from ‘Sportrecht – Berücksichtigung der Interessen des Sports in der Rechtsordnung’ by Martin Kaiser, 2011, is even more interesting. It is preceded with a statement from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which reads: ‘It is not for the Federal Court to make, abstractly, comparisons between the disciplines to assess whether a particular athlete has an advantage that makes sporting competition meaningless’

‘It is above all for the sporting federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is liable to distort competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Kaiser. ‘And, if so, to establish legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’. 

Again, such details might be considered as semantics. But – I would argue – important semantics. Reading the media maelstrom that has resulted from the SFT Decision, one could be forgiven for assuming that Semenya has lost her case, and has no chance of ever defending her 800m title. However, a statement issued by her lawyers reveals that she intends to challenge the ruling in European and domestic courts.

“I am very disappointed by this ruling, but refuse to let World Athletics drug me or stop me from being who I am”, the statement continues. “Excluding female athletes or endangering our health solely because of our natural abilities puts World Athletics on the wrong side of history. I will continue to fight for the human rights of female athletes, both on the track and off the track, until we can all run free the way we were born. I know what is right and will do all I can to protect basic human rights, for young girls everywhere.” More...



The Semenya Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal: Human Rights on the Bench - By Faraz Shahlaei

Editor's note: Faraz Shahlaei is a JSD Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. His research and teaching interests are public international law, international sports law, international human rights and dispute resolution.

 

The issue of international human rights was a central contention in Caster Semenya case ever since the start of her legal battle against the regulations of the IAAF. However, the human rights arguments were poorly considered in the two proceedings related to this case. To put it in perspective, it is like having a key player nailed to the bench throughout the whole game; no coach ever tried to give it a chance while it had the potential to be the game changer for all parties.

In 2019, the Human Rights Council, the inter-governmental human rights body of the UN, expressed concern over issues of discrimination in sports in particular regarding IAAF female classification regulations. In June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the “Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination in Sport”. The report draws a detailed picture of how human rights in the Semenya case have been violated and also elaborates on the inherent problem of addressing human rights issues in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms favored by the sport governing bodies. However, despite an in-depth discussion of Caster Semenya’s case at both the CAS and then the SFT, the question of human rights, a key concern and a fundamental pillar of the case, hasn’t been adequately answered yet! More...


The SFT’s Semenya Decision under European human rights standards: Conflicting considerations and why a recourse could be successful at Strasbourg - By Kevin Gerenni

Editor's note: Kevin Gerenni is Assistant Professor in Public International Law (Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires) and LLM Candidate 2021 in Public International Law at the London School of Economics.


Even though the decision rendered by the SFT in the Semenya Case was foreseeable, the Tribunal did put forward some concerning reasoning in terms of public policy (“ordre public”) and human rights. In case Semenya decides to challenge the Swiss state before the ECtHR, one can expect the case to shake some grounds at the ECtHR, which would be faced with the question of the application to sport not of fair trial guarantees (as in Mutu & Pechstein) but of substantial human rights provisions such as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 14 ECHR) and the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR).

Under Swiss law, the reasons that may lead to the annulment of an arbitral award are enumerated in art. 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA). Semenya’s strongest case relied on art. 190(2)(e): the award’s incompatibility with public policy. Naturally, this point concentrated most of the SFT’s attention. In order to analyze the compatibility of the CAS award with Swiss public policy, the SFT focused on three main potential breaches of human rights: prohibition of discrimination, personality rights, and human dignity. In doing so, it put forward certain observations that differ with European human rights standards and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The purpose of this short article is to analyze those discrepancies and, consequently, Semenya’s prospects of success before the Strasbourg Tribunal.More...


Selected procedural issues –and questions– arising out the Caster Semenya Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal - By Despina Mavromati

Editor's note: Dr Despina Mavromati is an attorney specializing in international sports law and arbitration (Sportlegis Lausanne) and a UEFA Appeals Body Member. She teaches sports arbitration and sports contracts at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

 

As the title indicates, this short note only deals with selected procedural issues and questions arising out of the very lengthy Semenya Judgment. In a nutshell, the SFT dismissed Semenya’s appeal to set aside the CAS Award, which had denied the request of Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) to declare unlawful the Differences of Sex Development (DSD) Regulations of World Athletics (formerly IAAF).[1]

At the outset, it has to be reminded that the CAS Award dealt with the merits of the Semenya case in a final and binding way by rendering an arbitral award according to Article R59 of the CAS Code (and Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – PILA). Therefore, the SFT did not act as an appellate court but rather as a cassatory court, entitled to review only whether the exhaustively enumerated grounds for annulment set out in Article 190 (2) PILA were met (and provided that they were properly invoked and substantiated in the motion to set aside said award).More...

Caster Semenya Case Exposes Design Flaws in International Sports Governance - By Roger Pielke Jr.

Editor's note: Roger Pielke Jr. is a professor at the University of Colorado Boulder

 

The decision this week by the Swiss Federal Tribunal not to revisit the arbitral decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Caster Semenya was not unexpected, but it does help to expose a major design flaw in international sports governance. Specifically, the institutions that collectively comprise, create and enforce “sports law” appear incapable of addressing flawed science and violations of basic principles of medical ethics.

While different people will have different, and legitimate, views on how male-female competition classifications might be regulated, the issues highlighted involving science and ethics are not subjective, and are empirically undeniable. In normal systems of jurisprudence, procedures are in place to right such wrongs, but in sports governance processes in place prevent such course corrections. And that is a problem.

