Editor's note: Prof. Thomas Kruessmann is key expert in the EU Technical Assistant Project "Strengthening Teaching and Research Capacity at ADA University" in Baku (Azerbaijan). At the same time, he is co-ordinator of the Jean-Monnet Network "Developing European Studies in the Caucasus" with Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu (Estonia).

The notion that “fish rots from the head down” is known to many cultures and serves as a practical reminder on what is at stake in the current wave of anti-corruption / integrity and good governance initiatives. The purpose of this blog post is to provide a short update on the recent founding of the International Partnership against Corruption in Sport (IPACS), intermittently known as the International Sports Integrity Partnership (IPAS), and to propose some critical perspectives from a legal scholar’s point of view.

During the past couple of years, the sports world has seen a never-ending wave of corruption allegations, often followed by revelations, incriminations and new allegation. There are ongoing investigations, most notably in the United States where the U.S. Department of Justice has just recently intensified its probe into corruption at the major sports governing bodies (SGBs). By all accounts, we are witnessing only the tip of the iceberg. And after ten years of debate and half-hearted reforms, there is the widespread notion, as expressed by the Council of Europe’s (CoE’s) Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) Resolution 2199/2018 that “the sports movement cannot be left to resolve its failures alone”.

What is IPACS and why has it been created? 

IPACS was founded under the authority of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as “a cross-sectorial, multi-stakeholder platform to enable a pragmatic partnership allowing the development and implementation of programmes and initiatives by the various partners, to strengthen efforts promoting transparency, integrity and good governance in sports organisations, in particular through education and awareness-raising initiatives.” These words, taken from the Declaration of the Second International Forum for Sports Integrity (IFSI), held in Lausanne on 15 February 2017, provide a summary of the tasks IPACS was agreed to address. Interestingly, later on the official mission statement was significantly watered down: “To bring together international sports organisations, governments, inter-governmental organisations and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen and support efforts to eliminate corruption and promote a culture of good governance in and around sport.” This change mission statement betrays some of the controversies that lie behind the difficult quest for good governance and integrity.

One obvious question is why was it only in 2017 that IPACS was created? The short answer is that IFSI took up an idea that had been put forward at the UK Anti-Corruption Summit one year earlier. However, the real question is, why did this initiative emerge only in 2016/17 after corruption scandals had been hitting SGBs over the entire past decade and had become particularly acute with FIFA around 2010? The reason is that there is a major undercurrent in fighting corruption in SGBs: the doctrine of the autonomy of sports. For historical reasons, most major SGBs have been created as private entities, often associations or non-commercial entities, and are adamant at defending the notion of independence and autonomy of sports. While international anti-corruption conventions by the nature of international law address only states, SGBs are in the fortunate position to have to comply only with the criminal laws of their host state. And despite the fact that the commercialisation of sports has turned SGBs into multi-billion dollar ventures, since their inception their internal structures have resembled “gentlemen’s clubs”. It therefore comes as no surprise that even in the IFSI Declaration of February 2017, participants are eager to refer to the 69^th United Nations General Assembly proclaiming the autonomy of sports and shifting the responsibility in fighting corruption primarily to governments.

This undercurrent explains why the original IPACS mission statement calls for a “pragmatic partnership” and emphasizes education and awareness-raising initiatives. The truth is that even by 2017, many stakeholders (“participants to the IFSI Declaration”) were fighting to protect the independence of SGBs teeth and claw. And that only now a consensus is emerging, as expressed in the CoE PACE Resolution 2199/2018, that “enough is enough” and that SGBs have actually failed in cleaning up their business. Earlier resolutions, e.g. by the 14^th CoE Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport from 22 February 2017, have been more diplomatic in language. But it is clear that IPACS, despite all defensive battles from SGBs, is now representing a change in the tide of governments and anti-corruption related international organisations (such as CoE, OECD and UNODC) finally eager “to talk tough” with SGBs.

Is “talking tough” with SGBs credible? 

