Asser International Sports Law Blog

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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The 2006 World Cup Tax Evasion Affair in Germany: A short guide. By Gesa Kuebek

Editor's note:

Gesa Kuebek holds an LLM and graduated from the University of Bologna, Gent and Hamburg as part of the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme in Law and Economics and now work as an intern for the Asser Instituut.


On Monday, 9 November, the German Football Association (DFB) announced in a Press Release the resignation of its head, Wolfgang Niersbach, over the 2006 World Cup Affair. In his statement, Niersbach argued that he had “no knowledge whatsoever” about any “payments flows” and is now being confronted with proceedings in which he was “never involved”. However, he is now forced to draw the “political consequences” from the situation. His resignation occurred against the backdrop of last week’s raid of the DFB’s Frankfurt headquarters and the private homes Niersbach, his predecessor Theo Zwanziger and long-standing DFB general secretary Horst R. Schmidt. The public prosecutor’s office investigates a particularly severe act of tax evasion linked to awarding the 2006 World Cup. The 2006 German “summer fairy-tale” came under pressure in mid-October 2015, after the German magazine “Der Spiegel” shocked Fußballdeutschland by claiming that it had seen concrete evidence proving that a €6.7 million loan, designated by the FIFA for a “cultural programme”, ended up on the account of Adidas CEO Robert-Louis Dreyfuß. The magazine further argued that the money was in fact a secret loan that was paid back to Dreyfuß. Allegedly, the loan was kept off the books intentionally in order to be used as bribes to win the 2006 World Cup bid. The public prosecutor now suspects the DFB of failing to register the payment in tax returns. German FA officials admit that the DFB made a “mistake” but deny all allegations of vote buying. However, the current investigations show that the issues at stakes remain far from clear, leaving many questions regarding the awarding of the 2006 World Cup unanswered.

The present blog post aims to shed a light on the matter by synthetizing what we do know about the 2006 World Cup Affair and by highlighting the legal grounds on which the German authorities investigate the tax evasion.


What’s the 2006 World Cup Affair all about?

The scandal centres on the payment of €6.7 million, which was, according to Der Spiegel, secretly loaned to the DFB by the private investor Louis Dreyfuß, at the time CEO of Adidas, prior to the Word Cup decision on 6 July 2000. Accordingly, the money was never recorded in either the balance sheets of the Bid Committee or, later, in the balance sheets of the German Organisation Committee of the World Cup. Der Spiegel argued that the money was used to buy the four votes of the Asian representatives of the 24-membered FIFA Executive Committee. The four Asians voted together with the European representatives at the elections in July 2000 in favour of Germany becoming the host of the 2006 World Cup. Due to the fact the New Zealand’s representative Charles Dempsey surprisingly refrained from voting in the last ballot, Germany won with 12:11 votes in favour. In a later article, Der Spiegel stated that Zwanziger and Schmidt discussed in a recorded telephone conversation to whom the Dreyfuß millions were transferred and mentioned the name of Mohamed Bin Hammam in this context. It is worth remembering that the Qatari Bin Hammam, a former member of the FIFA Executive Committee from 1996 to 2011, was charged with offering bribes for votes and banned for life from all football activities by FIFA on two occasions in 2011 and 2012. The DFB, however, denies all allegations of vote-rigging.

The current investigations of the public prosecutor focus on the supposed repayment of the €6.7 million loan in April 2005. The Organisation Committee officially declared the money as the German contribution to a “cultural programme” during the 2006 World Cup. As such, the German money went to a FIFA account in Geneva, Switzerland. However, the FIFA cultural programme never happened. Instead, FIFA allegedly transferred the money immediately to an account of Louis Dreyfuß in Zurich. Up to now, there are neither bills nor a receipt of payments at FIFA for the ominous €6.7 million. Furthermore, it remains unclear through which channels the DFB’s money was transferred back to Louis Dreyfuß.


How does the DFB react?

