Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a third year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

1.     Introduction

To many it may seem obvious that athletes in a national championship should only be able to participate if they have the nationality of the relevant state. The Dutch Road Cycling National Championships should have Dutch cyclists, and the German Athletics Championships should have German athletes and so forth. However, in reality, foreign competitors are allowed to participate in many national championships in the EU, and there is a wide discrepancy between the rules of national sport governing bodies on this issue. There is no unified practice when investigating this point by country or by sport, and rules on participation range from a complete ban on foreign competitors to absolutely no mention of foreign athletes.[1] Thus, the question arises: should foreign athletes be able to participate in national sport championships?

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will soon be required to provide an, at least partial, answer to this dilemma as a result of an application for a preliminary ruling.  A German Court has referred three questions to the CJEU on the case TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. (DLV) which in essence ask whether EU citizenship rights and in particular, the requirement of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, should be applied to non-nationals wishing to participate in an athletics national championship in Germany. In the meantime, the Advocate General (AG), who provides a non-binding opinion to the Court before a decision is delivered, Evgeni Tanchev has delivered an interesting opinion on the case. It addresses the claims from the applicants based on EU citizenship rights and urges the CJEU to instead review the case on the basis of the freedom of establishment.

This blog will dissect the AG’s opinion to assess the main arguments put forward in relation to freedom of establishment and EU citizenship. Furthermore, it will weigh the ramifications this case may have on the boundaries of EU law in relation to sport. To fully appreciate the AG’s opinion, it is necessary to first discuss the intriguing factual and legal background colouring this case. After all, this will not be the first time the CJEU faces thorny issues concerning discrimination on the basis of nationality and sport.

2.     Factual Background of TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. (DLV)

The second applicant in this case, Mr. Biffi, is an Italian resident in Germany since 2003. He works professionally as a personal trainer and coach and has a website which advertises his services. He has been a member of the Berlin-based athletics club TopFit (the first applicant) and has competed in athletics competitions including German national championships within the senior category of athletes above the age of 35. In these national competitions, he had his placings recorded and published his results on his website. In 2016, the DLV changed its rules on non-nationals participating in national championships across all age categories without notice or transitional period. The rules were changed to only allow German nationals to compete for the national title while non-nationals could only participate outside classification with the permission of the organisers. As a result, Mr. Biffi was even denied the ability to participate in one of the championships in which he previously participated without raising a brow. The applicants challenged the DLV rule on the basis that it is in contravention to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality under EU citizenship. 

3.     European Sports Law and Nationality Based Discrimination

Generally, sport governing bodies aim to have the maximum autonomy possible to formulate and apply their rules. In the EU, they have attempted and ultimately failed at securing an absolute autonomy.[2] The current relationship between the sport governing bodies and the EU has been described as a ‘conditional autonomy’ where sport governing bodies may exercise their discretion in formulating and applying their rules so long as they do not conflict with EU law.[3] It should be noted that the CJEU has mainly scrutinized rules from sport governing bodies which affect economic interests of the parties in the context of free movement and competition law. Evidently, this relationship has resulted in a struggle between sport governing bodies and the EU over a number of topics including non-discrimination on the basis of nationality.

Traditionally, the CJEU has addressed issues of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in sports cases from a free movement perspective in ensuring that sport rules do not disrupt the EU’s internal market. For example, when a rule from the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) required that a pacemaker be the same nationality as the cyclist in the UCI Motor-paced World Championships, the CJEU rendered its ruling on the basis of the provisions establishing the free movement of workers and service providers. Moreover, the Union of European Football Associations’ (UEFA) 3 plus 2 rule which allowed football clubs to limit the number of foreign players who could play in a match to three players plus two more players who had been ‘assimilated’ by having played a certain amount of years in the concerned national football association were found in the famous Bosman case to be in contravention of the free movement of workers provisions.

In the present case, the parties have argued the case on the basis of the prohibition on the discrimination of nationality flowing from EU citizenship rights. Based on Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union, all nationals of an EU member state automatically have EU citizenship. However, these rights are only triggered when other more specific rights, such as free movement rights, are not activated first. Put differently, if the facts of a case fall within a free movement right, then the case can only be inspected in light of the relevant free movement provision; hence, EU citizenship rights may only be invoked where free movement rights are not applicable.

Interestingly enough, as the AG points out in his opinion, the facts of this case could also be framed as a restriction to freedom of establishment. In any event, the CJEU has yet to address sport rules which concern non-discrimination on the basis of freedom of establishment or EU citizenship.

So how should the CJEU address this issue? Freedom of establishment or EU citizenship rights?

4.     Analysing AG Tanchev’s Opinion: Freedom of Establishment or EU Citizenship Rights?

4.1.Scope of the Freedom of Establishment

Very early on in the opinion, AG Tanchev unambiguously expresses his preference for analysing the present case through a free movement lens.[4] He explains that Mr. Biffi is self-employed as a personal trainer and coach on a continuous and stable manner in Germany which amounts to an economic activity connected to his sporting pursuits.[5] Therefore, AG Tanchev believes the analysis should be pursued under the freedom of establishment provisions. For this view to be endorsed, it is essential that Mr. Biffi’s economic activity is sufficiently connected to his sporting endeavours.

In this context, AG Tanchev recalls the Deliège case which concerned a Judoka, who argued that a national sport governing body’s refusal to select her for an international competition was a violation of her freedom to provide services. The Court in that case had to determine whether she was engaged in an economic activity in order for the fundamental freedom to apply. In doing so, the Court unequivocally states that simply because a sport governing body labels its athlete an amateur, it does not mean that they are automatically disengaged from economic activity, and economic activities in the context of free movement of services should not be interpreted restrictively.[6] Therefore, the Court in the Deliège case focused on the judoka’s sponsorships deals and grants to conclude that she was engaged in economic activities.[7] AG Tanchev, in examining the Deliège case’s relevance, explains that this demonstrates EU law’s flexibility in finding a link between sporting and economic activities, and that even if the DLV’s rules only have an ‘indirect impact’ on Mr. Biffi’s economic activities, it should fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment.[8]

4.2.Restriction on the Freedom of Establishment and Justifications

The opinion then goes on to find that there has been a restriction of Mr. Biffi’s freedom of establishment because the DLV rule puts Mr. Biffi ‘at a disadvantage when compared with German nationals engaged in the provision of athletic training services’ because he is unable ‘to make reference to his achievements in national sporting championships in order to attract business.’ Furthermore, he states that consumers are ‘more likely to be drawn to an athletics coach advertising on-going excellence … in the national athletics championships.’[9] Given that the DLV rule is directly discriminatory, EU law only allows justification under the express derogations enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The DLV would have had a larger window to defend their rules if they were indirectly discriminatory since the CJEU accepts both express derogations and justifications which have been developed by its own case law.

AG Tanchev readily finds that the DLV’s rules fall under the public policy derogation by aiming to ensure that the winner of the national title has a ‘sufficiently strong link’ with the country organising the championship and to ensure that the national selection of athletes for international competitions is not disrupted. It could be argued that these aims have been too easily advanced as public policy objectives. The CJEU has never accepted the former as a derogation or a justification, and concerning the latter, the CJEU has accepted objectives which ensure national representation in international competitions only as justifications. Since justifications developed by the CJEU generally are not applicable to cases of direct discrimination, such as the present case, it can be said that the opinion perhaps too quickly embraces these pursued aims as public policy objectives. This being said, sport already enjoyed a special treatment in the past as the CJEU has been open to consider justifications for directly discriminatory measures in the Bosman case.

4.3.Is the DLV’s measure proportionate?

Assuming that these aims are accepted as express derogations, the DLV measures must then pass proportionality requirements which in EU law require a measure to be suitable for the pursued aim and necessary to achieve those aims. In the sporting context, the CJEU has explained that in order for a sporting rule to be proportionate it must be limited to its proper objective and it must be inherent to the organization of the sport event.[10] AG Tanchev affirms that the measure is disproportionate because the rule disallows Mr. Biffi from competing for the national title and precludes classification in such a competition when for many years he had been allowed to compete and be classified as any other German athlete.[11] Furthermore, given he had this pre-existing right, the DLV’s failure to take any transitional measures or give sufficient notice of this change violates the legitimate expectations of Mr. Biffi who exercised his free movement in reliance of this established regime and infringes the general principle of acquired rights.[12] Thus, it can be inferred that in AG Tanchev’s view, the measure could have been proportionate had there been sufficient transitional measures in place. Such a broad interpretation of proportionality by including the non-national's right to compete for the national title, would greatly restrict the options of a sport governing body wanting to change a rule that could negatively affect the participation of non-nationals in their national competitions.

