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[Advanced professional training] Responding to human rights abuse in sport: Safe, effective & appropriate investigation - 5-6 March

Register now for the second edition of our advanced professional training and learn how to respond in a safe, appropriate, and effective way to cases of human rights abuse in sport. 

In recent years, the world of sport has seen a rise in reports of cases of emotional, psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. Sport has often struggled to respond in a safe, effective and appropriate way to these cases.  This has, at best, led to missed opportunities to improve and strengthen prevention mechanisms.  At worst, it has caused retraumatisation and additional harm to those affected. 

This professional training uses real life challenges from past investigations to provide insight into how (not) to respond to reports and allegations of sport-related cases of abuse. It will provide you with tools and knowledge on how to deal with abuse cases while protecting those affected, complying with human rights, and upholding the integrity of sport.

Register HERE

Widespread abuse in sports
The last five years have seen a huge uptick in reports of cases of emotional psychological, physical and sexual abuse in sport. All over the world, across different sports, non-recent and recent cases have come to light: abuse allegations in Dutch gymnastics and US gymnastics, the abuse of female basketball players in Mali, systematic abuse of child athletes in Japan, the abuse of young boys within the English football, or children in other grass-roots sport in Germany, the sexual abuse ofwomen’s football national teams in Afghanistan and Haiti, or the recent sexual assault against a player of the Spanish women’s national football team, to mention but a few.

Ineffective response
Responses from the relevant entities like sport organisations and governments have often fallen short of both the expectations of those impacted, and internationally recognised human rights standards. Some organisations have failed to initiate any investigation whatsoever, while others have commissioned or led inadequate responses. This has resulted in strong  criticism from affected persons, their representatives, and other civil society organisations. However, until now sport has not benefited from  any real  clarity or consistency around good practice on how to respond in a safe, adequate and effective way to allegations of abuse. This course seeks to address that.

Register HERE

Good practice based on research and experience
The Centre for Sport and Human Rights (CSHR) has conducted a study, in conjunction with victims, survivors, and whistleblowers of abuse across continents and sporting disciplines, and based on the learnings developed and published a guidance on how to conduct safe, appropriate and effective investigations into abuse cases in sport.  In this professional training, the Asser Institute partners with CSHR to connect practical research-based guidelines with relevant legal norms and procedures to address human rights abuses in sport. 

What will you learn? 

  •   How (not) to respond to reports and allegations of sport-related cases of abuse 

  •   Knowledge and experience in responding to such cases in a way that protects the affected person from further harm and complies with human rights 

  •    The role that investigations play in access to remedy more broadly 

Download the full programme

Speakers:

  • Kat Craig (CSHR)
  • Dr Daniela Heerdt (Asser Institute)
  • Joanna Maranhão (4x Olympians and Survivor Network Coordinator)
  • Loïc Alves (Senior Legal Counsel at FIFPRO)
  • Peter Nicholson (Head of Investigations and Intelligence Athletics Integrity Unit and Ethics Officer ICC)

Register HERE

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The EU State aid and Sport Saga – A blockade to Florentino Perez’ latest “galactic” ambitions (part 1)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The EU State aid and Sport Saga – A blockade to Florentino Perez’ latest “galactic” ambitions (part 1)

This is the first part of a blog series involving the Real Madrid State aid case.

Apart from being favoured by many of Spain’s most important politicians, there have always been suspicions surrounding the world’s richest football club regarding possible financial aid by the Madrid City Council. Indeed, in the late 90’s a terrain qualification change by the Madrid City Council proved to be tremendously favourable to the king’s club. The change allowed Real Madrid to sell its old training grounds for a huge sum. Though the exact price for the grounds remains unknown, Real Madrid was suddenly capable of buying players like Figo and Zidane for record fees. However, the European Commission, even though agreeing that an advantage was conferred to the club, simply stated that the new qualification of the terrain in question does not appear to involve any transfer of resources by the State and could therefore not be regarded as State aid within the meaning of article 107 TFEU.

