On Wednesday 20 January 2021 from 16.00-17.30 CET, the Asser International Sports Law Centre, in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret, is organising a Zoom In webinar on the recent judgment of the General Court in the case International Skating Union (ISU) v European Commission, delivered on 16 December 2016. The Court ruled on an appeal against the first-ever antitrust prohibition decision on sporting rules adopted by the European Commission. More specifically, the case concerned the ISU’s eligibility rules, which were prohibiting speed skaters from competing in non-recognised events and threatened them with lifelong bans if they did (for more details on the origin of the case see this blog). The ruling of the General Court, which endorsed the majority of the European Commission’s findings, could have transformative implications for the structure of sports governance in the EU (and beyond).

We have the pleasure to welcome three renowned experts in EU competition law and sport to analyse with us the wider consequences of this judgment.

Guest speakers:

• Dr. Ben Van Rompuy (Leiden University & representative of the complainants before the EC)
• Dr. Katarina Pijetlovic (Manchester Metropolitan University)
• Prof. Stephen Weatherill (Oxford University)

Moderators:

• Dr Antoine Duval (Asser Institute)
• Dr Marjolaine Viret
  

Registration HERE

Zoom In webinar series

In December 2020, The Asser International Sports Law Centre in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret launched a new series of zoom webinars on transnational sports law: Zoom In. You can watch the video recording of our first discussion on the arbitral award delivered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the Blake Leeper v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) case on the Asser Institute’s Youtube Channel. Click here to learn more about the Zoom In webinar series.

Yesterday the sports law world was buzzing due to the Diarra decision of the Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut (the Tribunal) based in Charleroi, Belgium. Newspapers were lining up (here, here and here) to spread the carefully crafted announcement of the new triumph of Jean-Louis Dupont over his favourite nemesis: the transfer system. Furthermore, I was lucky enough to receive on this same night a copy of the French text of the judgment. My first reaction while reading quickly through the ruling, was ‘OMG he did it again’! “He” meaning Belgian lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, who after a string of defeats in his long shot challenge against FIFA’s TPO ban or UEFA’s FFP (see here and here), had [at least I believed after rushing carelessly through the judgment] manufactured a new “it”: a Bosman. Yet, after carefully re-reading the judgment, it became quickly clear to me that this was rather a new Mutu (in the sense of the latest CAS award in the ‘Mutu saga’, which I have extensively analysed on this blog and in a recent commentary for the new Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration) coupled with some reflections reminding a bit (but not really as will be explicated below) the Pechstein case.

In this blog, I will retrace briefly the story behind the case and then analyse the decision of the Belgium court. In doing so, I will focus on its reasoning regarding its jurisdiction and the compatibility of article 17(2) RSTP with EU law.

I.              The facts of the case

On 20 August 2013, the French footballer Lassana Diarra and the Russian top-tier club FC Lokomotiv Moscow (Lokomotiv) agreed on a four-year contract (Contract). Article 8 (3) of the Contract provided that in case Lokomotiv terminates the Contract for disciplinary reasons, Mr. Diarra would be liable for compensation amounting to EUR 20,000,000 (Compensation).  One year later, on 22 August 2014, Lokomotiv terminated the Contract due to Diarra's recurring failures to perform his obligations arising thereof. Lokomotiv relied on Article 8 (3) of the Contract and claimed the Compensation.