Initially, the DFB acknowledged in a Press Release of 16 October that evidence came to light “that a payment of the Organisation Committee in April 2005 amounting to €6.7 million attributed to FIFA may not have been used according to the indicated purpose”. On that same day, Der Spiegel published its article. The DFB promptly reacted in another Press Release, denying the existence of slush funds. It refuted the allegations of Der Spiegel as “completely untenable” and denied any accusations of vote-rigging. Niersbach added that the DFB “will refute Der Spiegel’s claims and take legal action against them”. In a similar manner, German football legend Franz Beckenbauer, who acted as the head of the Head of the 2006 World Cup Organisation Committee, repudiated the article’s claims publicly.

By contrast, on 23 October, Zwanziger described Niersbach, his well-known enemy and successor as DFB president, as a liar in a Spiegel interview, acknowledging for the first time the existence of slush-funds “during the German World Cup application”. He argued that it is, “similarly clear that the current DFB president has not just been aware of the matter for a few weeks, as he states, but at least since 2005”.

Shortly thereafter, Franz Beckenbauer admitted for the first time that “mistakes” had been made, but still denied vote buying. According to the DFB, the €6.7 million were indeed disguised under the false pretences of the “cultural programme” and used to repay the loan to Louis Dreyfuß. However, the DFB claims that the original payment to the German Organisation Committee led by Franz Beckenbauer was made in 2002, thus after Germany had already won the 2006 World Cup bid. According to the DFB, the money was used to fulfil a particular demand of FIFA: FIFA president Blatter requested an advanced payment of €6.7 million to guarantee a €170 million loan.[1] Beckenbauer acknowledged that the Organisation Committee should not have agreed to the proposal of the FIFA Finance Committee. Blatter, however, denies this version.[2]

By this time, the DFB had contracted the law firm ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer’ to investigate the matter. On 27 October, the law firm stated that the proceedings will probably take a long time.


Why is the German public prosecutor’s office investigating tax evasion?

On 19 October, the German Prosecutor’s office stated that they were in the process of verifying an initial suspicion before launching a preliminary investigation. Possible criminal wrongdoings involved deception, fraud and corruption. However, in a later Press Release, the public prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt stated that there would be no further investigation into the alleged crimes due to the expiration of the limitation period of proceedings. Instead, a preliminary investigation involving a particularly severe case of tax fraud was initiated.

By indicating the €6.7 million transfer as a contribution to the “FIFA cultural programme” on the DFB’s tax return, the transaction was classified as an “operating expense” under German tax law and was as such tax deductible. The public prosecutor’s office, however, thinks that the payment had in fact a different purpose. As a result of this requalification, the payment cannot be declared as a deducible operating expense anymore. Therefore, the suspects are accused of declaring wrongful tax returns within the limit of their prior responsibilities in the Organisations Committee, thereby evading corporate and commercial taxes as well as solidarity surcharges[3] for the year 2006 to a substantially high extent.

According to an article of the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, the falsified tax return were signed by Niersbach himself. Niersbach denies “any involvement whatsoever” in the affair.


What are the legal grounds under German Law?

