Editor's note: Deeksha Malik is a final-year student at National Law Institute University, India. Her main interest areas are corporate law, arbitration, and sports law. She can be reached at dkshmalik726@gmail.com.

In 2015, while interrogating cricketer Sreesanth and others accused in the IPL match-fixing case, Justice Neena Bansal, sitting as Additional Sessions Judge, made the following observations as regards betting on cricket matches.

“Cricket as a game of skill requires hand-eye-coordination for throwing, catching and hitting. It requires microscopic levels of precision and mental alertness for batsmen to find gaps or for bowlers to produce variety of styles of deliveries’ (medium pace, fast, inswing, outswing, offspin, legspin, googly). The sport requires strategic masterminds that can select the most efficient fielding positions for piling pressure on the batsmen. Based on above description, cricket cannot be described anything, but as a game of skill.”

The debate on the issue of betting in sports has since resurfaced and gained the attention of sportspersons, media, sports bodies, policymakers, and the general public. In April 2017, the Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Dipak Misra and AM Khanwilkar agreed to hear a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking an order directing the government to come up with an appropriate framework for regulating betting in sports. The arguments put forth in the PIL present various dimensions. One of these pertains to economic considerations, a submission that regulated betting would be able to generate annual revenue of Rs. 12,000 crores by bringing the earnings therefrom within the tax net. As for policy considerations, it was submitted that a proper regulation in this area would enable the government to distinguish harmless betting from activities that impair the integrity of the game such as match-fixing. Further, betting on cricket matches largely depends on the skill of the concerned players, thereby distinguishing it from pure chance-based activities.

The issue of sports betting witnesses a divided opinion till this day. This is understandable, for both sides to the issue have equally pressing arguments. Aside from its regulation being a daunting task for authorities, sports betting is susceptible to corruption and other unscrupulous activities. At the same time, it is argued that it would be better for both the game and the economy if the same is legalised.

THE MAGNITUDE OF CONSIDERATIONS

It is feared by some that the consequences of recognition and legalisation of betting could be negative, considering what happened in Australia. Australia legalised online betting in 2001, and by 2009, it found itself in a situation where betting took over the sporting landscape in a big way. The impact was clearly visible; betting was marketed extensively in public places, attracting many young potential punters. Some found the trend disturbing, for sports fans were more concerned about their personal gains than about the sport itself. It is estimated that around 500,000 Australians are on the verge of becoming “problem gamblers.”

There has been an increasing support for the other side of the debate that argues for recognition of betting as a legal activity. It is argued that criminalising betting does not prevent its happening; it merely drives the activity underground where it continues to thrive. Add to it the substantial revenues that government would be able to obtain therefrom. In fact, the Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Reforms in Cricket, also called the Lodha Committee Report, submitted that given the worldwide legal sports betting market which is worth over $400 billion, it will be in the best interest of the economy if betting is given legal recognition.

POSITION IN THE USA AND THE UK: GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF THE UK-BASED MODEL

In the USA, federal law has taken a tough stand against betting and gambling. The 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) makes it unlawful for a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly, on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate. The provision prima facie makes no distinction between betting and gambling, and it is, therefore, irrelevant for the purpose of establishing an offence under this provision whether the activity in question involves skill or not.

On the other hand, one may refer to the position in the UK, where there has been a well-developed betting market with appropriate measures to ensure that the system is not abused. The governing organisation in this regard is the UK Gambling Commission, initially set up under the 1960 Betting and Gaming Act which works in partnership with all the sporting bodies which, in turn, frame their own bye-laws to regulate betting.[1] Apart from licensing requirements, the framework provides for an information-sharing system, whereby bookies are required to report any suspicious betting activity within their knowledge to the Gambling Commission.[2] The example of the UK shows how through appropriate safeguards and implementation policy that involves various stakeholders such as the sports bodies and the booking companies, sports betting could be effectively regulated, bringing, at the same time, significant economic advantage. It does not come as a surprise that a majority of Americans have advocated for a UK-based model.

Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States began dealing with the issue in the case of Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. The State of New Jersey seeks to get the PASPA annulled, which, in turn, would facilitate state-sponsored sports betting. It is being submitted that the federal government through the aforesaid statute is violating the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment, according to which states cannot be mandated to carry federal acts into effect. The outcome of the case would certainly have an impact on the debate, one way or the other.