Less than a month later, Lokomotiv lodged a request for compensation with the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) against Diarra. Diarra subsequently filed his counterclaim in which he asked for the payment of bonuses and wage arrears as well as the compensation amounting to the remuneration which would still have to be paid between August 2014 and 30 June 2017, the term provided for in the Contract. On 10 April 2015, the DRC rendered its decision ruling that Lokomotiv’s decision to terminate the Contract was justified (DRC Decision). Regarding the compensation due by Diarra, the DRC noted that Article 8 (3) of the Contract provided for the Compensation (amounting to EUR 20,000,000) claimed from Diarra. On the other hand, in case a compensation was due by Lokomotiv, Article 8 (5) of the Contract set a limit to three months of Diarra’s salary (approximately EUR 1,500,000). Taking into account the discrepancy, the DRC noted that the respective rights of the parties were completely disproportionate and the Contract should be disregarded. The DRC nevertheless decided that the consequences of the Contract's termination had to be assessed in light of Article 17 (1) of the FIFA Regulation for the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP). In line with the said provision, the DRC decided that Diarra had to pay Lokomotiv the amount of EUR 10,500,000 for having repeatedly breached the Contract. Although this issue was not directly related to the case, the DRC pointed out that, following the termination of the Contract, Diarra did not immediately manage to find a new club so that Article 17 (2) RSTP (making a professional player and his new club jointly and severally liable for a compensation owed to a previous club) was in principle not applicable to the case. Furthermore, the DRC ruled that, having regard to the date of the Contract's termination and the time elapsed between that date and the issuance of the DRC Decision, Article 17 (2) would not apply in case Diarra finds a new club in the future.

Yet, during the period between 22 August 2014 and 10 April 2015, Diarra had attracted attention from several European clubs (e.g. Inter Milan, West Ham United, Celtic Glasgow and Sporting Charleroi). Negotiations, however, did not succeed for the reason that those clubs were afraid of being held jointly liable for a compensation which could have been potentially awarded by the DRC. On 19 February 2015, the Belgian football club Sporting Charleroi (Charleroi) offered Diarra a 15-month contract concerning the period between 30 March 2015 and 30 June 2016. This offer was, however, subject to the following conditions:

1. Diarra is registered and qualified as a member of Charleroi by 30 March 2015 at the latest; and
2. The governing bodies, Belgian Football Association (URBSFA) and FIFA, expressly confirm that Charleroi is not required to pay the compensation for which Diarra could be held liable at the end of the proceedings before the DRC.

On this second condition, Diarra and Charleroi demanded confirmation from FIFA and the URBSFA. Both governing bodies refused to adopt a concrete position with respect to the application of Article 17 (2) RSTP to the case at hand. On 27 March 2015, in light of the abovementioned replies obtained from FIFA and URBSFA, Diarra referred the case to the President of the Commercial Court of Brussels asking to order FIFA and URBSFA:

1. To register and qualify him as a professional football player of Charleroi, thereby allowing him to play for the rest of the 2014/2015 season;
2.  Not to apply Article 17 (2) and (4) RSTP to Charleroi.

No order had been delivered before the DRC Decision was issued. Furthermore, the DRC Decision confirmed that Article 17 (2) RSTP was not applicable to any new club which would hire Diarra in future. As a result, Diarra decided to withdraw his action from the Commercial Court of Brussels. However, he was not able to play as a professional player for Charleroi until the end of the 2014/2015 season. In July 2015, Diarra entered into a contract with the French top-tier club Olympique Marseille. This contract is still in force. 

Diarra also appealed against the DRC Decision before the CAS in Lausanne. On 27 May 2016, the CAS rendered its award by which it confirmed the DRC Decision. In the end, Diarra filed a lawsuit with the the Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut. Diarra sued both FIFA and URBSFA for damages caused by not being able to exercise the status of a professional football player during the entire 2014/2015 season. Finally, on 19 January 2017, the Hainaut Commercial Tribunal – Charleroi division rendered the judgment analysed in this blog.            

II.            The decision of the Tribunal of Charleroi

A.    Does the Tribunal of Charleroi have jurisdiction?

FIFA (and the Belgium federation) argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction for two (main) reasons: Diarra was bound by a CAS arbitration clause and the Belgium court is incompetent based on the Lugano Convention. Let’s turn to the Tribunal’s rebuttal of both objections.

1.     The inexistence of a CAS arbitration clause

FIFA argued that M. Diarra was bound, through his registration as a professional football player with the French Football Federation, by the CAS arbitration clause included in the Statutes of FIFA.[1] In particular it refers to Article 68 of the FIFA Statutes. 