Agreements between the club and the Council have been a regularity for the last 25 years.  A more recent example concerns an agreement signed on 29 July 2011 (Convenio29-07-2011.pdf (8MB). The agreement regularizes two earlier agreements between the Council and Real Madrid dating from 1991 and 1998 respectively. The commitments deriving from those earlier agreements were not followed by the relevant parties and therefore had to give way to a new agreement. A closer look at the 29 July 2011 Agreement exposes a bizarre chain of events. It turned out that in 1998 Real Madrid transmitted an undivided half of their old training grounds to the municipality. Apart from a large sum of money, the club was to receive a number of terrains spread out over the municipality, including a terrain located in the area called Las Tablas valued at €595.194 in 1998. However, due to its qualification for sporting usage, the Council concluded in 2011 that the parcel could not be transferred to the club due to the fact that Madrid’s urbanity laws only permit a transfer of urban or urbanizable terrains. For that reason, the Council agreed to compensate the football club not for the original value of €595.194 but for a staggering €22.693.054,44! Real Madrid was not compensated in the form of a sum, but rather it was presented with a packet of terrains including four terrains of a total area of 12.435 m/2 in the street Mercedes Arteaga in the Carabanchel district of Madrid.

The year 2011 also saw a second agreement between the Council of Madrid and the football club, this time concerning construction works on the Real Madrid stadium Santiago Bernabéu. This agreement, dating from November 2011, is known as operation Bernabeú-Opañel and includes the following plans. The Council is to transfer to the club a terrain constituting a 12.250 m/2 buildable surface which borders the west-side of the Bernabéu stadium. This acquirement permits Real Madrid to cover the stadium with a roof, to build a shopping centre and a hotel on the façade situated on the Paseo de la Castellana (one of Madrid’s most important streets). In return, the club firstly agreed to transfer to the Council the shopping centre Esquina del Bernabéu, which is situated at the South-East-side of the stadium with a buildable surface of 6.858 m/2. The Council would then demolish the shopping centre and convert it into a public park. Secondly, the club is to transfer back to the Council part of the four terrains located in the street Mercedes Arteaga that it received as part of the 29 July 2011 Agreement.  In addition to the transfers of the old shopping centre and the terrains located in the street Mercedes Arteaga, Real Madrid is also to pay €6.6 million to the Council. The Council, however, encountered an obstacle in its own urban laws. The Plan General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid de 1997 (PGOU) did not permit private parties, like Real Madrid, to construct on public terrains owned by the Council. Therefore, on 16 November 2012, the Government of the autonomous region of Madrid announced that the PGOU is to be modified ad hoc for the operation Bernabeú-Opañel.

By means of the operation Bernabeú-Opañel, Real Madrid expressed that it hopes to “convert the Club in a sporting institution of reference in the world. The aim is for the stadium to have a maximum level of comfort and services superior to the most modern and advanced sporting stadiums in the world” (PropuestaRealMadrid.pdf (914.2KB)). According to the Council, the operation will not only improve sporting and leisure facilities in the city, it will also create up to 9.546 m/2 of “green zones”. Moreover, the investment for the construction works will be borne only by Real Madrid and it is expected that the construction works will give employment to more than 2 000 people and the exploitation to 600 people.

 

In 2012, the ecological movement Ecologistas en Acción found several legal irregularities with regard to the 29 July Agreement operation Bernabeú-Opañel and (unsurprisingly) concluded that the agreements appeared to be very beneficial for Real Madrid. It therefore started legal proceedings in front of the Spanish administrative Court claiming that the ad hoc modification of the PGOU was illegal. It would later on launch on appeal in front of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid, or Madrid High Court (TSJM-Order-31-07-2014.pdf (112.3KB)). Simultaneously, it informed the European Commission of potential unlawful State aid granted by the Council of Madrid to Real Madrid. To Spain’s outrage, on 18 December 2013, the Commission declared that it had enough reasons to believe that the incriminated transactions might involve State aid and launched a formal investigation in accordance with Article 108(2) TFEU. Concretely, the Commission expressed the following concerns:

