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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the ECHR and Rule 50 of the IOC Charter: Are these polar opposites? - By Nuray Ekşi

Editor's note: Prof. Dr. Ekşi is a full-time lecturer and chair of Department of Private International Law at Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. Prof. Ekşi is the founder and also editor in chief of the Istanbul Journal of Sports Law which has been in publication since 2019.


While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) secures the right to freedom of expression, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter of 17 July 2020 (‘Olympic Charter’) restricts this freedom. Following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) relating to sports, national and international sports federations have incorporated human rights-related provisions into their statutes and regulations. They also emphasized respect for human rights. For example, Article 3 of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (‘FIFA’) Statutes, September 2020 edition, provides that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights”. Likewise, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which are listed after the Preamble of the of the Olympic Charter 2020 also contains human rights related provisions. Paragraph 4 of Fundamental Principles of Olympism provides that the practice of sport is a human right. Paragraph 6 forbids discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In addition, the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’) inserted human rights obligations in the 2024 and 2028 Host City Contract.[1] The IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration even goes further and aspires to promote the ability and opportunity of athletes to practise sport and compete without being subject to discrimination. Fair and equal gender representation, privacy including protection of personal information, freedom of expression, due process including the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial panel, the right to request a public hearing and the right to an effective remedy are the other human rights and principles stated in the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration. Despite sports federations’ clear commitment to the protection of human rights, it is arguable that their statutes and regulations contain restrictions on athletes and sports governing bodies exercising their human rights during competitions or in the field. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the right to freedom of expression on which certain restrictions are imposed by the federations even if it done with good intentions and with the aim of raising awareness.

 

The provisions prohibiting propaganda and political demonstrations are enshrined in the statutes and regulations of international and national federations. For example, International Football Association Board (‘IFAB’) Laws of the Game 2020/2021 states that players must not reveal undergarments that display any political, religious, personal slogans, statements or images, or advertising other than the manufacturer’s logo.[2] As with any offence, the player and/or the team will be sanctioned by the competition organiser, national football association or by FIFA. On the one hand, freedom of expression is listed among the rights of athletes in Paragraph 11 of the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration[3], on the other hand, Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter restricts demonstrations or political, religious or racial propaganda, which may adversely affect freedom of expression. The propaganda ban was first introduced by the 1967 Olympic Charter.[4] This ban has been retained in later versions with minor modifications. Under the title of “propaganda advertising, demonstration”, Rule 50(2) of the current version of the Olympic Charter[5] provides that “no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”. The aim of Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter in prohibiting political statements is to maintain the neutrality of sport.[6] Rule 50(2) is only applicable in Olympic venues, namely on the field of play, in the Olympic Village, during Olympic medal ceremonies or during the opening, closing and other official ceremonies.[7] Displaying any political messaging, including signs or armbands, gestures of a political nature, like a hand gesture or kneeling, and refusal to follow the ceremonies protocol are some examples of what would constitute a protest, as opposed to expressing views non-exhaustingly indicated in Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.[8]

 

A disciplinary sanction can be applied against an athlete who has breached Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter. This sanction can be reviewed by the ad hoc division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’) established for the Olympic Games.[9] An arbitral award of CAS can be challenged before the Swiss Federal Court on the grounds listed in Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law including public policy.[10] Since freedom of expression is among the fundamental human rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Swiss Federal Tribunal may rule that a CAS arbitral award is incompatible with public policy. The limitations set out in the statutes and regulations of the national and international sports federations pertaining to the freedom of expression are aimed to protect the neutrality of sport and separate it from political, religious or any other type of interference; however, one cannot exclude potential challenges to be filed against Switzerland before the ECtHR. As in the Pechstein and Mutu cases, the sports community, including CAS, anxiously awaited what the ECtHR would decide. The judgements of the ECtHR have been taken into consideration and respect for human rights has been integrated in the statutes of some SGBs, including the IOC Charter.