The Tribunal finds that this provision poses difficult problems of interpretation. Especially, Article 68(3) FIFA Statutes does not stipulate that the prohibition to have recourse to ordinary courts entails necessarily an arbitration clause in favorem of the CAS. Instead, the Tribunal finds this lack of clarity in the wording of the provision to play in favour of the player. Thus, it concludes that the FIFA Statutes do not create an obligation for the player to turn to the CAS to solve this dispute.

The judges add that even if one considers the FIFA Statutes to be sufficiently clear and precise, the parties must have concluded an arbitral convention in the sense of Article 1680 of the Code Judiciaire Belge (Belgian Judicial Code). In this regard, FIFA needs to demonstrate through documentary evidence (not necessarily signed by the parties) the existence of an agreement fulfilling the law’s requirements of clarity and precision.[2] Yet, in the present case, FIFA was unable to show that it had any contractual links with Diarra. Hence, the judges concluded that there were no elements demonstrating that Diarra would have consented expressly or implicitly to arbitrate at the CAS disputes stemming from its relation with FIFA. Additionally, the Tribunal refers in footnote 7 to the evident contradiction between FIFA’s claim and the agreement signed with the European Commission to put an end in 2001 to the Commission’s investigation into the FIFA RSTP. Indeed, this agreement clearly stipulates that “arbitration is voluntary and does not prevent recourse to national courts”.[3] Finally, the Tribunal insists that any general prohibition (as the one included in FIFA’s statutes) to have recourse to national courts would be contrary to Ordre Public and, therefore, must be disregarded by the Tribunal.

Is it a new Pechstein? Hardly. FIFA is not relying on a specific arbitration clause included in its Statutes, nor does it refer to any arbitration clause included in the Statutes of the French Football Federation. In the Pechstein case (on ‘Pechstein’ see our blogs here and here), Claudia Pechstein was forced (as a condition of entry to the competitions of the ISU) to sign an arbitration agreement in favour of the CAS. In the Diarra case, the player never signed anything and the Tribunal just highlighted that the vague language included in the FIFA Statutes cannot be constructed as a sufficient legal basis for a general arbitration agreement binding all football players (and clubs) for all disputes involving FIFA or national federations around the globe.

2.     The competence of the Tribunal of Charleroi on the basis of the Lugano Convention

The second objection raised by FIFA and the URBSFA regarding the competence of the Tribunal is related to the Lugano Convention. In principle, as pointed out by the respondents, Article 2.1. Lugano Convention foresees that one should be sued in the courts of her domicile. Any derogation to this general rule is, in their view, limited to exceptional circumstances in which there is a particularly close linked between the dispute and the jurisdiction other than the one of the domicile of the respondent.

Yet, the Tribunal refers to Article 5.3. Lugano Convention, which stipulates that “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”. It held that this special competence is grounded on the existence of closed connecting factors between the dispute and the place where the damage occurred. The judges refer to the Mines de potasse and Shevill jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU to conclude that the notion of harmful event covers both the place where the damage materialized and the place where the event occurred. In the present case, it entails that Diarra is not forced to lodge a complaint in Switzerland, where FIFA adopted the controversial regulation. Instead, he could also submit a complaint at the place where the damage was felt. More precisely in Belgium (and more specifically Charleroi) due to the missed opportunity to be employed by Sporting Charleroi.

This is (with other cases we have chronicled on this blog, see here and here) a good reminder that FIFA’s regulations, as long as they have damaging effects outside of Switzerland, are easily subjected to challenges in the EU Member States. In particular due to a potential incompatibility with EU free movement and competition law.