POSITION IN INDIA: THE ‘GAME OF SKILL’ DEBATE

In India, the power to legislate on betting and gambling is conferred on states, since these subjects are enlisted in the State List. Nevertheless, the pre-independence legislation, namely the 1867 Public Gambling Act (Act), is still valid today, though some states have enacted their own laws pertaining to betting and gambling. Section 12 of this Act provides that it does not apply to a ‘game of skill.’ The legislation, therefore, makes a distinction between a ‘game of chance’ and a ‘game of skill.’ The term ‘game of chance’ has been explained in the case of Rex v. Fortier[3] as a game “determined entirely or in part by lot or mere luck, and in which judgment, practice, skill or adroitness has honestly no office at all or is thwarted by chance.” It has further been held in the case of State v. Gupton that any athletic game or sport is not a game of chance and instead depends on a number of factors such as skill, ability, form and practice of the participants.

At this juncture, reference must be made to the case of KR Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, wherein it was held by the Supreme Court of India that horse racing, foot racing, boat racing, football and baseball are all games of skill. Betting on, say, a horse race entails use of evaluative skills in order to assess several factors such as speed and stamina of the horse, performance of the jockey, and the like. Similarly, the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. K Satyanarayana observed that rummy is not like a three-card game which is based substantially on chance. There is considerable amount of skill involved in memorising the cards, or in holding and discharging them, in a rummy game. The uncertainty involved in shuffling and distribution of the cards does not alter the character of the game to one based on chance.

Based on these judgments, it is reasonable to infer that betting in cricket, too, is an activity involving sufficient skill and is not based merely on chance. A person who studies the form and performance of a player, the conditions of play and the like could predict the outcome of a game with a reasonable accuracy. The mere uncertainty of the outcome should not come in the way of understanding sports betting as an activity based on skill. Considering this important factor, the government should proceed to develop an appropriate framework to regulate betting. 

A PRACTICAL POLICY FRAMEWORK

The International Cricket Council, too, has suggested that India should come up with a suitable policy framework to regulate betting.[4] Such a framework would keep a check on individuals and further help detect and prevent corrupt activities. The above-mentioned Lodha Committee Report has strongly recommended legalising cricket betting in India. The suggestion is based on the premise that while match-fixing interferes with the integrity of the game itself and is unacceptable, betting is a “general malaise” indulged by different sections of the society and is capable of being regulated. Therefore, betting should not be equated with unscrupulous activities such as match-fixing.

Having been so distinguished, a regulation along the lines of the UK model could be put in place to establish regulatory watchdogs tasked with monitoring betting houses and persons entering into betting transactions. Those placing bets could be brought within a licensing system wherein their identification and other details are recorded. This could be supplemented by an information-sharing mechanism whereby a database of undesirable entities such as bookies and fixers would be shared with players so that they do not remain in the dark with respect to suspicious activities. Importantly, players, match officials and administrators should be kept out of such regulated betting, and they should continue to be bound by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) and IPL rules. It is important to note here that the BCCI Anti-Corruption Code prohibits participants from soliciting, authorising, placing, accepting, laying, or otherwise entering into any bet with any person in relation to the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any match or event. The Code further makes it an offence to ensure “the occurrence of a particular incident in a match or event, which occurrence is to the participant’s knowledge the subject of a bet and for which he/she expects to receive or has received any reward.” As can be seen from the provisions, the liability is imposed specifically on the participant. This is in line with the opinion of the Lodha Committee, which has recommended that if betting were to be legalised, the players should nevertheless be barred from indulging in the activity so as to prevent any apprehension concerning their integrity. It is submitted that bringing these reforms in the current uncertain and highly ambiguous regime would address several surrounding issues, provided all the stakeholders work in tandem.

Lesson could be learnt from the state of Nagaland, which recently enacted a law, namely the 2016 Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act. The said legislation defines “games of skill” as including “all such games where there is a preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets, or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses, or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen.” Besides providing such an inclusive definition, the Act sets out a schedule enlisting certain activities that shall be regarded as games of skill, such as poker, rummy and virtual games of cricket and football. All such games shall be regulated by way of issuance of a license to persons or entities based in India. Upon receiving the license, such a person or entity is eligible to earn revenue from games of skill, whether by way of advertising, obtaining a share of winnings or charging a fee for membership.