 

Although the IOC is established as an association under the Swiss Association Law, the rules of its Charter may adversely affect the enjoyment of certain human rights. Freedom of expression is enshrined not only in Article 10 of the ECHR but also in other international human rights legislative instruments, including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 17(1) of Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 10 of the ECHR covers not only the disclosure of political ideas, but also the freedom to disclose any literary, commercial and other ideas. The freedom of expression protected under Article 10 of the ECHR is not limited to words, written or spoken, but it extends to pictures and images including tv or radio broadcasts, films as well as electronic information etc.[11] The right to freedom of expression can be restricted in certain circumstances provided in the provisions of the human rights instruments. Although these instruments are hard law for the Member States, statutes and regulations of the international or national SGBs contain restrictions as to the right to freedom of expression. International or national SGBs are mostly established as associations.[12] The problem so far has arisen as to how national or international sports federations can restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitutions and international conventions.

 

Article 10 of the ECHR can also be applied in the field of sports because athletes can address a wide public during the competitions and may protest human rights violations or political events in their own country or elsewhere. Human rights violations including the right to freedom of expression may also occur in countries where the Olympic Games are held.[13] Generally, the IOC and its international federations take the necessary measures to ensure that athletes do not make political statements during competition. In fact, in 1967 famous boxer Mohammad Ali refused to fight in Vietnam to protest racial segregation.[14] During the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics, after winning the gold and the bronze medal in the 200-meter sprint, American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos stepped onto the podium barefoot, shared a pair of black gloves and raised their fists in the air when the national anthem played to protest against black poverty and lynching.[15] The IOC reacted swiftly and harshly to this 1968 black power salute, immediately suspending the athletes.[16] The history of sports has recorded various examples of athletes who were sanctioned or ostracized because they had exercised their freedom of expression. Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid kneeled or sat on the bench while the national anthem was played as a protest against racial discrimination and police brutality against people of colour in the United States.[17] Both players were not contracted in the NFL in the subsequent season.[18] Czech national gymnast Vera Caslayska’s career ended as she protested against Soviet hegemony in her country during a medal ceremony in Mexico in 1968.[19] John Carlos and Tommie Smith were suspended immediately from the United States Olympic Team as a result of the black power salute.  FIFA fined the England Football Association because its members displayed poppies, a symbol of National Armistice Day, during the World Cup qualifier against Scotland. Likewise, Scottish and Irish clubs were fined for flying the Palestinian flag in stadiums.[20] “During the Sochi Games, the IOC even reprimanded athletes for placing small stickers on their helmets in memory of deceased freestyle skier Sarah Burke, calling the gesture political”.[21]

 

Sometimes an athlete makes futile efforts to obtain permission to protest the situation in their countries. The request by Ukrainian athletes to wear a black headband to remember those who died during the political demonstrations in Kiev was rejected by the IOC as political propaganda. However, protests or demonstrations by athletes may not always contain political content. For example, Cheryl Maas, a Dutch and gay skier, wanted to wear rainbow gloves to protest Russia’s anti-gay legislation, but he was not allowed.  

 

As there is no judgment of the ECtHR to confirm whether or not Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter complies with Article 10 of the ECHR, various arguments have been put forward by academics. Dhonchak thinks the rule set out in Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter must be struck down at the earliest.[22] However, Faut puts forward two solutions which could increase compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. “The first one lies in more transparent and less excessive sanction mechanisms. A second option would be a laxer prohibition on political statements in the Olympic Charter, covering a smaller range of incidents”.[23] Anmol believes that IOC could also re-assess its position and come-up with fresh guidelines that uphold a balanced political speech before the Tokyo Olympics 2021.[24] For example, the IOC could allow the disciplinary body to assess the speech by examining its content and core intentions in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism set out in the Olympic Charter. Shahlaei states that “perhaps the solution lies somewhere in the middle. To maintain their general political objectivity, sports organizations could continue to prohibit purely domestic political gestures, such as flying a banner in support of a preferred presidential candidate. At the same time, they could allow athletes to express support for human rights, such as racial equality”.[25]

 

However, it should be noted that Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter in no way eliminates freedom of expression. In accordance with the Rule 50 Guidelines developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission, outside the Olympic venues athletes have the opportunity to express their opinions during press conferences and interviews or at team meetings or on digital or traditional media, or on other platforms. Any protest or demonstration outside Olympic venues must obviously comply with local legislation wherever local law prohibits such actions.[26] Nonetheless, this discussion will surely continue until the ECtHR will shed light on the application of Article 10 of the ECHR to Rule 50(2) of the Olympic Charter.