B.    The compatibility of article 17(2) FIFA RSTP with EU law?

The core of the substantial evaluation of the case plays out mainly around the question of the compatibility of article 17(2) FIFA RSTP with EU law. Unfortunately for the European Sports Law geek, but reasonably in the context of the factual construction of the case, the Tribunal did not pick on the request of Diarra’s lawyer to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU regarding the compatibility of article 17(1) FIFA RSTP with EU free movement law. [4]

Instead, the Tribunal focused on the interpretation (at least until April 2015) by FIFA (and the URBSFA) of article 17(2) FIFA RSTP. Indeed, it refers to the legislative history of the FIFA RSTP and in particular the EU Commission-FIFA agreement to strongly affirm that “there is no doubt that the European Commission would have never given its green light to such a system, which boils down in fine to preventing a worker dismissed by his employer – even if it is due to his behaviour - to find a new job”.[5] To further support this argumentation it refers directly to the CAS award rendered in the latest episode of the ‘Mutu saga’. In that case, the CAS clearly affirmed that the interpretation provided by the FIFA DRC, insofar as it extends the applicability of article 17(2) FIFA RSTP to players dismissed by their clubs on the basis of their behaviour, is contrary to EU law and the Bosman jurisprudence. Thus, the Tribunal concludes that the application of article 17(2) FIFA RSTP supported by the defendants in the present case was contrary to the freedom of movement of workers. Henceforth, the faulty behaviour of FIFA was established.

Interestingly, and this is the more original aspect of the decision, the Tribunal found that the URBSFA should also be deemed at fault for having implemented the rule on FIFA’s behalf. The national federation cannot hide behind its duty to implement FIFA regulations, especially because since 21 January 2015 (meaning before it opposed the move to Sporting Charleroi) it should have been aware of the decision of the CAS (here the Tribunal is a bit unfair with the URBSFA because the full text of the award was not published until March 2015, and until then it was impossible for the URBSFA to clearly assess the CAS’ reasoning). Moreover, the Tribunal rejects the objection raised by the URBSFA that the Russian federation would not have issued an International Transfer Certificate. Instead, the judges held that “when the contract is terminated by the club, the player must have the possibility to sign a new contract with a new employer, without restrictions to his free movement”. The Tribunal added [and this is the key part that had me believe in a new Bosman for a minute ;)]

“Allowing, like the RSTP seems to do, a federation or association to which the former club belongs […] not to deliver an ITC if there is a contractual disputes between the former club and a player that has been dismissed (and who has not taken the initiative of breaching his contract) and who has concluded (or wishes to conclude) a new contract in another country, is equivalent to requiring the new club to pay to the former club the compensation requested from the player, which is akin to imposing to the new club to pay a transfer fee to the former club to recruit a player who in fact is out of contract. This is exactly the practice deemed contrary to EU law in the Bosman case.”[6]

The scope of this paragraph could have been way broader if the Tribunal had not included the “who has been dismissed” part. Indeed, it seems to exclude situations where the player decides to leave his club and, thus, preserves the possibility to hold the new club accountable for compensation due by the player to his former club for having terminated his contract.

Conclusion: Interpreting the FIFA RSTP with a lot of help from EU law

This case matters, not so much for Diarra, who has secured a meagre EUR 60 001 in damages (and not the EUR 6 million announced everywhere) plus a bit more if his lawyers manage to demonstrate a substantial loss of opportunity from not having played with Sporting Charleroi (which, with all due respect, should prove rather difficult), not so much for its substantial solution because the CAS had come to a similar conclusion in its Mutu award from 2015, not so much either for its arbitration dimension as the Tribunal’s considerations regarding the absence of an arbitral agreement are not really surprising (or new for that matter). No, its importance lies in the reaffirmation of the need to read the RSTP in the light of EU law and to interpret it with the jurisprudence of the CJEU in mind and the agreement with the EU Commission on the table. This decision is laying further ground for broader challenges to the RSTP on the basis of EU law. For example, I do not see where one can find in the EU Commission-FIFA agreement the endorsement of a joint liability of the new club and a player for damages incurred by the latter when terminating his contract with his former club. Thus, the entire article 17(2) FIFA RSTP is build on shaky legal grounds, and if one pursues the logic of the Tribunal until the end there is no reason why it should not be deemed contrary to the EU free movement rights of players.

