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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The legality of surety undertakings in relation to minor football players: the Lokilo case. By Adriaan Wijckmans

Editor's note: Adriaan Wijckmans is an associate specialized in sports law at the Belgium law firm Altius.

In a recent judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance confirmed the legality of a so-called surety undertaking, i.e. an agreement in which the parents of a minor playing football guarantee that their child will sign a professional contract with a football club as soon as the child reaches the legal age of majority.

This long-awaited ruling was hailed, on the one hand, by clubs as a much needed and eagerly anticipated confirmation of a long-standing practice in Belgian football[1] and, on the other hand, criticised by FIFPro, the international player’s trade union, in a scathing press release.

Background

Jason Eyenga-Lokilo (“Jason Lokilo”), born on 17 September 1998, joined the youth academy at Belgian top club, RSC Anderlecht (“Anderlecht”), in the spring of 2007. Anderlecht had set up a specific youth academy a couple of months earlier, which combined school education and football training for young football players.

As Jason Lokilo was one of the youth academy’s more promising prospects, Anderlecht and Lokilo’s parents entered into an agreement in which the parents, in exchange for a payment of 75,000 EUR (paid in instalments), guaranteed Anderlecht that their son was going to sign his first professional contract with the club upon turning 16, i.e. the minimum age in Belgium for signing a player contract. This same agreement stipulated that the parents were liable to pay Anderlecht a lump sum of 450,000 EUR in damages, if their son did not sign such a player contract.

When, in 2013, Aston Villa made a request to Anderlecht to give Jason Lokilo a trial when he was 15 years of age, Anderlecht refused, citing the player’s training obligations and the existing surety undertaking. Jason Lokilo’s father, a football agent, then told Anderlecht that he wanted to revise the terms of the surety undertaking, given the fact that a number of European football ‘powerhouses’ wanted to sign his son. Anderlecht refused his demand.

In June 2014, Jason Lokilo and his parents sent a letter to Anderlecht arguing that the surety undertaking was unlawful and hence null and void. Jason Lokilo alleged that unacceptable coercion had been put on him to sign his first contract with Anderlecht, which the player and his advisers considered was contrary to public policy. Anderlecht replied that it considered the surety undertaking to be perfectly valid since the surety did not prevent the player from signing his first professional contract with another club.

By the end of July of 2014, the gridlock between both parties ended with Jason Lokilo leaving Anderlecht and the latter club starting court proceedings against Jason Lokilo’s parents for a damages claim of 450,000 EUR.

Jason Lokilo eventually signed a contract with Crystal Palace in the summer of 2015.[2]

The Brussels Court of First Instance ruling

In its 22 November 2016 judgment, the Brussels Court of First Instance (“CFI”) confirmed the principle of this surety undertaking in the context of professional football.

The CFI referred to Article 1120 of the Belgian Civil Code that expressly allows the principle of a surety undertaking. A surety undertaking under Belgian civil law can be defined as an agreement in which one party promises another party regarding what a third party (who is either absent or legally not competent) will do, give or refrain from doing. The third party retains the freedom not to commit himself, since he, as a third party, is not bound by the agreement. However, the contracting party that made the promise will in that case be liable to pay the contractually foreseen damages if this third party eventually does not commit himself.

The main question the court had to decide was to determine whether the surety undertaking had a valid object and cause.

Jason Lokilo’s parents first argued that the contract was contrary to public policy legislation, considering the contract violated the freedom of association principle enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Social Charter (“ESC”). The CFI did not follow this reasoning, simply stating that the surety undertaking did not bind Jason Lokilo and did not prevent him from signing a contract with another club.[3]

Lokilo’s parents also invoked an alleged violation of Belgian federal legislation, which prohibits player contracts below the minimum age requirement. This argument was cast aside by the court since at no point in time was a player contract signed below the legal minimum age of 16.

Furthermore, Lokilo’s parents argued that the contract breached a (regional) decree guaranteeing an amateur sportsperson the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. The CFI repeated that Lokilo was not bound by the surety undertaking and could still freely leave Anderlecht, stating that this outcome was, moreover, exactly what Lokilo did in 2014. An aggravating circumstance for the CFI was the fact that Lokilo’s father had indicated to Anderlecht that Aston Villa in 2013 was willing to cover the 450,000 EUR in damages, as a result of which the CFI considered these damages were ‘clearly not an obstacle for Jason Lokilo to leave Anderlecht’.