[1] Although certain steps have been taken on human rights by IOC since Sochi Olympics, they are found by Grell unsatisfactory and creates uncertainty in several ways. For more information see Tomáš GRELL, The International Olympic Committee and Human Rights Reforms: Game Changer or Mere Window Dressing?, 17(2018) International Sports Law Journal, p. 161 et seq.

[2] IFAB Laws of the Game 2020/2021, The Players’ Equipment, p. 60: https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/ifab-laws-of-the-game-2020-21.pdf?cloudid=d6g1medsi8jrrd3e4imp (accessed 17.5.2021).

[3] https://olympics.com/athlete365/who-we-are/athletes-declaration/(accessed 18.4.2021).

[4] FAUT, 254-255. For the text of the Olympic Charter of 1967 see http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/1967-Olympic_Charter.pdf. (accessed 20.4.2021).

[5] Olympic Charter in force as from 17 July 2020 © International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, 2020.

[6] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf

[7] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.

[8] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission: http://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule-50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf (accessed 17.4.2021).

[9] Johan LINDHOLM, From Carlos to Kaepernick and beyond: Athletes’ Right to Freedom of Expression, 17(2017)1-3 International Sports Law Journal, p. 2.

[10] LINDHOLM, 2.

[11] Frédérique FAUT, The Prohibition of Political Statements by Athletes and its Consistency with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Speech is Silver, Silence is Gold?, 14(2014) International Sports Law Journal, p. 257; Monica MACOVEI, Freedom of Expression Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2 A guide to the Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edition, January 2004, p. 7.

[12] For the criticisms about the extraordinary autonomy that sports governing bodies enjoy under Swiss law see Margareta BADDELEY, The Extraordinary Autonomy of Sports Bodies under Swiss Law: Lesson to be Drawn, 20(2020) International Sports Law Journal, p. 3-17.

[13] For the human rights violations occurred in China during Beijing Olympic Games see Bruce KIDD, Human Rights and Olympic Movement after Beijing, 13(2010) Sports in Society, p. 901-909.

[14] Faraz SHAHLAEI, When Sports Stand Against Human Rights: Regulating Restrictions on Athlete Speech in the Global Sports Arena, 38(2017)1 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, p.100.

[15] ANMOL, 67; SHAHLAEI, 101.

[16] SHAHLAEI, 101.

[17] ANMOL, 66; Brendan SCHWAB, Celebrate Humanity: Reconciling Sport and Human Rights through Athlete Activism, 28(2018)1 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, p. 170-171.

[18] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 2.

[19] SCHWAB, 171 footnote 6; ANMOL, 66.

[20] SHAHLAEI, 108.

[21] SHAHLAEI, 108-109.

[22] Dhananjay DHONCHAK, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter-Protesting Racial Inequality, 04.09.20: https://opiniojuris.org/2020/09/04/rule-50-of-the-olympic-charter-protesting-racial-inequality  (accessed 17.4.2021).

[23] FAUT, 262.

[24] Jain ANMOL, Political Speech in Sports: A Case for Non-Prohibition, 2(2020)1 Journal for Sports Law, Policy and Governance, p. 73.

[25] SHAHLAEI, 116.

[26] Rule 50 Guidelines Developed by the IOC Athletes’ Commission.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Editor’s note: Emilio García (emilio.garcia@uefa.ch)  is a doctor in law and head of disciplinary and integrity at UEFA. Before joining UEFA, he was the Spanish Football Federation’s legal director (2004–12) and an arbitrator at the CAS (2012–13).In this blog, Emilio García provides a brief review of a recent case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)[1], in which he acted as main counsel for UEFA. 