Some stakeholders are advocating for a uniform legislation on betting that would ensure that the legal position on betting remains the same across all the states. In July 2017, the All India Gaming Federation along with an advisory panel presented a white paper to Law Commissioner BS Chauhan, recommending a central legislation regulating online skill gaming, and that sports betting in general and cricket betting in particular be recognised as a game of skill. Such a legislation could introduce a system of checks and balances along the lines of that existing in the UK, for instance. A proposal has also been moved from the Central Information Commission in the case of Subhash Chandra Agrawal v. PIO, recommending the Government of India to consider moving the subject of sports from the State List in the Constitution of India to the Concurrent List so as to ensure a uniform policy regulating sports bodies and national sports federations such as the BCCI.

CONCLUSION

The international discourse on the issue of sports betting shows just how inadequate the Indian legal regime is to cater to the same. Suggestions have been pouring in from all quarters as to how, upon being legalized, cricket betting could be regulated. These suggestions, along with international best practices concerning ethics and betting, should be taken into account by the legislature and the executive to bring in an appropriate framework to address cricket betting. This, of course, requires the active participation of all the stakeholders, with the BCCI leading the way. 

[1] Ali Qtaishat and Ashish Kumar, ‘Surveying the Legality Issues and Current Developments’ (2013) 20 JL Policy and & Globalization 40, 42.

[2] See Gambling Act 2005 s 88.

[3] Rex v. Fortier 13 Que. KB 308.

[4] Rohini Mahyera, ‘Saving Cricket: A Proposal for the Legalization of Gambling in India to Regulate Corrupt Betting Practices in Cricket’ (2012) 26 Emory Int'l L. Rev.

On Thursday 14 October 2021 from 16.00-17.30 CET, the Asser International Sports Law Centre, in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret (University of Lausanne), will be launching the second season of the Zoom-In webinar series, with a first episode on Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Time for a Changing of the Guard?

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is a well-known mainstay of global sport. It has the exclusive competence over challenges against decisions taken by most international sports governing bodies and its jurisprudence covers a wide range of issues (doping, corruption, match-fixing, financial fair play, transfer or selection disputes) including disciplinary sanctions and governance disputes. In recent years, the CAS has rendered numerous awards which triggered world-wide public interest, such as in the Semenya v World Athletics case or the case between WADA and RUSADA resulting from the Russian doping scandal (we discussed both cases in previous Zoom-In discussion available here and here). In short, the CAS has tremendous influence on the shape of global sport and its governance.

However, as we will discuss during this webinar, recent work has shown that the arbitrators active at the CAS are hardly reflective of the diversity of people its decisions ultimately affect. This in our view warrants raising the question of the (urgent) need to change the (arbitral) guard at the CAS. To address these issues with us, we have invited two speakers who have played an instrumental role in putting numbers on impressions widely shared by those in contact with the CAS: Prof. Johan Lindholm (Umea University) and attorney-at-law Lisa Lazarus (Morgan Sports Law). Johan recently published a ground-breaking monograph on The Court of Arbitration for Sport and Its Jurisprudence in which he applies empirical and quantitative methods to analyse the work of the CAS. This included studying the sociological characteristics of CAS arbitrators. Lisa and her colleagues at Morgan Sports Law very recently released a blog post on Arbitrator Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which reveals a stunning lack of diversity (based on their calculations, 4,5% of appointed CAS arbitrators are female and 0,2% are black) at the institution ruling over global sport.

Guest speakers:

• Prof. Johan Lindholm (Umea University)
• Lisa Lazarus (Morgan Sports Law)

Moderators:

• Dr Antoine Duval (Asser Institute)
• Dr Marjolaine Viret (University of Lausanne/PMA Avocats)

Register for free HERE.

Zoom In webinar series

Editor's note
Piotr is an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre.

Introduction

On 24 July the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) issued its decision in the proceedings brought by the Indian athlete Ms. Dutee Chand against the Athletics Federation of India (AFI) and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) in which she challenged the validity of the IAAF Regulations Governing Eligibility of Female with Hyperandrogenism to Compete in Women’s Competition (Regulations). The Regulations were established in 2011 as a response to the controversies surrounding South African athlete Caster Semenya (see e.g. here, here, and here), and for the purpose of safeguarding fairness in sport by prohibiting women with hyperandrogenism, i.e. those with excessive levels of endogenous (naturally occurring) testosterone, from competing in women athletics competitions. Owing to the subject-matter that the Regulations cover, the case before the CAS generated complex legal, scientific and ethical questions. The following case note thus aims at explaining how the Panel addressed the issues raised by the Indian athlete. It follows a previous blog we published in December 2014 that analysed the arguments raised in favour of Ms. Chand.

