Editor's note: Björn Hessert is a research assistant at the University of Zurich and a lawyer admitted to the German bar.

The discussion revolving around the invalidity of arbitration clauses in organised sport in favour of national and international sports arbitral tribunals has been at the centre of the discussion in German courtrooms.[1] After the decisions of the German Federal Tribunal[2] (“BGH”) and the European Court of Human Rights[3] (“ECtHR”) in the infamous Pechstein case, this discussion seemed to have finally come to an end. Well…not according to the District Court (LG) of Frankfurt.[4] On 7 October 2020, the District Court rendered a press release in which the court confirmed its jurisdiction due to the invalidity of the arbitration clause contained in the contracts between two beach volleyball players and the German Volleyball Federation[5] (“DVV”) – but one step at a time.

1.     Arbitration clauses in organised sport

Over the past few decades, the Olympic movement has created its own judicial system in its endeavour to create and maintain a uniform judicial level playing field outside national courts. This is important, because athletes participating in international sports competitions need to be subject to the same sanctioning regime in the light of fairness and equality in sport.[6] In this regard, the jurisdiction of national courts threatens the uniform application of rules and regulations of international sports federations insofar as they could apply them differently. This could lead to the unsatisfying result that, for example, an athlete from Germany is punished for an anti-doping rule violation with a 2-year ineligibility sanction while a Swedish athlete is subject to a lifetime ban for the same misconduct.

In order to preserve the uniform application of sporting rules and – ultimately – a legal level playing field, the rules and regulations of the respective sports federation or individual contracts, including employment contracts or athlete agreements and licence agreements (“entry forms”), generally contain arbitration clauses in favour of private sports arbitral tribunals, e.g. the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”). As a result, the arbitration agreement between the parties to membership contracts or entry forms ousts the jurisdiction of national courts.[7] Due to the fact that athletes are not generally direct members of national and international sports federations, contractual clauses in their employment contracts or entry forms make reference to arbitration clauses set out in the rules and regulations of said sports federations. For example, international football players are generally bound by the regulations of the Fédération Internationale the Football Association (“FIFA”), including its statutes. Article 58(1) of the FIFA Statutes (2020 edition) provides that “[a]ppeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies against decisions passed by confederations, member associations or leagues shall be lodged with CAS […]”. References in individual contracts of sportspersons contained in the rules and regulations of sports federations, so-called “arbitration agreements by reference”, have been considered to be valid. In this respect, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (“SFT”) held that

“in sporting matters the Swiss Federal Tribunal examines arbitration agreements between parties with a certain goodwill in order to promote the fast resolution of disputes by specialised courts, which as the CAS, offer comprehensive guarantees of independence and neutrality.”[8]

Athletes are generally forced to accept such arbitration agreements in favour of sports arbitral tribunals due to the monopolistic structure in organised sport, meaning that only one national and international sports federation governs each sport on the basis of the pyramidal European Model of Sport (so-called Ein-Platz-Prinzip).[9] In other words, athletes can only choose between accepting such arbitration agreements (by reference) or renouncing their calling as professional athletes.[10] Against this background, it appears to be questionable whether mandatory arbitration agreements in organised sport concluded between monopolistic sports federations and athletes are valid, taking into account that arbitration as a mechanism of alternative dispute resolution generally finds its basis in the free and voluntary will of the parties to the dispute concerned. The validity of mandatory arbitration agreements was at the heart of the Pechstein[11] case and has now been addressed in the recent decision rendered by the District Court of Frankfurt[12].

2.     The decisions of the BGH and the ECtHR in the Pechstein case

Claudia Pechstein is a professional speed-skater. Prior to the speed-skating world championships, organised by the International Skating Union (“ISU”), she signed an entry form, including an arbitration agreement in favour of the CAS.[13] During her proceedings before German courts and the ECtHR, Pechstein argued that the arbitration agreement concluded between her and the ISU had not been accepted freely and voluntarily, because otherwise she would not have been eligible to participate in professional speed-skating competitions.

After the Higher Regional Court (OLG) of Munich had decided that the arbitration agreement signed by Ms Pechstein was invalid under German competition law as a result of ISU’s abuse of a dominant position[14], the BGH overruled this decision.[15] In the view of the BGH, the ISU is a monopoly within the meaning of sec. 19(1) of the German Competition Act (“GWB”).[16] However, the BGH took the view that the dominant position of a party to the arbitration agreement does not automatically revoke the voluntary nature of the consent to an arbitration agreement in favour of private sports arbitral tribunals.[17] Instead, the examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement is subject to a balancing process in consideration of the interests of both parties, i.e. sports federations and individual athletes.[18] In consideration of the legal protection of athletes and the specificity of sport, particularly in ensuring fair competitions and uniform case law in organised sport, which “would be seriously jeopardised”[19] by the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, the court came to the conclusion that the interests of the ISU prevail in this regard.[20] The CAS is a genuine arbitration court and guarantees legal protections for athletes equivalent to national courts.[21] Furthermore, the consistent application of the rules and regulations of sports federations by a specialised arbitration institution is not only in the interest of sports federations, but also in the interest of athletes.[22] 

The ECtHR indirectly confirmed the validity of the arbitration agreement concluded between Ms Pechstein and the ISU. However, in determining the free will of athletes when entering into an arbitration agreement with a monopolistic sports federation, the court held that the arbitration clause is generally not based on the free consent of the athlete and thus has a forced nature.[23] In case the athlete is compelled to accept an arbitration agreement, Article 6(1) of the ECHR is applicable to the sports arbitration proceedings in protection of the procedural rights of the athlete.[24]  