Now, even if we assume that the most recent investigations into corruption scandals were the straw that broke the camel’s back, will international anti-corruption organisations and governments be credible in fighting corruption by breaking up the doctrine of sports autonomy? Switzerland has been in the vanguard of national governments extending the offense of corruption in the private sector to NGOs and other non-commercial entities. This new offense (Arts 322^octies – 322^decies Swiss Criminal Code) is innovative because it does no longer require a distortion of the market. GRECO is reported to be preparing a “Typology Study on Private Sector Corruption” which will also cover the sports sector.

International anti-corruption organisations, by contrast, have a more careful line to tread. Arguably, there is a host of integrity-related problems in the world of sports that has been viewed for a long time in a reductionist way. Doping, match-rigging and other kinds of manipulation of sports events have ever too often been seen independently of the governance regimes of SGBs. Looking at them as individual wrongdoing at best supported the argument that SGBs may not have been vigilant enough. But this never came close to insisting that such kinds of wrongdoing are the logical consequence of structural governance defects in these bodies. As IPACS is now marking a shift in the consensus towards a more holistic and interventionist approach, what will this mean for international anti-corruption organisations? The problem is that during the past decade, many of them were only too happy to focus on singular problems while being co-opted by SGBs into “partnerships” to “address” governance issues. Analytically, this can be described as a horizontal legitimacy-building strategy by SGBs. By concluding memoranda of understanding, e.g. between the IOC and the UN or between FIFA and the CoE, SGBs, depending on their level of regional or universal activities, co-opted their potential critics and tried to acquire legitimacy by involving them into so-called reform processes.

Arguably, by being drawn into piecemeal reforms of SGBs over the last decade, international anti-corruption organisations have become part of the problem. The question is, how can they become part of the solution again? This is where IPACS presents an answer: it can be understood as a tacit dissolution of the prevailing partnerships and, depending on style and substance, offering a fresh start for a holistic and thus governance-related approach to establishing integrity. 

How is IPACS going about its work?

As mentioned before, IPACS was created in the wings of the Second IFSI, held on 15 February 2017 in Lausanne, and it will operate within the broader IFSI structure. By 2019 when the Third IFSI is scheduled, IFSI participants will therefore review a progress report on the activities realized which invariably includes any progress made by IPACS.

The work of IPACS itself is structured on three levels. There is a core group in which the most important anti-corruption international organisations are represented, a Working Group which is basically a tripartite structure representing the interests of SGBs, governments and inter-governmental organisations, and topical task forces. Core group members (CoE, IOC, OECD, UNODC and the UK Government) are in charge of preparing and co-ordinating the Working Group meetings. The first Working Group meeting took place at the CoE’s venue on 21 June 2017, the second Working Group meeting was held at the OECD on 14-15 December 2017. The third Working Group meeting is scheduled for June 2018 at the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne.

So far, three task forces with experts from outside the Working Group have been established:

• Task force 1 (TF1) on reducing the risk of corruption in public procurement;
• Task force 2 (TF2) on ensuring transparency and integrity in the selection of major sport events, with an initial focus on managing conflicts of interest; and
• Task force 3 (TF3) on optimising the processes of compliance with good governance principles to mitigate the risk of corruption.

The expected outputs from these task forces are as follows:

(1) TF1 to develop by the end of 2018 a general mapping of procurement standards to the specific context of sport, possibly complemented by illustrative case studies on how these standards could be applied in practice.

(2) TF2 to define conflict of interest in the specific sports context and undertake a stock-taking exercise of procedures and practices for managing conflict of interest in the specific context of the selection of major sporting events.

(3) TF3 “to aim to”

• map relevant governance standards and their applicability to the sports context;
• consider developing indicators to evaluate compliance with these standards;
• consider means for building capacity to implement good governance standards.

From the wording it appears that from TF1 to TF3, the tasks get ever larger and the commitment ever more unspecific. While TF1 is given a precise task with a definitive deadline, TF3 is asked to “aim to” reach certain goals. But this specific wording is perhaps a correct reflection of the difference in the scope of the problem. Procurement standards can easily be adopted from the corporate world. There is no specific challenge in running procurement for SGBs. Conflicts of interest, in particular when selecting major sports events, are of a different magnitude. Very often, the traditional ways of addressing such conflicts in the corporate setting or in public administration are clear-cut and addressed in a number of regulations. In SGBs which have been traditionally considered as “gentlemen’s clubs”, conflicts of interest run through the entire fabric of the institution. Therefore, the magnitude is much larger. But the real issue is how shall the mandate of TF2 be distinguished from that of TF3? Conflicts of interest and bad governance are twin concepts, and both flourish in the same environment. So, let us now turn to the central question: what can be expected from the most crucial TF3 in the IPACS setting?