The empirical flaws in the science underpinning the IAAF (now World Athletics) Semenya regulations are by now well understood, and have been accepted by WA in print and before CAS (I was an expert witness for Semenya, and was present when IAAF accepted responsibility for the flawed research). You can read all the details here and in the CAS Semenya decision. I won’t rehash the flawed science here, but the errors are fatal to the research and obvious to see.

One key part of the comprehensive institutional failures here is that the journal which originally published the flawed IAAF research (the British Journal of Sports Medicine, BJSM) has, inexplicably, acted to protect that work from scrutiny, correction and retraction. Normally in the scientific community, when errors of this magnitude are found, the research is retracted. In this case, the BJSM refused to retract the paper, to require its authors to share their data or to publish a critique of the IAAF analysis. Instead, upon learning of the major errors, the BJSM published a rushed, non-peer reviewed letter by IAAF seeking to cover-up the errors. All of this is non-standard, and a scandal in its own right.

The violation of basic principles of medical ethics required by the implementation of the WA Semenya regulations is also not contested. Both WA and the IOC have claimed to uphold the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration on medical and research ethics. Yet, the WMA has openly criticized the WA regulations as unethical and asked doctors not to implement them. In response, WA has stated that it will help athletes who wish to follow the regulations to identify doctors willing to ignore medical ethics guidelines.

Flawed science and ethical violations are obviously issues that go far beyond the case of Caster Semenya, and far beyond sport. In any normal system of jurisprudence such issues would prove readily fatal to regulatory action, either in the first instance of proposed implementation or via review and reconsideration.

Sport governance lacks such processes. At CAS, the panel claimed that matters of scientific integrity and medical ethics were outside their remit. The SFT is allowed to reconsider a CAS decision only on narrow procedural grounds, and thus also cannot consider matters of scientific integrity or medical ethics. So far then, the flaws in the WA regulations – sitting in plain sight and obvious to anyone who looks, have not been correctable.

This leaves the world of sport governance in a compromised position. Some may look past the scientific and ethical issues here, perhaps judging that barring Semenya from sport is far more important that correcting such wrongs. 

Regardless of one’s views on sex and gender classification in sport, the WA regulations and the processes that produced and have challenged them reveal that sports governance has not yet entered the 21st century. Science and ethics matter, and they should matter in sport jurisprudence as well.  It is time to correct this basic design flaw in international sport governance.

Caster Semenya at the SFT – in 10 points - By Jack Anderson

Editor's note: Jack Anderson is Professor and Director of Sports Law Studies at the University of Melbourne

 

1.     Caster Semenya appealed to the Swiss Federal Court (SFT) arguing that World Athletics’ regulations violated human rights principles relating to gender discrimination and human dignity. The Swiss Federal Tribunal (as at CAS) held that World Athletics’ regulations may prima facie breach such human rights principles but were “necessary, reasonable and proportionate” to maintain fairness in women's athletics;


2.     Although in part addressed at the SFT, expect further legal argument on this in the domestic courts of South Africa or at the ECtHR, and in the following ways:

  • Necessity - is the athletic advantage that Caster Semenya has of such a scientifically-measurable extent that it is necessary for World Athletics to intervene in such an invasive manner? In a broader ethical sense, is the incidence of what the World Athletics’ regulations call “difference of sex development” of such prevalence in the general population, and specifically in middle-distance athletics, that, by way of the principle of “sporting beneficence”, intervention is justified. Or, in contrast, is the incidence of DSD not at a level which justifies a departure from the ethical principle of primum non nocere – first, do no harm?
  • Reasonableness - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary, is the manner of implementation reasonable and in line with the principle of human and bodily integrity? In answering such a question, the focus must be on the fact that in order to continue to compete in her favourite events (such as the 800 metres) Caster Semenya will have to lower her testosterone level through medication;
  • Proportionate - if World Athletics’ regulations are necessary and reasonable is the manner of implementation proportionate? In answering such a question, the focus must be on whether the regulations disproportionately discriminate against a certain, limited group of athletes in a certain, limited number of events and in a certain, limited manner.More...


Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

 

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS. More...

New Transnational Sports Law Articles Released on SSRN - Antoine Duval

I have just released on SSRN four of my most recent articles on Lex Sportiva/Transnational Sports Law. The articles are available open access in their final draft forms, the final published version might differ slightly depending on the feedback of the editors. If you wish to cite those articles I (obviously) recommend using the published version.

I hope they will trigger your attention and I look forward to any feedback you may have!

Antoine


Abstract: This chapter focuses on the emergence of a transnational sports law, also known as lex sportiva, ruling international sports. In the transnational law literature, the lex sportiva is often referred to as a key example or case study, but rarely studied in practice. Yet, it constitutes an important playground for transnational legal research and practice, and this chapter aims to show why. The focus of the chapter will first be on the rules of the lex sportiva. Law, even in its transnational form, is still very much connected to written rules against which a specific behaviour or action is measured as legal or illegal. As will be shown, this is also true of the lex sportiva, which is structured around an ensemble of rules produced through a variety of law-making procedures located within different institutions. The second section of this chapter will aim to look beyond the lex sportiva in books to narrate the lex sportiva in action. It asks, what are the institutional mechanisms used to concretize the lex sportiva in a particular context? The aim will be to go beyond the rules in order to identify the processes and institutions making the lex sportiva in its daily practice. Finally, the enmeshment of the lex sportiva with state-based laws and institutions is highlighted. While the lex sportiva is often presented as an autonomous transnational legal construct detached from territorialized legal and political contexts, it is shown that in practice it operates in intimate connection with them. Hence, its transnational operation is much less characterized by full autonomy than assemblage.