However, arbitration agreements in organised sport are not compulsory per se if the applicable sports rules and regulations leave it to the sports federation and the athlete to freely and voluntarily agree on an arbitration agreement. In this case, athletes are not in the same predicament and may therefore choose between different clubs before signing an arbitration agreement.[25]Furthermore, the complaining athlete must provide evidence that “other professional football clubs, which perhaps have more modest financial means, would have refused to hire him on the basis of a contract providing for dispute settlement in ordinary courts.”[26]

According to the BGH, the validity of arbitration agreements in organised sport is subject to a balancing process between the competing interests of the parties to it. However, if an athlete was compelled to accept arbitration clauses of monopolistic sports federations, the ECtHR concluded that Article 6(1) of the ECHR is applicable to the arbitration proceedings concerned. Both courts therefore set the benchmark against which the validity of arbitration agreements and proceedings in organised sport is measured. 

3.     Decision of the District Court of Frankfurt (based on the press release)

The decision of the District Court of Frankfurt is insofar remarkable as the court was in the position to consider both the decision of the BGH and the ECtHR in its decision-making process. With regard to the validity of the arbitration agreement concluded between two volleyball players and the DVV, the court stated in its press release of 7 October 2020[27] as follows:

“Die Streitigkeit habe nicht vorrangig vor einem Schiedsgericht ausgetragen werden müssen. Zwar enthielten die Verträge der Klägerinnen mit dem Beklagten jeweils eine Schiedsvereinbarung. Dieser sei aber unwirksam, «weil die Klägerin sich ihr nicht freiwillig unterworfen habe», so die Richter. Seit der Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR) im Fall Pechstein sei bei professionellen Leistungssportlern von einer unfreiwilligen Unterwerfung unter einer Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit auszugehen, wenn die Profisportler «vor der Wahl stehen, eine Schiedsklausel anzunehmen, um durch die Ausübung ihres Sports ihren Lebensunterhalt bestreiten zu können, oder sie nicht zu akzeptieren und damit vollständig auf ihren Lebensunterhalt durch Ausübung des Sports zu verzichten.» Es sei nicht belegt, dass die Klägerinnen seinerzeit tatsächlich die Wahl hatten, die Schiedsklauseln abzuschliessen oder nicht. Deswegen sei von einer Unfreiwilligkeit auch dann auszugehen, wenn die Volleyballerinnen die Klauseln kritiklos unterzeichnet hätten.”

[free translation: The dispute did not have to be settled primarily before an arbitration tribunal. It is true that the plaintiffs' contracts with the defendant each contained an arbitration agreement. However, this was invalid ‘because the plaintiff did not voluntarily submit to it’, the judges said. Since the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Pechstein case, professional athletes must be presumed to have involuntarily submitted to arbitration if the professional athletes ‘are faced with the choice of accepting an arbitration clause in order to be able to earn their living by practising their sport or not accepting it and thus refrain completely from earning a living from their sport’. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs at the material time actually had the choice of whether or not to accept the arbitration clauses. Therefore, it can be assumed that the arbitration was involuntary even if the volleyball players had signed the clauses without criticism/objection.]

Based on the wording of the press release – and in absence of the full judgement – it appears that the court sided with the findings of the ECtHR insofar as it qualified the arbitration agreement contained in entry forms of athletes as mandatory in nature.

Furthermore, it can only be speculated why the court stated in its press release that the athletes had not objected to the signing of an arbitration clause. The court may have considered that the volleyball players were in a similar position than Ms Pechstein. This approach would be consequent, because beach volleyball players, like the plaintiffs in the proceedings before the District Court Frankfurt, are generally faced with the same dilemma as Ms Pechstein was. They cannot choose between different national federations for the sport of volleyball. In this case, it is not necessary for the athletes to show that they could not conclude a contract with the DVV without an arbitration agreement in favour of a sports arbitral tribunal.

Be it as it may, it is – with the BGH decision in the Pechstein case in mind – difficult to understand how the District Court of Frankfurt came to the conclusion that the arbitration agreement between the beach volleyball players and the DVV is invalid. It appears that the court deduces this invalidity from the compulsory nature of arbitration clauses in organised sport, as highlighted by the ECtHR. This would contradict the BGH’s view that forced arbitration can be justified in the sporting context and that the validity of particular clause must be determined on the basis of a balancing process.[28] If the District Court of Frankfurt applied such a balancing process between the competing interests of the parties to the dispute, it will be interesting to see why the court arrived at the conclusion that the arbitration agreement is invalid. In light of the above, the specificity of sport, particularly the consistent and uniform application of rules and regulations of sports federations, is a strong argument in favour of forced arbitration. Indeed, the legal level playing field and ultimately the sporting level playing field would be jeopardised if national courts would decide on sporting cases instead of national sports arbitral tribunals, such as the German Court of Arbitration for Sport (“DIS”) or the CAS. The interest of sports federations also prevails in domestic disputes. Otherwise, there is a risk that the national courts will interpret the sporting rules of a particular sports federation inconsistently.

On balance, it will be important to carefully analyse how the Frankfurt court substantiated its departure from the BGH decision in the Pechstein case. In my view, the press release indicates that the court was apparently unable to strike a fair balance between the competing interests involved, bearing in mind the specificities of sport.