Do governance standards finally get applied? 

In its first set of assignments, TF3 is asked to look into “relevant” governance standards, map them and analyse their applicability to the sports context. What sounds like a logical sequence of steps is actually quite muddled. Judging what is relevant and what is not is certainly the task at hand, but if we assume that “relevant standards” have been found, why is it necessary in a second step to “analyse their applicability in the sports context”? Is not applicability in the sports context the key criterion for judging what is relevant and what is not? Or will there first be other criteria for judging relevance outside from applicability in the sports context?

The point here is not to ridicule the language of the task force assignment, but to point to a deeper problem. Over the entire past decade, there have been numerous projects seeking to identify relevant governance standards. Without going into this issue very deeply, let me name just the most important ones:

• IOC Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement of 11/12 February 2008;
• IOC 2016 Code of Ethics;
• CoE Committee of Ministers Rec(2005)8 “On the Principles of Good Governance in Sport”;
• CoE PACE Resolution 1875 (2012) “Good Governance and Ethics in Sport” with appendix “Guidelines on good governance and ethics in sport”;
• CoE PACE Resolution 2053(2015) “The Reform of Football Governance”;
• CoE PACE Resolution 2199 (2018) “Working Towards a Framework for Modern Sports Governance” plus appendix;
• CoE PACE Resolution 2020 (2018) “Good Football Governance”;
• EPAS Study “A Review of Good Governance Principles and Indicators in Sport” (2016);
• EU Expert Group’s “Principles of Good Governance in Sport”;
• Sport Integrity Global Alliance’s (SIGA’s) “Good Governance Universal Standards Implementation Guidelines”.

In addition, when it comes the second set of assignments to TF3, in particular “developing indicators to evaluate compliance with these standards”, the following benchmarking tools already exist:

• EU’s Sports Governance Observer;
• EU’s “Support the Implementation of Good Governance in Sport” (SIGGS) project;
• and finally, the aforementioned Sport Integrity Global Alliance with a specific three-step benchmarking model.

So all things considered, a large amount of work has already been done to identify relevant standards for SGBs. Would it not simply be enough to take these project results seriously and start implementing them and evaluate their effects? Indeed, from an outside observer’s point of view, it looks as if this entire process is flawed. There is simply no need to go into another round of identifying standards, assessing their relevance and benchmarking them with indicators when all the work has already been done.

One argument to support the TF3 engagement is that there are simply too many different standards, and that, when it comes to governments intervening with SGBs and forcing them to adopt good governance standards, there should be one agreed-upon set of standards for all cases. Likewise, CoE PACE Resolution 2199 (2018) “strongly calls for the development and implementation of a solid set of harmonised good governance criteria” (italics not in the original). And in para 4 of the appendix to this Resolution, PACE even speaks of the necessity of identifying “core criteria” of good governance in sport. While such quest for harmonising and reducing to core elements may be intellectually stimulating, there is doubt whether the sports world can accept another round of soul-searching. The fish has already been rotting for a while, and the same “brave men” (aka experts) who had been dealing with the issue for a decade are now employed again in yet another attempt of the international community to clear up the mess of SGBs. We will eagerly await some results when the IPACS Working Group will convene for its next meeting in June 2018.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming master thesis. 

On 24 November 2016, a claim was lodged before a Zurich commercial court against FIFA’s transfer regulations by a 17-year-old African football player.[1] The culprit, according to the allegation: The provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players.[2] The claimant and his parents dispute the validity of this measure, based on the view that it discriminates between football players from the European Union and those from third countries. Besides to Swiss cartel law, the claim is substantiated on EU citizenship rights, free movement and competition law. Evidently, it is difficult to assess the claim’s chance of success based on the sparse information provided in the press.[3] Be that as it may, it does provide for an ideal (and unexpected) opportunity to delve into the fascinating subject of my master thesis on FIFA’s regulatory system aimed at enhancing the protection of young football players and its compatibility with EU law. This three-part blog shall therefore try to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. This first part will shed its light on the “birth” and “first years” of the provision, thereby illustrating the relevant developments from 2001 till 2009. The heart of this analysis is formed by two decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”): The Acuña and FC Midtjylland case. The second part shall subsequently cover the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. Therein, the major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed, together with the important CAS decisions concerning Article 19. The third, and final, part will constitute a substantive assessment of the provision under EU Internal Market law. 