Abstract: This chapter aims to show that the work of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’), which is often identified as the institutional centre of the lex sportiva, can be understood as that of a seamstress weaving a plurality of legal inputs into authoritative awards. In other words, the CAS panels are assembling legal material to produce (almost) final decisions that, alongside the administrative practices of sports governing bodies (‘SGBs’), govern international sports. It is argued that, instead of purity and autonomy, the CAS’ judicial practice is best characterised by assemblage and hybridity. This argument will be supported by an empirical study of the use of different legal materials, in particular pertaining to Swiss law, EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), within the case law of the CAS. The chapter is a first attempt at looking at the hermeneutic practice of the CAS from the perspective of a transnational legal pluralism that goes beyond the identification of a plurality of autonomous orders to turn its sights towards the enmeshment and entanglement characterising contemporary legal practice.


Abstract: Has the time come for the Court of Arbitration for Sport to go public? This article argues that after the Pechstein decision of the European Court of Human Rights, CAS appeal arbitration must be understood as forced arbitration and therefore must fully comply with the due process guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. In particular, this entails a strong duty of transparency with regard to the hearings at the CAS and the publication of its awards. This duty is of particular importance since the rationale for supporting the validity of CAS arbitration, if not grounded in the consent of the parties, must be traced back to the public interest in providing for the equality before the (sports) law of international athletes. Thus, the legitimacy and existence of the CAS is linked to its public function, which ought to be matched with the procedural strings usually attached to judicial institutions. In short, if it is to avoid lengthy and costly challenges to its awards, going public is an urgent necessity for the CAS.


Abstract: In 1998 the FIFA welcomed the Palestinian Football Association as part of its members - allegedly, as an attempt by then FIFA President, the Brazilian João Havelange, to showcase football as an instrument of peace between Israeli and Palestinians. Ironically, almost 20 years after Palestine’s anointment into the FIFA family, instead of peace it is the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians that moved to FIFA. In recent years the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) and the Israeli Football Association (IFA) have been at loggerheads inside FIFA over the fate - I will refer to it as the transnational legality – of five (and then six) football clubs affiliated to the IFA which are physically located in the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This chapter chronicles the legal intricacies of this conflict, which will serve as a backdrop to discuss arguments raised regarding the legality of business activities of corporations connected to the Israeli settlements. Indeed, as will be shown in the first part of this chapter, the discussion on the legality of economic activities in the OPT has recently taken a business and human rights turn involving systematic targeting of corporations by activists. Interestingly, we will see that this business and human rights turn also played a role in the conflict between the IFA and the PFA. This case study is therefore an opportunity to examine how the strategy of naming and shaming private corporations, and in our case not-for-profit associations, for their direct or indirect business involvement in the settlements has fared. It is also an occasion to critically assess the strength of the human rights ‘punch’ added to the lex sportiva, by the UNGPs.

Asser International Sports Law Blog | [Call for Papers] Through Challenges and Disruptions: Evolution of the Lex Olympica - 20 September 2024 - Inland School of Business and Social Sciences

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

[Call for Papers] Through Challenges and Disruptions: Evolution of the Lex Olympica - 20 September 2024 - Inland School of Business and Social Sciences

Editor's note: This is a call for papers for a workshop inviting sports lawyers and historians to reflect on how the lex olympica developed within the last 128 years through the prism of challenges and disruptions to the Olympic Games and the sharp and incremental changes they provoked.


Background

The lex olympica are legal rules the International Olympic Committee created to govern the Olympic Movement. Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the lex olympica, with the Olympic Charter taking its central place, has undergone tremendous changes. It has increased not only in volume but also in complexity and reach.

While some changes were designed to give further detail to the Olympic values, others seem to serve as responses to numerous disruptions and challenges that the Olympic Games experienced on their way. History shows that the Olympic Games faced boycotts, apartheid, armed conflicts, wars, propelled commercialisation, corruption, critique based on human rights and sustainability, pandemics, and many other obstacles.

One can see triggers for changes in specific incidents, broader societal changes, external political interests, long-term internal processes, etc., or further differentiate them according to relevant stakeholders impacting the change, such as IOC, NOCs, IFs, NFs, athletes, commercial partners, television, activist groups, NGOs, governments, host countries, etc. Regardless of their taxonomies, all these challenges met different reactions and affected the Olympic regulation in various ways. The IOC chose to distance the Olympic Games from some challenges and fully embrace others.


Keynote speakers

  • Jörg Krieger, Associate Professor, Department of Public Health and Sport Science, Aarhus University; co-leader of the Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center; Associate Professor II Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.
  • Mark James,  Professor of Sports Law and Director of Research in the Manchester Law School at Manchester Metropolitan University, Editor-in-Chief of the International Sports Law Journal.


Deadline for abstract submission: 15 June 2024

Confirmation of participation: 30 June 2024

Publication: Selected contributions will be considered for a special issue at International Sports Law Journal


Contact information

Yuliya Chernykh (Associate Professor)

yuliya.chernykh@inn.no


Organizer

Lillehammer Olympic and Paralympic Studies Center (LOSC), Inland School of Business and Social Sciences and Legal development research group at INN University


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

SFT rejects Semenya appeal: nothing changes - By Andy Brown

Editor's note: Andy Brown is a freelance journalist who has been writing about the governance of sport for over 15 years. He is the editor of The Sports Integrity Initiative where this blog appeared first.