Sport and match-fixing – A quick overview

Match-fixing is now legally defined as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others”.[2] It has been said that there has always been match-fixing in sport.[3] From the ancient Olympic Games to the most important global sports competitions of today, manipulation of results has always been an all-too-frequent occurrence.

We have seen a number of very prominent instances of this kind of issue over the years. One of the most remarkable examples, which was even the subject of a film,[4] was the match-fixing episode during the 1919 World Series, where several players from the Chicago White Sox were found guilty of accepting bribes and deliberately losing matches against the Cincinnati Reds.[5]

The situation has changed considerably since then. In particular, the globalisation of the sports betting industry has had a massive impact, with recent studies estimating that between €200bn and €500bn is betted on sport every year.[6] Match-fixing does not just affect football either;[7] it is also affecting other sports, most notably tennis.[8] 

In addition to these impressive figures, it is well recognised that match-fixing has become a global issue because it allows organised criminal gangs to expand their illegal and violent activities – which include murder, extortion and assault – worldwide. It also results in the loss of billions of dollars of tax revenue and public income every year. Indeed, match-fixing is now one of the most profitable forms of money laundering.[9]

In light of the growth of this phenomenon, both international sports federations and public authorities are now engaged in a continuous battle against this scourge. More and more sports federations are establishing specific programmes in this area, which is having a major impact at national level.[10] And as regards public authorities, various resolutions have been adopted by the European Union, several initiatives have been launched by INTERPOL and EUROPOL, and, in particular, excellent work has been done by the Council of Europe, which adopted the first ever international treaty aimed at combating the manipulation of sports competitions. These are all good examples of cooperation between public authorities and the world of sport, but we are still a long way from winning this particular battle.


UEFA’s rules and integrity-related cases

AC Milan: UEFA’s first modern-day integrity case

In May 2006, a match-fixing scandal – christened the ‘Calciopoli’ – was unearthed in Italian football. Investigations led by the Italian police revealed that a network of club managers, officials responsible for referees and other individuals had sought to influence the outcome of various matches in the Serie A. Several clubs were punished by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC). One of those clubs was AC Milan, which was given a 30-point penalty. However, despite the deduction of those points, AC Milan still managed to qualify for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League.

Thus, the admissions process for the 2006/07 UEFA Champions League presented UEFA with a real legal conundrum: could UEFA allow a club that had been punished for its involvement in the Calciopoli to take part in a European competition? On 2 August 2006, the UEFA Emergency Panel decided to allow AC Milan to participate in UEFA’s flagship competition on the basis of the following considerations:

“The UEFA Emergency Panel, being competent to decide on the matter, came to the conclusion that it had no choice but to admit AC Milan for the UEFA club competitions 2006-07 for formal reasons because of an insufficient legal basis in the regulations which would allow not admitting AC Milan under specific circumstances.”[11]

This situation was highly frustrating for UEFA, which felt that it was unable to prevent AC Milan from participating in its competition, despite the club’s involvement in match-fixing. It should also be noted that AC Milan went on to win that competition, beating English side Liverpool FC in the final on 23 May 2007.


Evolution of the legal framework

UEFA’s response to the AC Milan case was a swift one. At the very next UEFA Congress, which took place in Dusseldorf on 25 and 26 January 2007, representatives of the various member associations approved a new paragraph 3 for Article 50 of the UEFA Statutes.[12]

That amendment, which remains in force today, established a two-stage process aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of UEFA’s competitions. The first stage involves an administrative measure, whereby the offending club is excluded from European competitions for one season. The second stage involves disciplinary measures, which may be imposed subsequent to the administrative measure and do not have a maximum duration.[13]

Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes reads as follows:

“The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures.”

