Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The EU State aid and Sport Saga – A blockade to Florentino Perez’ latest “galactic” ambitions (part 2)

This is the second part of a blog series on the Real Madrid State aid case. In the previous blog on this case, an outline of all the relevant facts was provided and I analysed the first criterion of Article 107(1) TFEU, namely the criterion that an advantage must be conferred upon the recipient for the measure to be considered State aid. Having determined that Real Madrid has indeed benefited from the land transactions, the alleged aid measure has to be scrutinized under the other criteria of Article 107(1): the measure must be granted by a Member State or through State resources; the aid granted must be selective; and it must distorts or threatens to distort competition. In continuation, this blog will also analyze whether the alleged aid measure could be justified and declared compatible with EU law under Article 107(3) TFEU.


The aid is granted by the State or through State resources

In its decision to launch a formal investigation, the Commission concluded that Real Madrid “enjoyed an advantage which derives from State resources, as the State forgoes possible revenues”.[1] Given that the Commission argued in 2002 that a requalification of a terrain does not entail State aid because there was no transfer of State resources and given that the facts regarding the requalification show some striking similarities with the current case, it is surprising that the Commission provided such a limited analysis. This might leave open the possibility for Real Madrid or the Council to argue that they could have legitimately expected that the land transactions concerned were free of a transfer of State resources. Therefore, it would have been more prudent for the Commission to further highlight the differences between the case in question and its decision not to start an investigation in 2002.

As regards land sale transactions, the land that is sold under market value by the public authorities is to be considered a State resource. The agreements to (1) compensate Real Madrid for the terrain in “Las Tablas” by providing the club other terrains and (2) to provide Real Madrid the land between the stadium and the “Paseo de la Castellana” are both imputable to the Council of Madrid and imply a loss of State resources. As regards the ad hoc modification of the PGOU, even though the modification provides a selective advantage to Real Madrid, this measure is unlikely to qualify as State aid, because no State resource has been transferred. 


The selectivity of the aid granted

With regard to whether the agreements favoured Real Madrid over its competitors, the Council could hold that both agreements could only be made with Real Madrid and not with any other football club. The first agreement involved a compensation for the impossibility to transfer a land from the Council to Real Madrid and the second agreement concerned further land transactions between Real Madrid and the council that, due to the location of several of the terrains in question, could not be offered to another football club.

Nonetheless, both measures at hand can most definitely be considered selective, thereby favouring Real Madrid over its competitors. The agreement of 29 July 2011 is selective because it only involves Real Madrid. Not only does the compensation include an economic advantage for the club, Real Madrid will also have the acquired terrains at full disposal, allowing it to sell, rent, swap or construct in any way it pleases.

Moreover, despite that the Council stated that Real Madrid had to bear all the costs for the construction of the hotel, the parking space and the shopping centre, it is also true that all the benefits of the exploitation will go directly to the football club and not to any of its competitors. The competitors, in this sense, should be interpreted wider than just being other football clubs. The Council has not given any reasons why a hotel and shopping centre in one of the main streets of Madrid has to be exploited by the undertaking Real Madrid. The “Bernabéu-Opañel” plan is therefore also selective in that it favours Real Madrid over competitors that exploit hotels and shopping centres. 


The aid has an effect on inter-State trade and distorts competition

In order for the measures to fall within the prohibition of Article 107(1), there must be an effect on competition and inter-State trade. For this condition to be fulfilled, it is sufficient that the Commission can establish a link between the measures in question and a potential effect on competition and trade. The recipient, Real Madrid, is an undertaking that operates in the European football sector. The 29 July 2011 Agreement could have allowed Real Madrid to receive a higher compensation than what it should have gotten, had the Council used the market values of the terrains in question. The economic advantage obtained by Real Madrid could be used to strengthen its position in the football sector. The same can be said for the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel”. A possible economic advantage deriving from this measure enables the football club to generate profits from the exploitation of a hotel and a shopping centre. This extra income could enable them to strengthen their team by buying new players. A strengthened Real Madrid would distort competition since other football clubs have not enjoyed the same support.

Secondly, the fact that the measure facilitates Real Madrid to run and exploit a hotel in one of the most important streets of Madrid, distorts competition in the hotel sector as well. Other hotels might generate less money because Real Madrid is exploiting an indirectly publicly subsidized hotel.