The legal basis for prosecution of tax evasion is the eighth chapter (§§ 369-412) of the Abgabenordnung (Fiscal Code; abbr. AO). Here, tax offences are distinguished into tax crimes (Steuerstraftaten) and misdemeanours (Steuerordnungswidrigkeiten). Whilst the former is characterised as a deliberate act, the latter offence is triggered in case of gross negligence. Only tax crimes are punishable by penalties and imprisonment.[4] The core offence within the category of tax crimes is tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung) which is regulated under § 370 AO. A natural or legal person commits tax evasion by (i) misrepresenting or concealing relevant information regarding taxation to tax authorities; (ii) neglecting tax disclosure duties; or (iii) refraining from the compulsory use of tax stamps (§ 370 AO Abs. 1). As stated above, the act of tax evasion must be committed deliberately. In accordance with § 78 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Law Code; abbr. StGB), the statutory limitation period for prosecution of tax crimes is five years. However, the limitation period for tax repayment duties amounts to ten years; moreover, for tax repayment duties 6% interest per year is added. The potential sentence for tax evasion under German Law ranges from a financial penalty to a prison sentence of up to five years. In particularly serious cases of tax evasion in conjunction with abuse of an evader’s official authority or with fraudulent counterfeit the possible sentence ranges from minimally six month to maximally ten years of imprisonment (§ 370 AO Abs. 3 S. 1-5). If tax evasion is committed on a professional basis or as part of an organized crime (Gewerbs-/ Bandenmaessige Steuerhinterziehung) as stipulated in § 370a AO, the possible sentence ranges from one up to ten years of imprisonment.[5]

The search (Durchsuchungen) of private homes and business premises are primarily regulated in §§ 102 ff. Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure; abbr. StPO). Confiscation, or Beschlagnahmung, is regulated in §§ 98 ff. StPO. A search is conducted during preliminary investigations, and has to be based on “sufficient factual implications” (§ 152 Abs. 2 StPO). The preliminary investigation procedure can have three possible outcomes: First, one can decide to close the proceedings (§§386, 389 AO); second one can indorse a penalty order (Strafbefehl §§400; 407 StPO); and third, if enough evidence has been collected, the prosecutor can go to court and charge the defendant for tax evasion (§170 StPO).[6]


Against whom does the German prosecutor investigates?

The prosecutor’s investigation does not target the DFB as such. As stated in the introduction, suspects are the recently resigned DFB president Wolfgang Niersbach, who was the vice-president of the German Organisation Committee of the 2006 World Cup, his predecessor Theo Zwanziger, who acted as the treasurer of the Organisations Committee and Horst R. Schmidt, who was the managing Vice-President of the Organisations Committee and until 2007 General Secretary of the DFB. If Niersbach actually signed the falsified tax return papers, his role in the affair will most likely be difficult to deny.

The exact role of the other two officials in the putative tax evasion scheme remains unclear. Especially the role of Zwanziger raises questions. Not only did he publicly reveal Niersbach’s knowledge of the affair, he also gave evidence in front of ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer’ on 28 October. Although contracted by the DFB, the members of the law firm are supposed to act as external investigators. Zwanziger stated that he had “submitted all his documents [and] presented his annotations and assessments”. Six days later, the public prosecutor’s office initiated the preliminary investigation on tax evasion and searched the aforementioned premises. At this point in time, a linkage between Zwanziger’s testimony and the start of the preliminary investigations remains purely speculative.

It is further unclear why the investigators refrain from targeting Franz Beckenbauer, who acted as the president of the Organisations Committee. The prosecutor argued that Beckenbauer had “nothing to do” with the tax evasion. By contrast, the German journal “Handelsblatt” suggested that “the most likely explanation” is that Beckenbauer lives in Austria and is thus outside the jurisdictional reach of the investigators.


What potential charges are the accused facing?

As the topic of the missing €6.7 million arose prior to any of the statements of the FIFA officials and – as to my knowledge - no retroactive payments have been made, the accused will not be exempted from charges under § 371 AO. If enough evidence can be found and if the accused are proven guilty in front of a Court, the accused six months to ten years imprisonment in case of a severe tax evasion scheme (§ 370 AO Abs. 3).


Why does the combination of “tax evasion” “Germany” and “Louis Dreyfuß” rings a bell?

It is not the first time that Louis Dreyfuß has been involved in a “German football scandal”. In 2000, Dreyfuß provided a loan to Bayern Munich’s Uli Hoeneß of 5 million Deutschmark (around €2.56 million) as “play money” to speculate primarily on shares and current exchange rates, which was deposited in a Zurich financial institution. Subsequently, the bank reportedly granted Hoeneß a loan amounting to 15 million marks, for which Louis Dreyfus also acted as guarantor. Hoeneß refrained from declaring the proceeds of his gambling to the tax authorities. For this and other tax evasion offences, Hoeneß was sentenced to a total of three years and six month of imprisonment in 2014.