1) The Commission doubts whether it was impossible for the Council of Madrid to transfer the Las Tablas property to Real Madrid;

2) The Commission doubts that a market value of the Las Tablas plot of land has been sought;

3) The Commission doubts the market conformity of the value of the properties which were transferred to Real Madrid by the 2011 Agreement and at the occasion of the subsequent further exchange of land around the Bernabéu Stadium, and;

4) The Commission doubts that there is an objective of common interest, which could justify selective support to a very strong actor in a highly competitive economic sector. 

The Commission’s doubts seem, in light of the facts at hand, reasonable. To decide whether or not the land transactions qualifies as unlawful State aid, however, the four cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU need to be fulfilled. (1) The aid must confer an economic advantage on Real Madrid; (2) it must be granted by a Member State or through State resources; (3) the advantage must be selective and distorts or threatens to distort competition; and (4) it must affect trade between Member States.


Advantage to Real Madrid over its competitors

As the Commission pointed out in paragraph 21 of its notice initiating the infringement procedure against Spain, “Real Madrid appears to enjoy an economic advantage from the fact that a plot of land, which at the time of its acquisition was valued at €595,194, appears 13 years later, in an operation to offset mutual debts, with a value of more than €22 million”. Furthermore, there are also doubts regarding the market conformity of the lands transferred in the operation Bernabéu-Opañel. In situations where the public authorities wish to sell public property to private investors, it should make sure that the revenue obtained from the sale is comparable to market level. This criterion is also known as the “market economy vendor principle”. In accordance with the Land sale Communication, should the public authorities wish to avoid any advantage to the recipient over its competitors during a land sale transaction, it should apply one of the two following procedures: (1) an unconditional bidding procedure or (2) a procedure where the land is valued by one or more independent asset valuers prior to the sale negotiations. The Court of Justice has ruled that other methods may also achieve the same result, but in order to comply with EU State aid rules, the national provisions establishing rules for calculating the market value of land must in all cases lead to a price as close as possible to the market value.[2] Special obligations for the buyer, such as urban planning requirements, do play a role when determining whether or not the land was sold at market value. Furthermore, land transfer deals, which often consist of more than just one land transaction, have to be scrutinized in their entirety.[3] Therefore, to determine whether an advantage was conferred to Real Madrid, both agreements between the club and the Council have to be take into account with a special focus on the valuation methods used.

In 1998, the valuation for the terrain in Las Tablas (€595,194) was done by the administration of Madrid, on the basis of legislation which offers a technique to determine the value of urban real property. The calculated value for the same terrain in Las Tablas in 2011 amounted to €22.693.054,44. According to a valuation report released by the Municipal Valuation Department, the value was calculated in accordance the same application rules. Yet it has to be borne in mind that the Municipal Valuation Department forms part of the Área de Gobierno de Urbanismo y Vivienda del Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Not only is the Área de Gobierno de Urbanismo y Vivienda the main public authority regarding urban planning in Madrid, it is together with Real Madrid the main party in the 2011 Agreement itself.

Real Madrid was not compensated in the form of a payment, but rather it was presented with another packet of terrains valued at €19,972,348.96. In the valuation report released by the Municipal Valuation Department, a list is included with average terrain values per district calculated by the independent appraiser Tasamadrid. In continuation, the Municipal Valuation Department applied a formula based on its own legislation to determine the final value of the terrains. This packet of terrains included land in the street Mercedes Arteaga, valued at €4,360,862 which were transferred back to the municipality in the operation Bernabéu-Opañel.