All the four criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU are fulfilled. The land transactions have created an advantage to the recipient, Real Madrid. Furthermore, the lands provided by the Council are to be regarded as State resources and, given that the measures were selective, competition has been distorted.  


Can the aid be justified?

The moment an aid measure fulfils all the criteria of Article 107(1), it will be seen as constituting State aid. However, the measure could still be deemed justified under certain conditions in accordance with EU Law. There are no EU Regulations or Commission guidelines on the application of State aid rules to commercial sporting activities. Therefore, the question whether the aid can be justified needs to be based on the conditions set in Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.[2] Article 107(3)c) provides that aid may be compatible if it facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. The Commission understands that the specific nature of sport needs to be taken into account when dealing with State aid cases, as sport fulfils educational, public health, social and recreational functions. Furthermore, it is established Commission practice that a measure may be declared compatible if it is necessary and proportionate and if the positive effects for the common objective outweigh the negative effects on competition and trade.[3] In a Hungarian State aid case dating from 2011, the Commission approved an aid measure for the Hungarian sport sector, since the general objective of the measure (“increase the participation of the general public in youth activities”) took into account Hungary’s commitments that the benefits would be distributed to the widest possible beneficiaries, and is therefore in line with the common market. [4]

Furthermore, over the last two years the Commission has reached several final decisions involving State aid granted for the construction of football stadiums. For example, in a decision dating from 20 November 2013, the Commission decided not to raise objections regarding the plan of the Flemish government to subsidize the renovation and the construction of multifunctional football stadiums as the State aid contained therein was deemed compatible with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. Even though all the criteria of Article 107 (1) were fulfilled, the Commission acknowledged that the social, cultural and educational return of football stadiums plays a central role in the decision whether the aid could should be declared compatible. Since all the stadiums in question would have a clear multifunctional character and different players could use the stadiums for different events, the Commission found that the general public would benefit from the aid and that the positive effects would outweigh the negative effects.[5]

When applying the balancing test to the possible aid measures involving Real Madrid, firstly, as regards the 29 July 2011 Agreement, there does not appear to be an objective of common interest. The agreement was made with the sole objective of compensating Real Madrid and was not beneficial for the general public.

As regards the “Bernabéu-Opañel” on the other hand, the Council held that the operation would create additional “green zones” for the city and that the hotel and shopping centre would provide work to around 600 people. The question remains, however, whether the positive effects derived from the creation of 600 jobs outweigh the negative effects on competition and trade.

In its decision, the Commission considered that it did not appear to pursue an objective of common interest, which could justify an economic advantage to one of the biggest and most successful operators in a highly competitive economic sector. [6] Indeed, the only player in the football sector that will benefit from the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel” is Real Madrid. The fact that Real Madrid could generate profits from the hotel and shopping centre will not be beneficial to other football clubs operating in the football sector, nor will it be beneficial to the football sector in general. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the positive effects of the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel” outweigh the negative effects on competition and trade.  


The recovery of the aid and possible consequences of a negative decision

A measure which constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and which is declared incompatible with the internal market, is unlawful. Therefore, should the Commission find that the agreements between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid constitute unlawful aid, it will order Spain to recover the aid provided to the club.  


The Recovery of the aid

The purpose of recovery is to re-establish the situation existing before aid was unlawfully granted.[7] The procedural rules on the recovery of unlawful aid are laid down in in Council Regulation 659/1999. Article 14(1) of the Regulation provides that “the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary”. Not only is the Commission exclusively competent to decide whether or not a measure constitutes unlawful State aid, it is also exclusively competent to request from a Member State to recover the unlawful State aid. Importantly, however, the recovery itself shall be done in accordance with the procedures under the law of the Member State concerned, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the Commission’s decision.[8] As regards the quantification of the aid, there is no provision of Union law that requires the Commission to quantify the exact amount of aid to be recovered.[9] Nonetheless, the Commission may include information in its recovery decision enabling the addressee of the decision to work out that amount itself without overmuch difficulty.[10]

To establish the amount of aid to be recovered, one needs to firstly determine the total advantage obtained by Real Madrid and the exact moment in which Real Madrid started obtaining the advantage. At this stage in time it is difficult to determine what the Commission could consider as possible advantage. It is neither known whether the Commission takes all land transactions into account, nor is it clear what the exact value of each parcel is due to the complexity of the case and the lack of relevant information. However, once a total advantage is established, and with that the total amount of aid to be recovered, this amount would also probably include interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the Commission.[11]  Interest would be payable from the date the unlawful aid was put at the disposal of Real Madrid until the date of effective recovery. The aid can be recovered by means of a cash payment. However, alternative measures are allowed provided that the Member State ensures that the measure chosen is transparent and eliminates the distortion of competition caused by the unlawful aid. 