[1] Jugement du Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut, division Charleroi, A/16/00141, 19 January 2017, at paras 19-21.

[2] Ibid, at para.21.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, at para. 27.

[5] Ibid, at para. 28.

[6] Ibid.

Editor's note: Daniela Heerdt is a PhD candidate at Tilburg Law School in the Netherlands and works as Research Officer for the Centre for Sports and Human Rights. Her PhD research deals with the establishment of responsibility and accountability for adverse human rights impacts of mega-sporting events, with a focus on FIFA World Cups and Olympic Games. She published an article in the International Sports Law Journal that discusses to what extent the revised bidding and hosting regulations by FIFA, the IOC and UEFA strengthen access to remedy for mega-sporting events-related human rights violations.

On November 26^th, the Human Rights Advisory Board[1] of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) published its second report. This blog provides a summary and brief evaluation of the report, by drawing a comparison to the previous report issued by the Human Rights Advisory Board (hereinafter: the Board) based on the content of the recommendations and FIFA’s efforts to implement the Board’s recommendations. The third part of this blog briefly reflects on the broader implications of some of the new recommendations issued for FIFA’s internal policies. The conclusion provides five more general points of observation on the report.

Old and New Recommendations

In its second report, the Board makes 30 ‘specific recommendations’ to FIFA, just slightly less than the previous one. However, not all of these recommendations are new to FIFA. A number of them have been released in the two update statements the Board released since the publication of its first report, one in May 2018 and one in October 2018. Two more sets of recommendations were communicated to FIFA in December 2017 and February 2018, which are as well included in this new report, but which have not been reported publicly before.

Content-wise, most of the recommendations still deal with the human rights risks associated with FIFA’s upcoming and past events. The recommendations made with regard to the human rights issues surrounding the 2018 World Cup hosted by Russia have been issued in December 2017 and concern the general situation and human rights of construction workers, human rights defenders and media representatives, mostly recommending that FIFA should use its leverage to address these issues with the government or other relevant stakeholders, such as the Local Organizing Committee (LOC). Another December-recommendation concerned the sharing of measures taken by FIFA to investigate the involvement of Russia football players in the Russian doping scandal. Furthermore, the report includes the Board’s recommendations regarding the controversies surrounding the choice of accommodation of the Egyptian national team[2], which had been addressed in a set of recommendations initially issued in February 2018[AD1] . With regard to the human rights requirements for hosting the 2026 FIFA World Cup, the report repeats the recommendation issued in May 2018, concerning FIFA’s task to take into account the capacity of bidders to assess and manage human rights risks when deciding for a host. On this issue, the report also introduces a new recommendation for FIFA to reflect on the inclusion of human rights into the bidding requirements. Furthermore, the report also includes ‘interim recommendations’ in relation to the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar, and disclosed that a more detailed set of recommendations can be expected shortly.[3]

While these issues were already present in the first report, four new issues have been added in this second report by the Board:

• player’s rights,
• child safeguarding,
• the ban on woman attending sport matches in Iran,
• and FIFA’s approach to engagement and communication on human rights.[4]

With regard to player’s rights, the Board’s recommendations focus on access to remedy and FIFA’s evaluation of existing football arbitration mechanisms from a human rights perspective, the rules of the employment market for players and FIFA’s review of these rules, and on FIFA’s regulations on player’s rights which need to take the specific situation of children into account. Concerning child safeguarding, the Board recommends that FIFA’s safeguarding working group should conduct a comprehensive stakeholder consultation to identify the responsibilities of member associations concerning child players. Regarding the issue of discrimination against women in Iran, the Board recommends for FIFA to use its leverage on the Iranian Association and to issue sanctions if nothing is changing. Finally, on FIFA’s approach to engagement and communication on human rights issues, the Board recommends that FIFA establishes a systematic annual dialogue with key stakeholders, in addition to individual and event-specific stakeholder engagement and that it adopts a transparent approach on negative impacts connected to FIFA’s activities. Furthermore, the Board calls on FIFA to communicate this approach and share relevant information with confederations and member associations.