For the last three days, I have been struggling with what to write regarding the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s (SFT) Decision to dismiss a challenge from Caster Semenya and Athletics South Africa (ASA) against the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s (CAS) Decision to dismiss a challenge to the Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development), otherwise known as the DSD Regulations. From reading World Athletics’ statement welcoming the ruling, one could be forgiven for thinking that it had won a major trial. Sports journalists, accustomed to covering events now curtailed by Covid-19, focus on the fact that Semenya has ‘lost’ her case against the DSD Regulations. Neither assertion is strictly accurate.

The SFT’s powers to review the CAS’s ruling are severely limited. It can only consider whether the CAS Decision violates ‘widely recognised principles of public order’ on Swiss public policy grounds. The SFT has only reversed a decision based on a a violation of Swiss public policy once in 30 years.

The SFT didn’t reconsider the evidence put forward to the CAS. ‘For there to be incompatibility with public policy, it is not enough that the evidence has been poorly assessed, that a finding of fact is manifestly false or that a rule of law has been clearly violated’, its Decision reads. ‘The only question to be resolved is in fact whether or not the verdict of the CAS renders the referred award incompatible with substantive public policy’. 

There were questions about whether the appeal from Semenya and ASA qualified to be reviewed by the SFT in the first place. World Athletics is a private organisation headquartered in Monaco, and the SFT was troubled as to whether such a complaint brought by a South African athlete against an overseas private organisation is capable of violating Swiss public policy.

‘It is doubtful whether the prohibition of discriminatory measures falls within the scope of the restrictive concept of public order when the discrimination is committed by a private person and occurs in relations between individuals’, the Decision quotes from its pervious 29 July 2019 Decision, which refused the ASA’s request to provisionally suspend the application of the DSD Regulations. ‘In any event, there is no need to examine this question further here since […] the award under appeal does not in any way establish discrimination which would be contrary to public order’

The SFT ruled that the CAS was correct to uphold conditions of participation for 46 XY DSD athletes in order to guarantee fair competition for certain disciplines in female athletics. In doing so, the SFT was ruling on whether the decision taken by the CAS violates public policy, based only on the complaints brought forward by Semenya and ASA. 

Semenya and the ASA had challenged the CAS Decision based around the idea that the DSD Regulations are discriminatory. The CAS held that they are discriminatory, but agreed with the IAAF (as World Athletics was then named) that such discrimination was necessary to protect its female category. The SFT ruled that even if the discriminatory rules of a private organisation such as the IAAF were considered able to pose a threat to public order, Semenya and the ASA had failed to demonstrate that the CAS Decision was so egregious that it posed such a threat.

‘Caster Semenya essentially alleges a violation of the prohibition of discrimination’, reads the Swiss Federal Supreme Court statement. ‘The CAS has issued a binding decision based on the unanimous opinion of the experts who were consulted that testosterone is the main factor for the different performance levels of the sexes in athletics; according to the CAS, women with the “46 XY DSD” gene variant have a testosterone level comparable to men, which gives them an insurmountable competitive advantage and enables them to beat female athletes without the “46 XY DSD” variant. Based on these findings, the CAS decision cannot be challenged. Fairness in sport is a legitimate concern and forms a central principle of sporting competition. It is one of the pillars on which competition is based. The European Court of Human Rights also attaches particular importance to the aspect of fair competition. In addition to this significant public interest, the CAS rightly considered the other relevant interests, namely the private interests of the female athletes running in the “women” category.’

Such strong support for the principle behind its DSD Regulations was rightly welcomed by World Athletics. Its statement asserted that the SFT ‘acknowledged that innate characteristics can distort the fairness of competitions’. I would argue that the SFT ruling didn’t do this, but rather found that a CAS Decision asserting this didn’t violate Swiss public policy. Semantics, perhaps.

Likewise, when World Athletics quotes the SFT Decision as confirming that ‘It is above all up to the sports federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is likely to distort competition and, if necessary, to introduce legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’, it is paraphrasing two texts quoted in the SFT Decision. The first is ‘La qualification juridique des rules autonomes des organizations sportive’ by Jérôme Jaquier, 2004. ‘Inborn characteristics specific to athletes in a particular group can also distort the fairness of competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Jaquier. ‘When they enact regulations, the objective of sports federations is to ensure fair and equitable competition’.

The context of the second quote, from ‘Sportrecht – Berücksichtigung der Interessen des Sports in der Rechtsordnung’ by Martin Kaiser, 2011, is even more interesting. It is preceded with a statement from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which reads: ‘It is not for the Federal Court to make, abstractly, comparisons between the disciplines to assess whether a particular athlete has an advantage that makes sporting competition meaningless’

‘It is above all for the sporting federations to determine to what extent a particular physical advantage is liable to distort competition’, the SFT Decision quotes from Kaiser. ‘And, if so, to establish legally admissible eligibility rules to remedy this state of affairs’. 

Again, such details might be considered as semantics. But – I would argue – important semantics. Reading the media maelstrom that has resulted from the SFT Decision, one could be forgiven for assuming that Semenya has lost her case, and has no chance of ever defending her 800m title. However, a statement issued by her lawyers reveals that she intends to challenge the ruling in European and domestic courts.