What’s next in the investigation on the 2006 World Cup Affair?

With regard to the tax evasion charges, it is likely that the case will either be closed (§§ 386, 389 AO) or – if enough evidence is collected against one or all three of the officials – the offenders will be charged for tax evasion in front of a court (§170 StPO). The outcome will depend on the evidence that comes to light during the preliminary investigation. As the FIFA “cultural programme” never took place, it is very obvious that the money was indeed used for a different purpose than indicated on the tax return and as such, the transaction should not have been deducible as an operating expense. Hence, proving tax evasion will most likely not be the public prosecutor’s office primary problem. Instead, the investigators have to find evidence tying Niersbach, Zwanziger and/or Schmidt to the crime. If the Sueddeutsche Zeitung is correct in stating that Niersbach signed the illegal tax return, it will be difficult for him to avoid prosecution.

In any case, it is to be expected that the 2006 World Cup Affair will occupy Fußballdeutschland for a while. The results of the investigation which the DFB confided to the law firm ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer are not expected tomorrow. Moreover, the independence of the investigation is questioned after a personal connection between a Niersbach employee and a lawyer from the aforementioned firm became public. FIFA, too, has several external lawyers investigating the claims. In addition, the Sportausschuss (sport committee) of the German Bundestag started to look into the matter. However, the impartiality of the sport committee may also be questioned as one of the Bundestag’s members also acts as the treasurer of the DFB and is tipped to become the successor of Niersbach. As a result, the final word regarding the use, whereabouts and purpose of the €6.7 million is not to be expected soon.


[1] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:” Das Schweigen des Wolfgang Niersbach“, 04.11.2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/sport/fussball/dfb-praesident-wolfgang-niersbach-schweigt-nach-dfb-razzia-13893806.html

[2] Idem 1

[3] To finance the reunification of Germany a surcharge is levied from all taxpayers on their PAYE, income, withholding and corporation tax. The solidarity surcharge is currently 5.5 % of the relevant assessment basis.

[4] However, misdemeanours can be fined with up to €50 000

[5] See also L.P. Feld, A.J.Schmidt & F, Schneider: “Tax Evasion, Black Activities and Deterrence in Germany: An Institutional and Empirical Perspective”, Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Warwick, 2007.

[6] See also Christoph Bräuning: „Durchsuchung und Beschlagnahme durch die Steuerfahndung“, ROSE & PARTNER LLP, 2012, http://www.rosepartner.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Durchsuchung_Steuerfahndung__Christoph_Braeunig_01.pdf

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Blog Symposium: Why FIFA's TPO ban is justified. By Prof. Dr. Christian Duve

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Blog Symposium: Why FIFA's TPO ban is justified. By Prof. Dr. Christian Duve

Introduction: FIFA’s TPO ban and its compatibility with EU competition law.
Day 1: FIFA must regulate TPO, not ban it.
Day 2: Third-party entitlement to shares of transfer fees: problems and solutions
Day 3: The Impact of the TPO Ban on South American Football.
Day 4: Third Party Investment from a UK Perspective. 

Editor’s note: Finally, the last blog of our TPO ban Symposium has arrived! Due to unforeseen circumstances, FIFA had to reconsider presenting its own views on the matter. However, FIFA advised us to contact Prof. Dr. Christian Duve to author the eagerly awaited blog on their behalf. Prof. Dr. Christian Duve is a lawyer and partner with Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP and an honorary professor at the University of Heidelberg. He has been a CAS arbitrator until 2014. Thus, as planned, we will conclude this symposium with a post defending the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law. Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Duve for having accepted this last-minute challenge!