The consequences of a negative decision

The direct consequence of a negative decision for Real Madrid is that the situation existing before the aid was unlawfully granted would have to be re-established. Whether this situation concerns the time before the agreement of 1998, the Agreement of 29 July 2011 or before the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel” was conducted will depend on the Commission’s decision. An analysis of other Commission decisions involving land transactions in which the Commission ordered recovery of the aid indicates that the Commission does not simply undo the land transaction itself. The Commission decision that led to the Konsum Nord case included the order directed to the Swedish authorities to recover an amount equal to the difference between the amount offered for a land by the supermarket “Lidl” and the amount paid by the supermarket “Konsum”.[12] With regard to a Dutch case on an alleged sale of land below market price, the Commission established that the amount to be recovered consisted of the difference of the price paid by the undertaking “SJB” and the price initially agreed between the “SJB” and the local authorities. A third very recent example concerned unlawful forest swap transactions in Bulgaria. The Commission ordered Bulgaria to either recover the incompatible State aid granted or undo the swaps concerned. In other words, undoing the land transaction is merely an option and never an obligation.

Keeping the Commission practice in mind, in case of a negative Commission decision, the most likely scenario is that the Commission will oblige Spain to recover the advantage Real Madrid obtained from the transactions, but that the transactions themselves will not be undone. Therefore, the obvious direct consequences for the football club will constitute in paying a lump sum to the Spanish authorities equal to the difference between the valuation of the parcels as established by the Commission and as valued by the Council of Madrid.  

A more far-reaching consequence, such as an unlimited suspension of the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel”, are rather unlikely. The recovery will be done under national law[13], thus further recovery actions mainly depend on Spanish national law. The ad hoc modification of the Plan General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid de 1997 (PGOU) that opened up the possibility of constructing on the terrain between the stadium and the “Paseo de la Castellana” can, therefore, only be challenged under national law.

If the consequences of a negative decision are only limited to paying a lump sum and, given the fact that Real Madrid is possibly financially the most powerful football club in the world, one could legitimately ask the question what the fuss is all about. Indeed, why would Real Madrid worry about paying a lump sum of, say, €20 million when its turnover exceeds €600 million per year, and when it is capable of spending more than €100 million in summer transfer fees? In my opinion, the aspects that make the Real Madrid case unlike any other State aid case are not to be found in the amount that constitutes the total financial advantage for the club nor, consequentially, the amount that would have to be recovered. What makes this case special is the very specific role played by citizens and the position Real Madrid has in the football sector. A negative State aid decision involving one of the richest and most successful football clubs in the world would serve as a warning to the entire European football sector that the Commission is serious regarding unlawful State aid granted to football clubs.  

To be continued….


[1] SA.33754 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Spain Real Madrid CF, §36

[2] Article 107(2) and Articles 107(3)a), b) and d) are also justifications, but are not relevant to the case at hand

[3] Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 323, 30.12.2006, p. 1, point 1.3.

[4] SA.31722 Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme, §85-90

[5] SA.37109 (2013/N) – Belgium Football stadiums in Flanders, §28-34

[6] SA.33754 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Spain Real Madrid CF, §38-40

[7] Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, Recital 10

[8] Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, Article 14(3)

[9] Case C-480/98 Spain v Commission [2000] ECR I-8717, §25

[10] Commission Decision SA.24123 Alleged sale of land below market price by the Municipality of Leidschendam-Voorburg, §107

[11] Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, Article 14(2)

[12] Commission Decision No C 35/2006 – implemented by Sweden for Konsum Jämtland Ekonomisk Förening, §74-77

[13] Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, Article 14(3)