[1] See e.g. District Court (LG) Cologne, decision of 13 September 2006, 28 O (Kart) 38/05; District Court (LG) Munich I, decision of 26 February 2014, 37 O 28331/12; Higher Regional Court (OLG) Munich, decision of 15 January 2015 – U 1110/14 Kart.

[2] BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15; a translation of the decision is published on the CAS website.

[3] Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018.

[4] District Court Frankfurt, 7 October 2020, 2-06 O 457/19 (unpublished); press release available at https://ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/sites/ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/files/PM%207_10_2020%20Schadensersatz%20f%C3%BCr%20Profi-Volleyballerinnen_0.pdf.

[5] Press Release, District Court Frankfurt, 7 October 2020 available at https://ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/sites/ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/files/PM%207_10_2020%20Schadensersatz%20f%C3%BCr%20Profi-Volleyballerinnen_0.pdf.

[6] Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018, para. 98.

[7] Daniel Girsberger and Nathalie Voser, International Arbitration (3rd edn, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2016) 4; see also Antoine Duval, ‘Not in my Name! Claudia Pechstein and the Post-Consensual Foundations of the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No 2017-01.

[8] SFT, decision of 7 November 2011, 4A_246/2011, para. 2.2.2; see also SFT, decision of 28 May 2018, 4A_314/2017, para. 2.3.1; SFT, decision of 2 February 2018, 4A_490/2017, para. 3.1.2.

[9] Commission of the European Communities, ‘White Paper on Sport’, COM(2007) 391 final, 13. SFT, decision of 22 March 2007, 4P.172/2006, para. 4.3.2.2.; BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15; Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018, para. 113.

[10] SFT, decision of 22 March 2007, 4P.172/2006, para. 4.3.2.2.; BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15; Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018, para. 113.

[11] BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15; Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018.

[12] District Court Frankfurt, 7 October 2020, 2-06 O 457/19 (unpublished)¸ ); press release available at https://ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/sites/ordentliche-gerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/files/PM%207_10_2020%20Schadensersatz%20f%C3%BCr%20Profi-Volleyballerinnen_0.pdf.

[13] BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15, para. 2.

[14] Higher Regional Court (OLG) Munich, decision of 15 January 2015 – U 1110/14 Kart.

[15] BGH, decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15.

[16] Ibid, para. 9.

[17] Ibid, para. 54; Ulrich Haas, ‘The German Federal Court on Treacherous Ice- A final point in the Pechstein case’ in Christoph Müller, Sébastian Besson and Antonio Rigozzi (eds), New Development in International Commercial Arbitration 2016 (1^st edn, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2016) 219, 256 et seq.

[18] Ibid, para. 55.

[19] Ibid, para. 50.

[20] Ibid, para. 59; Ulrich Haas, ‘The German Federal Court on Treacherous Ice- A final point in the Pechstein case’ in Christoph Müller, Sébastian Besson and Antonio Rigozzi (eds), New Development in International Commercial Arbitration 2016 (1^st edn, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2016) 219, 263 et seq.

[21] Ibid, para. 62.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018, para. 113.

[24] Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland, ECtHR, Application no. 40575/10 and no. 67474/10, 2 October 2018, para. 115.

[25] Ibid, para. 120.

[26] Ibid, para. 119.

[27] Press Release, District Court Frankfurt, 7 October 2020, 2.

[28] Ulrich Haas, ‘The German Federal Court on Treacherous Ice- A final point in the Pechstein case’ in Christoph Müller, Sébastian Besson and Antonio Rigozzi (eds), New Development in International Commercial Arbitration 2016 (1^st edn, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2016) 219, 250.

The tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision of 9 November 2011 marked a turning point as regards the Commission’s decisional practice in the field of State aid and sport. Between this date and early 2014, the Commission reached a total of ten decisions on State aid to sport infrastructure and opened four formal investigations into alleged State aid to professional football clubs like Real Madrid and Valencia CF.[1] As a result of the experience gained from the decision making, it was decided to include a Section on State aid to sport infrastructure in the 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation. Moreover, many people, including myself, held that Commission scrutiny in this sector would serve to achieve better accountability and transparency in sport governance.[2]

Yet, a recent report by Transparency International (TI), published in October 2015, raises questions about the efficiency of State aid enforcement in the sport sector. The report analyzes the results and effects of the Hungarian tax benefit scheme and concludes that:

“(T)he sports financing system suffers from transparency issues and corruption risks. (…) The lack of transparency poses a serious risk of collusion between politics and business which leads to opaque lobbying. This might be a reason for the disproportionateness found in the distribution of the subsidies, which is most apparent in the case of (football) and (the football club) Felcsút.”[3]

In other words, according to TI, selective economic advantages from public resources are being granted to professional football clubs, irrespective of the tax benefit scheme greenlighted by the Commission or, in fact, because of the tax benefit scheme.

One would expect TI’s report to be a wake-up call for the Commission, triggering it, as “Guardian of the Treaties”, to re-investigate Hungary’s tax benefit scheme without delay. Further incentives to scrutinize the matter is provided by the Hungarian MEP Péter Niedermüller, who in November 2015 officially asked the Commission whether it intended to review its earlier decision to authorize the tax benefit scheme. The Commission’s answer, seen here below, indicates that immediate action is not to be expected.

Not satisfied with this answer, Niedermüller replied that even though the Commission had authorized the tax scheme in 2011, it does not absolve it “from the obligation to proceed with the appropriate care thereafter and to monitor whether the system is operating in accordance with the objectives originally set”.