The argument invoked by Lokilo’s parents under EU law (free movement) was also dismissed by the CFI ‘for lack of a cross-border EU element[4].

In the end, the CFI granted damages to Anderlecht but limited the amount payable by the parents, on the one hand, based on the grounds that Jason Lokilo’s mother was not an agent (and hence not professionally active in football) and, on the other hand, because 450,000 clearly exceeded the actual damages suffered by Anderlecht. The CFI set the damages ex aequo et bono at 140,000 EUR instead.

Some considerations

The Lokilo case echoes the Spanish Baena case,[5] although the latter concerned a slightly different situation and had a clearly different outcome.

Where the Spanish Supreme Court in its 5 February 2013 ruling considered a pre-contractual agreement concluded on behalf of a minor football player at odds with the minor’s best interests and therefore contrary to public policy, the CFI adopted a rather strict ‘pacta sunt servanda’ approach.

The CFI considered that the surety undertaking did not prevent Lokilo from signing a contract with a club other than Anderlecht. This finding may be correct from a strictly legal perspective, but ignores the reality that a child may not want to pursue his or her career at another club if he realises that, by doing so, his or her parents will be liable to pay damages. Moreover, under Belgian law, while a minor is indeed of legal age to sign his or her first professional contract when turning 16, the minor in principle still needs parental authorisation to do so until reaching 18 years of age. Parents might of course not be very inclined to agree to their child signing his or her first professional contract elsewhere, and therefore not provide the necessary parental authorisation, if doing so triggers important financial liabilities for them…

The surety undertaking seems also incompatible with regional decrees guaranteeing amateur sportsmen the right to leave their club free-of-charge at the end of each sporting season. These decrees are considered to have a public policy character by the case law, and disallow any hindrance, financial or otherwise, when moving to another sports club.[6] The fact that the surety undertaking related to a switch from an amateur to a professional contract,[7] did not alter the fact that the player was not free to leave for another amateur club when turning 16 either, since he was forced to sign a professional contract with Anderlecht when turning 16 or see his parents face the prospect of paying hefty compensation.

Arguments regarding the fundamental rights of the minor were either not invoked or not upheld by the CFI. The CFI stated that the matter concerned a contract between the parents and the club and not between the player and the club, as a result of which the minor’s fundamental rights were not jeopardised.

This argument is frankly unconvincing.

It should be noted that the UNCRC[8] recognises the right of a child to freedom of association[9] and the right to participate freely in cultural life.[10] The UNCRC furthermore protects children from economic exploitation.[11] The UNCRC provides also that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The UNCRC is often labeled as ‘soft’ law,[12] with Belgian case law even considering most of its provisions lacking a self-sufficient or self-executing character;[13] yet, the UNCRC remains a treaty with clear moral authority. Moreover, a number of its provisions do have direct effect, especially when read in combination with other international legal sources, such as the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The obligation to consider the best interests of the child is expressly incorporated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.[14] Even though the obligation to observe the child’s best interests is not expressly laid down under the ECHR, the ECtHR incorporates this obligation also in its case law.[15] One could further argue that the surety undertaking disproportionally affects the career development and perspectives of a player who is a minor, and so violates that player’s proprietary rights[16] and the right to family life that both the player and the player’s family enjoy.[17]

In addition, both the Belgian Constitution[18] and the Belgian Economic Code[19] protect the freedom for each individual to freely choose his or her occupation. This freedom can only be curtailed through or by law.[20] An agreement jeopardising one’s freedom to freely choose one’s occupation, has an unlawful causa and is null and void.[21]

The statement made by the CFI that the EU internal market law does not apply due to a lack of cross-border effect is at odds with the fact that Lokilo clearly intended to join a club outside Belgium, within the EEA (as shown by Aston Villa’s interest and his eventual signing with Crystal Palace), a fact that was not contested by Anderlecht. As Anderlecht is a Belgian football ‘powerhouse’, and clearly one of the top clubs in Belgium (if not the top club), a player aiming higher than Anderlecht would necessarily have to look at opportunities abroad.