Comments (9) -

  • Florentino Perez

    9/30/2014 11:12:08 PM |

    Nice description but I do believe that you are underestimating the consequences of a decision against Real Madrid. Whilst the Commission may or may not order the recovery of the aid in the form of paying the difference as a lump sum as opposed to unravelling the transactions, the Spanish courts (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid) are already looking at the issue and may order that unravelling. As a matter of fact that court has already halted the Bernabeu redevelopment until the Commission adopts its decision to avoid that the construction works could go ahead in the pieces of land that were exchanged in the 2011 agreements thus preventing the unravelling of the July 2011 agreement (see as.com/.../1406899063_287580.html). It is therefore very likely that, should the Commission confirm that the July 2011 was done at a too favourable price for Real Madrid, the Spanish courts will abort the July 2011's transfer of the land, thus preventing the Bernabeu from being redeveloped and presumably forcing the club to either stick to his old stadium or build a new stadium in the Valbebebas area near its new training grounds if it wanted to increase its match-day revenue. Real Madrid is in deeper trouble than one may think both in this case (Florentino recently said that he was giving his life to get the stadium redeveloped) and in the Spanish Sports Law case but they will not admit it.

    In addition to this, the Commission also expressed doubts in its decision regarding the prices of the second exchange of land (land in the poorer Carabanchel district being exchanged against prime land in La Castellana, probably Madrid's most expensive area) and the price difference could be much bigger than €20 million (probably in the region of €60m although it is difficult to quantify).  

    Kind regards

    • Oskar van Maren

      10/1/2014 2:32:14 PM |

      Thank you for your comment. My predictions were purely based on previous Commission decisions ordering the recovery of aid regarding land transactions. You are however right in saying that in addition, the national court could impose other and more far-reaching sanctions. As regards the decision by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid to suspend all the construction works on the stadium until the Commission reaches a final decision, I would like to stress that one of its arguments was to protect all interested parties, including Real Madrid itself, in case the Commission were to order such a sanction as the unraveling of the land transaction. The damages would be much higher for the football club in case the construction works have already started.
      Personally, I do not deem it likely that the Spanish courts would undo the agreements leading to the construction works for two reasons: Firstly, because the same Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid  has allowed the project under Spanish law in July 2012 (futbol.as.com/.../1342592815_850215.html). Secondly, since I don't think the Commission would oblige Spain to unravel the land transactions, I cannot see a reason why the Spanish court would take such a politically charged measure. I would be glad to hear your opinion on this matter.
      Lastly, as to the current financial numbers of Real Madrid, it is true that several media reports have been saying that they are in trouble. However, other press reports show that the club is in fact not so economically unhealthy as estimated (as.com/.../1411600377_994920.html).
      Either way, let's hope that the Commission's final decision answers many of these questions, because I am very eager to find out.

      Kind regards

      • Florentino Perez

        10/2/2014 1:11:26 PM |

        Many thanks for your response. In terms of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (TSJM) protecting the interests of all parties (including Real Madrid) and whilst this may be in theory the case, the reality though is that this was a huge blow for Real Madrid's plans since both Real Madrid (RM) and Madrid City Council (MCC) were very keen to start the construction works as soon as possible to follow a strategy of fait accompli that would make more difficult that the July 2011 agreement could be unravelled thus ensuring that RM would only have to pay the difference (otherwise as you rightly point out there would be damages for the club for having to stop the construction works and MCC could argue that if the transaction had to be unravelled, RM could sue MCC for damages). This strategy is no longer possible due to TSJM's decision and MCC (acting as always as instructed by RM) immediately challenged that decision with no luck so far.

        TSJM has already adopted a number of politically difficult decisions in the past and the case for declaring the July 2011 null and void under Spanish law is very very strong since the amount owed by RM to MCC for RM's failures to comply with the 1991 agreement (parking lot, etc.) greatly exceeds the amount owed by MCC to RM for the Las Tablas property (which should not exceed €1.5m even under the most favourable valuations for RM) and there was simply no need to include any piece of land in the July 2011 agreement. The only logical solution is that RM pays the difference to MCC and that no land is transferred to RM.