The overall aim of this two-part blog is to analyze the rules and procedures surrounding the monitoring of previously authorized aid schemes in the sports sector by the Commission. It will use the tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision as a starting point, describing the objective and the functioning of the aid scheme, as well as the conditions and obligations for Hungary and the Commission attached to it. In continuation, basing myself on the findings and conclusions drawn in the report, I will try to determine whether the current practice in Hungary deviates from the original objectives and conditions of the aid scheme, and what the consequences of such a deviation could be. Do the State aid rules impose an obligation upon the Commission to act and, if so, in what way? Furthermore, could the Hungarian case make one reconsider the usefulness of State aid rules to achieve better accountability and transparency in sport in general? 

The tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision

A description of the scheme

In April 2011, the Hungarian authorities notified the Commission of their plans to introduce a tax benefit scheme with the aim of developing the country’s sport sector.[4] More specifically, via the scheme, they hoped to “increase the participation of the general public in sport activities, by inter alia, promoting mass sport events, training of the young generations as well ensuring adequate sport infrastructure and equipment for the general public”. Due to the existence of a market failure (i.e. a situation where individual market investors do not invest even though this would be efficient from a wider economic perspective), Hungary saw itself obligated to provide public money to the sport sector in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives.[5]

Under the scheme, which will run until 30 June 2017, corporations (operating in any sector that is subject to corporate tax) can choose to donate money to sport organizations, both amateur and professional. Sport organizations may use these resources to train the young generation, cover personnel expenses and to construct/renovate sport infrastructure. The donations would be deducted from the corporation’s taxable income and from their tax liability.[6] Hungary decided to focus the aid scheme on the five most popular team sports in the country, i.e. football, basketball, ice hockey, water polo and handball. The reasoning behind this choice is that the scheme would not only benefit the sport organizations themselves, but also the sportsmen and sportswomen using the facilities, as well as the general public interested in attending the sporting events.[7] Sport organizations wishing to receive donations have to elaborate a development programme (DP), in which they outline the planned use of the donations. The DPs are evaluated by the respective national sport governing bodies (SGBs), who decide whether the sport organization is eligible for the donations. Once the SGBs approve a DP, the sport organizations may approach corporations willing to donate money to them.[8]

In the specific case of donations used for the construction, renovation or maintenance of sport infrastructures, Hungary notified the Commission that it had introduced a monitoring system that serves to avoid any misuse of the donations or cross-subsidizations of other activities of sport organizations. The so-called Controlling Authority (a public entity falling directly under the Ministry of National Resources) monitors compliance of donators and beneficiaries with the central price benchmarking mechanism regarding rental and operation fees of the infrastructure, introduced to limit the distortion of competition arising from the tax benefit scheme.[9]  

The Commission’s decision

As stated above, the donations should be used to fund the development of sport infrastructure, train the youth teams and cover personnel expenses. The Commission agreed with Hungary that the training of youth teams falls outside the scope of EU State aid rules, in line with the 2001 Commission Decision Subventions publiques aux clubs sportifs professionels. Donations used to cover personnel costs could be falling under the General Block Exemption Regulation[10] or the de minimis aid Regulation.[11] Compliance with the two Regulations is a task for the Hungarian authorities.[12] Consequently, and taking into account that amateur sport clubs are generally not considered to be undertakings within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, the tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision only covers aid for the infrastructures used by the professional sport organizations.

Although the tax benefit scheme fulfilled the criteria of Article 107(1), and thus constituted State aid, the Commission declared the scheme compatible with EU law under Article 107(3)c) TFEU. Importantly, the Commission held that the scheme was introduced in a sufficiently transparent and proportionate manner, i.e. that the measure was well-designed to fulfil the objective of developing the country’s sport sector.[13] Moreover, the Commission acknowledged the special characteristics of sport and held that the objective of the scheme is in line with the overall objectives of sport as stipulated in Article 165 TFEU, namely that the EU “shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues”, because the sport sector “has enormous potential for bringing the citizens of Europe together, reaching out to all, regardless of age or social origin”.[14]

It is worth mentioning that the Commission took a very similar approach in its decisions on the other State aid measures granted for sport infrastructure. It considers a sport infrastructure as embodying a typical State responsibility for which the granting of State aid is a well-defined objective of common interest.[15]

Finally, to ensure that the monitoring and transparency obligations are carried out properly, the Commission requires Hungary to submit an annual report to the Commission, containing inter alia, information on the total aid amount allocated on the basis of this scheme, the sport infrastructure projects funded, their aid intensities, their beneficiaries, the parameters applied for benchmarking prices, the rents effectively paid by the professional sport organizations, as well as a description on the benefits provided to the general public and on the multifunctional usage of the infrastructures.[16] There is no requirement to publish this annual report. Therefore, assessing whether the information provided by Hungary to the Commission is in line with the actual practice in the country is currently extremely difficult. 

Transparency International report, “Corruption Risks in Hungarian Sports Financing”

The tax benefit scheme in the Hungarian sport sector decision looked like a blue print for the way in which public authorities could grant State aid to the sport sector: It was aimed at a wide scope of recipients and the general public would benefit as well, transparency was guaranteed, monitoring and compliance mechanisms were introduced and, last but not least, it was notified in advance to the European Commission. 