If EU law is deemed to apply, then the guiding principles of the Bernard case must be observed. The CJEU, in its Bernard ruling,[22] recalled that an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. The CJEU clearly accepted recruitment and training of players as a legitimate aim. Even where that is so, that measure’s application still must be such as to ensure the objective’s achievement and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In considering whether a system restricts the freedom of movement, the specific characteristics of sport, and of football in particular, their social and educational function, should be taken into account. One may even take into account the costs of training other players that do not succeed at establishing a professional career (the player factor).[23]

This being said, the surety undertaking mechanism in this case seems overly restrictive for the player. Although, again, a surety undertaking binds the parents and not the player, and damages can only be claimed from the parents, the surety undertaking obviously ultimately serves to discourage a player from exercising his or her right of free movement. Moreover, the player already suffers a restriction upon his or her free movement, following the training compensation mechanism in place under FIFA regulations, which is criticisable in its own right.[24] The surety undertaking constitutes an additional burden on the player’s free movement. In Bernard, although the CJEU seemed to accept the principle of training compensation, the CJEU dismissed the French arrangements governing young players (‘joueurs espoirs’) since they did not involve compensation for real training costs incurred, but rather were damages for breach of contractual obligations calculated with reference to the total loss suffered by the club. And taking into account the actual loss suffered by Anderlecht is exactly what the CFI has done. To the extent a surety undertaking goes beyond what is necessary to encourage the recruitment and training of minors (and funds those activities), a violation of the EU internal market law seems given.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the considerations set out above, it can certainly not be excluded that the ruling will be overturned on appeal. Such an appeal, which would bring the case before the Brussels Court of Appeal, is being considered by the player’s parents, but has not yet been lodged.

Apart from the doubt around their enforceability, it should be noted that payments under surety undertakings may in addition give rise to (social) tax issues, if they are not structured correctly.[25] [26]

The problem with the surety undertaking in the Lokilo case predominantly lies with the surety undertaking’s disproportionate character in the specific case at hand. Less restrictive solutions could, in the author’s view, be envisaged, although exploring such alternatives would exceed the scope of this article.



[1] Surety undertakings, together with money lending contracts (loan to parents pledging that their child will sign first professional contract, non-reimbursable if child effectively signs contract), are common practice with Belgian top level teams.

[2] Jason Lokilo is still a member of the Crystal Palace Academy. Crystal Palace offered Anderlecht compensation for an approximate amount of 45,000 EUR, which Anderlecht refused.

[3](…), la convention de porte-fort litigieuse n’engageait que les parents de Jason vis-à-vis du club et ne créait aucune obligation pour lui

[4]Or, contrairement à l’arrêt Bernard qu’ils invoquent (arrêt du 16 mars 2010 – pièce 3 de leur dossier), M. et Mme Lokilo ne démontrent pas, dans le cas present, l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité.

[5] Sentencia de 5 de febrero de 2013. STS 229/2013. Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Civil. http://www.iurismuga.org/es/bases-de-datos/jurisprudencia/144-jurisprudencia-derecho-espanol/8153-sts-n-de-resolucion-26-2013-de-05-02-2013-sentencia-baena. The case was invoked by the parents before the CFI but considered irrelevant because, according to the CFI, the contract between Baena and Barcelona was entered into by (on behalf of) the minor player.

[6] Vred. Ghent 16 September 2013, role n° 130318.

[7] The relevant decrees apply to amateur sports, not professional sports.

[8] http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx

[9] Article 15 UNCRC

[10] Article 31 UNCRC

[11] Article 32 and 36 UNCRC. One may argue that, in the end, a child is used to generate money through (later) transfers and sponsorship deals.

[12] H. Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability, Hart Publishing, [2012], 34.

[13] Belgian case law has been reluctant to grant direct effect to the UNCRC: cf. Cass. 11 June 2010, obs. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, Le droit international et européen des droits de l’homme devant le juge national, Larcier, [2014], 196 and following.

[14] Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

[15] Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 75.

[16] Article 1 of ECHR First Protocol: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. (…)”.

[17] Article 8 ECHR

[18] Article 23 Constitution

[19] Article II.9 of the Economic Code. This is one of the oldest Belgian public policy principles, previously laid down in the famous Decree D'Allarde of 2 - 17 March 1791

[20] C.E. 12 July 1993, JLMB [1993], 1442, note J.F. NEURAY

[21] Cass. 29 September 2008, C.06.443.F, JTT [2008] 464.