If this broad approach is not accepted, AG Tanchev contends the measure is still disproportionate since the DLV’s rules potentially exclude non-national participants from competing at all in the national championships. Such a measure could only be legitimate in ‘unusual circumstances.’ In this vein, the opinion suggests less restrictive rules which instead limit the number of non-classified athletes.[13]

Other alternative models have been suggested which are much more likely to pass the proportionality test. One commentator has suggested that non-nationals should be allowed to compete in national championships while perhaps only restricting their ability to actually win the title.[14] If applied to this case, this model would allow Mr. Biffi to participate with classification in the national championships, but if he (or other non-national) were to take the first place, the national title would be given to the highest classified German athlete in the competition. Another model put forward in a recent study suggests that a non-national can only compete in the national championship after having been resident or being member of a local club for a certain period of time. All of these suggestions show that there are a multitude of less restrictive ways to protect the organisation of national championships and the selection process of national athletes for international competitions. An outright ban on participation or only allowing participation outside of classification is remarkably restrictive and has very little chance of passing the necessity requirements under proportionality.

Overall, the argument that this case should be analysed from the freedom of establishment perspective is rather convincing because the economic dimension is clearly present. However, there is still a possibility that the CJEU will follow the line of arguments brought by the applicants based on EU citizenship rights addressed at the end of AG Tanchev’s opinion.

4.4.EU Citizenship Rights

AG Tanchev begins by explaining that even if non-discrimination on the basis of nationality deriving from EU citizenship are applied, the result of the case should be the same because the stated aims of the DLV simply do not meet the proportionality requirements.[15]  However, the opinion goes on to firmly oppose the application of EU citizenship rights in this context.

In its submissions, the Commission had strongly endorsed a view that access to leisure activities should always fall within the scope of EU citizenship rights. AG Tanchev disagrees with such a wide-ranging interpretation because it would be a huge ‘constitutional step’ to give Article 21 TFEU horizontal direct effect, meaning a private party could invoke this provision in a national court against another private party. He maintains that this provision is meant to only have vertical direct effect, where a private party may invoke this provision in a national court against the state. He explains that extending horizontal direct effect to this rather open-ended provision would have a capricious effect that would damage legal certainty because Article 21 TFEU ‘comes into play in the broad and unpredictable range of circumstances’ where applicants are ‘unable to show a link between what is in issue and economic activities’ or ‘fall outside of EU legislation concerning freedom of movement.’[16] On the other hand, one could argue the very purpose of this Article is to provide EU citizens with other means to dispute measures which harm their free movement, and such a restricted interpretation would damage l’effet utile of this provision.   

While it is probably the case that Mr. Biffi’s circumstances fall within the scope of his free movement rights, imagine if he did not have any economic interest, and instead of a coach and personal trainer, he was an accountant or car mechanic. If AG Tanchev’s approach were to be taken in such a case, Mr. Biffi would have absolutely no recourse under EU law to challenge such a discriminatory rule. If Article 18 and 21 TFEU were to be interpreted so restrictively, private monopolistic actors who exercise powers that resemble those of a state (such as many sport governing bodies) could make the exercise of the European citizenship less attractive by limiting the participation of non-nationals in certain leisure activities. The Commission is right in taking a broad approach on this issue, although in the end it found the DLV’s rule to be proportionate, especially since Article 18 and 21 TFEU makes no express reservations against the applicability of these provisions on private parties.[17] A wide interpretation would completely fit the ‘conditional autonomy’ model in which sport rules fall within the scope of EU law, and it is for the sport governing bodies to explain how and why the rule is necessary or ‘inherent’ to the conduct of sports.

5.     Conclusion

If the CJEU finds this case to fall under the scope of the freedom of establishment, it is likely the DLV’s rules will fail to be justified or crumble under the proportionality requirements. Likewise, the outcome is likely to be the same in the improbable case that EU citizenship rights are applied. However, it truly would be a ‘constitutional step’, as AG Tanchev asserted, by greatly widening the possibility of using EU citizenship rights to challenge nationality discrimination in even amateur and leisure sport. Moreover, solidifying horizontal direct effect of the EU citizenship rights would have an impact way beyond sport related cases.

Regardless, even if Mr. Biffi’s case is examined from the freedom of establishment, it will be a momentous occasion for the CJEU to further elucidate the boundaries of the application of EU law to sport. In this respect, AG Tanchev’s opinion provides an excellent analysis of the legal issues arising from the free movement perspective and picks up on the most evident detail that all the parties in the case seemed to have glanced over: Mr. Biffi has an economic interest which is tied to his sporting activities. In the long run, the application of EU citizenship rights to sports seems inevitable, but TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi most likely does not provide the CJEU with a golden opportunity to express itself on this matter.

[1] T.M.C. Asser Institute Report, ‘Study on the Equal Treatment of Non-Nationals in Individual Sports Competitions’ (2010).

[2] Case 36-74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1974 –01405; Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.

[3] Stephen Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (1^st edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 71.

[4] Case C-22/18 TopFit e.V. Daniele Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:181, Opinion of AG Tanchev, para 48.

[5] ibid para 55.

[6] Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo [2000] ECR I-02549 para 46.

[7] ibid paras 51-53.

[8] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) para 62.

[9] ibid para 70.

[10] Walrave (n 2) para 9; Deliège (n 6) para 64.

[11] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) paras 80, 88.

[12] ibid para 83.

[13] ibid paras 92-93.

[14] Weatherill (n 3) 203.

[15] TopFit, Opinion of AG Tanchev (n 4) para 97.

[16] ibid para 103.

[17] ibid paras 37-40.

On 8 August, U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken ruled in favour of former UCLA basketball player O'Bannon and 19 others, declaring that NCAA's longstanding refusal to compensate athletes for the use of their name, image and likenesses (NILs) violates US antitrust laws. In particular, the long-held amateurism justification promoted by the NCAA was deemed unconvincing.

On 14 November, the NCAA has appealed the judgment, claiming that federal judge erred in law by not applying a 1984 Supreme Court ruling. One week later, the NCAA received support from leading antitrust professors who are challenging the Judge Wilken’s reasoning in an amicus curiae. They are concerned that the judgment may jeopardize the proper regulation of college athletics. The professors argued that if Wilken’s judgment is upheld, it

“would substantially expand the power of the federal courts to alter organizational rules that serve important social and academic interests…This approach expands the ‘less restrictive alternative prong’ of the antitrust rule of reason well beyond any appropriate boundaries and would install the judiciary as a regulatory agency for collegiate athletics”.   

Background 

The plaintiff, Edward O’Bannon, competed for the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) during the 1991-1995 seasons. In the 1994-95 season, O’Bannon was elected MVP of the UCLA national championship basketball team and also received the John R. Wooden award as the nation’s most outstanding men’s basketball player.  

In 2009, O’Bannon saw his likeness in a video game authorized by the NCAA for which he provided no consent and received no compensation. In July 2009, he filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of current and former NCAA student-athletes against the NCAA, alleging that college football and men's basketball players should be allowed to sell their NIL to the NCAA.

The defendant, the NCAA, is an unincorporated organization consisting of colleges, universities, and conferences. The NCAA rules impose strict limits on the amount of compensation that cannot exceed the value of a full “grant-in-aid” consisting of tuition and fees, room and board and required books.[1] As such, the NCAA prohibits current student-athletes from receiving any compensation from their schools for the use of their NIL, suggesting that the whole college sport relies upon “amateurism”. To participate in NCAA athletics, however, the NCAA requires each student-athlete to sign Student-Athlete Statement (Form 08-3a), which grants the NCAA the right to use the athlete’s NIL to “promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”  

Arguments of the parties

Plaintiff  

O’Bannon’s complaint alleged that the NCAA’s college sports amateurism rules harmed student-athletes as it constituted a price-fixing agreement among FBS football and Division I basketball schools. Under antitrust law[1], O’Bannon asserted that the violation unreasonably restrains trade in the market by foreclosing current and former NCAA men’s basketball and Division I-A football (FBS) players from receiving compensation for the use of NIL. The NCAA accomplishes this unreasonable restraint of trade in part by requiring all student-athletes to sign Form 08-3a. Mr O’Bannon asserts that the Form 08-3a is used by the NCAA to mislead and compel uninformed student-athletes to forfeit their rights not to be compensated for their NIL.  

Claimant

 The NCAA put forth a number of procompetitive justifications for amateurism:

• compensating athletes would negatively impact competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams;  

• paying players would adversely affect the integration of academics and athletics on campuses. In practice, athletes would spend more time doing sports than studying;

• restricting compensation increases output of its product and if lifted, schools might disregard Division I;

• preservation of amateurism is essential to its core identity, as it protect the popularity of sport. The claimant cites the example of the Olympics, which are deemed popular because athletes are not compensated.  