Lack of transparency

However, TI’s report shows that, four years after the scheme was launched, little remains of all those good intentions. To start with, TI claims that Hungary’s objective was not to increase the participation of the general public in sport activities, but simply to make Hungarian football clubs “excel at the European and international levels”.[17] TI’s primary finding is that there is a flagrant lack of transparency on every level regarding the scheme. Most of the data collected in the report was obtained by TI through freedom of information requests.[18]

The first flaw in the scheme is that under Hungarian national laws and regulations, there is no obligation to disclose the identity of the donating corporations. Consequently, even though the SGBs keep count of which clubs are entitled to receive donations and how much they actually received, many questions remain on how the money is distributed in practice.

TI also questions the integrity of the clubs’ eligibility process. The Hungarian SGBs, who are in charge of selecting the clubs worthy of receiving donations, are to a large extent run by people with close ties to the Hungarian Government.[19] Moreover, for the selection process, the SBGs do not need to provide a reasoning behind the decision to choose or not to choose a club worthy of donations. As TI states, the tax benefit scheme poses a serious threat to transparency and accountability, and can lead to illicit lobbying and backroom deals between politicians, businessmen and clubs. 

Disproportionate distribution of beneficiaries

The advantage of using a general tax scheme as a State aid measure is that it leads to many different beneficiaries and is therefore considered as one of the least distortive type of state intervention.[20] However, the functioning of this particular tax benefit scheme creates the exact opposite result a few clubs are clearly favored. According to the report, the subsidies from the tax scheme totaled €649 million in four years. An amount of €240 million was specifically designated for football clubs, 37% of the total amount. Of all the money donated to football, 28% (or €68 million) went specifically to 13 football clubs, who, perhaps unsurprisingly, all play in Hungary’s highest football league.[21] Of these 13 football clubs, Puskás Akadémia FC received by far the highest amount, no less than €30 million. Puskás Akadémia FC plays in Hungary’s top division, but also functions as the youth team of Videoton FC, one of Hungary’s biggest and most successful clubs. Interestingly enough, Puskás Akadémia FC was founded in 2007 by the current Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. 

Unnecessary construction of new sport infrastructure?

The Hungarian authorities expressed the need in 2011 for adequate sport infrastructure facilities. Due to a market failure, it was necessary for the State to step in and provide the necessary funds, albeit by means of a tax benefit scheme. The Commission agreed with Hungary that there is a lack of investments in sport infrastructure and that using public money to do so is an objective of common interest.[22] The TI report indicates that especially the Hungarian football stadiums have undergone significant upgrades since 2011, but at the same time questions the necessity to use public funds for these upgrades. Hungarian professional football has not been attracting more people to stadiums since 2011. The country’s highest division averaged only 4,897 spectators per game for the 2014/15 season, 624 less than in the previous year.[23] An example of potential unnecessary construction of sport infrastructure is the “Nagyerdei” stadium, opened in 2014,  in the city of Debrecen. The stadium, that can hold over 20,000 spectators, cost €40 million to construct. However, with a match average of 3,400,[24] one wonders whether the construction of this stadium was an objective of common interest, or whether there was another, hidden, agenda. Referring to the well-reported, including by the European Commission, close relationships between Hungary’s businesses and its political elite, TI points to the realistic possibility that the construction and renovation of (football) stadiums through public procurement procedures, was simply a way to for contractors to “finance the economic orbit of influential politicians in return for all manners of political and financial favours”.[25]  

Interim conclusion

TI’s report clearly shows that there is a huge discrepancy between Hungary’s intention to devise a tax benefit scheme benefitting to the entire sport sector, as notified to the Commission in 2011, and the actual operation of the scheme. The necessity for new and renovated football infrastructure appears superfluous and the tax benefit scheme itself proved to be more beneficial for some clubs, particularly Puskás Akadémia FC. Furthermore, the Commission decision declaring the tax benefit scheme compatible with EU law highlighted the transparency of the scheme and acclaimed its monitoring mechanisms. More than four years on, it can be concluded that the scheme is far from transparent and questions can be raised on the independence and functioning of the monitoring mechanisms. Assuming that the Commission receives annual reports by the Hungarian authorities on the tax benefit scheme, why has it not undertaken any action? Is it simply a matter of unwillingness or could the answer be found in EU State aid law and its procedural rules itself? The next part of this blog will analyze the rules and procedures surrounding the monitoring of previously authorized aid schemes by the Commission, and determine whether Commission action can be expected.

[1] An explanation on why the public financing of sports infrastructure and professional sports clubs only started to attract State aid scrutiny in recent years can be read in: Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, “EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?” Forthcoming in: “The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport”, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016.

[2] See for example Oskar van Maren, “EU State Aid Law and Professional Football: A threat or a Blessing?”, European State Aid Law Quarterly, Volume 15 1/2016, pages 31-46.

[3] Transparency International, “Corruption Risks in Hungarian Sports Financing”, page 41.

[4] Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, SA.31722 – Hungary - Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme, paras 2-3.

[5] Ibid., paras 88-90.

[6] Ibid., paras 15-16.

[7] Ibid., paras 28-34.

[8] Transparency International report of 22 October 2015, “Corruption Risks in Hungarian Sports Financing”, page 31.

[9] Commission Decision SA.31722, paras 37-39.

[10] The GBER applicable at the time the decision was taken was Commission Regulation No800/2008 of 6 August 2008.

[11] Commission Decision SA.31722, para 10.

[12] Ibid., para 64.

[13] Ibid., paras 95-98.

[14] Ibid., paras 86-87.