        By the way, Florentino Perez promised back in December that he would hold a press conference to explain all the issues surrounding the EU cases as soon as they were communicated to RM ("Cuando nos llegue una comunicación oficial, daré una rueda de prensa para clarificar esto" www.cadenaser.com/.../Tes) but ten months later we are still awaiting that press conference .

        The reason is that the problems are much deeper than he originally thought and that he has realised that, once the issue hit the public domain, the EU authorities are not as easy to influence as their Spanish counterparts. So far he has been comfortable under the protection of Almunia and his Spanish team that includes some hardcore RM supporters but the situation will change significantly at the end of October when the new commission takes over. As Juan Varela rightly points out, the trust in the commission state aid policies needs to be restored and I do not see any reason why the new commission would not apply the law and simply order Spain to unravel the agreement. Any other solution would set a very dangerous precedent and be very damaging for the reputation of the EU (plus expose the EU unnecessarily to litigation from RM's competitors).

        Keep up the good work, your articles are very enjoyable.

        Best

        • Florentino Perez

          10/16/2014 8:33:56 PM |

          TSJM has confirmed earlier today that, despite Real Madrid's and Madrid City Council's appeals, the Bernabeu redevelopment will continue to be halted pending the EC's decision: www.elmundo.es/.../543faf3922601db7658b4590.html
          Things do not look good for Perez.

  • Juan Varela

    10/1/2014 12:29:14 PM |

    I agree with the previous comment, but I would go a step further:

    The Commission Decision underlines that there was no reason to undo the land exchange in Las Tablas and compensate Real Madrid in the first place. This, in my opinion, complicates very much Real Madrid's position, since they did not take any legal action to demand the ownership of the Las Tablas plot, and by now probably the available legal actions have expired.

    The compensation being undue, a normal Market Economy Investor(?) would not pay a compensation which he is not legally obliged to pay.

    Besides, the aim of state aid recovery is to re-establish the situation in the market prior to the granting of the aid.

    The benefits that Real Madrid has derived from the series of land exchange operations (which are all marred from the outset) are obviously greater than the mere - although substantial - difference in price between the plots given and the plots received.

    In my opinion, it would go clearly against the aim of State aid control to allow Real Madrid to retain the plot by paying a more or less small or large amount of money, since the exchanges are flawed not only by the unbalanced values, but by the ceasing to exist of the basis of the transactions. I think this fact distinguishes this case from the Konsum or the Bulgarian cases.

    Will the European Commission take this into account? It is doubtful, considering the reluctance it has shown so far to investigate Spanish football. But such a decision obliging to undo the land swaps would definitely help to restore trust in the European Commission's neutrality.

  • Florentino Perez

    10/20/2014 4:54:34 PM |

    Diario As informs that Real Madrid will now hire lawyers specialised in competition law to deal with the club's ever growing amount of competition cases.

    futbol.as.com/.../1413592348_489006.html

    Bring them on!

  • sultan

    1/25/2015 12:40:49 PM |

    how long will it take for the European commission to decide this case?

    • Oskar van Maren

      1/26/2015 10:20:57 AM |

      Good question! I wish I could tell you, but unfortunately I do not know. A Commission decision was already expected not only for this case, but for the other State aid cases in sport (i.e. Valencia, Spanish tax advantages and aid granted to Dutch football clubs) as well. Hopefully we don't have to wait too long anymore.

  • Anonymous complainant

    2/11/2015 1:18:39 AM |

    Bye bye New Bernabeu!

    High Court overturns decision on Bernabéu redevelopment

    as.com/diarioas/2015/02/10/english/1423606995_940982.html

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | Women’s Football and the Fundamental Right to Occupational Health and Safety: FIFA’s Responsibility to Regulate Female Specific Health Issues - By Ella Limbach

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Women’s Football and the Fundamental Right to Occupational Health and Safety: FIFA’s Responsibility to Regulate Female Specific Health Issues - By Ella Limbach

Editor's noteElla Limbach is currently completing her master’s degree in International Sport Development and Politics at the German Sport University Cologne. Her interests include human rights of athletes, labour rights in sport, the intersection of gender, human rights and sport and the working conditions in women’s football. Previously, she graduated from Utrecht University with a LL.M in Public International Law with a specialization in International Human Rights Law. This blog was written during Ella's internship at the Asser Institute where she conducted research for the H.E.R.O. project. The topic of this blog is also the subject of her master's thesis.