“I am very disappointed by this ruling, but refuse to let World Athletics drug me or stop me from being who I am”, the statement continues. “Excluding female athletes or endangering our health solely because of our natural abilities puts World Athletics on the wrong side of history. I will continue to fight for the human rights of female athletes, both on the track and off the track, until we can all run free the way we were born. I know what is right and will do all I can to protect basic human rights, for young girls everywhere.”

Men vs. Women 

World records prove that men run faster and throw further than women. As explained in the CAS Decision, the IAAF modified the DSD Regulations to exclude XX athletes from their scope. By doing this, it was able to frame the DSD Regulations as mitigating any advantage held by ‘biologically male’ athletes in international events run between 400m and one mile in its female category.

Caster Semenya fits the IAAF definition as ‘biologically male’, as she has one of the five DSDs outlined in the DSD Regulations, and competes in the Restricted Events. Semenya’s status as a 46 XY DSD athlete was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on 29 July 2019, when it revoked a supra-provisional suspension of the application of the DSD Regulations to Semenya. ‘Mokgadi Caster Semenya is an “athlete concerned” within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the DSD Regulations’, reads its 29 July interlocutory order (available here in French).

The Semenya case isn’t exclusively about whether men should be able to line up against women in female events – although the debate has sometimes been framed that way. Caster Semenya is a woman, who has been outed as having a DSD by World Athletics’ relentless case against her, which began when she was 18 (she is now 29). She is a 46 XY karyotype woman who has been very successfully competing (and this is not insignificant) against 46 XX karyotype women.

The Semenya case is firstly about whether World Athletics has conclusively proven that women who are 46 XY DSD karyotype hold a significant advantage in the events the rules cover. Secondly, it is also about whether it has proven that such an advantage is so great that it renders competition between female and DSD athletes in the covered events meaningless.

Such an argument should always be decided scientifically. The SFT Decision doesn’t do that. There were serious concerns about the scientific evidence used to support the DSD Regulations both before, during, and after the CAS Decision. Although we have been through some of these concerns before, they are worth restating, as they have yet to be addressed.

There are also concerns about the way in which sport’s rules and regulations have been moulded and changed in order to accommodate the DSD Regulations. They have also not been addressed. But, firstly, it is important to explain what the DSD Rules seek to regulate and why.

The DSD Rules

The DSD Rules, as they have been called since November 2019 (PDF below), cover athletes with one of five listed DSDs competing in international events run between 400m and one mile in World Athletics’ female category, if their endogenous (natural) testosterone levels are above 5nmol/L and have an ‘androgenising effect’ (i.e. if that testosterone is taken up by their androgen receptors and boosts their physiology). Athletes who meet these conditions must use hormonal contraceptives to reduce their testosterone levels to below 5 nmol/L for six months prior to competing, and must maintain testosterone levels at below 5 nmol/L in order to continue competing.

Testosterone is a natural, endogenous (internally produced) steroidal hormone. In the XY karyotype, it is understood that testosterone is the single primary hormone driving the endocrine system, a chemical messaging system that regulates the physiology. In the XX karyotype, it is understood that two primary hormones – oestrogen and progesterone – perform the same function, along with testosterone in much smaller amounts. 

The logic behind the DSD Rules – explained during Semenya’s challenge to them – is that DSD athletes develop an unfair advantage over XX karyotype women due to the continued action of ‘elevated’ testosterone on their XY karyotype physiology from puberty onwards. I have termed this a ‘legacy advantage’, since not every DSD athlete will automatically become an elite runner between 800m and one mile in World Athletics’ female category. Correct diet, dedication, and training over time is also required.  

The DSD Rules seek to reconcile this ‘legacy advantage’ by requiring medical intervention in the present. It could be argued that World Athletics is medically handicapping DSD athletes in the present for an advantage they have strived to develop over time. But as explained, the SFT was not required to consider that conundrum.

‘Affected athletes can either (a) take a daily oral contraceptive pill; or (b) take a monthly injection of a GnrH agonist; or (c) have their testes surgically removed (a ‘gonadectomy’)’, reads Briefing Notes on the Rules published by World Athletics. ‘It is their choice whether or not to have any treatment, and (if so) which treatment to have. In particular, the IAAF does not insist on surgery. The effects of the other two treatments are reversible if and when the athlete decides to stop treatment. Importantly, lowering testosterone in one of these ways is the recognised ‘gender-affirming’ standard of care for any individual (athlete or not) who is 46 XY but has a female gender identity.’

As explained above, the SFT couldn’t make any determination about whether it was ethical to require a 46 XY DSD athlete who is not unwell to take a contraceptive pill designed for 46 XX karyotype females. The CAS did recognise this issue, and found that there were serious side effects on 46 XY DSD individuals who used contraceptive pills designed for XX females to lower their endogenous (internally produced) testosterone to below 10 nmol/L (the DSD Rules set an upper limit of 5 nmol/L).

‘Ms. Semenya described the negative effects that the testosterone-suppressing medication had on her mental and physical health’, reads para.78 of the CAS Decision. ‘Her symptoms included becoming hot and sweating profusely each night and experiencing significant weight gain. She also felt sick constantly, suffered from regular fevers and had constant internal abdominal pain. These symptoms also had an “enormous” effect on her mental state, impeding her mental sharpness and undermining her self-confidence.’

In the XY karyotype, testosterone is the only hormone driving the endocrine system that regulates an individual’s physiology. Therefore, it is understood that reducing it is likely to make people unwell. As the CAS and SFT decisions recognise, XY karyotype individuals typically have circulating testosterone between 7.7 nmol/L to 29.4 nmol/L. 