The first years, from 2001 onwards[4]

The 2001 “Commission-condoned” FIFA transfer rules included for the first time a section dedicated to the enhancement of the protection of minors.[5] An accompanying circular by FIFA stipulated that the new transfer rules imposed strict conditions “in order to provide a stable environment for the training and education of players”.[6] Moreover, stating that abuses frequent in the past had to be tackled, it seemed to inaugurate a new era of safeguarding young footballers.[7] The starting point of the new provision is a general prohibition for players under the age of 18 (“minor”) to transfer internationally.[8] The same principles apply to a so-called “first registration” of a minor who requests to be registered in a country other than that of his nationality.[9] An absolute transfer ban however was apparently deemed too radical.[10] The prohibition was therefore made subject to two exceptions. Firstly, the “parents-rule” allows for minors to transfer internationally when their family moves to a country, in which the new club is located, for “reasons not related to football”.[11] Secondly, within the territory of the EU and EEA, players younger than 18 but above the minimum working age can transfer internationally, given that their sporting and academic education is guaranteed by the new training club.[12] FIFA further stressed its intention to issue, together with UEFA, a code of conduct guiding the national associations regarding these conditional arrangements.[13] However, this self-obligation was removed from the subsequent 2005 edition of the RSTP.[14]

Only a year after the introduction of the new rules, the first adaptations were made in response to concerns raised by national associations.[15] FIFA’s Players Status Committee (“PSC”, FIFA’s competent body adjudicating any disputes on matters related to the protection of minors) decided to add a third exception, which became known as the “50 + 50-rule”.[16] Hereby it aimed at dealing with the case of players living close to national borders where “cross-border traffic is a daily matter”.[17] Those young players living within this 50 km range may attend a club of a neighbouring association if that club is similarly situated within a 50 km distance of the border, provided that these players remain living at home. The two-part FIFA Circular is rather ambiguous in its explanation, stating on the one hand that minors in this situation can solely “train” with the club situated across the border,[18] while on the other hand introducing a full exception to the transfer ban (thereby permitting a “complete” international transfer).[19] This latter view is in accordance with the regulations’ revision that entered into force on 1 July 2005.[20] Next to adding the “50 + 50-rule”, the new article 19 RSTP slightly adjusted and hence further clarified the first two exceptions. A minor can transfer internationally only if his “parents” move to another country for reasons not related to football, restricting the scope of the rule from “family” to “parents”.[21] Moreover, with respect to the “EU and EEA-rule” it set the international standard of 16 as the minimum age and spelled out several additional requirements on the arrangements made by the recruiting club for the academic education of the transferred player.[22] These oblige the club to: “provide the player with an adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national standards”; “guarantee an academic or vocational education which will allow the player to pursue a career other than football”; “ensure that the player is looked after in the best possible way” by arranging housing with optimal living standards; and “provide its association with proof of compliance”.[23] Importantly, paragraph 4 orders national associations to safeguard compliance by clubs and paragraph 5 installs the PSC as the competent body to adjudicate in this field.[24] Hence, more explicit accountability and control was established concerning the abidance with the rules on the protection of minors.