That provision has also been incorporated in the regulations governing the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League, which currently feature the following wording:

“If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes, i.e. 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club ineligible to participate in the competition. Such ineligibility is effective only for one football season. When taking its decision, UEFA can rely on, but is not bound by, a decision of a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court.”[14]


Key CAS rulings (2008-15)

UEFA has been very active in applying this two-stage process to its European club competitions – particularly as regards the first stage. Since the introduction of this peculiar but successful process, more than ten clubs from all over Europe have been declared ineligible to participate in UEFA competitions. In some cases, those one-season bans have been accompanied by disciplinary measures.

Inevitably, many of those cases have resulted in proceedings before the CAS in Lausanne.[15] The CAS case law derived from those key cases can be summarised as follows:

  • It is firmly in the interest of UEFA, as the organiser of sports competitions, for the integrity of its competitions to be ensured and perceived to be so by the public. It is undeniably in UEFA’s interest to show the public that it takes all necessary steps to safeguard the integrity of its competitions.[16]
  • UEFA does not need to wait for a final decision at domestic level, particularly when it comes to criminal proceedings, since neither UEFA nor the CAS can be forced to defer their decisions when an effective fight to ensure the integrity of sport depends on prompt action. UEFA and the CAS are not subject to the same rules as the ordinary courts in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance.[17]
  • The essential aim of the administrative measure is not to punish the club, but to protect the values and objectives of UEFA’s competition, its reputation and its integrity. It seeks not only to prevent a club which has violated such values from taking part in UEFA’s competition (i.e. to protect the integrity of that competition), but also to dispel any doubts in the public domain regarding the integrity, values and fairness of its competition (i.e. to protect the reputation of that competition).[18]
  • The administrative measure is not of a disciplinary nature. Consequently, the fundamental legal principles that could potentially be applicable to disciplinary matters are not relevant.[19]
  • The question of whether the club has any degree of culpability as regards the prohibited activities is entirely irrelevant. The principle of nulla poena sine culpa does not apply to administrative measures adopted by sports associations.[20]
  • The range of conduct resulting in the application of an administrative measure is broader and more generic than that resulting in a disciplinary measure, which is, in principle, more restrictive and specific.[21]
  • The administrative measure is only applicable to a club, whereas disciplinary measures can be imposed on all persons bound by UEFA’s rules and regulations (i.e. member associations and their officials, clubs and their officials, match officials, players, etc.).[22]


The CAS ruling on KS Skënderbeu: Is betting analysis sufficient to declare a club in breach of UEFA’s integrity rules?

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system (BFDS) was established in 2009 in response to the growing threat of match manipulation in both UEFA and domestic competitions.

The BFDS highlights irregular betting patterns, both before and during matches, in the core betting markets, monitoring all major European and Asian bookmakers. The core betting markets are: the Asian handicap market; the totals market (number of goals in a match); and the 1X2 market (home win, draw or away win). The BFDS covers all UEFA competition matches (approximately 2,000 per season) and all matches in member associations’ top two divisions and cup competitions (approximately 30,000 matches per season).

The BFDS uses sophisticated algorithms and mathematical models to compare calculated odds with actual bookmakers’ odds, in order to determine whether the odds at a specific point in time or over a specific period are irregular.[23]

If a match displays irregular betting patterns, the matter is escalated and a report is generated. These reports include detailed information on the betting operators being monitored, together with match-specific data – e.g. regarding the current form of the teams involved, on-field action, players, match officials and motivational factors (such as the potential for promotion, relegation or qualification for a UEFA competition). Reports contain textual analysis and expert assessments, as well as graphical representations of movements in the relevant betting market.[24]

UEFA’s primary BFDS partner and information provider is Swiss-based company Sportradar. Founded in 2001, this company employs a team of highly trained sports betting analysts dealing exclusively with European football.


The facts of the case

On the basis of analysis of BFDS reports, it was concluded that Albanian football club KS Skënderbeu had been involved in a very large number of matches with inexplicable betting patterns. These included matches in Albania’s domestic league, the Albanian Cup and UEFA competitions, as well as several friendlies against foreign clubs. On the basis of UEFA’s experience in the areas of betting and match-fixing, it was concluded that the activities relating to Skënderbeu were of a highly organised nature.