What also changed in the second report is that the Board does not issue requests to FIFA anymore. All measures proposed are formulated as recommendations. However, it is questionable to what extent the requests entailed in the first report really made a difference, since the majority of these requests were merely inquiries for more information or clarifications on certain issues.[5] Such requests about additional information or more transparency on certain issues are now included in the recommendations, such as in recommendation R42, asking FIFA to “be as transparent as possible” and to “proactively publish the steps it has taken”.[6] 

The New Tracking System

The second report of FIFA’s Human Rights Advisory Board is not only longer in terms of page numbers  but it also provides more detailed insights into human rights-related efforts FIFA undertook in the past year and continues to undertake, based on the recommendations it received. While in the first report, ‘part B’ consisted of a general overview of FIFA’s human rights efforts up to that point in time, ‘part B’ in the new report lists concrete measures taken by FIFA in reaction to the recommendations issued by the Board in its first report and other recommendations statements made in the past year. To assess these measures, the second report introduces a tracking system, which ranks the status of FIFA’s implementation of the Board’s recommendations from 1 to 4, moving from no implementation (1), to ongoing implementation (2), to advanced implementation (3), and to full or “closed out” implementation (4).[7]

There is only one recommendation for which implementation has not yet started (category 1) according to the Board. This concerns the promotion of a policy with host countries of direct employment of construction workers to prevent the strong reliance on subcontractors, which involves greater risks for workers and migrant workers in particular.[8] Ongoing implementation (category 2) has been observed in relation to the embedding of human rights throughout the FIFA organisation, including relevant committees and key staff, as well as its member associations, the testing of the method of risk identification with informed stakeholders to confirm or challenge findings, and the joint inspections together with LOCs. Furthermore, the Board assessed that implementation is ongoing for three other recommendations: first, FIFA’s considerations on how it can make the most efficient use of its leverage when it comes to the issue of security arrangements linked to hosting a FIFA event; secondly, the publishing of information on the design, operation, and the results of the monitoring of construction sites; and thirdly, making prompt and factual statements to show awareness and knowledge about critical human rights issues when they arise. The Board found that FIFA made considerable advancement (category 3) in developing a system for risk identification,  such as monitoring systems or the detailed human rights salience analysis that is part of the Sustainability Strategy and policy of the 2022 World Cup, as well as in identifying risks to fundamental civil and political rights and communicating its expectation to respect these rights with host governments.

The adoption of a human rights policy has been assessed as fully implemented (category 4). The same evaluation has been made in relation to the recommendations for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cup tournaments, as well as for the bidding processes and the 2026 FIFA World Cup. However, even though the implementation efforts concerning these issues have been evaluated under the same category, taking a closer look reveals that the actual status of implementation is not the same. This is because category 4 combines two criteria, which in fact reflect very different results. ‘Full implementation’ does not necessarily reflect the same situation as ‘closed out implementation’. In other words, a reason for an implementation to end (‘close out’) is not necessarily linked to the fact that the recommended measure has been implemented in its entirety. In fact, full implementation of a certain measure can produce a completely different scenario than abandoning a certain recommendation or measure.

This can be illustrated by taking a closer look at the implementation of measures recommended to FIFA concerning the handling of human rights issues related to the 2018 World Cup. Most of them have been assessed as fully implemented or closed out, and so have the measures taken in relation to the 2022 World Cup. In reality, however, the 2018 World Cup lies in the past and the majority of measures taken in that context were discontinued before they could fully be implemented. For example, the recommendation on offering the Egyptian team an alternative location, including the financial support needed, has been evaluated as ‘closed out’, even though the Egyptian team in the end decided to stick with Grozny. The same can be said about the recommendation that FIFA should raise with the LOC that timely compensation is provided in case a worker on the World Cup construction sites got injured. Even though FIFA states that they did not have access to any financial records that would allow a verification of cash flows, the recommendation has been evaluated as “implemented/closed out”.[9] Due to this combination of two criteria under category 4, simply taking a look at the tabular overview provided at the end of the report[10] can create a distorted picture of the actual implementation status of the Board’s recommendations. Instead, a more careful look at FIFA’s actual efforts on certain issues is necessary to fully understand whether FIFA was indeed successful in implementing a certain recommendation, or whether it just dropped the implementation, for instance because it was linked to a certain event that is over now. 