[22] CJEU 16 March 2010, Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle United.

[23] i.e. the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player.

[24] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Press [2014], 485 and following.

[25] The tax and social security authorities may e.g. argue that these payments relate to the (future) employment contract of the player.

[26] The surety undertaking’s ‘nephew’, the money lending contracts, in addition pose problems under Belgian finance law since clubs as a rule do not possess the necessary licences or authorisations.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Dahmane v KRC Genk: A Rough Translation

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Dahmane v KRC Genk: A Rough Translation

Dahmane v KRC GENK

Court of Labour of Antwerp (Hasselt district) 6 May 2014

Chamber 2

Algemeen rolnummer 2009/AH/199

 

The Facts 

  • Dahmane signed with KRC GENK on 1 July 2007 for four years (till 30 June 2011). Dahmane unilaterally terminated the contract January 2008. 
  • KRC GENK demanded from Dahmane compensation of EUR 878.888,88 (36 months wages) at the labour court of Tongeren. The demand was based on Article 5 § 2 of the Law for Professional Sportsmen (24 February 1978) and the Royal Decree of 13 July 2004 that Determines the Amount of the Compensation based on the Law for Professional Sportsmen. According to the Royal Decree (of 2004) the compensation had to be equal to 36 months of salary in the case of Dahmane. 
  • Dahmane demanded EUR 250.000,00 from KRC GENK compensation calculated in accordance with the Labour Agreements Law (03 July 1978). D. argued that according to article 40 § 1 of this law, the severance pay can only amount to 12 months of salary.  

  • 25 May 2009 - The Labour Court agreed with the demands of KRC GENK, whereas it disagreed with Dahmane’s. Dahmane placed an appeal. 

  • 22 June 2010 – Court of Labour decided that Dahmane had unlawfully unilaterally terminated the labour contract between him and KRC GENK. Dahmane had to reimburse KRC GENK with a compensation equal to 36 months of salary, because Dahmane fell under the Law regarding Labour Agreements of Professional Sportsmen of 24 February 1978. The Court rejected Dahmane’s request for damages.   

  • The Court of Labour turned to the Belgian Constitutional Court with the preliminary question whether the Law for Professional Sportsmen of 24 February 1978 breaches the Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution on Equal Treatment, as there was an inconsistency with the Labour Agreements Law of 03 July 1978 under which the severance pay can only amount to 12 months of salary. Secondly, it was questioned whether the rule in question infringed the freedom of employment.  

  • 18 May 2011 – the Belgian Constitutional Court declared itself incompetent to answer the preliminary questions because the question whether a professional sportsmen falls under either the Law for Professional Sportsmen or the Labour Agreements Law solely depended on Royal Decree on Determining the Amount of the Compensation based on the Law for Professional Sportsmen (13 July 2004). According to Belgian law, the legality of the Royal Decree has to be decided by the Court of Labour itself. 

  • Therefore, the judgment of 6 May 2014 was the second time the Court of Labour dealt with the case regarding the unilateral termination of the player’s contract between Dahmane and KRC GENK. This time it had to decide whether the Royal Decree breached the Belgian Constitution.

 

The Case 

  • The demands by Dahmane:

    • That the Court of Labour rejects the Royal Decree on Determining the Amount of the Compensation based on the Law for Professional Sportsmen (13 July 2004) because it breaches the Belgian Constitution (part II, §1).

    • That the Court of Labour asks the CJEU the preliminary question whether the Royal Decree of 2004 breaches Article 45 TFEU since the free movement of professional sportsmen is unreasonably restricted by the Royal Decree (part II, §1).

 

  • KRC GENK arguments:

    • Football has specific characteristics that can be summarized in:

      • Atypical employment market

      • Atypical professional career (part III.b. §5).

    • That the difference between labour agreements of professional sportsmen on the one hand “normal” labour agreements is based on the “specific character of labour agreements of professional sportsmen en the specific character of sport in general”.

      The “specificity of sport” forms a special statute for sport, whereby common law cannot be applied unabridged (part III.b. §6).

    • Referring to European Case Law, and the Commission’s White book on sport, KRC GENK highlighted that to achieve the objectives inherent to sport, which include avoiding competition distortions and the preservation of the stability of participating sport clubs, certain specifics measures can be taken aimed at guarantying  legal certainty of labour relationships in the sport sector (part III.b. §6).