[15] See for example Commission Decision of 20 March 2013, SA.35135 Multifunktionsarena der Stadt Erfurt, para 14.

[16] Commission Decision SA.31722, para 57.

[17] Transparency International report, page 29.

[18] Ibid., page 31.

[19] Ibid., page 32. TI points out that the chairman of the Hungarian FA is CEO of the country’s biggest commercial bank and close to the Government.

[20] Commission Decision SA.31722, para 20.

[21] The TI report actually mentions the clubs as well as their youth academia. The 13 clubs are: Puskás Akadémia FC (aka Felcsút FC, the youth team of Videoton FC); Ferencváros; Újpest FC; Vasas SC; Szolnoki MÁV FC; Debreceni VSC; Diósgyőri VTK; Zalaegerszegi TE; OVI-FOCI; Illés Sport Alapítvány; Budapest Honvéd FC; Balmazújvárosi FC and; Békéscsaba 1912 Előre.

[22] Commission Decision SA.31722, paras 91-93.

[23] Transparency International report, page 38.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., page 42.

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.

Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper.
For that purpose, the author will depart from the restrictive interpretation of article 6(3) adopted by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) and continue with a substantive assessment of the rule, firstly by looking at its purposive aim and secondly, by evidencing the potential negative impact on players’ mobility and its inherent anticompetitive effects. 

A. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016)

Article 6(3) of the FIFA-RSTP reads as follows: “3. If the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract. Such an offer shall furthermore be at least of an equivalent value to the current contract. This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the player’s previous club(s).”[4]
In summary, as a general rule, the former club of the player loses its right to claim training compensation if it fails to offer the player a contract in the terms described by the article, or cannot demonstrate a legitimate interest.
So far, the DRC has been consistent in interpreting that the obligation to offer the player a contract lies exclusively with the former club of the player as opposed to the previous clubs. In other words, the previous club is entitled to ask for training compensation when the player signs the first professional contract[5] no matter whether they offered the player a contract or showed bona fide interest in retaining him.
At first glance, this rigid interpretation might appear controversial in light of the more pragmatic approach towards the formal requirements of article 6(3) adopted in the CAS award 2009/A/1757 between MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano SpA[6]. In this case, in order to conclude that MTK Budapest was still entitled to request training compensation despite not having offered the player a contract in the terms indicated in the regulation, the adjudicating Panel emphasized that “[the] aims of sporting justice shall not be defeated by an overly formalistic interpretation of the FIFA Regulations which would deviate from their original intended purpose”.[7]
The DRC has thus systematically admitted claims of previous clubs against clubs that have registered professional players for the first time (e.g. DRC decision of 17 May 2016[8]) without delving into whether such clubs are indeed entitled to training compensation or not.
In an attempt to defy such dogmatic approach to the issue, I question whether the different references made in Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP to the “former club”[9] could and should instead be interpreted more extensively, so as to include all former clubs (thus including previous clubs) where a player has been registered. Firstly, by having a look at the systematic context of the rule and its purposive interpretation[10], and secondly, by taking into consideration the potential competitive disadvantages between European clubs resulting from the regulation.
As to the rationale of the rule, the FIFA DRC jurisprudence (vid. e.g. DRC Decision of 27 April 2006 ref. no. 461185[11]) indicates that “the spirit of and purpose of article 6 para 3 of Annexe 4 of the RSTP, 2016 edition, is to penalise clubs which are obviously not interested in the players’ services as a professional, no matter if the club would have to offer the player an employment contract for the first time or a renewal due to the expiry of an already existing contract.”[12]
It appears therefore, contrary to the spirit of the rule that a club that has shown no interest in keeping the player as a professional, a roster or for its academy, can at a later stage request to be rewarded for the training of that player, irrespective of whether it was the former club, strictly speaking, or the former former club, so to speak (i.e. the previous club in the RSTP exact wording).
One could easily argue at this point, and I would subscribe to it, that at very young ages it is either legally prohibited for training clubs to offer a contract, or unreasonable to require clubs to offer contracts to all its players in order to safeguard their potential right to training compensation.  This was highlighted by the CAS Panel in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC[13] which was the appeal against the above cited DRC Decision of 27 April 2006.
However, nothing prevents training clubs to at least show a genuine interest in retaining the player as an amateur by formally offering him to continue training with them or even through a simple positive evaluation of the player. In order to alleviate the unreasonable burden that such obligation would suppose on training clubs, a solution could be to require the genuine interest at least, for players as from the season of their 16^th birthday. This would coincide with the age when in most EU countries players are legally allowed to sign employment contracts, and form a strict sportive perspective, the age from when training compensation is calculated in full according to article 5(3) of Annexe IV.
The final reference in article 6(3) (i.e. “This provision is without prejudice to the right to training compensation of the players’ previous club(s)”) helps to ground this interpretation. It is difficult to justify from a legal standpoint, why previous clubs should be exempted (as they, in fact, are) from observing the same rules and obligations as the former clubs, especially considering the principle of free movement of workers in the EU. The right to claim training compensation is, being redundant, “without prejudice to the right (…) of the players’ previous club(s)”. Previous clubs should therefore, demonstrate as well their entitlement to training compensation by evidencing a genuine interest in the player, such as former clubs do. 
To illustrate the situation, consider the case were an EU football club omits to offer one of its players (e.g. 18 years old) a professional contract in the terms of article 6(3) of Annexe IV, and that player further registers as an amateur with another EU club for one season. That second club also fails to offer the player (now 19 years old) a professional contract. After two seasons as an amateur, the player, finally signs a professional contract with a third EU club at the age of 20 years. The current interpretation of the exception leads to conclude that the first club, which failed to offer the player a professional contract, perhaps because he was simply not sufficiently interesting to retain, would now be reinstated in the right to claim training compensation, while the former club, under identical circumstances and reasons would be deprived from it.
Within those parameters, de lege ferenda the exception of article 6(3) could reasonably be extended to those previous clubs that failed to show the so-called bona fide interest. This way, by failing to show real interest in keeping a player, the previous clubs would be also prevented from asking training compensation upon the first registration of the player as a professional, to the same extend as the former club when it fails to offer the player a contract, in the terms indicated by the exception.
Turning now the attention, to EU law, the conclusions on why article 6(3) Annexe 4 current interpretation seems unfair and should be reformulated, point towards the same direction. 
 