Women’s football has experienced exponential growth over the past decade, though the professionalization of the women’s game continues to face barriers that can be tied to the historical exclusion of women from football and insufficient investment on many levels. While attendance records have been broken and media coverage has increased, the rise in attention also highlighted the need for special accommodations for female footballers regarding health and safety at the workplace. Female footballers face gender specific circumstances which can have an impact on their health such as menstruation, anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injuries and the impact of maternity. As the recent ILO Brief on ‘Professional athletes and the fundamental principles and rights at work' states “gender issues related to [occupational health and safety] risks are often neglected (p. 23).” While it could be argued that from a human rights point of view article 13(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of Women stipulates “the right to participate in […] sports [on an equal basis to men],” reality shows that so far practices of men’s football were simply applied to women’s football without taking into consideration the physiological differences between male and female players and the implications that can have for female players’ health. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work(ILO Declaration, amended in 2022) includes “a safe and healthy working environment” as one of the fundamental rights at work (Art. 2e). This begs the question whether the scope of the right to occupational health and safety at the workplace includes the consideration of female specific health issues in women’s football.

Scope of the fundamental right to occupational health and safety

 The ILO Declaration also identifies the Convention on Occupational Health and Safety (No. 155, 1981) and the Convention on a Promotional Framework for Occupational Health and Safety (No. 187, 2006) as fundamental frameworks guaranteeing the right to occupational health and safety. In its Brief on ‘Professional athletes and the fundamental principles and rights at work’ the ILO reaffirms that athletes get their right to occupational health and safety through these two conventions. The Occupational Health and Safety Convention “applies to all branches of economic activity (Art. 1),” and as football is a global industry generating billions in revenue, it should be included within the scope of the convention. Article 3 provides that the term health includes physical elements affecting safety at work. Article 4 reads the following: 

1. “Each Member shall, in the light of national conditions and practice, and in consultation with the most representative organisations of employers and workers, formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent national policy on occupational safety, occupational health and the working environment.

2. The aim of the policy shall be to prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of, linked with or occurring in the course of work, by minimising, so far as is reasonably practicable, the causes of hazards inherent in the working environment.” 

Applying this to football, could mean that signatory states of the Occupational Health and Safety Convention shall consult FIFA and their respective national federations, clubs and player unions to mitigate hazards specific to football. Moreover, the employers are obligated to ensure “workplaces, […] equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to health (Art. 16(1).” The cost of ensuring safety and health at the workplace shall not be covered by athletes according to article 21. 

The Convention on a Promotional Framework for Occupational Health and Safety emphasizes that “the principle of prevention is accorded the highest priority (Art. 1d).” It also calls for continuous improvement of occupational safety and health in order to prevent injuries (Art. 2). The national policy shall be supported by a national occupational safety and health system which amongst others should include laws and regulations and collective agreements, compliance mechanisms, research and data collection and analysis on occupational injuries and diseases (Art. 4). While maternity is not discussed within the context of the above mentioned conventions, the ILO’s Maternity Protection Convention (No. 183, 2000) protects the health of pregnant or breastfeeding women by ensuring that they are not obliged to perform work which is harmful or poses a risk to the health of the mother or the child (Art. 3). It also stipulates a minimum of 14 weeks maternity leave (Art. 4).

Health concerns specific to women’s football

Female footballers face several barriers that are unique to their experience as women. Generally, there is a lack of education on female physiology and health and how it affects performance. Several risks are specific to women’s football and must be differentiated from the men’s game. Here three different points are assessed: the impact of menstruation on training, performance and injury risk, ACL injuries and maternity. These have already been identified by Martínez-Lagunas, Niessen and Hartmann in 2014 for necessitating specific adaptations to the training of female players due to their difference in physiology compared to men.

First, menstrual cycle disfunctions are not uncommon for athletes. FIFA has recognised the lack of scientific literature on the health of female athletes and has through reviewing current literature developed the FIFA Female Health Projectaiming to provide educational resources for all stakeholders in women’s football. That can include having infrequent periods, not ovulating, heavy bleeding and pain. These can be tied to disease, genetics, as well as stress which is common in the competitive environment of professional football. Stress can be caused by workload, travel and psychological pressure. In addition, if players experience lower energy levels, they are more prone to injury. There are a number of symptoms women experience during their period such as cramps, fatigue, disturbed sleep and back and leg pain. The impact of nutrition on menstrual health also should be monitored, the same applies to hydration. Therefore, health issues related to menstruation should be taken more seriously in football and women players should receive proper care.