 

  • The Court's holdings

    • Agreed that sport exhibits certain characteristics that can deviate from other labour relationships between employer and employee, but held that since the Royal Decree in question did not mention the specificity of sport, this exception is inapplicable (part III.b. §5).

    • KRC GENK did not take the economic aspect of sport (e.g. the pursuit of economic profits) into account in its arguments, and the importance of fair competition in this regard. These economic objectives are not exclusive to the sport sector but underlie the market economy in general. Therefore, the Court sees no valid reason as to why a separate Royal Decree is necessary to achieve the objectives of the sport sector when similar objectives are pursued by other economic sectors. In other words, no separate laws should be applicable to sport when it pursues economic objectives (part III.b. §6).

    • As regards KRC GENK’s arguments that for football in particular certain legislative deviations preventing richer clubs from buying all the good players from smaller clubs, thereby distorting competition, are justifiable, the Court found them to be incorrect. Even though football’s transfer system causes movement of footballers to differ from the “normal” functioning of the labour market, in this case it is important to draw a distinction between the buying and selling of players between clubs on the one hand, and the unilateral termination of a player’s contract by either club or player on the other. Yet again the Court saw no reason why the specificity of football should enable the adoption of Royal Decrees breaching article 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution (part III.b. §6).

    • The Court took into account that the average career of a professional sportsman is relatively short (12 years according to RKC GENK and six to eight years according to Dahmane). A compensation amounting to 36 months of salary would for many professional sportsmen be equal to 1/3 of total career revenues and is therefore not justified in the present case (part III.b. §7).

    • The Royal Decree applies to professional sports in general, not only to football, KRC GENK’s can therefore not rely on the specificity of football to justify its legality (part III.b. §6 and §7).

    • Given that the Royal Decree is declared contrary to the Constitution, the Court sees no reason to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ (part III.b. §12).

 

Conclusion: the Court considered that a Royal Decree imposing a compensation of 36 months of salary on a player breaching his contract is disproportionate. Furthermore, the Court found the Royal Decree unjustifiable under the Constitutional principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination (part III.b. §8).

 

 

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The CAS jurisprudence on match-fixing in football: What can we learn from the Turkish cases? - Part 1 - By Thalia Diathesopoulou

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The CAS jurisprudence on match-fixing in football: What can we learn from the Turkish cases? - Part 1 - By Thalia Diathesopoulou

The editor’s note:

Two weeks ago we received the unpublished CAS award rendered in the Eskişehirspor case and decided to comment on it. In this post Thalia Diathesopoulou (Intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre) analyses the legal steps followed and interpretations adopted by CAS panels in this case and in a series of other Turkish match-fixing cases. The first part of the post will deal with the question of the legal nature of the ineligibility decision opposed by UEFA to clubs involved in one way or another into match-fixing and with the personal and material scope of UEFA’s rule on which this ineligibility is based. The second part is dedicated to the procedural rules applied in match-fixing cases.


Introduction

The unpredictability of the outcome is a sine qua non feature of sports. It is this inherent uncertainty that draws the line between sports and entertainment and triggers the interest of spectators, broadcasters and sponsors. Thus, match-fixing by jeopardising the integrity and unpredictability of sporting outcomes has been described, along with doping, as one of the major threats to modern sport.[1] 

It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the fight against match-fixing has been elevated over the past years to a general interest issue, being also included in European Commission’s Agenda on sports as a priority. The urge to protect the integrity of sport, has stimulated the adoption by sports-governing bodies, and especially UEFA and FIFA, of regulations specifically intended to combat match-fixing. The evolution of UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (UEFA DR) in the last 10 years has been remarkable: it follows a path from a broad capture of match-fixing conduct by reference to the general values of loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship[2] in the 2004 version, to the explicit - first ever- reference to the offence of match-fixing in the revised 2013 edition.[3]

In this context, the CAS has been called to implement these rules in a series of match-fixing cases. Especially Turkey’s unprecedented match-fixing scandal in 2011 led to a series of important CAS awards tackling match-fixing. The latest episode of this Turkish series was written on 2 September 2014: following Fenerbahçe and Besiktas, it was Eskişehirspor’s turn to face a CAS ruling on a match-fixing related case.