The operation Bernabéu-Opañel also included the club transferring the old shopping centre Esquina del Bernabéu and added a payment of €6,6 million. A second valuation report indicates that the value of the Esquina del Bernabéu is €3,861 per square meters passed on the average values of terrains found in adjacent streets. Furthermore, the Council “requalified” the terrain between the Bernabéu stadium and the street Paseo de la Castellana by ad hoc modifying the local urban laws (PGOU) before transferring it to Real Madrid. The value of this terrain is also calculated in the second report and ads up to €1,208 per square meter. Even though two of the terrains in question can be found in the same area, the value per square meter of the Esquina Bernabéu is much higher (€3,861) as compared to the value of the land between the Bernabéu stadium and the street Paseo de la Castellana (€1,208). True, the terrain with the Esquina del Bernabéu has already been built on, thereby increasing the value, but one should keep in mind that the operation Bernabéu-Opañel consists of demolishing the Esquina del Bernabéu and turning it into a green zone. On the other, the other terrain will be used for the construction of a hotel and a new shopping centre. Secondly, a quick glance at other real estate transfers in the same area of Madrid shows that the value of the terrains is in fact much higher. In 2012, the Picasso tower was purchased by a private firm for €400 million, or €5000 m/2. Today, the building Torre Titania can be bought for €11,000 m/2 and the building Castellana 200 is for sale for €150 million.

With all the above in mind, one could legitimately get the feeling that the actual aim of the Agreement of 29 July 2011 was to pave the way for the operation “Bernabéu-Opañel”, as some media suggested. Unlike in the Konsum Nord case, where the General Court held that the presence of a link between different transactions could mean that the measure in question does not constitute State aid, the link between the agreements in the Real Madrid case only increases suspicions regarding unlawful State aid. Furthermore, the Council of Madrid has also been inconstant regarding its valuation methods. The value of the terrain in Las Tablas was calculated without an independent appraiser and the value of the Esquina del Bernabéu was calculated using the average value of terrains found in adjacent streets. In short, there are good reasons to believe that the transactions were made in order to provide a financial advantage to Real Madrid.

The remaining three criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and possible justifications will be discussed in an upcoming blog post.



[1] Notes are omitted. A comprehensive article can be accessed at Oskar van Maren, "The Real Madrid case: A State aid case (un)like any other?".

[2] Case C-239/09 Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe [2010] ECR I-13083, §33-35

[3] Case T-244/08 Konsum Nord ekonomisk förening v Commission [2011] ECR II-0000, §58

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 1: The Early Years. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 1: The Early Years. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming master thesis. 


On 24 November 2016, a claim was lodged before a Zurich commercial court against FIFA’s transfer regulations by a 17-year-old African football player.[1] The culprit, according to the allegation: The provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players.[2] The claimant and his parents dispute the validity of this measure, based on the view that it discriminates between football players from the European Union and those from third countries. Besides to Swiss cartel law, the claim is substantiated on EU citizenship rights, free movement and competition law. Evidently, it is difficult to assess the claim’s chance of success based on the sparse information provided in the press.[3] Be that as it may, it does provide for an ideal (and unexpected) opportunity to delve into the fascinating subject of my master thesis on FIFA’s regulatory system aimed at enhancing the protection of young football players and its compatibility with EU law. This three-part blog shall therefore try to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. This first part will shed its light on the “birth” and “first years” of the provision, thereby illustrating the relevant developments from 2001 till 2009. The heart of this analysis is formed by two decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”): The Acuña and FC Midtjylland case. The second part shall subsequently cover the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. Therein, the major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed, together with the important CAS decisions concerning Article 19. The third, and final, part will constitute a substantive assessment of the provision under EU Internal Market law. 