The decision 

On 8 August 2014, the Court found that the NCAA is a cartel that exercises market power, fixes prices, and restrains competition. The NCAA, therefore, must allow schools to redistribute to athletes some of the money it generates by licensing an athlete’s name, image and likeness to companies. In her injunction, Judge Wilken issued that the NCAA is restrained from prohibiting an athlete from getting deferred compensation of $5,000 or less per student-athlete per year. The money is to be paid in a trust fund that could be tapped after college. Furthermore, the NCAA cannot cap the value of a scholarship below the full cost of attending college (which is few thousands more than the current scholarship).[2]

The Court rejected each of the NCAA’s pro-competitive justifications to defend amateurism. Wilken ruled that the NCAA failed to consistently adhere to a single definition of amateurism. In short, Judge Wilken put the longstanding model of amateurism (the core principle of college sport since 1906) at risk in a few sentences: 

“The historical record that the NCAA cites as evidence of its longstanding commitment to amateurism is unpersuasive. This record reveals that the NCAA has revised its rules governing student-athlete compensation numerous times over the years, sometimes in significant and contradictory ways. Rather than evincing the association’s adherence to a set of core principles, this history documents how malleable the NCAA’s definition of amateurism has been since its founding.” 

Additionally, the Court also held that people would not stop watching college sports if players are paid.[3] The fans care about watching football, but not whether athletes are paid or not.

Analysis 

This ruling is a “game-changer” because the Court jeopardizes the long-standing fundamental principle of amateurism on which the whole economic and social system of the NCAA lies. Wilken had no use for the amateurism defence to justify the restraints on paying players. It is particularly ironic that the NCAA seems to be a victim of its own success. No one would have imagined at the time when the NCAA came to existence in 1906, that college sport would grow into such a big business.

Ironically, again, the NCAA was also a victim of its own witness. Daniel Rubinfeld, a prominent antitrust expert, claimed that NCAA operates as a “joint venture which imposes restraints” on trade. This confession is definitely reflected in the Court’s subsequent finding, suggesting that Mr Rubinfeld never denied that the NCAA restricts competition among its members for recruitment.[4] To make matters even more complicated, Mr Rubinfeld had called the NCAA a “cartel” in a prior microeconomics textbook: “The NCAA restricts competition in a number of important ways. To reduce bargaining power by student-athletes, the NCAA creates and enforces rules regarding eligibility and terms of compensation.” Nevertheless, he still considered that the anti-competitive restraint was lawful because it serves procompetitive purposes.

Despite the appearances, however, the situation is not as bad as it looks for the NCAA. It is true that student-athletes will probably be compensated in some form or another. Nevertheless, the cap of $5000 to the compensation could have been higher and it is to be paid to a trust fund. Furthermore, the NCAA can continue preventing student-athletes from endorsing commercial products or selling their NIL rights individually, as the NCAA and its schools have the right to protect them against “commercial exploitation”. Hence, it is likely that Judge Wilken did not intend to blow up the entire NCAA’s system, but to change it gradually. From the point of view of the NCAA, it would have been way worse if the Court had issued an injunction to enter in a collective bargaining agreements with student-athletes.[5] Nevertheless, the ruling opens a space for broader pervasive changes to college athletics in the future.

Appeal 

On 14 November, the NCAA appealed the judgment. The NCAA argues that a federal judge erred in law by not applying a 1984 Supreme Court ruling that the NCAA believes protects amateurism in college sports. The Supreme Court held that “athletes must not be paid” in order to preserve the character and quality of the product. Furthermore, the NCAA argued that other lower district courts have upheld the 1984 ruling.

In support of the NCAA’s appeal, fifteen antitrust-law professors filed an amicus brief. They argue that U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken “misapplied” the “less restrictive alternative prong” of the rule of reason when she found that the NCAA violated antitrust law. The professors added that precedents show that the Court overstepped its bounds. Furthermore, allowing antitrust courts to “impose their own views” could leave other organizations open to suit. They also argued that following Judge Wilkin’s reasoning in the O’Bannon case, a court could even “require compensation for Little League baseball players” at whatever level that seems ‘fair’ by a district judge.

What’s next? 

If the NCAA loses the appeal, the injunction will take effect the next recruiting cycle; it will affect athletes entering school after 1 July 2016. In such scenario, the ruling will open more space for competition between the schools, in the form of the design of compensation packages. It seems that the volcano did not erupt yet. However, the volcano might finally and irremediably erupt if the next legal battle against the NCAA is successful: the Jeffrey Kessler case. He seeks to remove all scholarship limitations imposed by the NCAA and not only be tied to the NIL.  Kessler aims to introduce a free market in college sport with players receiving salaries in addition to scholarships. In short, he wants to turn recruits into free agents.  An outcome in his favour would change US College Sport forever. I will keep you posted!

[1] O’Bannon v  NCAA, No. 09-3329  CW, at 19  (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014)

[2] Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A.  §1 (2011): “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”

[3] Cost of Attendance at Buffalo, for example, is $36,483 while Athletic Scholarship is $33,566. See http://www.ubbullrun.com/2014/6/25/5840110/full-cost-of-attendance-scholarships-what-does-it-mean-at-buffalo

[4] O’Bannon v NCAA, at 28-30.

[5] O’Bannon v NCAA, at 22.

[6] For example, in NBA collective bargaining agreement is the contract between the NBA (the commissioner and the 30 team owners) and the NBA Players Association that dictates the rules of player contracts, trades, revenue distribution, the NBA Draft, and the salary cap, among other things.

The Headlines

CAS Decision on Manchester City FC Case

After the UEFA’s Adjudicatory Chamber of the Club Financial Control’s (CFCB) decision earlier this year to ban Manchester City FC for two seasons, observers waited impatiently to see the outcome of this high profile dispute. The CFCB’s decision had found that Manchester City FC overstated sponsorship revenues and in its break-even information given to UEFA. While some feared this showdown could lead to the demise of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, the now publicized CAS panel’s decision is more nuanced. The panel’s decision turned on (see analysis here and here) (a) whether the ‘Leaked Emails’ were authentic and could be admissible evidence, (b) whether the ‘CFCB breached its obligations of due process’, (c) whether the conclusions of the 2014 Settlement Agreement prevents the CFCB from charging Manchester City FC, (d) whether the charges are time-barred, (e) the applicable standard of proof, (f) whether Manchester City FC masked equity funding as sponsorship contributions, and (g) whether Manchester City FC failed to cooperate with CFCB. In the end, among other findings, the Panel held that some of the alleged breaches were time-barred but maintained that Manchester City FC had failed to cooperate with CFCB’s investigation. In light of this, the Panel significantly reduced the sanction placed on Manchester City FC by removing the two-season suspension and reducing the sanction from 30 million euros to 10 million euros.

Qatar Labour Law Reforms Effectively Abolishes the Kafala System

Just a few days after Human Rights Watch released a lengthy report on abusive practices suffered by migrant workers in Qatar, Qatar adopted a series of laws that effectively gets rid of the Kafala system by no longer requiring migrant workers to obtain a ‘No Objection Certificate’ from their employer in order to start another job. The International Labour Organization declared that this development along with the elimination of the ‘exit permit requirements’ from earlier this year means that the kafala system has been effectively abolished. In addition to these changes, Qatar has also adopted a minimum wage that covers all workers and requires that employers who do not provide food or housing at least give a minimum allowance for both of these living costs. Lastly, the new laws better define the procedure for the termination of employment contracts.

In reaction to these changes, Amnesty International welcomed the reforms and called for them to be ‘swiftly and properly implemented’. Indeed, while these amendments to Qatar’s labour laws are a step in the right direction, Amnesty International also cautions that the minimum wage may still be too low, and in order to be effective, these new laws will have to be followed with ‘strong inspection and complaint mechanisms’.

CAS Decision Concerning Keramuddin Karim Abuse Case

In June of last year, Keramuddin Karim, former president of Afghanistan’s soccer federation, was banned by FIFA for life (see the decision of the adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee) after reports of sexual and physical abuse that emerged in late 2018. Following a lengthy and tumultuous investigation in Afghanistan, Afghan officials came forward with an arrest warrant for Mr. Karim. Nevertheless, despite attempts to apprehend Mr. Karim, Mr. Karim has still avoided arrest over a year later. Most recently in August, Afghan Special Operation officers attempted to apprehend him but he was not at the residence when they arrived.

Meanwhile, Mr. Karim had appealed FIFA’s lifetime ban to the CAS and the CAS Panel’s decision has recently been released. In its decision, the Panel upheld both the lifetime ban and the 1,000,000 CHF fine, finding that due to the particular egregious nature of Karim’s acts, ‘they warrant the most severe sanction possible available under the FCE’. Since both Karim and his witnesses were unable to be heard, the case raises questions connected to the respect of fundamental procedural rights at the CAS. 