CAS jurisprudence on match-fixing being in its infancy, the approach of the CAS panels towards procedural, evidentiary and matters of substance in match-fixing disputes is still uncertain. Considering the magnitude of the match-fixing threat and the CAS role as a ‘cartographer’ of the so called lex sportiva, it is worthwhile to monitor the emerging trends of CAS on these integrity-related issues. This blog series will, therefore, use the Turkish cases as a vehicle in order to build a legal roadmap in match-fixing cases and shed light on four issues that have been extensively addressed in recent CAS jurisprudence: the qualification of the legal nature of the measure of ineligibility as a result of a Club’s involvement in match-fixing, the scope of application of this measure, the standard of proof to be applied and, finally, the admissibility of evidence in match-fixing cases

Particularly, two substantial problems that emerged in match-fixing disputes, i.e. the legal qualification of the match-fixing related measure of ineligibility under Article 2.08 of the UEL Regulations as administrative or disciplinary measure (1) and the scope of application of Article 2.08 (2), will constitute the axes of this first blog series. 


The 2011 Turkish match-fixing series in brief

In the summer of 2011, following Turkish’s police investigation into 19 football matches suspected of being fixed, 61 individuals were arrested, including club managers and Turkish national players. Fenerbahçe, Besiktas and Eskişehirspor were connected with match-fixing allegations in domestic tournaments in 2011.

Istanbul giant Fenerbahçe was at the epicentre of this match-fixing scandal, with its Chairman, Aziz Yildirim, being convicted by Istanbul’s 16th High Criminal Court of establishing and leading a criminal organisation, which rigged four games and offered payments to players or rival clubs to fix three others. Particularly, among other matches, it was found that under the leadership of the then President of Fenerbahçe, match-fixing agreements were made for the matches of Eskişehirspor against Fenerbahçe and Eskişehirspor against Trabzonspor dating from 9 April 2011 and 22 April 2011 respectively. The Eskişehirspor head coach and the player were found guilty for match-fixing in the match with Trabzonspor and were sentenced to imprisonment. Furthermore, the High Criminal Court convicted Besiktas’ Officials of match-fixing activities with regard to the Final Cup played between Besiktas and Istanbul BB on 11 May 2011.

As a result of this alleged match-fixing involvement Fenerbahçe was banned by the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) from participating in the 2011-2012 CL. Later on, the 25 July 2013, Fenerbahçe was found ineligible by the UEFA Appeals Body (UAB) to participate in the next two UEFA club competitions including the 2013/14 UEFA CL, since it could not comply with the UEFA Champions League (UEL) admission requirements. Similarly, Besiktas and Eskişehirspor, in 2013 and 2014 respectively, were considered by the UAB ineligible to participate in the next UEL season, on the grounds of a breach of the UEL admission criteria and particularly of Article 2.08.

A next round of proceedings was brought before the CAS. On 28 and 30 August 2013, the CAS rejected Fenerbahçe’s and Besictas’ appeals.[4] One year later, on 2 September 2014, Eskişehirspor faced the same fate. Interestingly enough, the Eskişehirspor panel was the first CAS panel to deal with the sanction of a club victim of a match-fixing arrangement.

The outcome of the Turkish cases is not necessarily surprising. The CAS practice has been consistently embracing the UEFA zero tolerance policy against match-fixing. However, the legal reasoning followed by CAS to reach a similar outcome differs significantly fostering legal uncertainty in the match-fixing context. At this point, therefore, this blog post will attempt to map the reasoning of the CAS over the following thorny issues which were particularly raised in the Turkish cases: the legal nature of the measure of ineligibility under Article 2.08 of the UEL Regulations (1) and the scope of application of Article 2.08 (2).   


Qualifying Article 2.08 UEL Regulations: administrative measure or disciplinary sanction?

At a first glance, the question of the legal nature of the ineligibility measure of Article 2.08 is rather theoretical, but it also bears important practical implications. The identification of the legal nature of Article 2.08 as administrative or disciplinary determines ‘how this measure shall be applied and under which legal principles’.[5] In other words, the characterization of the measure of Article 2.08 as a disciplinary one may trigger the application of UEFA Disciplinary regulations, including the strict liability principle and the possibility of issuance of a probationary period. Before proceeding with our analysis, it should be pointed out that the Fenerbahçe case, deals with the legal nature of Article 2.05 UEFA Champions League Regulations (UCLR). However, since the wording of Article 2.05 UCLR and Article 2.08 UELR is exactly the same, the panel’s findings are transposable.