Secondly, women’s football has suffered what many describe as an epidemic concerning the number of players suffering ACL injuries. Injuries arising out of being employed as footballers in general are not uncommon, however the rise in ACL injuries is alarming. ACL tears are twice as likely in women, a higher likelihood also recognised by the ILO in its Brief. About two thirds of ACL injuries occur without physical contact. In addition, ACL injuries take between six to twelve months to recover, which has a large impact on a footballer’s career. Not much research has been done on the topic but a few potential reasons as to why that is the case have been identified by stakeholders in women’s football such as FIFPRO and academics especially within the field of sport medicine. For one, football boots and kits are designed based on the male physique and many female players reported having issues with their shoes. Another possible reason for ACL injuries could be inconsistency of the match calendar experienced by some players. Female players experience underload due to fewer teams, shorter seasons and longer breaks as well as long lasting discrimination of the women’s game which impacts its professionalization. However, at the same time parts of an elite player’s season are characterized by overload where players play a high number of games in a short period of time. For some players the increase in workload and decrease in recovery through a packed competition schedule may also be an issue, though this issue does not exclusively impact women’s football. Nevertheless, on the elite level women face less structured match calendar and more precarious conditions regarding medical treatment and recovery.

Thirdly, female players have to arrange their career with family planning. As FIFPRO reports, many women in football had to leave the sport early because they wish to become mothers and current structures in elite football were not allowing both, being a mother and a professional football player. Childcare support and maternity pay are rarely provided. While FIFA has developed protections of players during and after pregnancy, FIFPRO has recently shown that the regulations have not been implemented by most of FIFA’s member associations. Moreover, pregnant professional players previously reported that medical care throughout their pregnancy especially regarding training and support as to which exercises are beneficial during pregnancy are lacking. Lastly, an early return after pregnancy can also lead to health implications if not monitored.

FIFA’s responsibility to ensure respect for ILO Conventions throughout football

FIFA is the world governing body for football and has committed to respecting internationally recognised human rights throughout its activities. The FIFA Statutes state that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.” Moreover, FIFA published a ‘Human Rights Policy’ in 2017, which refers to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). As highlighted by the UNGPs, internationally recognized human rights include at least some ILO Conventions. Therefore, FIFA following its own commitment to respect and strive to promote human rights, should ensure that throughout football minimum standards of health and safety aligned with ILO requirements are in place. FIFA should, therefore, be deemed to be bound under FIFA law to ensure respect with ILO Conventions throughout its activities (including regulations affecting professional football players). In fact, FIFA has started to include a set of ‘Special Provisions Relating to Female Players’ in their Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP). For example, menstruation and maternity leave. 

Current status of female players health regulations by FIFA 

When looking at the risks specific to female players the question arises how FIFA and national football federations contribute to realizing the right to health and safety at work. FIFA has launched the Women’s Health, Wellbeing, and Performance Project in 2023, consulting 20 experts to investigate the female physiology and women’s health challenges. It covers all three topics and should be available to FIFA stakeholders in full soon. Some of its objectives include increased research, awareness, optimized training and access to screening and monitoring tools. It is yet to be seen whether this project will positively impact players health.

The Special Provisions Relating to Female Players included in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) are also relevant here. Indeed, an article related to menstruation has recently been added to FIFA’s RSTP. It requires a club to respect a player’s needs regarding their menstrual cycle and health (Art. 18quinquies), meaning, if a player receives a medical certificate by her gynaecologist or another medical professional, the player has the right to miss trainings or games due to her menstrual health without consequences for her pay. FIFPRO points out that while this does not differentiate from taking a certificate to excuse them from training or games due to illness, it provides legal certainty that menstruation is covered by sick leave.