Major International Sports Law Decisions

• CAS - CAS 2020/A/6785 Machester City FC v. UEFA
• CAS – CAS 2019/A/6388 Karim Keramuddin v. FIFA
• CAS - CAS 2018/A/6075 Igor Labuts v. Football Association of Ireland
• CAS - CAS 2018/A/5725 Santos Futebol Clube v. FC Barcelona, Neymar da Silva Santos Junior, Neymar da Silva Santos, Neymar Sport e Marketing s/s Limitada and FIFA & CAS 2018/A/5726 Neymar da Silva Santos Junior v. Santos Futebol Clube & FIFA
• CAS - CAS 2018/O/5830 International Surfing Association v. International Canoe Federation

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

• CAS – CAS Bulletin 2020/01
• CAS - CAS issues its decision in the appeal filed by Trabzonspor A.S. against UEFA
• CAS - CAS confirms the life ban imposed on Keramuddin Karim
• CAS - Decision in the arbitration procedure between Manchester City FC & UEFA
• CAS - CAS annuls the seven-point deduction imposed on PAOK FC and refers the matter back to the Hellenic Football Federation Appeals Committee for adjudication
• CAS - Amendments to the Rules of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Spanish becomes the 3rd official language for CAS arbitrations
• CAS - CAS arbitration Manchester City FC v. UEFA: the hearing has concluded / decision to be issued in July
• CAS - CAS registers the appeals filed by Andrea Iannone and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) against the FIM International Disciplinary Court decision of 31 March 2020
• CAS – The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Decides that the International Surfing Association shall be the International Federation Governing and Administrating the Sport of Stand-Up Paddleboard at Olympic Level
• CAS - The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Finds Ibai Salas Zorrozua Guilty of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation; Imposes Four-Year Period of Ineligibility
• CAS - The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Dismisses the Appeal Filed by the UAE Football Association

FIFA

• FIFA – FIFA Statement
• FIFA - Bureau of the FIFA Council approves FIFA COVID-19 Relief Plan regulations
• FIFA – Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players – June 2020 Edition
• FIFA – FIFA greatly welcomes Brazilian court’s decision rejecting Spuni lawsuit
• FIFA - FIFA welcomes CAS decision in the case of former president of Afghan Football Federation Keramuudin Karim
• FIFA - Five-substitute option extended into 2021 in response to COVID-19 pandemic
• FIFA - Relive the Football Law Annual Review 2019 conference
• FIFA - Adjudicatory chamber of the independent Ethics Committee sanctions Markus Kattner
• FIFA – Decision of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee – Arsenal Football Club
• FIFA - Decision of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee – Markus Kattner
• FIFA - FIFA acknowledges WTO panel report
• FIFA - FIFA provides further guidance on COVID-19 football regulatory issues
• FIFA - Further changes to the international match calendars due to the COVID-19 pandemic unanimously approved by the Bureau of the Council
• FIFA - Statement from the chairperson of the investigatory chamber of the independent Ethics Committee
• FIFA - Independent Ethics Committee extends provisional ban on Yves Jean-Bart and sanctions other Haitian football officials
• FIFA - Bureau of the FIFA Council temporarily adapts rules on release of players for September 2020 window due to COVID-19
• FIFA - FIFA publishes first reports for Disciplinary & Ethics Committees and on anti-doping activities
• FIFA - Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players – August 2020 Edition
• FIFA - FIFA insists Trinidad and Tobago dispute has to be resolved at CAS
• FIFA - FIFA publishes first reports for Disciplinary & Ethics Committees and on anti-doping activities

IOC

• IOC – International Olympic Committee Publishes 2019 Annual Report and Financial Statements
• IOC - Candidatures for IOC Vice Presidency And Executive Board
• IOC - UN General Assembly Confirms New Dates for the Observation Period of the Olympic Truce
• IOC – IOC Executive Board makes Decisions with Regard to International Weightlifting Federation

UEFA

• UEFA - UEFA statement on CAS Manchester City decision
• UEFA - Temporary emergency measures for Financial Fair Play
• UEFA - FFP update on the 2019/20 monitoring of clubs by the CFCB

WADA

• WADA – Strategic Plan 2015-2019
• WADA - WADA publishes its Five-Year Strategic Plan under the theme ‘Leading Anti-Doping in a New Era’
• WADA - WADA responds in detail to ONDCP Report regarding Agency’s funding
• WADA - WADA publishes final designed version of Athletes’ Anti-Doping Rights Act
• WADA - WADA publishes final versions of 2021 World Anti-Doping Code and International Standards in English and French
• WADA - WADA update on its follow-up of McLaren investigation into the International Weightlifting Federation
• WADA - WADA delays call for proposals for 2021 Social Science Research Grant Program to October
• WADA - WADA statement on investigation into the International Weightlifting Federation
• WADA - WADA suspends accreditation of New Delhi Laboratory for another period of up to six months
• WADA - WADA Compliance Review Committee update
• WADA - WADA statement on the dismissal of RUSADA’s Director General

• Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) - Third Review Of International Federation Governance
• Athleten Deutschland - Mehr Teilhabe bei der Planung der Olympischen Spiele in Tokio 2021
• Athleten Deutschland - Stellungnahme zur Überprüfung von Regel 50 der Olympischen Charta
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) - FEI Tribunal issues Final Decision in human anti-doping case
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) - CAS rules on appeal against horse abuse sanctions
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) – Court of Arbitration for Sport issues Decision on equine anti-doping appeal
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) – FEI Tribunal hands down record sanction in horse abuse case
• Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) - FEI Tribunal dismisses athlete appeals on Villeneuve-Loubet decision
• Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) - FIG makes significant progress towards the highest standards of good governance
• Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) - Antidoping - A Brazilian athlete sanctioned
• FIBA – FIBA Executive Committee condemns all forms of racism in open letter from President
• FINA - FINA allocates US$ 6.4 million in a COVID-19 support plan
• International Biathlon Union - The IBU joins UN climate action initiative for sports
• International Fencing Federation (FIE) - FIE Announces 2020 Global support Plan for World Fencing Family
• International Judo Federation - The Judo Family Stands up Against Racism
• International Paralympic Committee - IPC Anti-Doping Code revised
• International Shooting Sport Federation - The ISSF significantly improves its position on Governance
• International Tennis Federation – ITF Announces Further Measures to Support Stakeholders
• International Tennis Federation – ITF Welcomes Publication of ASOIF Governance Review
• International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) – ITTF united against racism and all forms of discrimination
• International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) - ITTF delivers on promise to improve its Governance
• International Weightlifting Federation - McLaren Findings And IOC Support Driving Reform Process At International Weightlifting Federation
• SportIreland - Anti-Doping Rule Violation - Issued on behalf of Swim Ireland and Sport Ireland
• Tennis Integrity Unit – Tunisian Tennis Player Majed Kilani Banned For Seven Years And Fined $7,000 After Conviction On Match-Fixing And Associated Corruption Charges
• UCI - The UCI strengthens the health protocol for procedures to be followed with the reopening of the 2020 season of road cycling competitions
• UCI - The UCI publishes its 2019 Annual Report
• UCI - ASOIF ranks the UCI among top International Federations for its good governance
• UCI - Decision of the UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal regarding Kanstantsin Siutsou
• World Archery – World Archery Improves in International Federation Good Governance Report
• World Athletics – World Athletics Council resolves to expel RusAF if payments not received by 15 August
• World Athletics - Statement on Russian Federation
• World Athletics - ASOIF governance review recognises significant progress in World Athletics reform agenda
• World Para Powerlifting - Para powerlifter Johannes Hernandez given 15-month ban
• World Rowing - ASOIF Governance review highlights key accomplishments for FISA
• World Rugby - Rugby unified in solidarity against racism
• World Sailing – Third Review of IF Governance reveals significant progress, challenges remain
•  World Sailing - World Sailing confirms International Olympic Committee financial support
• World Taekwondo – World Taekwondo improves position in ASOIF’s IF Governance Review

International/national Organizations

• Belgische Mededingingsautoriteit - Het Mededingingscollege heeft geweigerd voorlopige maatregelen op te leggen zoals gevraagd door Royal Excelsior Virton
• International Labour Organization - Dismantling the kafala system and introducing a minimum wage mark new era for Qatar labour market 

Civil Society Organizations/Unions

• Amnesty International UK  - Qatar: 100 World Cup stadium workers not paid for up to seven months
• Centre for Sport and Human Rights – 2019 Sporting Chance Forum – Meeting Report
• EU Athletes - Covid-19 impact on players and their player associations
• FIFPro – Playing Our Part: Footballers During the Covid-19 Pandemic
• FIFPro - Afghanistan Women's National Team Sexual Abuse: Statement
• FIFPro – FIFPro and ECA Develop Guidelines on Player Health Protection
• Global Athlete – Athlete Groups Call On World Anti-Doping Agency To Implement Stronger Reforms
• Global Athlete – Global Athlete Statement On Olympic Charter Rule 50
• Global Athlete – Sport, Politics, Protest … And The Olympics
• Global Athlete – Global Athlete Calls On The International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) To Implement Independent Athlete Oversight As A Result Of The McLaren Independent Investigation
• Global Athlete – Athlete Groups Cal on World Anti-Doping Agency to Implement Stronger Reforms
• Human Rights Watch - “I Was Hit So Many Times I Can’t Count”: Abuse of Child Athletes in Japan
• Rapid Transition Alliance - Report: Playing Against The Clock: Global sport, the climate emergency and the case for rapid change
• UNI Global Union - Sport & Rights Alliance: IOC Should Uphold Human Rights