Of course, reducing this to 5 mol/L will make an XY karyotype athlete slower. This is because the only natural hormone driving the XY karyotype endocrine system, which supports their physiology, has been seriously curtailed. The same effect cannot be replicated in the XX karyotype, since three hormones drive the endocrine system and a much lower baseline level of testosterone (0.06 nmol/L to1.68 nmol/L) exists in the first place. 

This is why testosterone deficiency is a recognised as a medical condition that can make XY karyotype people unwell. DSD athletes are XY karyotype, as the IAAF made clear during its arguments against Semenya’s appeal at the CAS. Other XY karyotype athletes, such as Kristen Worley and Sloan Teeple, have also been made unwell due to sport’s rules on testosterone, as have certain DSD athletes who underwent a horrific experience ahead of the London 2012 Olympics. Shockingly, the IAAF used the experience of these medically damaged athletes as evidential support that the DSD Regulations are effective in making 46 XY DSD athletes slower!

Unlike XY karyotype individuals who are transitioning to become XY females, 46 XY DSD athletes usually do not wish to change their physiology through hormonal modification. Their testosterone levels are not ‘elevated’, to borrow World Athletics’ description, but are normal for their karyotype. World Athletics requires them to reduce the primary stimulus for their endocrine system to levels consistent with the XX karyotype in order to compete in events run between 400m and one mile in its female category. 

World Athletics requires 46 XY DSD athletes to undergo potentially damaging hormonal treatment to compete in its female category. Arguably, it requires athletes to ‘feminise’ themselves.

As explained above, this is likely to make 46 XY karyotype athletes unwell, although the SFT didn’t have to examine whether the CAS had assessed this danger sufficiently. Nowhere in the DSD Regulations, or in the Explanatory Notes, is there any mention of measures taken to monitor an athlete’s health after her natural testosterone levels are reduced to below 5 nmol/L.

Show me the science

As detailed in this article, there were two major pieces of scientific evidence used to support the DSD Regulations. The first is 2017’s Paper One, entitled ‘Serum androgen levels and their relation to performance in track and field: mass spectrometry results from 2127 observations in male and female athletes’. Paper Two, published in 2018, is ‘Circulating Testosterone as the Hormonal Basis of Sex Differences in Athletic Performance’.

Paper One has a number of significant issues, discussed in this article under ‘Scientific evidence on performance advantage’. In short, the Paper found a correlation between XX karyotype females with elevated free testosterone and performance at the Daegu 2011 and Moscow 2013 IAAF World Championships, events which were marred by doping. Among the 1,332 female observations in the study, just nine were 46 XY DSD.

Paper Two also has a number of significant issues, detailed under ‘The 2018 Study’ in this article. In short, evidence for increases in muscle mass and strength appear to come from a 2014 Study performed on 62 XX karyotype post-menopausal women (mean age, 53) who had undergone a hysterectomy; it references several other studies in order to support the proposition that DSD athletes benefit from increases in circulating testosterone that increases circulating haemoglobin, which in turn translates to an increase in oxygen transfer; and compares endogenous testosterone levels with increases in muscle mass and strength.

One of the studies it relies on is a 2017 Study examining women with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition in which the adrenal gland can produce more testosterone. The Study found that in women with CAH, erythropoiesis may be driven by androgens. The proposition is that as DSD athletes have higher levels of testosterone (an androgen), they benefit from increased erythropoiesis (production of oxygen-carrying red blood cells). 

On 9 January 2019, shortly before the CAS hearing on 26 February, the IAAF removed CAH and a CAH variant from the scope of the Regulations. It did so because, in the IAAF’s words, ‘individuals with these DSDs only have high testosterone levels if their adrenal conditions are uncontrolled, in which case they would suffer side-effects that would make elite sports performance impossible’

Yet as explained above, a study examining XX karyotype women with CAH had been used as part of the IAAF’s evidence base in support of the Regulations. It would appear that by carving XX karyotype women and CAH out from the scope of the Regulations, the IAAF negated part of its own evidence base. 

There is more information about scientific inaccuracies in the evidence used to support the DSD Rules here; here; and here. In addition, as previously mentioned, World Athletics used data from athletes medically damaged by its Hyperandrogenism Regulations – the forerunner to the DSD Rules – to prop up the DSD Rules. 

The issue is not that World Athletics hasn’t proven that 46 XY karyotype athletes can run faster or throw further than 46 XX karyotype athletes. Anybody with access to Wikipedia can do that. It is whether World Athletics has proven that by virtue of the effects of testosterone on the 46 XY DSD physiology from puberty onwards, 46 XY DSD athletes have been able to develop an advantage that is so significant that it should be considered unfair in the specific international female events that World Athletics targets. It is here that scientists argue World Athletics falls short (see the Twitter threads here and here).

Moving the goalposts

As already mentioned, today’s DSD Rules are not the same as the DSD Regulations that Semenya challenged. The IAAF amended the DSD Regulations both before and after the CAS heard Semenya’s case against them. The result was that shortly before the CAS hearing, the DSD Regulations applied to five disciplines rather than the seven referred to in the CAS judgment.

World Athletics even sent a lawyer to Play The Game 2019. The lawyer didn’t participate in a debate about the science underpinning the DSD Regulations, but distributed a pre-prepared Paper attacking the presenters and their arguments. Anyone interested in whether World Athletics succeeded should read this article.