While research and support on ACL prevention and treatment has been lacking overall, FIFPRO, the Professional Footballer Association England, Nike and Leeds Beckett University have launched a project aiming to reduce ACL injuries in women’s football, the findings of which they will also make available to FIFA. The study will run for three years and examine players of the Women’s Super League which is England’s top-tier women’s football league. They will also track players workload, travel and appearances. From the findings best practice will be identified. 

Finally, FIFA, with support of FIFPRO, established maternity regulations in 2021 which are included in the RSTP (Art. 18quater). These must be implemented by member associations in their national regulations. Female players are now granted a minimum of 14 weeks of maternity leave, including eight weeks after childbirth, two more weeks as required by the ILO Convention. In its latest advocacy, FIFPRO advocated for 10 weeks after childbirth. Additionally, players receive two thirds of their salary during maternity leave. The FIFA RSTP also give players the autonomy to decide when to stop playing while pregnant, as long as it not considered a risk to the health of both player and child, with clubs having to accept the player’s decision. During their pregnancy clubs must also provide the opportunity for players to do alternative work. As of 2024, the RSTP include adoption leave of eight weeks, if the child is under two years old, and family leave for non-childbearing parents of eight weeks (Art. 18(7)). They now also included a postpartum plan and the obligation of clubs to provide adequate ongoing medical support. After already engaging heavily with the topic, FIFPRO recently published a guide on supporting players during pregnancy and in returning to play which was developed “with football players who actually experienced motherhood while they were professionals and with doctors and physiotherapists specialised in maternity in professional sport.” While the RSTPs include a postpartum plan to be agreed between player and club without including recommendations, the question remains in how far the best practices identified in the guide will be transposed by FIFA in the next RSTPs.

The implementation of the rights enshrined in the FIFA RSTP by national federations is still lacking, however. For example, the case of Sara Björk Gunnarsdóttir against her former club Olympique Lyonnais shows that clubs are not necessarily upholding the provisions related to maternity protection. The dispute arose because Lyon failed to continue paying Gunnarsdóttir’s salary during her pregnancy in contravention with FIFA’s maternity regulations, but in line with French law. Gunnarsdóttir won the case before the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. However, (financial) sanctions for non-compliance are often insufficient and not effective in providing incentives for clubs to adhere to the rules, and in the worst case could even lead to national football federations allocating less resources to women’s football, thus also impacting the adherence with the RSTP. There is also a risk of double standards, between national and international players, as rules and regulations may apply differently to them. 

Conclusions and the way forward

The right to health and safety is a fundamental right at work therefore it should also apply to professional female footballers. ILO conventions impose primary duties onto signatories of the Conventions and while FIFA is a Swiss association and thus not directly bound by ILO Conventions, it can be argued that because of its commitments to uphold internationally recognized human rights in line with the UNGPs it should adhere to ILO conventions. In addition to FIFA’s responsibility through its own commitments and as the global regulator of football there are several other duty bearers that play a relevant role. Because member states should consult with representatives of employers one could argue that national football federations and clubs, in their role as employers of players, and the states in which they are located have a shared responsibility to fulfil the right to occupational health and safety at the work for female footballers. Consequently, because the ILO requires that employers create a safe working environment minimizing causes of hazards, having adjusted training programs and doing the necessary research and studies on the health and safety of female footballers will be a necessity for clubs and federations. To provide a practical example, developing football boots adapted to female physicality might be an obligation under article 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Convention.

As has been outlined above, there is no question on whether menstruation, ACL injuries and maternity affect the health and wellbeing of female athletes at the workplace and thus fall under the ILO’s scope of the fundamental right to occupational health and safety at the workplace. While FIFA has begun to work on including female specific health issues in their regulations, the national implementation of the relevant provisions is still lacking efficiency. Thus, more active pursuit of national football associations and club’s adherence should be high on FIFA’s to do list. Moreover, FIFPRO must be credited with a lot of work regarding the implementation of these rights. As the global football players union, it represents the workers in this case and thus it can be seen as a positive step that FIFA is to a certain extent implementing their recommendations. Though it is clear that FIFA needs to take greater responsibility as long as serious issues, such as extensive workload and the impact on players health, continue to be highlighted by FIFPRO without meaningful action by FIFA. Overall, a way forward would include establishing effective mechanisms to ensure that relevant provisions of the RSTP are universally implemented and ultimately stronger sanctions for breaching these provisions.

Comments are closed