In the News

Football

• David Conn - Manchester City decision does not mean end of financial fair play
• David Conn - Der Spiegel claims new Manchester City emails cast doubt on Cas verdict
• Tariq Panja - Secret Contracts Held a Surprise for Fiorentina’s New Owners
• Graham Dunbar - Swiss attorney general offers to resign in FIFA case fallout
• Graham Dunbar - FIFA bans former finance director Kattner for 10 years
• Graham Dunbar - FIFA has 13 ongoing investigations, plus 62 other cases
• Graham Dunbar - Banned for life by FIFA, soccer officials line up to appeal
• Graham Dunbar - Fresh Swiss investigation targets ex-FIFA president Blatter
• Graham Dunbar - IOC to open talks about easing protest ban at Olympics
• Graham Dunbar - Slovak club fights UEFA at CAS over Champions League forfeit
• Sean Ingle - Saudi TV piracy ruling puts Newcastle takeover under renewed scrutiny
• John Leicester - Former IAAF president turns on son at corruption trial
• Matt Slater and Sam Lee - Man City v UEFA: The full 93-page CAS judgment explained
• Guillem Balague - Lionel Messi hands in Barcelona transfer request
• Associated Press - Platini quizzed in Swiss investigation of $2M FIFA payment

Doping

• Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber - Russian anti-doping chief rejects social media corruption allegation
• James Ellingworth - Investigation finds doping cover-ups in weightlifting
• Andy Brown - RusAF Restoration Commission meeting postponed

Other

• Dave Zirin and Jules Boykoff – Athletes Are Fighting the Olympic Ban on Protests
• Jules Boykoff and Dave Zirin - Op-Ed: Tokyo’s 2020 Olympics are showing the nightmare waiting for L.A. in 2028
• Dave Zirin and Jules Boykoff - Racist IOC President Avery Brundage Loses His Place of Honor
• Dave Zirin and Jules Boykoff - Should the World Boycott the 2022 Beijing Olympics?
• Philip Barker - CANOC President calls for IOC to rescind life bans issued to athletes 48 years after podium protests
• Bill Donahue - The Price of Gold
• Peter Olusoga and David Olusoga - From Muhammad Ali to Colin Kaepernick, the proud history of black protest in sport
• Neil Shefferd - Athletes Germany welcomes plan to review Rule 50 of Olympic Charter
• Liam Morgan - IOA vice-president slams IOC and FIH for refusing to take action against Batra
• Clément Guillou - Le Tribunal arbitral du sport, arbitre controversé
• Clément Guillou - Au Tribunal arbitral du sport, un petit nombre d’arbitres trustent les nominations
• Ben Bloom - Athletes taking a knee at Tokyo 2021 Olympics and Paralympics face bans
• Michael Pavitt - IOC "fully respects" athlete statements as USOPC pledges to hold forum amid protests
• Michael Pavitt - World Uyghur Congress lodges complaint to IOC over Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics
• David Wharton - L.A. Olympic officials ask IOC to allow athlete protests
• Gillian R. Brassil and Jeré Longman - Who Should Compete in Women’s Sports? There Are ‘Two Almost Irreconcilable Positions’
• Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Fahim Abed - Afghan Soccer Official, Charged With Sexual Abuse, Evades Arrest
• Marc Stein - Led by N.B.A., Boycotts Disrupt Pro Sports in Wake of Blake Shooting

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

• Borja Garcia-Garcia, Mark James, Dionne Koller, Johan Lindholm, Despina Mavromati, Richard Parrish and Ryan Rodenberg - The impact of Covid-19 on sports: a mid-way assessment
• Jan Exner - Fixed sanction frameworks in the World Anti-Doping Codes 2015 and 2021: Can hearing panels go below the limits in the pursuit of proportionate punishments?
• Artur Flamínio da Silva and Daniela Mirante - Mandatory arbitration as a possible future for sports arbitration: the Portuguese example
• Jan Łukomski - On the finalisation of international football transfers and professional football players’ contracts
• Björn Hessert - Cooperation and reporting obligations in sports investigations
• Jacob Kornbeck - What can sports governing bodies do to comply with EU antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity?
• Cedrick Aghey - Integration of eSports in the structure of Ifs: disruption or continuity?
• Shaun Star and Sarah Kelly - A level playing field in anti-doping disputes? The need to scrutinize procedural fairness at first instance hearings

Tilburg Law Review

• Antoine Duval and Daniela Heerdt - FIFA and Human Rights – a Research Agenda
• Wojciech Lewandowski - The Implications of the Recent Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union for the Protection of the Fundamental Rights of Athletes and the Regulatory Autonomy of Sporting Federations
• Bodo P. Bützler and Lisa Schöddert - Constitutionalizing FIFA: Promises and Challenges
• Raquel Regueiro - Shared Responsibility and Human Rights Abuse: The 2022 World Cup in Qatar
• Michele Krech - Towards Equal Rights in the Global Game? FIFA's Strategy for Women’s Football as a Tightly Bounded Institutional Innovation

Other

• Dikaia Chatziefstathiou, Borja García and Benoit Séguin (eds) - Routledge Handbook of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
• Johan Lindholm and Richard Parrish - Horizontal direct effect of Union citizenship and the evolving sporting exception: TopFit

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Marjolaine Viret - Anti-Doping in Times of COVID-19: A Difficult Balancing Exercise for WADA

Law in Sport

• Benoît Keane and Ben Foster – Sport and competition law – the year in review 2019/20
• David Menz and Maximilian Wegge - Political protest in football – is it time for a (legal) debate? Analysing FIFA’s regulations and recent actions in the Bundesliga
• John Mehrzad QC and Joseph Bryan - Can sports clubs compel players to return to play and waive health and safety liability?
• Jack Anderson - Sports governance - the year in review 2019/20
• Lindsay S. Brandon and Howard Jacobs - Lawson v. IAAF: a view from the perspective of athletes' counsel
• Michiel Fierens and Jan De Bruyne - Artificial intelligence in sports – the legal and ethical issues at play

Play the Game

• Mary Hums, Eli A Wolff and Nina Siegfried - Making a case for athlete advocacy: Humanitarians, Olympism and good governance
• Jens Sejer Andersen - The man who blew the whistle on his own corruption
• Faraz Shahlaei – Athletes’ gestures are protected by international human rights law
• Nikki Dryden - Athletes should not be gagged in exchange for Olympic dream

Sport and EU Blog

• Joanna Harper - Right to compete: Transgender women
• Dhananjay Dhonchak - Football Player Contracts in times of Covid-19
• Maximilian Seltmann - Covid-19: Amplifying the Voice of Athletes

Sport Integrity Initiative

• Andy Brown - RUSADA completes analysis of ROC & RPC audit
• Andy Brown - FIDAL doctors & official acquitted of responsibility in Schwazer case
• Andy Brown - Leading Russian athletes consider changing citizenship
• Andy Brown - ‘Whereabouts’ & ‘Tampering’ charges snare another athlete
• Andy Brown - US may withhold WADA funding due to failure to reform
• Andy Brown - CAS annuls FAI’s ban on Latvian player for match-fixing
• Andy Brown - Peruvian swimmer sanctioned with eight year ban for second offence
• Kuo Zhao - Are you allowed to be heard? How the Sun Yang case reveals the systematic prejudice against athletes in sport arbitration

SportLegis

• Despina Mavromati - A. v. IFAF, USA Football, Football Canada et al. – Election dispute – Ultra Petita
• Despina Mavromati - Appeal against the CAS award of June 8, 2018 by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS 2017/A/5301 and CAS 2017/A/5302)
• Despina Mavromati - Judgment 4A_662/2018 of May 14, 2019 FC A. v. FC B. Request for revision of the CAS Award 2015/O/4502

Other

• Andrew Boyce - Aggrieved football clubs turn to EU antitrust law after Covid-19 stops play
• Nii Anteson – Reconsidering Rule 50
• Richard Martin and Ihar Nekrashevich - Covid-19 And Anti-Doping Testing: Is Virtual Testing the Answer and the Future?
• Andrea Cattaneo - Financing sport after Brexit: challenges lie ahead
• Human Rights Defender – Special Issue: The Human Rights of Athletes

Podcasts

• International Network of Doping Research – Interview with Howard Jacobs
• BBC - Is the party over for the Olympics?
• LawInSport - Brent Nowicki, Head of the CAS Anti-Doping Division - E92
• LawInSport - How sports diplomacy can help the sport sector respond to COVID19 crisis - Dr J Simon Rofe E91

Upcoming Events

• 17-18 September 2020 - Understand The Rules Of The Game 2020 - LawInSport Annual Conference
• 24 September 2020– Women In Sports Law 4^th Annual Online Conference
• 17-18 June 2021 – Sport & EU 2020 Annual Conference, Rijeka and Opatija, Croatia

On March 27, 2014, a Brazilian court ruling authorized the Football Players’ Union in the State of Sao Paulo[1] to tap funds generated by TV rights agreements destined to a Brazilian Club, Comercial Futebol Clube (hereinafter “Comercial”). The Court came to this decision after Comercial did not comply with its obligation  to pay players’ salaries. It is a peculiar decision when taking into account the global problem of clubs overspending and not complying with their financial obligations.  Furthermore, it could create a precedent for future cases regarding default by professional sporting clubs.