In early 2007, FIFA issued a commentary on the RSTP in order to further clarify the separate provisions.[25] It stipulated that the international transfer of minors should be subject to stern restrictions in order to provide a stable environment for the player’s training and education.[26] Furthermore, “the term ‘parents’ has to be understood in a strict way”, a minor therefore cannot live with a close relative in the country of the new club. The document acknowledges that the “EU and EEA-rule” was adopted as to not interfere with EU free movement law.[27] National associations are once more reminded that they possess a vital role in ensuring compliance, amongst other by carrying our on-spot investigations regarding the mandatory educational arrangements if need be.[28] 

The Acuña case

These rules have not operated in a vacuum. The real effect of the provisions on the protection of minors has been shaped by the judicial practice of FIFA, through the PSC, and first and foremost the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”, the competent institution that deals with appeals contra FIFA’s internal decisions).[29]

The first (published) case before the CAS concerning a dispute on the provision’s content was Càdiz C.F. and Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v. FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol.[30] In January 2005, the 16-year-old Acuña Caballero represented his Paraguayan club Olimpia in an international tournament for players under 20. His successful performance led to foreign interest, and on 14 February 2005 he, together with his family, left Paraguay for Cádiz, Spain.[31] Three days later, Cádiz C.F. (a club meandering through the Spanish second and third league) and the player signed an employment contract, and subsequently Olimpia agreed to the transfer.[32] However the Paraguayan football association refused to issue the compulsory international transfer certificate (“ITC”), referring to Acuña Caballero’s age.[33] The FIFA PSC decided upon the matter on 26 August 2005 by verifying whether the requirements of the “parents-rule” of Article 19(2)(a) RSTP were observed. By highlighting the apparent lack of intention to continue his education besides football, as well as the fact that the mother’s employment contract commenced much later than her son’s, the PSC found the case to be in total contradiction with the letter and spirit of the exemption: “the mother would have followed the player”[34], instead of the other way round. The PSC noted that the protection of minors is one of the fundamental principles of the RSTP, which requires the strict application of Article 19, and consequently refused the request of the Spanish association to register Acuña with Cádiz C.F.[35] Both the club and the player appealed this decision before the CAS, after which the tribunal organized a hearing of all parties concerned and several witnesses in order to grasp the factual context of this international transfer.[36] The CAS Panel swiftly countered the appellants’ views by stating that FIFA’s rules limiting the international transfer of minors do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy under Swiss law or any other national or international law, insofar that “they pursue a legitimate objective, namely the protection of young players from international transfers which could disrupt their lives, particularly if, as often happens the football career eventually fails or, anyways, is not as successful as expected and they are proportionate to the objective sought, as they provide for some reasonable exceptions”.[37] Subsequently it explained that, it had to be determined whether the move of the mother was related to the transfer of her son, and ergo whether the exception of article 19(2)(a) was applicable? The Panel found that “the players’ decision to move to Spain was made first”[38], by emphasizing the inconsistencies in the appellants’ statements, and as a result thereof doubting their truthfulness.[39] Furthermore, the club’s submission stated that “from all the possibilities, the offer made by CÁDIZ C.F. was the most suited to his parents’ wishes”, which lead the Panel to believe that in fact the clubs’ offer for her son made the mother look for a suitable job in Cádiz.[40] As such, the Panel established that the appellants could not benefit from the exception, since it concluded that Acuña’s family moved “for reasons linked to football”.[41]

The Acuña case exhibits a strict application of the rule. This strict application, although being in line with FIFA’s policy, lead to a disadvantageous outcome for the minor in question.[42] As argued by the player, his life in Paraguay meant living alone in a small apartment at his agent’s house and only seeing his mother two or three times a year.[43] The move to Spain allowed him to live with his mother and was therefore positive for both his career and his family. The CAS Panel addressed this matter by stating that “the task of the CAS is not to revise the content of the applicable rules but only to apply them”.[44] Moreover, it stressed that any adverse consequences in relation to the refusal to allow the player to be registered with the club were the result of the appellants own actions. The Panel finally put forward that the player would not have to face the adverse consequence for long as he would turn 18 in a couple of months.[45] 

The FC Midtjylland case

The next confrontation followed suit: the case of FC Midtjylland.[46] The Danish Superligaen club came in FIFA’s crosshairs through a FIFPro complaint concerning the signing of six young Nigerians.[47] These players were registered as amateurs and played for Midtjylland’s youth teams. Additionally, they were granted short-term residence permits as students, excluding the right to work, and enrolled in the Danish educational program.[48] The FIFA PSC emphasized that Article 19 RSTP on the protection of minors, being one of the principles included in the FIFA/UEFA and European Commission agreement and “one of the pillars of the regulations”, is applicable to both amateur and professional players.[49] Thereto, only a strict, consistent and systematically implemented interdiction subject to very limited exceptions could stop the abuse and maltreatment of many young players. The PSC hence warned the Danish Football Association (DBU) and FC Midtjylland, and subsequently refused the registration of the players.[50]