The Facts

Since 2012 Ms. Chand has been a resident at the National Institute of Sports, a training facility operated by the Sports Authority of India (SAI).[1] In 2013 the Indian Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport introduced the Standard Operative Procedure which became binding on the SAI.[2] The purpose of the measure was to establish rules governing investigations, diagnosis and assessment of eligibility to compete of female athletes with hyperandrogenism.[3] According to Ms. Chand, in mid-2014 she was asked by the Director of the AFI to undergo a doping test.[4] During a meeting with Dr. Mendiratta, the Chairperson of the AFI’s Medical Commission, the athlete was informed that she needed to undertake a routine medical examination.[5] She was then subjected to an ultrasound scan instead of a blood test.[6] While denying that the medical examination had anything to do with gender determination or hypernadrogenism testing, Dr Mendiratta admitted that a number of athletes expressed their concerns regarding Ms. Chand’s appearance, and questioned whether she should be permitted to compete in female athletics competitions.[7] After additional tests at the SAI’s training camp, Ms. Chand was notified that she would neither be allowed to compete in the World Junior Championships, nor would she be eligible for selection for the Commonwealth Games due to high levels of testosterone detected in her body.[8] The information subsequently reached the media, thus compromising the confidentiality of the athlete’s case.[9] At the end of August 2014 Ms. Chand received a letter from the AFI informing her that she has been provisionally suspended from participating in any athletics events with immediate effect.[10] On 26 September 2014 the athlete filed an appeal against the decision asking the CAS to declare the Regulations invalid and void, and to set aside the AFI’s decision.[11] Even though the decision to suspend Ms. Chand was taken by the AFI, both the IAAF and the AFI agreed to the submission of the dispute to the jurisdiction of the CAS[13] which then addressed the following issues:

I.      Do the Regulations discriminate against certain female athletes on the basis of a natural physical characteristic and/or sex?

II.    Should the Regulations be declared invalid on the basis that there is insufficient scientific evidence to uphold them?

III.  Should the Regulations be regarded as disproportionate?

IV.  Are the Regulations invalid because they are a form of unauthorised anti-doping sanction?[14]

Decision of the CAS

As a preliminary point the CAS addressed the issue of the burden and the standard of proof. Concerning the former, the parties agreed that the onus of proof as to the validity of the Regulations lies with Ms. Chand, and that in case the instrument is found to be prima facie discriminatory the burden will shift to the IAAF to establish that the Regulations are justified and proportionate.[15] If the IAAF was to succeed in establishing that the measure is justified and proportionate it was then for the athlete to disprove the grounds for the justification.[16] Ms. Chand also accepted that she bears the burden of proof as to the scientific basis for the Regulations and the issue of its validity.[17] Moreover, referring to the decision in Pistorius[18], the Panel indicated that the balance of probabilities was to be the appropriate standard of proof.[19] However, the Panel indicated that the ‘standard to justify discrimination of a fundamental right, which includes the right to compete as recognised in the Hyperandrogenism Regulations, should be to a level higher than that of the balance of probabilities’.[20]

Subsequently, and in connection to the issue of discrimination, the parties and the CAS agreed that the Regulations place restrictions on the eligibility of certain female athletes to compete on the basis of a natural physical characteristic.[21] Moreover, the instrument required female athletes to undergo testing for levels of endogenous testosterone, an obligation that does not apply to male athletes. Therefore, the Regulations were regarded by the CAS as prima facie discriminatory.[22] Consequently, it was for the IAAF to prove that the measures were necessary, reasonable, and proportionate for the purpose of establishing a level playing field for female athletes (the third issue).[23]