The first years, from 2001 onwards[4]

The 2001 “Commission-condoned” FIFA transfer rules included for the first time a section dedicated to the enhancement of the protection of minors.[5] An accompanying circular by FIFA stipulated that the new transfer rules imposed strict conditions “in order to provide a stable environment for the training and education of players”.[6] Moreover, stating that abuses frequent in the past had to be tackled, it seemed to inaugurate a new era of safeguarding young footballers.[7] The starting point of the new provision is a general prohibition for players under the age of 18 (“minor”) to transfer internationally.[8] The same principles apply to a so-called “first registration” of a minor who requests to be registered in a country other than that of his nationality.[9] An absolute transfer ban however was apparently deemed too radical.[10] The prohibition was therefore made subject to two exceptions. Firstly, the “parents-rule” allows for minors to transfer internationally when their family moves to a country, in which the new club is located, for “reasons not related to football”.[11] Secondly, within the territory of the EU and EEA, players younger than 18 but above the minimum working age can transfer internationally, given that their sporting and academic education is guaranteed by the new training club.[12] FIFA further stressed its intention to issue, together with UEFA, a code of conduct guiding the national associations regarding these conditional arrangements.[13] However, this self-obligation was removed from the subsequent 2005 edition of the RSTP.[14]

Only a year after the introduction of the new rules, the first adaptations were made in response to concerns raised by national associations.[15] FIFA’s Players Status Committee (“PSC”, FIFA’s competent body adjudicating any disputes on matters related to the protection of minors) decided to add a third exception, which became known as the “50 + 50-rule”.[16] Hereby it aimed at dealing with the case of players living close to national borders where “cross-border traffic is a daily matter”.[17] Those young players living within this 50 km range may attend a club of a neighbouring association if that club is similarly situated within a 50 km distance of the border, provided that these players remain living at home. The two-part FIFA Circular is rather ambiguous in its explanation, stating on the one hand that minors in this situation can solely “train” with the club situated across the border,[18] while on the other hand introducing a full exception to the transfer ban (thereby permitting a “complete” international transfer).[19] This latter view is in accordance with the regulations’ revision that entered into force on 1 July 2005.[20] Next to adding the “50 + 50-rule”, the new article 19 RSTP slightly adjusted and hence further clarified the first two exceptions. A minor can transfer internationally only if his “parents” move to another country for reasons not related to football, restricting the scope of the rule from “family” to “parents”.[21] Moreover, with respect to the “EU and EEA-rule” it set the international standard of 16 as the minimum age and spelled out several additional requirements on the arrangements made by the recruiting club for the academic education of the transferred player.[22] These oblige the club to: “provide the player with an adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national standards”; “guarantee an academic or vocational education which will allow the player to pursue a career other than football”; “ensure that the player is looked after in the best possible way” by arranging housing with optimal living standards; and “provide its association with proof of compliance”.[23] Importantly, paragraph 4 orders national associations to safeguard compliance by clubs and paragraph 5 installs the PSC as the competent body to adjudicate in this field.[24] Hence, more explicit accountability and control was established concerning the abidance with the rules on the protection of minors.

In early 2007, FIFA issued a commentary on the RSTP in order to further clarify the separate provisions.[25] It stipulated that the international transfer of minors should be subject to stern restrictions in order to provide a stable environment for the player’s training and education.[26] Furthermore, “the term ‘parents’ has to be understood in a strict way”, a minor therefore cannot live with a close relative in the country of the new club. The document acknowledges that the “EU and EEA-rule” was adopted as to not interfere with EU free movement law.[27] National associations are once more reminded that they possess a vital role in ensuring compliance, amongst other by carrying our on-spot investigations regarding the mandatory educational arrangements if need be.[28] 


The Acuña case

These rules have not operated in a vacuum. The real effect of the provisions on the protection of minors has been shaped by the judicial practice of FIFA, through the PSC, and first and foremost the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”, the competent institution that deals with appeals contra FIFA’s internal decisions).[29]