In 2013, 19 players were victims of financial mismanagement of the football club based in Ribeirao Preto. This year, with the problem still unresolved, the 19 players once again were facing financial distress. The total sum that Comercial still owed players, which consisted of overdue salaries, social security contributions and severance pay after contract expiration, amounted to R$ 363,147.71, or €120,000.00. By means of meeting the player’s demands, Comercial had issued unredeemed cheques in order to pay part of the salaries of the Players before this year’s carnival. To receive the salaries Comercial owed, the Players’ Union filed a complaint against Comercial in front of the Labour Court of Ribeirao Preto, representing eight players who are members of the Union. It asked, inter alia, for a provisional measure that would freeze  the amount that Comercial would receive from the Football Federation of Sao Paulo and the Brazilian television network Rede Globo for the TV rights. Rede Globo is the biggest broadcasting company in Brazil and holds the rights to broadcast the main competitions in football, including the upcoming FIFA World Cup. For Comercial, this would mean not receiving up to €850,000.00 from the Football Federation of Sao Paulo for the TV rights agreement. The agreement included the broadcasting of the Campeonato Paulista, for which Comercial was to be paid in four instalments (January, February, March and April 2014). At the time of the request, three out of four instalments had already been paid. Therefore, the Players’ Union could only acquire the amount of the fourth instalment due in April 2014, equal to €210,000.00.

In accordance with the tradition of Roman Law, on which the Brazilian legal system was developed, the Court had identified the existence of both legal requirements in order to issue a provisional measure: fumus boni juris, i.e. that the claim has a reasonable prospect of success and periculum in mora, i.e. the danger that claimant's rights may be impaired by the lapse of time. Regarding the first requirement, the Court established (in accordance with Article 335 of Brazilian Civil Procedural Code[2]) that Comercial had issued cheques that afterwards could not be claimed by the players. As regards the second requirement, the Court took in consideration the fact that Comercial was relegated to the second division of the Sao Paulo State League[3] and that the players were dismissed.

As a consequence, the Court accepted the request of the Players’ Union, and ordered the Football Federation of Sao Paulo and Rede Globo to deposit the amount that was due to CFC on the Union’s bank account instead. Whether Comercial exerted its possibility to challenge this measure within five days is yet unknown.

This decision is, to our knowledge, a novel and efficient method (from the point of view of the players) to tackle the problem of unpaid salaries in the world of football. It has, therefore, also been welcomed by FIFPRO. The measure issued in this particular case is of limited importance, because it only applies to the eight players affiliated to the Players’ Union. However, the method used by the Union, ceasing the TV rights income directly, might prove very useful for players in similar situations worldwide, it ensures that, even in case of default of their employers, the contractual demands of the players can be satisfied.

2nd Labour Court of Ribeirao Preto SAPESP-Comercial F C (3).pdf (14.6KB)

[1] Sindicato de Atletas Profissionais do Estado de São Paulo, one of the five founding members of the Brazilian National Players’ Union (FENAPAF)

[2] that states the application of rules of common experience in absence of specific regulations

[3] Paulistão da Série A2

Editor’s note: Tomáš Grell holds an LL.M. in Public International Law from Leiden University. He contributes to the work of the ASSER International Sports Law Centre as a research intern.

Concerns about adverse human rights impacts related to FIFA's activities have intensified ever since its late 2010 decision to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cup to Russia and Qatar respectively. However, until recently, the world's governing body of football had done little to eliminate these concerns, thereby encouraging human rights advocates to exercise their critical eye on FIFA. 

In response to growing criticism, the Extraordinary FIFA Congress, held in February 2016, decided to include an explicit human rights commitment in the revised FIFA Statutes which came into force in April 2016. This commitment is encapsulated in Article 3 which reads as follows: ''FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognized human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights''. At around the same time, Professor John Ruggie, the author of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ('UN Guiding Principles') presented in his report 25 specific recommendations for FIFA on how to further embed respect for human rights across its global operations. While praising the decision to make a human rights commitment part of the organization's constituent document, Ruggie concluded that ''FIFA does not have yet adequate systems in place enabling it to know and show that it respects human rights in practice''.[1]

With the 2018 World Cup in Russia less than a year away, the time is ripe to look at whether Ruggie's statement about FIFA's inability to respect human rights still holds true today. This blog outlines the most salient human rights risks related to FIFA's activities and offers a general overview of what the world's governing body of football did over the past twelve months to mitigate these risks. Information about FIFA's human rights activities is collected primarily from its Activity Update on Human Rights published alongside FIFA's Human Rights Policy in June 2017.

The most salient human rights risks

FIFA faces human rights risks through its events, commercial subsidiaries and business partners, member associations or other parties. This section identifies sources of human rights risks that are most often associated with FIFA's activities.

Bidding and selection

Allegations of corruption have cast a shadow over FIFA's decision to organize the 2018 and 2022 World Cup in Russia and Qatar respectively.[2] If these allegations were proven to be true, it would be conceivable that financial incentives provided by the successful candidates helped them not only to secure the right to stage the tournament, but also to evade certain requirements, including those related to human rights. As Ruggie puts it, ''lack of financial integrity […] is a foundational source of human rights risks''.[3]

Moreover, in the past, countries bidding to host FIFA's tournaments have not been required to present a strategy addressing human rights risks that may arise in connection with the tournament’s organization. This allowed Qatar to win the bidding contest for the 2022 World Cup without explaining how it plans to protect migrant workers from the adverse impacts of the kafala system. Another example is Papua New Guinea that was awarded the 2016 U-20 Women's World Cup despite the country's high rate of sexual violence against women.

Construction

FIFA delegates the organization of the World Cup to the Local Organizing Committee ('LOC'), a separate legal entity created by the government and the national football association of the Host Country. The LOC is responsible, inter alia, for the delivery of World Cup-related infrastructure. In order to meet their deadlines, contractors hired by the LOC may ignore safety standards or force their employees to work overtime. Other reported practices include, for instance, appalling living and working conditions, non-payment of salaries, withholding identity documents or restrictions on the freedom of association.

In March 2017, Norwegian football magazine Josimar uncovered a series of human rights abuses faced by North Korean men working at Zenit Arena in Saint Petersburg. As recently as 14 June 2017, Human Rights Watch documented the mistreatment of construction workers at five other World Cup stadium construction sites in Russia. As the situation in Qatar has not been much better,[4] the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation filed in December 2016 a lawsuit with the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zürich, asking the court to find FIFA responsible for alleged human rights violations of migrant workers. The court dismissed the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds in January 2017 (for a detailed analysis, see our blogs here and here).

Discrimination

Article 4 of the FIFA Statutes prohibits ''discrimination of any kind against a country, private person, or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth, or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason''. In practice, FIFA must enforce this provision by taking further action to tackle issues such as anti-gay legislation in countries where its tournaments are staged, homophobic chants by fans or gender discrimination in the world of association football. 

Players' rights 

In January 2017, the international players' association FIFPro published a Global Employment Report on working conditions in men's professional football. Out of nearly 14,000 players interviewed, 41% reported having experienced delayed salary payments over the past two seasons. Players who lodge a formal complaint against their club put themselves at risk of being excluded from the squad or subjected to violence and harassment. FIFPro strongly condemned these practices and called upon FIFA to reform its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players ('RSTP') to ''provide stronger protections of players against material breaches of contracts by clubs''.[5] Another issue that merits closer attention is human trafficking in football, especially as it often involves minors.[6]

Other 

In addition to the above, FIFA could better address human rights abuses that may occur (i) in the supply chains of its licensees; (ii) in the process of land acquisition for stadiums and event-related infrastructure; or (iii) in connection with event-related security measures.

Overview of the measures taken by FIFA

First and foremost, FIFA strengthened its internal capacity to deal with human rights risks. In 2016, FIFA established the Governance Committee which provides, via its Human Rights Working Group, strategic guidance to the FIFA Council on human rights-related matters. At the operational level, the overall responsibility for the implementation of FIFA's human rights commitment rests with the Secretary General who delegates the day-to-day management of human rights-related work to the Sustainability and Diversity Department. In September 2016, FIFA employed a Human Rights Manager to work within this department. Moreover, in March 2017, FIFA appointed an independent Human Rights Advisory Board with the view of accelerating its efforts to embed respect for human rights. Composed of experts from the United Nations, trade unions, civil society and business, the Advisory Board is scheduled to meet at least twice a year. It has already contributed to the development of FIFA's Human Rights Policy, a landmark document clarifying FIFA's approach to the implementation of its human rights commitment in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles.