When qualifying the legal nature of the ineligibility measure in match-fixing disputes, the Fenerbahçe,Besiktas and Eskişehirspor panels used as a landmark the well-established distinction between administrative acts and disciplinary measures.[6] This is the common point of reference for the three cases, which thereafter differentiates in the interpretation of the ineligibility measure.

In the first case, the Fenerbahçe panel introduced the idea of a ‘two stage process’ in match-fixing disputes: the first stage encompasses an administrative measure, akin to a preliminary minimum sanction, while the second stage is a disciplinary measure, imposing an additional sanction. Thereafter, in a surprising twist the CAS declared the inherent disciplinary nature of the administrative measure of ineligibility, since the subject matter of Article 2.08 is ‘the imposition of a sanction’. According to this panel, the minimum sanction serves the legitimate interest of UEFA to exclude a club from European competitions with immediate effect, while additional sanctions can be imposed if the circumstances so justify. However, this interpretation creates a paradox in that it blurs the lines between acts of administrative and disciplinary nature, a distinction well entrenched in CAS case law.

The Besiktas case adds to the legal uncertainty with regard to the legal nature of the ineligibility measure. According to this panel and contrary to the assessment in the Fenerbahçe case, Article 2.08 UELR does not have a sanctioning character, even if it excludes a club from UEFA competition. This argument is based on the wording of Article 50 (3) UEFA Statutes which, by referring to the ineligibility measure as a measure imposed ‘without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures’, implicitly excludes its sanctioning nature.

This contradictory interpretation of the ineligibility measure by the previous panels triggered the concerns of the Eskişehirspor panel, which aimed to put an end to the legal uncertainty surrounding the definition of the legal nature of Article 2.08. Therefore, the CAS proceeded for the first time with an extensive analysis of the legal nature of Article 2.08. First of all, the CAS recognized the existence of a double regulatory regime in match-fixing cases: an administrative measure aiming at preventing match-fixing, laid down in Articles 2.05 UCL or 2.07, 2.08 of UEL Regulations and Article 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes 2008, and a disciplinary measure enshrined in the Disciplinary Regulations, specifically at Art 5.2j of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (DR) 2008. While this distinction seems to be inspired by the ‘two stage process’ elaborated in the Fenerbahçe case, this panel went a step further by drawing a clear line between measures of administrative and disciplinary character. After having clarified this distinction between measures of different legal nature and effect, the panel concluded that the measure of ineligibility of Article 2.08 is of a purely administrative nature. This assessment is based on an interpretation of Articles 2.09 UEL Regulations and Article 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes 2008 similar to the one adopted in the Besiktas case: both provisions refer to the automatic administrative application of the measure of ineligibility, leaving the door open for potential additional disciplinary measures ‘if the circumstances so justify’. Furthermore, the CAS noted that the administrative measure of Article 2.08 has a broad scope of application encompassing ‘any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of the match’, as compared to the disciplinary offence which in line with its sanctioning character is more restrictive.

Thereafter, the panel highlighted the consequences to be drawn from this qualification. As a result of the pure administrative nature of Article 2.08, the legal principles usually applicable to disciplinary measures are considered irrelevant. In practice, this means that the CAS excludes the application of: a) Articles 5.2 .j. and 17.1 of UEFA DR about the evaluation of mitigating circumstances when disciplinary measures are imposed; b) Article 6 of UEFA DR imposing a strict liability system; c) Article 11 of UEFA DR about the elimination of the ineligibility measure or the issuance of a probationary period; and finally, d) the ‘nulla poena sine culpa’ principle recognized in criminal law.

This straightforward position of the CAS in the Eskişehirspor case reflects its intention to put a provisory end to the legal uncertainty with regard to the legal nature of Article 2.08 and the legal consequences it entails. Borrowing elements from the previous Turkish cases, the CAS came up with a more sophisticated and coherent interpretation of the legal nature of the ineligibility measure, an interpretation that may serve as a reliable guideline for subsequent arbitral panels dealing with match-fixing. 


The scope of application of Article 2.08 UEL Regulations

Article 2.08 UEL Regulations does not define precisely the activities of a club that is directly or indirectly involvement in match-fixing. In match-fixing disputes, therefore, the CAS has a decisive role in clarifying the scope of application of the ineligibility measure.