The first (published) case before the CAS concerning a dispute on the provision’s content was Càdiz C.F. and Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v. FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol.[30] In January 2005, the 16-year-old Acuña Caballero represented his Paraguayan club Olimpia in an international tournament for players under 20. His successful performance led to foreign interest, and on 14 February 2005 he, together with his family, left Paraguay for Cádiz, Spain.[31] Three days later, Cádiz C.F. (a club meandering through the Spanish second and third league) and the player signed an employment contract, and subsequently Olimpia agreed to the transfer.[32] However the Paraguayan football association refused to issue the compulsory international transfer certificate (“ITC”), referring to Acuña Caballero’s age.[33] The FIFA PSC decided upon the matter on 26 August 2005 by verifying whether the requirements of the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a) RSTP were observed. By highlighting the apparent lack of intention to continue his education besides football, as well as the fact that the mother’s employment contract commenced much later than her son’s, the PSC found the case to be in total contradiction with the letter and spirit of the exemption: “the mother would have followed the player”[34], instead of the other way round. The PSC noted that the protection of minors is one of the fundamental principles of the RSTP, which requires the strict application of Article 19, and consequently refused the request of the Spanish association to register Acuña with Cádiz C.F.[35] Both the club and the player appealed this decision before the CAS, after which the tribunal organized a hearing of all parties concerned and several witnesses in order to grasp the factual context of this international transfer.[36] The CAS Panel swiftly countered the appellants’ views by stating that FIFA’s rules limiting the international transfer of minors do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy under Swiss law or any other national or international law, insofar that “they pursue a legitimate objective, namely the protection of young players from international transfers which could disrupt their lives, particularly if, as often happens the football career eventually fails or, anyways, is not as successful as expected and they are proportionate to the objective sought, as they provide for some reasonable exceptions”.[37] Subsequently it explained that, it had to be determined whether the move of the mother was related to the transfer of her son, and ergo whether the exception of article 19(2)(a) was applicable? The Panel found that “the players’ decision to move to Spain was made first”[38], by emphasizing the inconsistencies in the appellants’ statements, and as a result thereof doubting their truthfulness.[39] Furthermore, the club’s submission stated that “from all the possibilities, the offer made by CÁDIZ C.F. was the most suited to his parents’ wishes”, which lead the Panel to believe that in fact the clubs’ offer for her son made the mother look for a suitable job in Cádiz.[40] As such, the Panel established that the appellants could not benefit from the exception, since it concluded that Acuña’s family moved “for reasons linked to football”.[41]

The Acuña case exhibits a strict application of the rule. This strict application, although being in line with FIFA’s policy, lead to a disadvantageous outcome for the minor in question.[42] As argued by the player, his life in Paraguay meant living alone in a small apartment at his agent’s house and only seeing his mother two or three times a year.[43] The move to Spain allowed him to live with his mother and was therefore positive for both his career and his family. The CAS Panel addressed this matter by stating that “the task of the CAS is not to revise the content of the applicable rules but only to apply them”.[44] Moreover, it stressed that any adverse consequences in relation to the refusal to allow the player to be registered with the club were the result of the appellants own actions. The Panel finally put forward that the player would not have to face the adverse consequence for long as he would turn 18 in a couple of months.[45] 


The FC Midtjylland case

The next confrontation followed suit: the case of FC Midtjylland.[46] The Danish Superligaen club came in FIFA’s crosshairs through a FIFPro complaint concerning the signing of six young Nigerians.[47] These players were registered as amateurs and played for Midtjylland’s youth teams. Additionally, they were granted short-term residence permits as students, excluding the right to work, and enrolled in the Danish educational program.[48] The FIFA PSC emphasized that Article 19 RSTP on the protection of minors, being one of the principles included in the FIFA/UEFA and European Commission agreement and “one of the pillars of the regulations”, is applicable to both amateur and professional players.[49] Thereto, only a strict, consistent and systematically implemented interdiction subject to very limited exceptions could stop the abuse and maltreatment of many young players. The PSC hence warned the Danish Football Association (DBU) and FC Midtjylland, and subsequently refused the registration of the players.[50]

The CAS Panel addressed four main issues in relation to what had been brought to the fore in the parties’ submissions concerning Article 19 RSTP:

1. Is it applicable to both professional and amateur minor players?

2. What are the exceptions and are any of these applicable?

3. Does the application of the provision “contradict any mandatory provision of public policy or any of the provisions of EC Law”? Is there a breach of the non-discrimination principle, following the alleged inconsistent approach of FIFA?[51]

In short, the Panel answered the first question in the affirmative, based on a textual approach together with taking due notice of the intended objective as “to apply Art. 19 of the RSTP restrictively to professional players only could result in obviating protection of young amateur players from the risk of abuse and ill treatment”.[52] As to the second question, it was noted that the codified exceptions provided in Article 19(2) RSTP were not applicable to the case at hand. Nevertheless, the Panel regarded this list not to be exhaustive and allowed for two additional exceptions relating to students: first, “where the players concerned could establish without any doubt that the reason for relocation to another country was related to their studies, and not to their activity as football players”, and second, “where the association of origin and the new club of the players concerned have signed an agreement within the scope of a development program for young players under certain strict conditions (agreement on the academic and/or school education, authorization granted for a limited period of time)”.[53] Yet, neither of these additional exceptions applied here.[54] The third issue was related to appellant’s Cotonou Agreement argument.[55] The Panel agreed that the non-discrimination rights are conferred by article 13(3) of the Cotonou Agreement to “Workers of ACP countries legally employed in its territory”.[56] Nonetheless, the Nigerian players in question are to be considered as “students”, not as “workers” legally employed in Denmark, which means they fall outside the scope of this provision.[57] The Panel moreover dismissed, based on that same reasoning, the appellant’s claim founded on the Simutenkov[58] case in their attempt for the “EU and EEA-rule” of Article 19(2)(b) RSTP to be applicable.[59] The Panel furthermore stressed with regard to this third question that agreements between the EU and third countries that prohibit discrimination in working conditions are clearly limited in scope to foreigners “legally employed in the Member States” and do not concern access to the employment market.[60] It also endorsed the Acuña case in that the FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players “do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible”.[61] Lastly on the fourth issue, in reaction to the appellant’s allegation that FIFA’s approach was inconsistent and favoured bigger clubs (by reference to Bayern München’s registering a minor player from South America), the CAS solely pointed at the general principle “that no one can claim for equal treatment by referring to someone else who has adopted an illegal conduct, without sanction (nemini dolus alienus prodesse debet)”.[62] Concluding, FC Midtjylland was found to have breached Article 19 RSTP as the CAS favoured a strict interpretation, yet simultaneously, it allowed for two additional implicit exceptions for students.

Around this point in time, the European Commission’s attention was also drawn to the protection of minors in sport. In its white paper on sport, it  pointed at “children who are not selected for competitions and abandoned in a foreign country, often falling in this way in an irregular position which fosters their further exploitation”.[63] Even though it makes reference to neither of the two abovementioned cases, this explicit consideration by the Commission, emphasizing the importance of protecting minors, could be seen as an indirect endorsement, prima facie, of the strict interpretation of Article 19 RSTP by CAS.

The next, second, part of this blog series shall aim to cover the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. The major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed. Furthermore, important CAS decisions concerning Article 19, Muhic, Vada I and II, FC Barcelona, RFEF, and the FIFA decisions relating to Real and Atlético Madrid, will be at the centre of the attention. 




[1] CNN, 24 November 2016, “FIFA: African footballer, 17, takes world governing body to court

[2] Article 19 FIFA RSTP (2016)

[3] Eurosport, 24 November, “FIFA faces lawsuit over rules banning transfer of minors

[4] The text of this blog contribution is part of my forthcoming thesis, which shall be submitted in order to complete my master’s degree in European Law at Leiden University.

[5] Art. 12 FIFA RSTP 2001.

[6] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[7] N. St. Cyr Clarke, “The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game”, 2011 CJEL, P. 627.