B. Article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP and EU competition law

The Bosman ruling and its most recent successor, the Bernard ruling, stand out as constant reminders that EU Law applies to the realm of European club football insofar as it constitutes an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty.[14] It is nowadays unarguable that football is a real economic activity and that the regulations adopted by its governing bodies must respect EU Law as long as they apply in the territory of the EU, or in case the player concerned has a European passport and is transferring to an EU Member State. Only rules which are “inherent to sport” such as the rules of the game, and other “practices likely to be exempted” meaning, those activities not necessarily linked to sport but which are worth of protection, could potentially fall outside the remit of EU competition law (the sporting exception) as pointed out by the “Helsinki Report on Sport” in 1999. However, the decision in the Meca-Medina case went even further, overcoming the traditional distinction between rules of purely sporting nature from others, to determine that rules cannot be of purely sporting nature when they have economic repercussions, and consequently, making it possible to explore new legal avenues to test regulations that in principle may seem outside the scope of EU competition law (such as the doping regulations in Meca-Medina).
According to Bosman[15] and Bernard, training compensation is a practice worth of protection, but it is undeniable that its rules have strong economic implications, for they are expressly meant to financially reward[16] football clubs involved in the training and education of players when these move to other clubs. For that reason, they fall under the remit of EU Law.
The legitimate aim of the training compensation system is also embraced by legal scholars. For example, while delving into the aftermath of the Bosman case and the agreement reached between FIFA and the EU Commission in 2001, S. Weatherill remarked that “(…). Sport has special features that deserve respect. In accordance with Bosman, it should be regarded as legally permissible for football to devise an internal taxation system to transfer money into the hands of nursery clubs, as part of a scheme for sustaining a larger number of clubs than would survive in ‘pure’ market conditions and to diminish gaps in economic strength between clubs.”[17]
However, it is my firm belief that Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP has in many ways gone beyond the indications in Bosman, the Helsinki Report[18] and later in Bernard. In this last case, the Court referred to a system meant to compensate[19] and not reward training; and it is precisely that difference regarding the foundations of the system implemented by FIFA that leads to disproportionate results when the amounts to pay as training compensation are superior to the real costs incurred by the training clubs.[20]
All these issues jeopardize free mobility within the EU[21], for they restrict the chances of clubs to recruit players, and have an impact on the commercial relations between clubs and players in the sense of Article 101. By way of example, a Romanian football club registering a 21-year old player trained in Romania as a professional for the first time, would end up paying the training club a significantly lower amount of training compensation than a Hungarian club of the same category, wishing to sign that same player. The reason for that is that whilst in the first scenario the Romanian club would be subject to the internal training compensation mechanism; in the second scenario, the Hungarian club would be subject to the FIFA regulations that impose higher training compensations.
With these premises in mind, the testing of article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA RSTP under EU competition law seems appropriate, although the application of EU competition law in this type of cases will probably remain an exception.[22]
In short, Article 101 TFEU[23] prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion within the internal market.[24] Saskia King, explaining the so-called “objective criterion”[25], has highlighted that “when determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires separate consideration”. Therefore, if the object of the agreement is anticompetitive, there is no need to look behind the effects.
A primary aspect of competition law is the identification of the relevant market where a possible anticompetitive practice takes place. In the present context, the relevant market is the transfer market of football players, that is, the market on which the offer and supply of players meets and clubs compete against each other to recruit the best players.[26] Geographically speaking, the market is limited to the territory of the Member States of the EU.
Assuming also, that the FIFA RSTP (ed. 2016) qualifies as a “decision by an association of undertakings”[27] and that the rules of training compensation have an appreciable affect in trade between Member States[28] since any change of clubs for players under the age of 23 requires the payment of a training compensation[29]; the questions left to answer are therefore, whether or not article 6(3) of Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016), in its current formulation is (1) likely to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU transfer market of football players under Article 101(1) TFEU and more importantly, (2) whether the restrictive effects are proportionate and “[reasonably] necessary for the organization and proper conduct of sport?”[30]
As to the first question, it is my view that both the object and the effects produced by, article 6(3) restrict and distort competition between clubs, for they discriminate former clubs vis-à-vis previous clubs with regard to their right to claim training compensation. Additionally, the compensation limits the ability of clubs to take on players acting as free agent.
As to the second question, the Meca-Medina case –though in a different context[31]- offered valuable guidance to test the compatibility of rules of sports associations with EU competition law: “42. Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.”
Following the Meca-Medina reasoning, and focusing on the rationale behind article 6(3) Annexe IV, in the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, the CAS Panel corrected the view of the original DRC decision of 27 April 2006. Specifically, it remarked that the aim of the rule is “to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest, is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of ‘compensation price tag”[32] rather than to penalize clubs failing to offer a contract to their amateur players. The unquestionably legitimate goal of “the exception to the exception” - as the Panel calls article 6(3) - is thus to limit the obstacles to the free mobility of players aforementioned.
However, as to “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them” there cannot be a positive answer. To me it is doubtful whether the anticompetitive effects produced by establishing different conditions between former clubs and previous clubs are inherent or a necessary consequence to ensure the objective of rule (i.e. contributing to free mobility). I believe the contrary to be true. (i.e. uently,conditions ctive of the rule, tt of EU Law. by scholars.r compensation. in the application of such principle. nsatI bI be The effects generated by the current interpretation of article 6(3) collide with the aim of the rule (i.e. protecting free mobility), for reinstating previous clubs in their rights to claim training compensation irrespective of their behaviour vis-à-vis the player, compromises free movement within the EU and creates unfair competitive advantages for previous clubs.
In conclusion, my suggestion is to rethink, the current formulation of article 6(3) (if not the entire training compensation system) and correct its detrimental effects by preventing all previous clubs that fail to offer players a professional contract or to show bona fide interest as from the season in which a player turns 16 years old from requesting training compensation. It is certainly not the role of the CAS to do so, but the responsibility of the EU Commission to take an active lead to ensure full compliance of football regulations with EU law. 

