Editor's Note:  Marjolaine is an attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.  She currently participates as a scientific collaborator at the University of Neuchâtel on a research project to produce the first article-by-article legal commentary of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code.

Over the past days, we have been flooded by media reports discussing the “Caster Semenya-case”, reports rapidly relayed in social networks. Since the debate has a distinct legal component and since almost every report appears to draw significantly from the legal background, I granted myself permission – as compensation so to speak - to publish a somewhat more personal, less legal, post than I usually would.

Let me make one thing clear from the outset – I am still ‘agnostic’ about the question of how to solve the issues surrounding the male versus female divide in sports. Each time I have been asked to write or speak on the subject, I have tried to stick to describing the legal situation and its implications. I do not have the miracle solution as to how to handle this infinitely complex issue. And I am not sure anyone can claim to hold that solution at this point. Like everyone, I am doing my research and trying to be humble enough to stay within the realm of my competences.

What I do know: when discussing legal regulation, it is usually not wise to focus disproportionality on an individual case, no matter how much that case stands out. Humans are wired to respond to the particular and the concrete. Caster Semenya’s story is a compelling narrative, which can also very conveniently be supported by pictures (often in poses that – deliberately? – do not do her justice). By contrast, legal regulation is general and abstract and must be designed to address multiple potential situations. I am not naïve enough to believe that regulation is not influenced by politics and – yes - emotions. Still: law-making must be able to distance itself from the pressure of public opinion. This is especially true if the resulting regulations are to deliver satisfactory results on the long term, after the public eye has turned away.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport ruling in the Dutee Chand matter that suspended the validity of the IAAF Hyperandrogenism Regulations was based on a lack of sufficient scientific evidence. More precisely, the decisive factor for the CAS panel was that the IAAF had not adduced sufficient evidence that testosterone levels - at the threshold set in its Regulations - conferred to female athletes an advantage that would outrank any other natural characteristic, in a manner that would place them in a position comparable to male competitors. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Thus, the mere fact that the IAAF – reportedly – intends to continue seeking support to regulate hyperandrogenism and related issues does not truly amount to a ‘challenge’ of the CAS’ ruling or a ‘contempt’ for the decision of the panel. Nor do the IOC recommendations to the same effect. These statements are, on the contrary, the logical sequel of the interim award and the two-year deadline given to the IAAF. I previously made the point – along with my co-author - that the rendering of an interim award was surprising, for various reasons related to legal technique and arbitration practice. But the reactions of the IAAF and the IOC to that award seem rather unsurprising. What is more significant from a legal perspective: the CAS panel placed the burden of proof on the IAAF. This means that, as long as the science is unsettled, women with hyperandrogenism will be given the benefit of the doubt.

Which leads us back to Caster Semenya. I have been reading that making history in Rio could paradoxically be career-ending for her[i]. This is because an outstanding victory would represent outstanding indication of her enjoying an unfair advantage. This may – unfortunately – hold true for public rumour. However, what the CAS panel was looking for in the Dutee Chand award is clearly scientific studies, supported by data and analysed by experts. Evidence in court may not always be rocket science, but CAS panels do not rely on purely anecdotic evidence either.

Meanwhile, the manner in which the topic is being dealt with today is fundamentally divisive, when we should be aiming for cohesion. It positions men against women, sports authorities against athletes, (presumed) non-hyperandrogenic females against (suspected) hyperandrogenic ones. The level playing field is an ever-elusive ideal – some may call it an illusion or utopia - but one worth striving for. It is one of the primary reasons humans bother to look at a couple of other humans running around a 400m loop. Perhaps regrettably, giving legal contours to the level playing field will always involve compromise of some sort, leaving out certain factors to include others.

Today, Caster Semenya is competing legitimately under the rules currently applicable to her. End of the story. And she is entitled to enjoy it - like any other individual, male or female, - who invested years of their lives into their Olympic dream. Let us continue the debate around the legitimacy of gender categories in sport, but without tarnishing the reputation of individuals in the process.

[i] See e.g. http://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/37102204 (accessed 18.08.16): “For what greater indication of unfair advantage could there be, when the IAAF is trying to buttress its case, than a victory unlike anything history has ever seen before”.

Pursuant to Kelsen’s famous pyramid, the authority of norms may be ranked according to their sources: Constitution is above the Law, which is in turn superior to the Regulations, which themselves stand higher to the Collective Agreement etc…Under French labour law, this ranking can however be challenged by a “principle of favourable treatment” which allows a norm from a lower rank to validly derogate from a superior norm, if (and only if) this derogation benefits to the workers.

On 2 April 2014, the Cour de Cassation (the French Highest Civil Court) considered that these principles apply in all fields of labour law, regardless of the specificity of sport[1].  In this case, Mr. Orene Ai’i, a professional rugby player, had signed on 13 July  2007 an employment contract with the Rugby Club Toulonnais (RCT) for two sport seasons with effect on 1 July 2007.

Yet, article L. 1242-13 of the French Labour Code states that a fixed term employment contract must be handed to the worker within a maximal period of two days after the beginning of the contract. Should this period of two days not be respected the worker is entitled to claim for a requalification of his fixed term contract into permanent contract[2]. Mr. Ai’i relied on this article to argue for the requalification of his contract.

It must be noted that the requalification of the initial two seasons contract in a permanent contract, implies that it can be terminated by the employer with a cause. Therefore, a termination at the occurrence of the term of the contract, i.e. after the 2 years, may be regarded as a “dismissal without genuine and serious cause” which in turn would allow the player to seek compensation.  

The RCT argued on the other hand that article L. 1242-13 and the potential requalification is inapplicable to professional rugby players whose employments relationships can never be for an indefinite time period. Indeed, according to article 1.3 of the collective agreement of professional Rugby, an employment contract with a professional rugby player can last for a maximum of 5 sport seasons.

The Cour de Cassation reminds however that a collective agreement cannot depart unfavourably for the worker to the imperative provisions of the law and therefore states that the provisions of article 1.3 of the collective agreement of professional Rugby shall not impede the requalification of a fixed term contract between a professional rugby player and his club, into a permanent contract.

This solution is not limited to Rugby and may be extended to all fields of professional sports. Indeed, like the collective agreement of professional Rugby, article 12.3.2.3 of the national collective agreement of sports, which is applicable for every professional athlete, also provides that “the duration of a same contract cannot be superior as 5 sport seasons (60 month)”.

Based on the above mentioned decision it is fair to conclude that any French professional athlete can claim for a requalification of his fixed term employment contract if he hasn’t received a copy of his employment contract within the 2 days of its beginning. Potential consequences could be significant considering that a professional athlete can terminate a permanent contract, without cause or compensation[3]. In this regard it will be interesting to see if the requalification of fixed term sport contract into a permanent contract will facilitate their termination and allow some professional athlete to change Club without any transfer fee…

This decision could have wider implications for sporting labour relationships in general. Indeed, the Cour de Cassation rejected the specificity argument put forward by the Rugby Club. The legal reasoning on which the decision is grounded could, therefore, easily be transposed to other instances, where core labour rights of athletes are at stake. 

Patrick Millot, Avocat à la Cour

[1] Cass. Soc. 2 April 2014 n° 11-25442 (cf. concurring; CA Aix-en-Provence,  17 May  2013 R.G. n° 12/06543).

[2] Cass. Soc. 6 December, 2011 n° 16-16454 ; Cass. Soc. 4 April, 2012 n° 11-10986; Cass. 11 March, 2013 n° 11-28687.

[3] In opposition to a fixed term employment contract, which could only be terminated for a serious cause (i.e. serious misconduct, force majeure or medical inability to work)