The CAS Panel addressed four main issues in relation to what had been brought to the fore in the parties’ submissions concerning Article 19 RSTP:

1. Is it applicable to both professional and amateur minor players?

2. What are the exceptions and are any of these applicable?

3. Does the application of the provision “contradict any mandatory provision of public policy or any of the provisions of EC Law”? Is there a breach of the non-discrimination principle, following the alleged inconsistent approach of FIFA?[51]

In short, the Panel answered the first question in the affirmative, based on a textual approach together with taking due notice of the intended objective as “to apply Art. 19 of the RSTP restrictively to professional players only could result in obviating protection of young amateur players from the risk of abuse and ill treatment”.[52] As to the second question, it was noted that the codified exceptions provided in Article 19(2) RSTP were not applicable to the case at hand. Nevertheless, the Panel regarded this list not to be exhaustive and allowed for two additional exceptions relating to students: first, “where the players concerned could establish without any doubt that the reason for relocation to another country was related to their studies, and not to their activity as football players”, and second, “where the association of origin and the new club of the players concerned have signed an agreement within the scope of a development program for young players under certain strict conditions (agreement on the academic and/or school education, authorization granted for a limited period of time)”.[53] Yet, neither of these additional exceptions applied here.[54] The third issue was related to appellant’s Cotonou Agreement argument.[55] The Panel agreed that the non-discrimination rights are conferred by article 13(3) of the Cotonou Agreement to “Workers of ACP countries legally employed in its territory”.[56] Nonetheless, the Nigerian players in question are to be considered as “students”, not as “workers” legally employed in Denmark, which means they fall outside the scope of this provision.[57] The Panel moreover dismissed, based on that same reasoning, the appellant’s claim founded on the Simutenkov[58] case in their attempt for the “EU and EEA-rule” of Article 19(2)(b) RSTP to be applicable.[59] The Panel furthermore stressed with regard to this third question that agreements between the EU and third countries that prohibit discrimination in working conditions are clearly limited in scope to foreigners “legally employed in the Member States” and do not concern access to the employment market.[60] It also endorsed the Acuña case in that the FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players “do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible”.[61] Lastly on the fourth issue, in reaction to the appellant’s allegation that FIFA’s approach was inconsistent and favoured bigger clubs (by reference to Bayern München’s registering a minor player from South America), the CAS solely pointed at the general principle “that no one can claim for equal treatment by referring to someone else who has adopted an illegal conduct, without sanction (nemini dolus alienus prodesse debet)”.[62] Concluding, FC Midtjylland was found to have breached Article 19 RSTP as the CAS favoured a strict interpretation, yet simultaneously, it allowed for two additional implicit exceptions for students.

Around this point in time, the European Commission’s attention was also drawn to the protection of minors in sport. In its white paper on sport, it  pointed at “children who are not selected for competitions and abandoned in a foreign country, often falling in this way in an irregular position which fosters their further exploitation”.[63] Even though it makes reference to neither of the two abovementioned cases, this explicit consideration by the Commission, emphasizing the importance of protecting minors, could be seen as an indirect endorsement, prima facie, of the strict interpretation of Article 19 RSTP by CAS.

The next, second, part of this blog series shall aim to cover the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. The major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed. Furthermore, important CAS decisions concerning Article 19, Muhic, Vada I and II, FC Barcelona, RFEF, and the FIFA decisions relating to Real and Atlético Madrid, will be at the centre of the attention. 

[1] CNN, 24 November 2016, “FIFA: African footballer, 17, takes world governing body to court”

[2] Article 19 FIFA RSTP (2016)

[3] Eurosport, 24 November, “FIFA faces lawsuit over rules banning transfer of minors”

[4] The text of this blog contribution is part of my forthcoming thesis, which shall be submitted in order to complete my master’s degree in European Law at Leiden University.

[5] Art. 12 FIFA RSTP 2001.

[6] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[7] N. St. Cyr Clarke, “The beauty and the beast: Taming the ugly side of the people’s game”, 2011 CJEL, P. 627.