On the question regarding the scientific basis for the Regulations the parties agreed that lean body mass (LBM) contributes to increased sports performance, however, disagreed on the question of the effect of testosterone in generating LBM.[24] The Panel thus deemed it necessary to firstly look at the issue of the relationship between testosterone and athletic performance, and secondly, the difference between endogenous and exogenous testosterone. Concerning the former, the athlete’s expert tried to convince the Panel that on the basis of a study by Healy et al, which compared 24 variables between elite male and female athletes such as hormone levels and body fat,[25] no correlation between testosterone levels and LBM can be established.[26] It was further argued, without support in clinical or scientific data however, that the difference in LBM ratios in males and females should not be attributed solely to testosterone, but also to sociological and biological factors including the growth hormone.[27] It was also submitted, again as a mere hypothesis, that if testosterone was the key determinant of athletic performance, men with low testosterone should not be capable of successfully competing in sporting events.[28] In their response the IAAF’s experts criticized the above-mentioned study pointing at its methodological limitations (failure to use state-of-the-art methods for measuring testosterone),[29] the fact that the samples were not taken for medical purposes,[30] the timing of the blood samples (those were taken after competitions when testosterone levels in men are likely to be decreased),[31] and the lack of a discussion on the correlation between testosterone and LBM.[32] In this regard the Panel noted that, contrary to the athlete’s experts, the IAAF’s experts, relying on inter alia the Harper study, specifically addressed the relationship between testosterone and LBM. The IAAF’s experts thus established evidence for testosterone being the key factor underlying the difference in male and female athletes’ performance.[33] Moreover, the Panel agreed with the IAAF’s experts that ‘outliers’, i.e. athletes with abnormal levels of testosterone, should not be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the average testosterone levels of male and female athletes.[34] Consequently, the CAS decided that by failing to sufficiently address the issue of the relationship between testosterone and LBM, Ms. Chand did not present a case that testosterone is not a material factor in determining athletic performance.[35]

The relevance of the second sub-issue was due to the fact that the athlete and her experts agreed that exogenous testosterone has performance enhancing effects.[36] Also here the Panel was faced with contradicting evidence and testimonies. Ms. Chand’s experts indicated that the 2005 Sader study established that exogenous and endogenous testosterone may have opposite effects.[37] Furthermore, on the basis of the research done by Crewthler et al it was argued that both ‘types’ of testosterone do not necessarily lead to the same results in terms of muscle growth enhancement.[38] The IAAF’s experts did not accept these arguments. They described the Sader study as flawed in terms of the methodology used (e.g. lack of specification as to whether the subjects themselves were hyperandrogenic),[39] and submitted that the research done by Crewthler et al has not only been misrepresented since it focused on examining the short-term effects of exogenous and endogenous testosterone, but also that its findings were inconclusive.[40] Furthermore, the IAAF referred to the Cardinale and Stone study which examined both the testosterone levels and jumping abilities of female volleyball players and sprinters, and where the correlation between endogenous testosterone and performance has been established.[41] The counter argument by the athlete’s experts that the difference between sprinters and volleyball players may be due to the different nature of the two sports was considered by the Panel as a speculation and a hypothesis which cannot trump the established data and was thus rejected.[42] As a result, the CAS ruled that, based on the current scientific knowledge, it is not possible to conclude with certainty whether a difference between exogenous and endogenous testosterone exists.[43] Hence, as the burden of proof was on the athlete, she failed to prove the existence of such a difference which in turn led the CAS to conclude that there is a scientific basis for the use of testosterone as the determining factor under the Regulations.[44]

On the issue of proportionality the CAS underlined that it was of the view that endogenous testosterone is a key biological indicator of the difference between males and females.[45] It also noted that there are two categories of competitions, namely male and female, and that they cover all athletes wishing to compete.[46] However, the CAS also pointed out that it is contrary to the fundamental principles of Olympism to prevent some women from competing as a consequence of the natural and unaltered state of their body.[47] As a consequence, the Regulations could stand only if the IAAF could prove that the measures were necessary and proportionate for achieving the goal of safeguarding fair competition. And since the Regulations were based on a premise that women with hyperandrogenism enjoy a significant performance advantage, the degree of the advantage became the key issue in assessing the proportionality of the measure.[48] Here, the CAS relied on expert testimonies in order to assess both the quantitative and qualitative effects of high levels of testosterone on female athletes. Concerning the former, the CAS concluded that there is currently no evidence as to the exact effect of hyperandrogenism on female athletes’ performance.[49] Regarding the latter, the Panel found that medical examinations of female athletes are similarly not capable of providing sufficient data to illustrate what degree of competitive advantage results from endogenous testosterone over the level of 10 nmol/L that has been accepted as the threshold for the purpose of the Regulations.[50] Hence, the CAS was not able to conclude that hyperandrogenic female athletes enjoy a substantial competitive advantage.[51]  Excluding them from competing unless they agree to take medication or undergo a treatment cannot be regarded as a necessary and proportionate means of safeguarding fairness.