While the vast majority of clubs will never feature in BFDS reports, it should be noted that Skënderbeu has appeared in more than 50. If we look at all the clubs that have been the subject of BFDS reports since 2010, Skënderbeu has been flagged up far more times than any other club in Europe.


Proceedings before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies

Against this background, charges were brought against Skënderbeu before UEFA’s disciplinary bodies with a view to imposing an administrative measure preventing the club from taking part in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.[25] A hearing took place before the UEFA Appeals Body, which acted as the first and final instance in this case.[26] The Appeals Body upheld the charges against the club – i.e. it deemed that Skënderbeu had indeed been involved in domestic and international activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches. Consequently, the club was declared ineligible to participate in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League.

Skënderbeu then lodged an appeal against this decision before the CAS.


The CAS award

The dispute between UEFA and Skënderbeu before the CAS essentially revolved around the interpretation of the BFDS reports and the legal value that should be attributed to them. UEFA, for its part, relied on those betting reports in concluding that the Albanian club had been involved in activities aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of matches at domestic and international level. Skënderbeu, on the other hand, maintained that the BFDS reports (i) were not sufficient to prove match-fixing, (ii) were not capable of attributing specific responsibility as regards involvement in match-fixing, and (iii) were simply objective alarm mechanisms, which needed to be supported by other external evidence pointing in the same direction.

The CAS limited itself to an analysis of four Skënderbeu matches in UEFA competitions (namely, the club’s matches against Crusaders FC on 21 July 2015, against GNK Dinamo Zagreb on 25 August 2015, against Sporting Clube de Portugal on 22 October 2015 and against FC Lokomotiv Moskva on 10 December 2015) and refrained from analysing domestic matches and other pieces of evidence submitted by UEFA. It did so in order to avoid prejudicing any disciplinary measures that UEFA might potentially impose on the club.[27]

The starting point for the legal analysis conducted by the CAS Panel tallied with UEFA’s approach to this case and the question of whether BFDS reports could be used as the sole piece of evidence when prosecuting cases of match-fixing. The CAS agreed with UEFA that there were potential analogies between athletes’ biological passports and BFDS reports: “The Panel notes the similarities between the procedures followed in respect of the BFDS and the athlete blood passport (the ‘ABP’) in doping matters. Both rely initially on analytical data which is subsequently interpreted by experts/analysts before conclusions are drawn as to whether a violation is presumed to be committed or not.”[28]

Using this analogy, the Panel explained how analytical information was processed within the BFDS, highlighting the fact that the BFDS – like the ABP – indicates the likelihood of a violation having occurred, rather than providing absolute proof one way or the other: “The BFDS analyses whether the analytical information regarding betting on football matches can be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances. The conclusion that the statistical information cannot be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances does not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the results are to be explained by match-fixing.”[29] The Panel went on to say that “[i]n order to come to the conclusion that a match is fixed […] the analytical information needs to be supported by other, different and external elements pointing in the same direction”.[30] With this in mind, the Panel noted that “the final conclusions drawn are not only based on analytical data and the absence of any ‘normal’ explanation, but indeed take into account several external factors corroborating the theory that the abnormal betting behaviour was likely to be explained by match-fixing: suspicious actions of players that took place on the field of play, suspicions raised by an opponent after the match, the emergence of a betting pattern in respect of the Club whereby it would concede late goals when the tie was no longer competitive and the fact that the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a prominent Asian bookmaker, removed the Club from live markets before the end of a game”.[31]

The Panel also attributed considerable weight to the betting patterns surrounding the four European matches under examination: “The Panel particularly considers the emergence of a betting pattern […] to be convincing evidence that the Club is at least indirectly involved in match-fixing activities. This betting pattern consists of the fact that it was observed in four different matches of the Club in either the UEFA Champions League or the UEFA Europa League in the first half of the 2015/2016 sporting season, that the actual bookmakers’ odds started to divert considerably from the calculated odds at the end of the match when the tie was no longer competitive (i.e. when it was clear that the Club would lose the tie on the basis of the aggregate score or that it would win the tie).”[32]