[8] Art. 12(1) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[9] Art. 12(2) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[10] Press release EU Commission, IP/01/29, 14 February 2001.

[11] Art. 12(1)(a) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[12] Art. 12(1)(b) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[13] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[14] F. de Weger, “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, Asser Press (2016), p. 14.

[15] FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002.

[16] Supra at 14, pp. 36-37.

[17] Supra at 15.

[18] Ibid.

[19] New Art. 12(1)(c) FIFA RSTP 2001 in FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002, “Amendments to the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”.

[20] Art. 19(2)(c) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[21] Art. 19(2)(a) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[22] Art. 19(2)(b) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[23] C. Lembo, “FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major Changes In European Football And The Negative Effect On Minors”, Emory Int'l L. Rev 2005, p. 557.

[24] Art. 19(4) and 19(5) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[25] FIFA Circular no. 1075, 18 January 2007.

[26] Commentary on the Status and Transfer of Players, p. 58.

[27] Ibid, p. 59.

[28] Ibid, p. 59.

[29] For more information see A. Duval, “The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Transnational Law-Making in the Shadow of Bosman” in A. Duval and B. Van Rompuy (Eds.) “The Legacy of Bosman”, Asser Press (2016), pp. 81-116; A. Duval “The Court of Arbitration for Sport and EU Law. Chronicle of an Encounter”, MJ 2015, pp. 224-256.

[30] CAS 2005/A/955 Càdiz C.F., SAD v FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol and CAS 2005/A/956 Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v/FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol.

[31] Ibid, para. 2.5.

[32] Ibid, paras. 2.6-2.7.

[33] Ibid, para. 2.10.

[34] Ibid, para. 2.16.

[35] Ibid, para. 2.17.

[36] Ibid, paras. 3.6-3.17.

[37] Ibid, para. 7.2.

[38] Ibid, para. 7.3.1.

[39] Ibid, paras. 7.3.2-7.3.5; Especially the circumstances surrounding the mother’s search for a job, the agreement between her and her employer, and the reasons why she decided to take up work in Cádiz while, being a cook, she could have worked anywhere in Spain, did not assist to their case.

[40] Ibid, para. 7.3.6.

[41] Ibid, para. 7.3.8.

[42] FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002.

[43] Supra at 30, para. 3.3.5 and 3.11.

[44] Ibid, para. 7.3.10.

[45] Ibid, para. 7.3.10.

[46] CAS 2008/A/1485 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Féderation Internationale de Football Association.

[47] A. Wild, “Young Football Players: Protection of Minors” in “CAS and Football: Landmark Cases”, Asser Press (2012), p. 249.

[48] Ibid, p. 250.

[49] Supra at 46, p. 3.

[50] Ibid, p. 4.

[51] Ibid, para. 10.

[52] Ibid, para. 15.

[53] Ibid, paras. 19-21.

[54] Ibid, para. 22.

[55] The Cotonou agreement between the EU and certain African, Caribbean and Pacific States, including Nigeria; Ibid, paras. 30-31.

[56] Supra at 46, para. 35.

[57] Ibid, para. 36.

[58] Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and RFEFl [2005] ECR I-2579, Therein the ECJ ruled that non-EU/EEA sportsmen can challenge nationality clauses if: they are legally employed in a host EU Member State and “can rely upon a directly effective equal treatment provision included in an international agreement establishing a partnership between the EU and their country of origin, regardless of whether accession to the EU is envisaged or not”, see S. Van den Bogaert, “From Bosman to Bernard” in J. Anderson (Ed.), “Leading Cases in Sports Law”, T.M.C. Asser Press (2013), p. 104.

[59] Supra at 46, para. 40.

[60] Ibid, para. 41.

[61] Ibid, para. 45; Supra at 30, para. 7.2.

[62] Supra at 46, paras. 47-49.

[63] The White Paper on Sport (COM 2007) 391 final, point 4.5; European Parliament, Report on the on the future of professional football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), p. 25.

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