The World Athletics Paper references recent research involving the administration of 10mg of testosterone cream daily to athletes. The research found that athletes who administered the cream performed better. Of course they did. This is doping.

A person doped with testosterone is getting something extra. Testosterone doesn’t discriminate. If you administer testosterone, an athlete’s physiology has something that it didn’t have before. Everyone knows this. It is the reason why the application of exogenous (external) testosterone is prohibited in sport. 

The same is not true for 46 XY DSD athletes. Their testosterone levels are endogenous (internal), and are their hormonal normal. 

The forerunner to the DSD Rules were the Hyperandrogenism Regulations. The CAS allowed the IAAF to terminate Dutee Chand’s case against them by promulgating the DSD Regulations. That the CAS would allow a serious grievance to be terminated by simply promulgating new Regulations should ring alarm bells for anyone interested in jurisprudence. 

The CAS Decision also raised questions about whether athletes had given their consent for samples collected for anti-doping purposes to be used for gender verification purposes. As previously reported, the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code has been amended to allow anti-doping samples to be used in this way. Up until 2019, the World Anti-Doping Agency’s International Standards (ISL) prohibited such use.

The Hyperandrogenism were promulgated in May 2011. Article 6.3 of the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) 2012 International Standard for Laboratories (ISL) mandates that written consent is required from any athlete for a sample collected for anti-doping purposes to be used in any other way. ‘No Sample may be used for any purpose other than as described in Article 6.2 without the Athlete’s written consent’, it reads. ‘Samples used for purposes other than Article 6.2 shall have any means of identification removed such that they cannot be traced back to a particular Athlete’.

Such a prohibition was repeated in the 2015 ISL, but is not present in the 2019 ISL. However, Annex 2.1 of the 2019 ISL mandates: ‘The Laboratories and WADA-Approved Laboratories for the ABP shall follow the Helsinki Accords and any applicable national standards as they relate to the involvement of human subjects in research. Voluntary informed consent shall also be obtained from human subjects in any drug administration studies for the purpose of development of a Reference Collection or proficiency testing materials.’

‘In medical research involving human subjects capable of giving informed consent, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it may entail, post-study provisions and any other relevant aspects of the study’, reads Article 26 of the World Medical Association’s (WMA) Helsinki Declaration. ‘The potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to participate in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. Special attention should be given to the specific information needs of individual potential subjects as well as to the methods used to deliver the information.

‘After ensuring that the potential subject has understood the information, the physician or another appropriately qualified individual must then seek the potential subject’s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be expressed in writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed.’

The IAAF’s Competition Medical Guidelines (click here to download) also emphasise that they comply with the Helsinki Declaration. The CAS Decision in Semenya’s case highlights serious questions as to whether athletes provided consent for their anti-doping samples to be used in Paper One. ‘The IAAF relies on the initial consent provided for doping control purposes’, reads the Decision. ‘ASA repeatedly asked the IAAF to disclose copies of the signed consent forms provided by the athletes whose samples and data form the basis of the analysis in BG17 [Paper One]. The IAAF has declined to do so. The Panel considers that it can therefore be inferred that no such forms exist, or that if they do exist they do not assist the IAAF on this issue.’

It would therefore appear that World Athletics relied on evidence obtained from athletes in breach of WADA’s ISL, its own Competition Medical Guidelines and the WMA’s Helsinki Declaration in order to support the DSD Rules. This would also appear to invalidate part of its evidence base, but the CAS Panel didn’t consider this to be important, and the SFT didn’t assess the reliability of the evidence in support of the Rules.

The United Nations, Human Rights Council, and the WMA itself have already expressed concern about this. In September 2018, the Human Rights Special Procedures body of the United Nations wrote to Sebastian Coe, President of World Athletics. Three UN Special Rapporteurs for physical and mental health; torture; and discrimination against women highlight ‘serious concerns’ that the DSD Regulations:

• Contravene human rights standards and norms;
• do not present evidence justifying that they pursue a legitimate aim;
• are not reasonable and objective;
• do not demonstrate proportionality between their aim and effects.

World Athletics’ response was to accuse the UN of not understanding its Rules. ‘It is clear that the author is not across the details of the IAAF regulations nor the facts presented recently at the Court of Arbitration for Sport’, wrote World Athletics in a statement to the BBC, after the UN Human Rights Council reiterated its concerns in March last year. ‘There are many generic and inaccurate statements contained in the motion presented to the UN Human Rights Council so it is difficult to work out where to start’.

In July this year, the Human Rights Council urged UN Member States to prohibit the enforcement of the DSD Rules. Its Report was unequivocal that the DSD Rules represent an infringement of the right for athletes with a DSD to compete. ‘The implementation of female eligibility regulations denies athletes with variations in sex characteristics an equal right to participate in sports and violates the right to non- discrimination more broadly’, it outlines.

In May last year, the WMA reiterated its advice to physicians not to implement the DSD Rules. “We have strong reservations about the ethical validity of these regulations”, said WMA President Dr. Leonid Eidelman. “They are based on weak evidence from a single study, which is currently being widely debated by the scientific community. They are also contrary to a number of key WMA ethical statements and declarations, and as such we are calling for their immediate withdrawal.”

“Caster’s legal defeat is not a victory for World Athletics, nor does it legitimize the CAS or global sport’s ‘system of justice’”, said Brendan Schwab, Executive Director of the World Players Association (WPA), in a statement. “Despite the World Athletics eligibility regulations being condemned as a violation of the human rights of athletes by authorities as eminent as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Caster’s human rights could not be properly considered at any stage of the process. In the same report the UNHCHR has identified how sport’s justice system systemically denies athletes of their right to an effective remedy where their human rights have been violated.