All in all, the Panel concluded that the “analytical information derived from the BFDS is valuable evidence that, particularly if corroborated by further evidence, can be used in order to conclude that a club was directly or indirectly involved in match-fixing”.[33]


Conclusion

Over the last few years, I have heard many betting experts state that monitoring is not the answer to match-fixing in sport. I fully agree with all of them, particularly since they know far more about the betting market than I do. Perhaps as a consequence of my limited legal skills (since even bad lawyers are always trying to find solutions to a complex reality), I would prefer to say that monitoring is not the only answer to match-fixing.

What the CAS ruling on Skënderbeu shows is that action can be taken if you have a proper monitoring system. Again, monitoring is not the sole solution to this problem, but it represents an additional evidentiary tool and can play an important role in legal proceedings. We should remember that match-fixing is linked to corruption and that the parties involved will inevitably “seek to use evasive means to ensure that they will leave no trail of their wrongdoing”.[34] Importantly, the legal framework governing match-fixing is clearly different for ordinary courts, where “the applicable rules in terms of procedure, proof (types of evidence and standard of proof) and substance are not the same as those that apply before UEFA and the CAS”.[35] In this context, a monitoring system can play a key legal role in safeguarding the integrity of a competition.



[1] A copy of the CAS award is available at: http://www.uefa.org/disciplinary/casdecisions/index.html.

[2] Article 3(4) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.

[3] See Hill, D. (2016). Why sport is losing the war to match-fixers. Global Corruption Report: Sport, Transparency International, p. 231.

[4] Eight Men Out, directed by John Sayles, which was released in 1988.

[5] See Carpenter, K. (2013). Global Match-Fixing and the United States’ Role in Upholding Sporting Integrity. Berkeley Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law, Vol. 2, Issue 1.

[6] See Sorbonne-ICSS (2014). Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport.

[7] See FIFPro (2016). 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report.

[8] See ESSA (2016). ESSA Q3 2016 Integrity Report.

[9] See Anderson, J. (2014). Match Fixing and Money Laundering. The International Sports Law Journal.

[10] Among others, the Tennis Integrity Unit (see http://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/) or the Cricket Anti-Corruption Unit (see http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/46/anti-corruption/overview).

[11] The full official UEFA statement is accessible at the following link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/2342180/Milan-restored-to-Champions-League.html

[12] See http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/aboutuefa.

[13] CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe SK v UEFA, para. 160 et seqq.

[14] Article 4.02 of both the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17 and the Regulations of the UEFA Europa League 2016/17 (http://www.uefa.org/documentlibrary/regulations/index.html).

[15] The CAS has reviewed a total of six cases relating to the refusal of admission on grounds of integrity. See generally Deakes, N. (2014). Match-Fixing in football: The epistemology of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Jurisprudence. Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal

[16] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 141.

[17] Ibid., para. 136.

[18] CAS 2014/A/3625, Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 123.

[19] Ibid., para. 128.

[20] CAS 2014/A/3628, Eskişehirspor Kulübü v UEFA, para. 136.

[21] Ibid., para. 105.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Calculated odds are a mathematical representation of the true probability of an occurrence, without the external effects of money and subjective opinions. In effect, they show what should be happening to the odds, instead of what is actually happening.

[24] See Forrest, D., & McHale, I. (2015). An evaluation of Sportradar’s fraud detection system.

[25] See García, E. (2015). UEFA’s Judicial Bodies. Football Legal, Issue 4.

[26] See Article 24(4) of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations.

[27] See Article 4.03 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2016/17.

[28] CAS 2016/A/4650 Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA, para. 82.

[29] Ibid., para. 85.

[30] Ibid., para. 86.

[31] Ibid., para. 87.

[32] Ibid., para. 97.

[33] Ibid., para. 79.

[34] CAS 2010/A/2172, Mr Oleg Oriekhov v UEFA, para. 54.

[35] TAS 2011/A/2528, Olympiacos Volou FC v UEFA, para. 136.

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