The Implications for FIFA’s Internal Policies

Some of the recommendations included in the report relate to how FIFA embeds its human rights commitments internally and within its member associations. For instance, according to the Board FIFA should discuss with the Board the reasons for the decision of the Ethics Committee to not publish a detailed explanation of how it reached a decision in a case, and that it should review its operations in that regard.[11] In addition, it recommends FIFA to be explicit with its member associations on what it expects and in what timeframe it expects them to align with FIFA’s human rights responsibilities. The Board also implies that anticipated sanctions should be included in FIFA Statutes, the Disciplinary Code and the Ethics Code.[12]

Furthermore, the update statement by FIFA in this second report reveals that a number of measures were taken in relation to embedding human rights in its organization, based on previous recommendations made by the Board.  For instance, FIFA Council and Committee members have to follow an e-learning course, which includes a human rights module, and a human rights working group has been established within FIFA’s Governance Committee. However, implementation on those matters is ongoing and it becomes clear that this so far has not been the focus of FIFA’s human rights-related efforts and more could be done in that regard.[13] The context and overview FIFA provides on embedding the respect for human rights is rather vague and the measures taken so far do not reach the entire FIFA organization.[14]

Conclusion

A number of general observations can be made based on this summary and comparison. First, most recommendations and action taken by FIFA seem to concentrate on FIFA’s commitment to identify and address human rights risks, which actually was already the case in the first report. Secondly, while FIFA’s events still seem to be a priority, the Board focused also on new issues. Yet, perhaps not enough attention is dedicated to changing FIFA’s international structures and culture into a well-established acceptance and reflection of FIFA’s human rights responsibilities. Furthermore, the report provides valuable and detailed insight into the progress made and how it is made, for instance in relation to FIFA’s leverage over Qatar’s Supreme Committee and the Qatari government to change certain regulations, the human rights defender cases in which FIFA intervened, or the external partners FIFA worked with to address certain human rights risks.[15] Finally, it is a comprehensive report, reflecting the Board’s understanding towards FIFA’s burden of having to address issues of “the past, present and future all at once”, and the fact that “FIFA has to deal with the legacy of decisions taken and contracts signed before the organisation recognized its human rights responsibilities”.[16] This also shows that FIFA takes the Board seriously and in many ways follows the Board’s recommendations.

In general, the fact that FIFA has an active Human Rights Advisory Board in place for more than a year now and renewed its mandate until the end of 2020 should be applauded.[17] Just this month, the International Olympic Committee announced that it is also setting up a Human Rights Advisory Committee, which is supposed to be fully operational by the 2024 Olympic Games, unfortunately not in time for the Beijing Winter Olympics in 2022.

[1] The members of the board are listed in the annex of the first report.

[2] Egypt’s national team chose Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, as its training camp during the World Cup 2018. FIFA authorized this choice, despite the fact that the region’s human rights record is dominated by cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances and the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, is known for his repression of journalists, critics, minority groups, and human rights defenders.  

[3] See p.19 of the second report

[4] Ibid., p 20

[5] See p. 5, 7, or 11 of the first report

[6] See p. 15 of the second report

[7] See p. 5 of the second report

[8] See p. 60 of the second report

[9] See p. 48 of the second report

[10] Ibid. p. 80 ff.

[11] Ibid. p. 27

[12] Ibid. p. 25

[13] Ibid. p. 34 f.

[14] Ibid. p. 33 & 35

[15] Ibid. pp. 17-18, 67, & 69

[16] Ibid. p. 28

[17] Ibid. p. 79