This blog article outlines FIFA’s reasons to introduce Art. 18ter FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) which bans third-party ownership of players’ economic rights (TPO). In recent years, TPO was perceived as a threat to the integrity of football competitions within the international football community[i] and has become an area of concern for FIFA. Nevertheless Art. 18ter RSTP has been heavily criticized mainly by the proponents of TPO and a complaint has been filed with the European Commission by the Spanish and the Portuguese Leagues for an alleged violation of EU competition law. In the following it will be shown that such criticism does not sufficiently take into consideration the specific characteristics of the practice of TPO as well as football in general. It explains the rationale behind Art. 18ter RSTP which

-      fosters the integrity of competition which is a priority topic for FIFA,

-      promotes the independence of clubs by preventing third parties’ influence in sporting decisions,

-      leads to stable squads,

-      provides an opportunity for investors to invest in the clubs rather than in single players,

-      leads to financially healthier clubs.

Hence, with the introduction of Art. 18ter RSTP, FIFA pursues legitimate aims which justify the ban of the TPO practice.


1.              FIFA’s Way to Art. 18ter RSTP

TPO covers various situations in which a third party invests in the economic rights of a player in order to receive a compensation with regard to a future transfer. Whilst it is widely used in South America and in Southern Europe as an alternative funding possibility, especially to finance investments in sporting talent,[ii] TPO is explicitly prohibited in England, France and Colombia.[iii] The English ban on TPO was introduced in 2008 after the commotion caused by the Tévez case in 2006 where the contract between Tévez and West Ham United contained a provision giving a third party owner the right to decide on the transfer and the transfer fee of the player without any right to veto by the club.

FIFA has introduced a new rule Art. 18bis RSTP which prohibits clubs to enter into contracts that are liable to jeopardise the club’s independence, its policies or the performance of its teams and freedom of decision-making in employment and transfer-related matters and came into force on 1 January 2008.[iv] However, after having mandated two studies providing data and information on TPO in several countries in 2013 and 2014, it was felt that Art. 18bis RSTP was not sufficient and did not address this subject in an appropriate manner. Therefore FIFA decided to introduce a new Art. 18ter RSTP as from 1 May 2015.

The main provision of Art. 18ter RSTP reads:

1.      No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation. […]

It has been criticized that Art. 18ter RSTP prevents and restricts competition in the market for capital investment in football in a way that is not proportionate for attaining its legitimate objective and that Art. 18ter RSTP is therefore incompatible with EU Competition law. However, such criticism does not sufficiently take into consideration the specific characteristics of football as will be shown in this blog.


2.              The Rationale of Art. 18ter RSTP

First and foremost, Art. 18ter RSTP protects the integrity of the game itself by allowing for the necessary freedom in the contractual relationship between a club and a player, to determine whether and when the player is fielded as well as to decide independently and for sporting reasons only whether and when they are transferred.

Second, with regard to financial aspects of the clubs, critics undervalue that Art. 18ter RSTP is limited to a prohibition of an investment in a club’s players and does not in any way limit an investment in the clubs themselves leading to financially healthier clubs.

2.1           Art. 18ter RSTP Fosters the Integrity of Football

Art. 18ter RSTP pursues several legitimate aims, inter alia, the integrity of competition (2.1.1.), the independence of clubs (2.1.2.) and the stability of squads (2.1.3.).

2.1.1      Integrity of Competition

The protection of the integrity of the game is not only one of FIFA’s main objectives according to Art. 2 e) of the FIFA Statutes, it was also recognized by the European Commission as a legitimate aim justifying limitations on competition.