As far as the scope ratione materiae is concerned, the Fenerbahçe and Besiktas panels converged in a broad understanding of the scope of Article 2.08. Indeed, based on the ordinary meaning of Article 2.08 which encompasses ‘any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at a national or international level’ in conjunction with the ratio legis of this provision, which reflects the zero tolerance policy of UEFA against match-fixing, the CAS considered that Article 2.08 targets not only activities directly intending to fix the outcome of a game, but also activities that may have an unlawful influence on it. In this sense, for instance, the fact that Eskişehirspor accepted a bonus from a third party, i.e. Fenerbahçe, for winning, even though it cannot be qualified as match-fixing, is influencing the outcome of the match and, therefore, falls within the scope of Article 2.08. Furthermore, the Besiktas panel offered a broad interpretation of the wording ‘aimed at’ suggesting that not only the act of match-fixing, but also an attempt falls within the broad scope of Article 2.08. Hence, the Turkish cases establish an important finding with regard to the scope of application of the ineligibility measure in match-fixing disputes: a broad interpretation of Article 2.08 is in line with UEFA’s statutory objectives and, therefore, has to be adopted.

On the other hand, with regard to the scope ratione personae of Article 2.08, the CAS panels have been inconsistent. In order to identify whose actions are attributable to the club, the Besiktas panel applied the strict liability principle enshrined in Article 6 of the 2008 UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (DR). Here, the application of UEFA DR seems to be at odds with the previous characterization of Article 2.08 as an administrative measure. By contrast, in the Eskişehirspor case, where the issue whether the actions of a coach, who is a mere employee, can be attributed to the club is raised. In that case, the panel relying on the pure administrative character of Article 2.08, rejected the application of the strict liability principle. The Eskişehirspor panel, insisting on the qualification of the measure of ineligibility as an administrative measure, suggested an entirely different, but equally broad, interpretation of the ratione personae scope of article 2.08. Indeed, it suggests a broad interpretation of the term ‘official’, an interpretation that would capture ‘every board member ….coach, trainer and any other person responsible for technical, (…) as well as other persons obliged to comply with the UEFA Statutes’. In other words, the coach has to be considered as an official in the sense of Article 2.08 and his actions were, thus, attributable to the club.

To conclude, it seems that whatever the interpretative road chosen, the scope of application rationae personae and materiae of article 2.08 will be understood broadly. Nevertheless, it would be more coherent to have such a broad interpretation rely on a stabilized legal practice and the Eskişehirspor award provides an interesting first step in this direction.


The series of Turkish cases has provided the CAS with the opportunity to frame a consistent approach in substantive matters linked to match-fixing cases. In the Eskişehirspor case, the CAS attempts to clarify its approach to match-fixing in football. Two important conclusions can be drawn: the ineligibility measure imposed by Article 2.08 UELR has a broad scope of application and, secondly, it should be qualified as having an administrative nature. As a result, disciplinary rules do not apply to match-fixing disputes involving the eligibility of a club to European competitions. Regarding certain procedural matters, however, disciplinary standards and rules do apply. This is the real Achilles’ heel of the CAS approach in match-fixing cases: how can the application of rules of different nature to substantial and procedural matters in an identical match-fixing dispute be explained? 

(To be continued)


[1] Match-fixing in sport-A mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27,  (http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/studies/study-sports-fraud-final-version_en.pdf), 14.

[2] CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v/ UEFA, para 78.

[3] UEFA Disciplinary Regulations 2013, Article 12 ‘Integrity of matches and competitions and match-fixing’ (http://www.ecaeurope.com/Legal/UEFA%20Documents/2013_0241_Disciplinary%20Regulations%202013.pdf)

[4] CAS 2013/A/3256 Fenerbahçe Spor Kubülü v UEFA & CAS 2013/A/3258 Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA

[5] CAS 2014/A/3628 Eskişehirspor Kulübü v UEFA, para 98.

[6] CAS 2007/A/1381 & CAS 2008/A/1583

Comments (1) -

  • Ender Kuyumcu

    9/24/2014 9:43:00 AM |

    If you contact me on my mail, I can suuply you with the CAS verdicts on Besiktas and Fenerbahce cases alongside more info regarding Turkish match fixing scandal.

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