“World Athletics flagrantly maintains that, as a private body, it has no responsibility to respect Caster’s internationally recognised human rights. It argued that her rights are to be primarily determined in accordance with the Constitution of World Athletics and the Olympic Charter of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), neither of which uphold the human rights of athletes.”

Herein lies the problem. Sport’s closed arbitration system allowed World Athletics to avoid all of these serious issues, raised by major international bodies, and to welcome the SFT’s inability to consider them as a victory.

Thin end of the wedge

Nobody is arguing that World Athletics shouldn’t be able to exclude ‘male’ athletes from certain ‘female’ categories. World Athletics clearly thinks is approach to its DSD Rules is in line with this proposition, otherwise it wouldn’t have spent so much time, effort, and money defending it. If ‘male’ athletes were inclined to compete in female sport, they would dominate it (although there is no evidence that anyone who identifies as a ‘man’ has ever sought to compete in ‘female’ sport).

Given what we know about determination to win and doping, it isn’t unreasonable to assume that unscrupulous coaches would seek out DSD athletes in order to win, as Paula Radcliffe highlighted. World Athletics is right to point to the prevalence of DSD athletes in the Restricted Events as evidence that they may hold an advantage over XX karyotype athletes who have not benefitted from testosterone’s action on their physiology from puberty onwards.

But is such an advantage ‘unfair’? World Athletics thinks so. It is ‘category defeating’, to borrow its grandstand term. But it doesn’t appear to have done any other research as to how ‘unfair’ the advantage is compared to other advantages within the Restricted Events. The playing field is never level in any sporting event. Does height or stride length also confer an advantage in the Restricted Events? 

Nobody is saying that World Athletics shouldn’t be free to exclude ‘male’ athletes from its ‘female’ categories. However, the danger is that by pegging rules on who can compete in its female category to natural testosterone levels, World Athletics risks making people ill. World Athletics is effectively saying to a 46 XY DSD athlete: use medication not designed for your physiology to reduce your natural hormonal levels, otherwise you cannot compete internationally in our restricted events as a female.

In addition, some of the Restricted Events appear to be arbitrary, leading to conjecture that the DSD Rules are designed to target Caster Semenya. World Athletics refused to listen to the CAS when it asked it to consider deferring the application of the Rules to the 1,500m and one mile events, due to lack of evidence. But this didn’t trouble the SFT.

‘Although the CAS has expressed concerns about the inclusion of these two test events in the DSD Rules and indicated that the IAAF might consider deferring the application of this rule to such events, it nevertheless considered that the IAAF had provided evidence for all “covered events”, as well as a rational explanation as to how this category was defined’, reads the SFT Decision. ‘In these circumstances, this result cannot be qualified as contrary to public order’.

The problem is that the pegging of eligibility rules in female categories to natural testosterone levels doesn’t end with events run between 400m and one mile, or with the DSD Rules. The CAS Decision permitted World Athletics to add further events to the Rules in the future. ‘The majority of the Panel observes that it may be that, on implementation and with experience, certain factors, supported by evidence, may be shown to affect the overall proportionality of the DSD Regulations, either by indicating that amendments are required in order to ensure that the Regulations are capable of being applied proportionately, or by providing further support for or against the inclusion of particular events within the category of Restricted Events’, read an Executive Summary of its Decision.

Transgender females are currently not permitted to use testosterone at levels above 10 nmol/L if they are to be permitted to compete in female sport. Now that World Athletics has got its DSD Rules over the line, they also face the possibility that permissible limits will be reduced, potentially making them ill.

This is why nothing has changed with the SFT ruling. Realistically, I don’t think that anybody expected Caster Semenya to prove that the CAS Decision violates Swiss public policy.

What the SFT decision has highlighted, for athletes, is that appealing such issues through sport’s closed arbitration system is pointless. The CAS allowed the IAAF to amend the DSD Rules before, during, and after its hearing. It held that the Rules are discriminatory and despite this, the IAAF was able to ignore its warning about the inclusion of the 1,500m and one mile events due to lack of evidence without repercussion. The SFT held that none of this qualifies as a threat to Swiss public policy. Case closed.

Kristen Worley was only successful in her appeal that International Olympic Committee (IOC) policies had infringed her human rights by taking her case outside of sport’s closed arbitration system. Claudia Pechstein was only partially successful by taking her case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which forced the CAS to open its hearings to the public. This has not gone well so far. 

It would appear that World Athletics doesn’t want to face similar battles to the Semenya case in the future. ‘The decision of the CAS will be final and binding on all parties, and no right of appeal will lie from that decision’, reads Article 5.5 of the DSD Rules. ‘All parties waive irrevocably any right to any form of appeal, review or recourse by or in any court or judicial authority in respect of such decision, insofar as such waiver may be validly made’. Perhaps World Athletics knows that the CAS provides a sensitive ear.

The SFT decision doesn’t bring us any closer to ascertaining whether it is ethical for World Athletics to require 46 XY DSD females to self medicate their natural biology in order to be eligible for certain international female events. Caster Semenya was brought up as a woman, lives as a woman and is legally recognised as a woman, as the DSD Rules require. The action of testosterone on her XY karyotype has provided her with a distinct advantage, but it is an advantage she has had to work on throughout her life, just as other athletes play to their strengths. Is it right to penalise all DSD women for her success?

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