[8] Art. 12(1) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[9] Art. 12(2) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[10] Press release EU Commission, IP/01/29, 14 February 2001.

[11] Art. 12(1)(a) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[12] Art. 12(1)(b) FIFA RSTP 2001.

[13] FIFA Circular no. 769, 24 August 2001.

[14] F. de Weger, “The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”, 2nd edition, Asser Press (2016), p. 14.

[15] FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002.

[16] Supra at 14, pp. 36-37.

[17] Supra at 15.

[18] Ibid.

[19] New Art. 12(1)(c) FIFA RSTP 2001 in FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002, “Amendments to the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”.

[20] Art. 19(2)(c) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[21] Art. 19(2)(a) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[22] Art. 19(2)(b) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[23] C. Lembo, “FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major Changes In European Football And The Negative Effect On Minors”, Emory Int'l L. Rev 2005, p. 557.

[24] Art. 19(4) and 19(5) FIFA RSTP 2005.

[25] FIFA Circular no. 1075, 18 January 2007.

[26] Commentary on the Status and Transfer of Players, p. 58.

[27] Ibid, p. 59.

[28] Ibid, p. 59.

[29] For more information see A. Duval, “The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Transnational Law-Making in the Shadow of Bosman” in A. Duval and B. Van Rompuy (Eds.) “The Legacy of Bosman”, Asser Press (2016), pp. 81-116; A. Duval “The Court of Arbitration for Sport and EU Law. Chronicle of an Encounter”, MJ 2015, pp. 224-256.

[30] CAS 2005/A/955 Càdiz C.F., SAD v FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol and CAS 2005/A/956 Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v/FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de Fútbol.

[31] Ibid, para. 2.5.

[32] Ibid, paras. 2.6-2.7.

[33] Ibid, para. 2.10.

[34] Ibid, para. 2.16.

[35] Ibid, para. 2.17.

[36] Ibid, paras. 3.6-3.17.

[37] Ibid, para. 7.2.

[38] Ibid, para. 7.3.1.

[39] Ibid, paras. 7.3.2-7.3.5; Especially the circumstances surrounding the mother’s search for a job, the agreement between her and her employer, and the reasons why she decided to take up work in Cádiz while, being a cook, she could have worked anywhere in Spain, did not assist to their case.

[40] Ibid, para. 7.3.6.

[41] Ibid, para. 7.3.8.

[42] FIFA Circular no. 801, 28 March 2002.

[43] Supra at 30, para. 3.3.5 and 3.11.

[44] Ibid, para. 7.3.10.

[45] Ibid, para. 7.3.10.

[46] CAS 2008/A/1485 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Féderation Internationale de Football Association.

[47] A. Wild, “Young Football Players: Protection of Minors” in “CAS and Football: Landmark Cases”, Asser Press (2012), p. 249.

[48] Ibid, p. 250.

[49] Supra at 46, p. 3.

[50] Ibid, p. 4.

[51] Ibid, para. 10.

[52] Ibid, para. 15.

[53] Ibid, paras. 19-21.

[54] Ibid, para. 22.

[55] The Cotonou agreement between the EU and certain African, Caribbean and Pacific States, including Nigeria; Ibid, paras. 30-31.

[56] Supra at 46, para. 35.

[57] Ibid, para. 36.

[58] Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and RFEFl [2005] ECR I-2579, Therein the ECJ ruled that non-EU/EEA sportsmen can challenge nationality clauses if: they are legally employed in a host EU Member State and “can rely upon a directly effective equal treatment provision included in an international agreement establishing a partnership between the EU and their country of origin, regardless of whether accession to the EU is envisaged or not”, see S. Van den Bogaert, “From Bosman to Bernard” in J. Anderson (Ed.), “Leading Cases in Sports Law”, T.M.C. Asser Press (2013), p. 104.

[59] Supra at 46, para. 40.

[60] Ibid, para. 41.

[61] Ibid, para. 45; Supra at 30, para. 7.2.

[62] Supra at 46, paras. 47-49.

[63] The White Paper on Sport (COM 2007) 391 final, point 4.5; European Parliament, Report on the on the future of professional football in Europe (2006/2130(INI)), p. 25.