The rest of this section looks at the most significant steps taken by FIFA in each of the areas outlined above.

Bidding and selection

The FIFA Council has recently agreed that, as of the 2026 World Cup, human rights requirements will feature in the bidding procedure. This is of paramount importance as it means that countries failing to present an effective human rights strategy should not be allowed to host the World Cup. In other words, the protection of human rights will constitute a material factor in the bid evaluation. Had such requirements existed at the time of the bidding procedure for the 2022 World Cup, Qatar would arguably never have been selected.

The bidding procedure for the 2026 World Cup, the first to feature 48 teams, is currently in an early stage, and therefore bidding requirements are not yet available. The Host Country of the 2026 World Cup will be announced in 2020 at the latest.

Construction

As part of the implementation of the Sustainability Strategy for the 2018 World Cup, FIFA and the Russia 2018 LOC have launched a Decent Work Monitoring System aimed at detecting non-compliance with labour standards at World Cup stadium construction sites. Under this system, two-day on-site inspections are conducted on a quarterly basis by the Klinsky Institute of Labour Protection and Working Conditions, at times accompanied by the Building and Wood Workers' International ('BWI') and the Russian Building Workers Union ('RBWU').[7] After each inspection, companies are provided with a report containing recommendations for further improvement of working conditions. This report is forwarded to FIFA and the Russia 2018 LOC, and, in cases where the health or safety of workers are seriously threatened, also to the competent Russian authorities. As of 14 June 2017, a total of 58 inspections have been carried out.[8]

In Qatar, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy ('Supreme Committee'), an entity tasked with the delivery of World Cup-related infrastructure,[9] has developed a comprehensive set of Workers' Welfare Standards ('WWS'). Inspired by international labour standards, the WWS are mandatory for all contractors working on World Cup-related construction projects. To see whether contractors are adhering to these standards, the Supreme Committee has designed a four-tier monitoring system which comprises due diligence conducted by the Supreme Committee, the British company Impactt Ltd.,[10] the Qatari Ministry of Labour and contractors themselves. As of February 2017, the implementation of the WWS is further monitored via on-site inspections carried out jointly by the Supreme Committee and the BWI.[11]

Discrimination 

Establishment of the Anti-Discrimination Monitoring System in May 2015 is regarded as the most significant step taken by FIFA to combat discrimination in the world of football. This system uses independent observers who are present at matches identified as involving heightened risks of discriminatory incidents. Based on the reports provided by these observers, FIFA may open disciplinary proceedings and eventually impose sanctions on member associations. For instance, several Latin American associations have been sanctioned for homophobic chants by spectators during the 2018 World Cup qualifying matches.

Internally, FIFA promotes gender equality by requiring each of the six confederations to reserve at least one seat in the FIFA Council for women.[12]

Players' rights

As far as the protection of players' rights is concerned, FIFA informs that it has introduced certain measures intended to preserve confidentiality of the data available in the Transfer Matching System.[13] Furthermore, on 1 March 2015, FIFA modified the RTSP so as to put in place 'fast-track' proceedings for disputes concerning overdue payable claims (for a detailed analysis, see our blogs here and here).[14]

Other

In addition to contractors working on World Cup-related construction projects, other companies having business relationships with FIFA are now required to strengthen their human rights compliance. These include the suppliers of FIFA-licensed balls, artificial turf and technology used in games. Before a license agreement is entered into between FIFA and the supplier, FIFA must satisfy itself that both the supplier and its manufacturer are in compliance with the World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry ('WFSGI') Code of Conduct, whose purpose is ''to guide WFSGI members in the standards and practices expected in the workplaces that they operate or contract from''.[15] Should FIFA-licensees cease to comply with the standards laid down in the WFSGI Code of Conduct, FIFA may decide to withdraw its license.

Concluding Remarks

The aforementioned report on human rights violations of World Cup-related construction workers in Russia, published by Human Rights Watch in June 2017, came as a major setback to the otherwise encouraging measures taken by FIFA in respect of human rights compliance. This and similar reports demonstrate that FIFA's human rights activities have not yet produced their desired effect. To increase the efficiency of its human rights activities in the future, FIFA should probably engage in a tougher discussion with the competent authorities of the Host Country. This is important because event-related human rights abuses often flow from inadequate domestic legislation and administrative practices of the Host Country.[16] Examples from the past show that FIFA is able to exert pressure on the future Host Country to modify its domestic legislation when it is in the interest of FIFA's sponsors.[17] At the risk of stating the obvious, it is hard to understand why FIFA's sponsors should be prioritized over thousands of people facing human rights abuses in connection with the organization of the World Cup. Thus, a lot will depend on FIFA's amendment of the bidding requirements for the 2026 World Cup. Though it may sound optimistic and far-fetched, if FIFA were to award the World Cup taking into account human rights compliance of the potential Host Countries, it could become a strong force in spreading the human rights gospel across the globe.

[1]    John G. Ruggie, 'For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights' (April 2016) p. 19.

[2]    Jonathan Calvert and Heidi Blake, 'Plot to Buy the World Cup' (The Sunday Times, 1 June 2014). See also David Conn, 'France Investigates Votes for 2018 and 2022 World Cups and Questions Blatter' (The Guardian, 27 April 2017).

[3]    See Ruggie's report (n 1) p. 21.

[4]    Amnesty International, 'The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site' (30 March 2016).

[5]    FIFPro, '2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report: Working Conditions in Professional Football' (January 2017) p. 30.

[6]    See Ruggie's report (n 1) p. 25.

[7]    In August 2016, the BWI and the RBWU signed a memorandum of understanding with FIFA and the 2018 World Cup LOC.

[8]    FIFA, 'Statement on Human Rights Watch Report on Russia' (14 June 2017).

[9]    The Supreme Committee works closely with the Qatar 2022 LOC.

[10]   In April 2017, Impactt Ltd. published its first report.

[11]   The Supreme Committee and the BWI signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2016.

[12]   FIFA Statutes, Article 33(5). See also FIFA, '2016 Reform Committee Report' (2 December 2015) p. 9.

[13]   RSTP, Definitions.

[14]   RSTP, Article 12bis.

[15]   WFSGI Code of Conduct, Introduction.

[16]   It should be noted that, in December 2016, the Qatari government introduced certain reforms to its labour laws. However, Amnesty International asserted that these reforms ''barely scratch the surface of labour exploitation''.

[17]   One such example is the well-known 'Budweiser Law' – a law enacted by Brazil in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup allowing beer sales at match venues despite the fact that the sale of alcohol had been prohibited in Brazil's stadiums for almost ten years.

Editor's note: This is the (belated) fifth part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio. The other acts are available at:

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu
• Act II: On being implicated 
• Act III: On being sufficiently tested
• Act IV: On Bringing a sport into disrepute

Act V: Saving the last (Russian) woman standing: The Klishina miracle 

Darya Klishina is now an Olympic celebrity. She will enter the history books not because she won a gold medal or beat a world record. Instead, her idiosyncrasy lies in her nationality: she was the sole Russian athlete authorized to stand in the athletics competitions at the Rio Olympics. And yet, a few days before the start of the long jumping contest in which she was due to take part, the IAAF surprisingly decided to revoke her eligibility (‘And Then There Were None’). But Klishina appealed the decision to the CAS ad hoc Division and, as all of you well-informed sports lawyers will know, she was allowed to compete at the Olympics and finished at a decent ninth place of the long jump finals.

Two important questions are raised by this case:

• Why did the IAAF changed its mind and decide to retract Klishina’s authorization to participate?
• Why did the CAS overturn this decision?

A.    The IAAF’s second thoughts over the implication of Klishina

What happened between 9 July, when Klishina was first green lighted by the IAAF Doping Review Board (DRB) and 10 August when the DRB revoked its previous decision to let her compete? Basically, the publication of the McLaren Report, and especially evidence showing “that the Applicant had been directly affected and tainted by the State-organised doping scheme described in the IP Report”.[1] More concretely, according to the Report, Klishina was affected in the following three ways:

      i.   “a sample collected on 26 February 2014, yielding a T/E ratio of 8.5, had been subject to a "SAVE" order by the Ministry of Sport on 3 March 2014;

      ii.   a sample collected on 17 October 2014 and subsequently seized by WADA December 2014 was found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap and contained urine from the Applicant but also from another female athlete; and

      iii.  a sample collected on the occasion of the 2013 IAAF World Championships in Moscow was also found to bear marks and scratches consistent with the removal of the cap.”[2]

In its original decision, the DRB had reserved its right “to reconsider the Applicant’s case should information ever be brought to its attention (including but not limited to as a result of the current investigation being conducted by Professor McLaren on behalf of WADA) that the Doping Review Board considers is such as to undermine the basis upon which the application was accepted”.[3] Thus, unsurprisingly, the CAS acknowledged that the DRB had the competence to reconsider the eligibility granted to the athlete. Nonetheless, surprisingly, it found that such reconsideration was not legitimate in light of the new information gathered.