With regard to the UEFA rule on the “Integrity of the UEFA Club competitions: Independence of clubs” establishing a ban on the ownership of several clubs participating in the same competition by the same person or company, the European Commission held that the ban was in any case a necessary rule to ensure its legitimate aim of protecting the integrity of sporting competitions by “protecting the uncertainty of the results and giving the public the right perception as to the integrity of the […] competitions with a view to ensure their proper functioning“.[v] Previously, a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) decision has also confirmed the validity of this limitation and found that “when commonly controlled clubs participate in the same competition, the «public’s perception will be that there is a conflict of interest potentially affecting the authenticity of results»” and that “that ownership of multiple clubs competing in the same competition represents a justified concern for a sports regulator and organizer”.[vi]

The danger of such conflicts of interests is, however, not limited to club owners, it extends to investors, agents and coaches. Similar to the situations in which a third party has interests in several clubs participating in the same competition, conflicts of interests can also arise in cases where third parties own shares in economic rights of several players of different teams which are competing against each other.[vii] Especially if a player in which a third party has an economic interest competes against a club that is owned by the same investor, there is a significant potential for such conflicts. Even within the same team, the risk of having the same owner of a number of players presents a competitive integrity risk.[viii]

In any case and irrespective of an actual conflict, a conflict may at least be perceived by the public in connection with TPO. Such perception leads to a loss of confidence in the integrity of the competition and damages the image of the sport. In the light of the increasing threat of match manipulation, the involvement of third-party owners creates a danger to the reputation of the competition that could weaken the football world. The integrity of the game is therefore only guaranteed if players and clubs are not influenced by third parties owning the players’ economic rights with the aim to maximize their investment.[ix]

2.1.2      Independence of Clubs

To ensure the independence of its Members’ affiliated clubs is one of FIFA’s objectives pursuant to Art. 18 para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes. The second TPO study found that “the spread of TPO in the majority of the cases may be closely related to a partial takeover of the clubs’ control by actors seeking primarily short-term profit and speculating on the purchase and sale of economic rights, regardless of sporting concerns”[x]. TPO potentially has an impact on player selection on the field of play and creates complications for transfer negotiations as the clubs’ sporting interests (e.g. of holding a player despite a lucrative offer or of letting a player go without being offered a lucrative transfer fee) may conflict with investors seeking a profitable return on their investment.

Even though interests may coincide if the investor speculates for a rise in the player’s market value (e.g. Santos FC refusing Chelsea FC’s offer for Neymar), one prominent example of conflicting interests is the Tévez case in which West Ham United was deprived of any rights with regard to a future transfer of the player. More recently, contract renewal negotiations with Zambrano, a key player of Eintracht Frankfurt, are jeopardized by a third party whose entitlement to future transfer compensation for Zambrano is to be bought by Eintracht.[xi] 

Overall, the more clubs are depending on TPO financing, the more negotiating power third party investors have. The second TPO study mentions the purchase of economic rights at preferential prices, pre-emptive rights on new players or even greater influence on transfer policy.[xii] Moreover, with players’ economic rights in the hands of various investors the fragmentation of interests within a club increases. The independence of clubs can only be guaranteed by preventing a partial takeover of the clubs’ control by third parties especially with regard to transfers.

2.1.3      Stability of Squads

The aforementioned clash of interests between investors speculating on the purchase and sale of players’ economic rights and clubs reoccurs when it comes to the frequency of transfers. Whereas an investor makes money out of transfers, a club may be more interested in building a stable team and team cohesion for sporting reasons. The Demographic Study of CIES in 2014 found that “in general, the number of transfers carried out by teams during the current season is at an all-time high” and stated that “the increasing speculation surrounding players’ transfers is also visible through the progressive drop in the number of club-trained players, which has attained its lowest level since 2009”.[xiii] Pursuant to the same study, players recruited from January 2013 onwards represented 41.3% of squads on average (10.2 signings per club). At the same time, the best performing clubs generally have the most stable squads. For instance, FC Barcelona has the most stable squad among European top division teams. Its Players have been for 5.5 years in the first team squad on average pursuant to the Demographic Study of CIES in 2014.[xiv]

Leagues and club representatives stressed in the Second TPO study that the increasing gaps between clubs in terms of stability contribute to the general decline in the competitive balance both at national and international level.[xv] FIFA’s overall objective to promote football, laid down in Art. 2 a) of the FIFA Statutes, is endangered by such contractual instability caused by TPO.