Lastly, the CAS rejected the athlete’s contention that the Regulations constitute an impermissible doping sanction. The Panel indicated that anti-doping sanctions seek only to punish the use of external substances by athletes and endogenous testosterone cannot be regarded as such.[52] Moreover, the CAS indicated that the Regulations provide for eligibility rules, and thus, have not been established to regulate prohibited conduct and to impose sanctions for violations, and do not involve any reprimand or censure.[53] Also, athletes banned on the basis of hyperandrogenism can resume competing as soon as they comply with the eligibility criteria.[54] Finally, the Panel noted that the Regulations do not purport to modify, supplement, or expand the WADA’s list of prohibited substances.[55] Consequently, the athletes last ground of appeal was rejected by the CAS.

Conclusion

The Dutee Chand affair has not quite reached the global climax experienced at the time of the Pistorius award in 2008. Yet, similar complex scientific facts and assessments are at play in evaluating whether high levels of endogenous testosterone provide such a competitive advantage to a women that she should be deprived of her fundamental right to compete in sporting competitions. The complexity of the matter is reflected in the length of the award (161 pages). In that regard the Pistorius decision was much shorter (14 pages). The arbitrators decided to comprehensively reflect the current state of scientific knowledge and debate over the role of high endogenous testosterone in providing a competitive edge to female athletes. This is a commendable feat of transparent decision-making by a Court and enables commentators and scientist to critically engage with the assessment made. On the scientific side of the case, the CAS arbitrators sided with IAAF. They recognise that high endogenous testosterone might provide a competitive advantage to Ms. Chand. Yet, and this is the important final twist in the decision, this does not imply that anything goes to deprive these athletes of their right to compete. Indeed, this right to compete is deemed so fundamental (obviously in line with what sport is in the end about) that a drastic restriction to it, as the one imposed on Ms. Dutee Chand, can only be justified if it is absolutely necessary and proportionate. In other words, the right to compete trumps policy decisions of international federations when these decisions are not sufficiently grounded in supporting reasons and facts. This is where the burden of proof shifts back onto the IAAF: is a high endogenous testosterone level susceptible to give an athlete such a competitive advantage that the fairness of the races be jeopardised? The IAAF has two years to demonstrate this assertion, in the meantime it will have to tolerate Ms. Chand in its competitions and we will get the opportunity to see whether or not she will outrageously dominate the world’s best runners.

[1] CAS 2014/A/3759 Dutee Chand v Athletics Federation of India and the International Association of Athletics Federations (Dutee Chand), para 8

[2] Ibidem, para 9

[3] Ibidem

[4] Ibidem, para 11

[5] Ibidem

[6] Ibidem

[7] Ibidem, para 12

[8] Ibidem, paras 15-16

[9] Ibidem, paras 17-20

[10] Ibidem, para 27

[11] Ibidem, para 75

[12] Ibidem, paras 106, 114, 358

[13] Ibidem, paras 424, 428-430, 436

[14] Ibidem, para 32

[15] Ibidem, para 441

[16] Ibidem, para 445

[17] Ibidem, paras 442-443

[18] CAS 2008/A/1480 Oscar Pistorius v the International Association of Athletics Federations

[19] Dutee Chand, paras 446-447

[20] Ibidem, para 443

[21] Ibidem, paras 448-450

[22] Ibidem, para 448

[23] Ibidem, para 449

[24] Ibidem, para 454

[25] Ibidem, para 137

[26] Ibidem, para 455

[27] Ibidem, paras 156, 460-461

[28] Ibidem, para 465

[29] Ibidem, para 456

[30] Ibidem, paras 151, 461

[31] Ibidem, para 456

[32] Ibidem

[33] Ibidem, paras 459, 462, 469

[34] Ibidem, para 467-468, 494

[35] Ibidem, paras 498-499

[36] Ibidem, para 490

[37] Ibidem, para 475

[38] Ibidem, para 478

[39] Ibidem, para 476

[40] Ibidem, para 478

[41] Ibidem, para 480

[42] Ibidem, para 481

[43] Ibidem, paras 479, 488

[44] Ibidem, paras 488, 498-499

[45] Ibidem, para 511

[46] Ibidem, para 512

[47] Ibidem, para 513

[48] Ibidem, para 517

[49] Ibidem, para 521

[50] Ibidem, para 530

[51] Ibidem, paras 524, 527, 532, 534-535

[52] Ibidem, para 543

[53] Ibidem, para 544

[54] Ibidem

[55] Ibidem, para 545