B.    The surprising decision of CAS to let Klishina jump

Klishina won in front of the CAS. From the outset this is a surprising decision, since she was at least as implicated in the IP Report as numerous other Russian athletes who were barred from entering the Games.[4] Indeed, she had clearly profited from being “saved” by the Russian Ministry of Sport. So why on earth would the CAS decide to let her jump?

This decision is intimately linked with the legal basis of the original decision of the DRB. Despite the repeated view of the IOC that the IAAF policy was stricter than its own,[5] the Klishina case demonstrates that this is not universally true in practice. The main point was that the IAAF’s DRB had recognized that since 1 January 2014, Klishina “had been subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of-competition”[6] and therefore fulfilled the criteria enshrined in the IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b). This was based on the following factual findings:

• “The fact that she had spent 632 days out of Russia, being 86.6% of her time, in the Relevant Period;
• She had relocated permanently to the United States in March 2014 and had been trained under a US coach since October 2013;
• She regularly competes in competitions on the international circuit;
• A total of 11 samples had been collected from the Applicant outside of Russia in the Relevant Period;
• 1 sample had been collected by the IAAF since June 2016 and sent for analysis by a laboratory outside of Russia.”[7]


The question is then whether the new information, indicating that Klishina was implicated and benefitted from the Russian doping scheme, recognized as valid by the Panel[8], could justify revisiting the first decision. In other words, could this new information lead to reconsidering the eligibility of Klishina under the regime of IAAF Competition rule 22.1A(b) on which the original decision was based? To assess this, the Panel starts by pointing out that the rule “is not the same as the decision of the IOC Executive Board made after the publication of the IP Report. (…) As the parties agreed, the IOC Executive Board decision is not in evidence in this case and decisions of the Ad hoc Panel of the CAS for the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro as to the application of, or the terms of, the IOC Executive Board decision are not applicable”.[9]

The CAS Panel insists that the IAAF’s DRB “was comfortably satisfied that during the Relevant Period the Applicant satisfied each of the criteria set out in the Rule for exceptional eligibility, notwithstanding the suspension of the National Federation”.[10] Furthermore, “in making its findings, the DRB was aware of, and took no account of, tests conducted in Russia and that it was cognisant of inadequacies in the system of testing in Russia, for which RusAF had been suspended”.[11] Those are decisive conclusions that will lead to the second decision being set aside. The CAS Panel was of the view “that the conclusion reached in the Second Decision, and the basis for that decision, are not in accordance with the Rule which was purportedly invoked”.[12] It is so, because “the further evidence considered by the DRB for the purposes of the Second Decision did not undermine its finding in the First Decision that the Applicant was eligible to compete by reason of her compliance with the Rule”.[13] This analysis leads to an unfair solution as the undisputed evidence points at Klishina profiting not once but on three occasions from the Russian doping scheme and still this evidence is not considered as relevant to reconsider the IAAF’s original decision to let her jump.

This decision is grounded on the following legal reasoning: the Panel considers that the “implication [of Klishina in the State-doping system] is not relevant to the application of criteria which, if fulfilled, mean that for the purposes of the Rule [22 IAAF], the Applicant is not affected or tainted by the failures of the National Federation”.[14] The CAS Panel is of the view that the IAAF Rule “provides for a mechanism or a basis by which an athlete is granted exceptional eligibility”.[15] And this “mechanism is fulfilment of the two criteria which, for this athlete, was established by the DRB in the First Decision”.[16] Thus, the “fact that the athlete was subjected to or the subject of drug testing that was not fully compliant during the Relevant Period does not derogate from the fact that she was, during the Relevant Period (that is, ‘a sufficiently long period’), subject to fully compliant drug testing in- and out-of- competition by reason of the fact that she was during that time training in and resident in the United States and not in Russia”.[17] Additionally, “there is no evidence to suggest that the testing that she was subject to was other than equivalent in quality to the testing to which her competitors were subject”.[18] In other words, “an athlete may have undergone non-compliant testing while concurrently being subject to fully compliant testing and still fulfil the second criterion”.[19] This is comforted by the fact “that the Rule is addressed to the suspension of any International Federation for failure to put in place an adequate system and the impact on the eligibility of the athlete” and the “criteria are directed to the establishment by an athlete that he or she is outside the country of his or her National Federation during the Relevant Period”.[20] Hence, it “is not addressed to the implication of an athlete in a defective system”.[21] Instead, “it states that an athlete is taken not to be affected or tainted by the action of the National Federation if he or she was subject to other, compliant systems outside of the country”.[22] In a nutshell, for the CAS Panel, the “relevant question is not whether the athlete was affected by the Russian System, or how, or whether she had knowledge of the way in which the system worked”.[23] No, the only question is “whether she fulfilled the criteria of the Rule”.[24] And the answer to that question is: she did early July; and she still does in August!

This case is disconcerting as it contradicts the line of cases regarding the implication of athletes in the IP Report discussed a few days ago. The CAS relied on the ambiguous wording of the IAAF provision to offer an escape route to Klishina. In doing so, it disregarded the spirit and objective of the provision, which was to provide a mechanism for athletes who were not personally tainted by the Russian doping scandal to participate in IAAF competitions. Yet, another aspect of the case is even more bizarre. Why did the IOC not block the eligibility of Klishina on the basis of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision? She was undoubtedly implicated and benefited from the scheme. In fact, only one of the three sources of implication provided by McLaren should (and would) have been enough for the IOC Review Panel and the CAS arbitrator reviewing her eligibility to discard her from the Olympics. It did not happen, Zeus only knows why…

Epilogue

These five blogs have discussed the awards rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio involving Russian athletes wishing to compete at the Olympics. In general, the CAS has been willing, with few exceptions (Efimova and Klishina), to approve the ineligibility of Russian athletes. Rightfully, in my view, the CAS has supported the IFs that have opted for a strict approach in dealing with the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. The CAS has also unsurprisingly rebutted the blunt rule of the IOC excluding Russian athletes who were previously sanctioned for doping. But, it has surprisingly let Klishina jump, in spite of all the factual elements pointing at her being implicated in, and having profited from, the Russian State-doping scheme. Overall, the CAS ad hoc Division has served its purpose as a review instance well, forcing the IFs and the IOC to properly justify their decisions and providing an avenue for the Russian athletes to be heard.

These cases also highlight the variety/plurality of responses to the Russian doping scandal and its impact on the eligibility of Russian athletes for the Rio Olympics. It seems that some IFs have taken WADA’s call for a strong response of the SGBs seriously. Unfortunately, and this is one of the negative consequences of the IOC’s decision to not decide, due to a lack of information, it is impossible to assess the different policies of the IFs which have not faced (due to their reluctance to act or else) a challenge of their eligibility decisions in front of the CAS ad hoc Division. In light of recent revelations concerning the International Swimming Federation (FINA) it is likely that a number of IFs decided to interpret narrowly the IOC criteria and waved through the overwhelming majority of Russian athletes without a proper check.

Finally, the awards show that CAS arbitrators would have been ready to condone a general exclusion of Russian athletes, with a narrow exception for those not tainted by the scandal or who could not benefit from the scheme because they were residing outside of the Russian Federation (this is very much the position adopted in the recent decision of the CAS in the dispute between the Russian Paralympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee). The CAS recognized the seriousness of the situation and the collective responsibility of Russian sports organizations. It seemed also ready to follow up on this collective responsibility by endorsing collective sanctions that would most likely have been found compatible with the Russian athletes ‘natural rights’. Hence, ultimately, the IOC’s decision to let the Russian athletes compete at the Rio Olympics may have been politically unavoidable, but was certainly not legally mandated. I leave you to appreciate whether this decision is compatible with the IOC’s proclaimed fundamental values and its commitment to enforcing the World Anti-Doping Code. What is certain, however, is that the World Anti-Doping System needs an overhaul (for some reform proposals/directions see here) sooner rather than later.

[1] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 2.12.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.8.

[4] See Act II of this blog series.

[5] See CAS OG 16/13 Anastasia Karabelshikova and
Ivan Podshivalov v. 
World Rowing Federation (FISA)
and
International Olympic Committee (IOC), para. 7.14 and CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, para. 7.22.

[6] CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF, para. 7.3.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[8] Ibid., paras 7.40-45.

[9] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[10] Ibid., para. 7.34.

[11] Ibid., para. 7.35.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.46.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., para. 7.56.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., para. 7.57.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., para. 7.58.

[20] Ibid., para. 7.60.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.