2.2           Art. 18ter RSTP Provides an Incentive for Investment in Clubs

Football clubs play the central role with regard to the aforementioned legitimate aims. In order to achieve those objectives, appropriate financing mechanisms are fundamental for football clubs. It is undisputed that clubs need external sources. A solution that takes sufficiently into account the role of the clubs and their needs can only be to finance clubs directly. By prohibiting the TPO of single players’ economic rights, Art. 18ter RSTP creates an incentive for investors to invest in the clubs themselves.

Admittedly, some football clubs have been affected by financial difficulties and thus do not seem to be attractive for investors at first sight. In this context, however, it must be taken into account that clubs that seek regular access to talent by means of TPO are becoming even more and more dependent on the regular injection of funds from external investors which may lead to a “vicious circle of debt and dependence”.[xvi] With a club selling its players’ economic rights to third parties, the value of the respective club’s assets decreases. As a result, it is even harder to find potential investors interested in financing the club.[xvii] Therefore TPO cannot be a sustainable financing option. Improving the overall financial health of club football is a major concern for football associations. Therefore the UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP) were established to prevent professional football clubs from excessive spending. Although the regulations only contain disclosure requirements with regard to TPO, they were released in view of a TPO ban.[xviii]

Overall, critics therefore have to take into account that Art. 18ter RSTP prohibits only one single form of investment whilst it promotes at the same time investment in the clubs specifically tailored to the overarching aim of fostering the integrity of the game.


3.              Conclusion

Art. 18bis RSTP has already targeted the aforementioned legitimate aims. However, this provision may be easily circumvented by inserting a clause into the TPO agreement stating that it does not permit any exercise of influence by the third party within the club’s employment and transfer-related matters, policies or performance of its team. In practice, the engaged third parties will interfere with a club’s sporting decisions in many cases despite such a contractual clause. Interviewees in the second TPO study reported that in practical terms, many third­party investors do influence the transfer of players.[xix] Therefore, there is a consensus among football stakeholders that TPO should be restricted. The legitimate aims underlying Art. 18ter RSTP can be achieved most effectively by a total ban of the TPO practice. Whereas critics point to the lack of financing options caused by the prohibition of TPO, this blog has argued that in the specific context of football competitions the integrity of the game benefits from direct investments in the clubs.


[i] Cp. FIFA Circular no. 1420 of 12 May 2014.

[ii] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 3.

[iii] Moreover, Poland has a rule which is interpreted by its football association as prohibiting third parties to hold a player’s economic rights with an exception for former clubs, cp. TPO study I, p. 3, 17 et. seq.

[iv] Art. 18bis RSTP, as introduced in 2008, reads:

1.   No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.

2.   The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.

[v] European Commission, Rejection Decision of 25 June 2002, Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/ UEFA, para. 47.

[vi] Arbitration CAS 98/200 AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague / Union of European Football

Associations (UEFA), award of 20 August 1999, para. 48 (available at http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/200.pdf).

[vii] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p.  9, 81.

[viii] Cp. Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part I., Centre international d’étude du sport, p. 33.

[ix] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 81 et. seq.

[x] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 8.

[xi] Available at: http://www.fr-online.de/eintracht-frankfurt/carlos-zambrano-eintracht-frankfurt-zambrano-deal-gefaehrdet,1473446,29843342.html.

[xii] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 88.

[xiii] Available at http://www.football-observatory.com/demographic-study-2014-now.

[xiv] Available at http://www.football-observatory.com/demographic-study-2014-now.

[xv] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 78.

[xvi] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 9.

[xvii] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 88.

[xviii] Available at http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html.

[xix] Third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, Part II., Centre de droit et d’économie du sport et Centre international d’étude du sport, June 2014, p. 88.

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