[1] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, Annex 4 (29 June 2005) at page 124.

[2] European Commission Press Release of 5 March 2001, “Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers”.

[3] A bona fide and genuine interest in keeping the player must be demonstrated before the DRC cf. Arbitration CAS award 2009/A/1757 MTK Budapest v. FC Internazionale Milano S.p.A., award of 30 July 2009.

[4] FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, article 6(3) Annexe IV.

[5] In cases of subsequent transfer, the club entitled to claim training compensation will always be the “former club”.

[6]“17. As noted earlier, it is the 2005 Regulations which apply in the present case. At the same time, however, FIFA itself has clarified that the aim of the revisions introduced in 2005 was simply to “facilitate the evidence of a contract offer being made”. In its Decision, the DRC stated that “...when revising the Regulations it was decided to integrate in the 2005 edition of the Regulations some formal preconditions in order to facilitate the evidence that a contract offer was effectively made...This is the actual aim of the relevant formalities”. Consequently, the Panel does not interpret the 2005 revisions to the Regulations as constituting a substantive or material alteration to the 2001 regulatory regime because, as FIFA has said, the changes introduced related only to matters of form, and not of substance.”

[7] See para. 31 of the award. Although, the transfer structure used in this case could qualify as a bridge transfer used for the purpose of circumventing the FIFA regulations on transfer compensation.

[8] Decision of the Single Judge of the Sub-committee of the DRC case Budapest Honved FC (Hungary) v. AFC ASA 2013 Targu Mures (Romania) ref. TMS 243. Unpublished.

[9] See also FIFA RSTP, article 2 para. 2 of Annex IV.

[10] See the CAS award 2007/A/1363 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v/ETTU, award of 5 October 2007 para 12 page 8: “10. By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels. It is also embedded in the law of Luxembourg (see, e.g., Art. 1156 of the Code Civil of Luxembourg) and the parties have not argued otherwise.” Emphasis added.

[11] Decision not published.

[12] De Weger, The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition, 2016. Page 401.

[13] See para. 22 of the CAS award 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haag v. Newcastle United FC, award of 7 February 2007.

[14] See also Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v UCI, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

[15] Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras. 106-110.

[16] See FIFA Executive Committee, “Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”, article 1(2) and Annex 4 para. 1 (Objectives), page 112.

[17] S. Weatherill, European Sports Law Collected Papers, Asser Press, 2^nd Edition (2014), pages 218 and 219.

[18] See Report from the Commission to the European Council of 10 December 1999 with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework – The Helsinki Report on Sport - para. 4.2.1.3: The Report refers to a system of objectively calculated payments that are related to the costs of training.

[19] Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, paras. 44 and 45.

[20] As an example of this disproportionality, a simple comparison between the training costs established for Cat. III UEFA clubs (30.000 Euro per) with the training costs established for internal transfers by the Romanian Football Football Federation (5.000 RON per year equivalent to 1.107 Euro).

[21] Training compensation rules were recently tested against EU law, and in particular with regard to the freedom of movement of workers, by TAS-CAS in the Riverola case (CAS award 2014/A/Bologna FC 1909 SpA v. FC Barcelona). The award is not public, but a full comment and legal analysis is published in: Luca Smacchia, “The Riverola case: how the enforcement of FIFA rules may restrict the freedom of movement for workers within the EU”, Football Legal, #5 (June 2016), pages 20-24.

[22] See e.g. Ben Van Rompuy, “Sport and EU Competition Law: New developments and unfinished business”, Asser International Sports Law Blog (22 May 2015).

[23] Article 101 TFEU: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (…) (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;”

[24] “The distinction between "restrictions by object" and "restrictions by effect" arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.” - Commission Staff Working Document of 25 June 2014, Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, page 3.

[25] Saskia King, “Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101 (1) TFEU: Past, present and future”, PhD Thesis – The London School of Economics and Political Science (2015), Page 28.

[26] “The combined investment of summer and winter transfer windows in the top five European leagues was almost €3.4 billion. That was up by 29 per cent versus last season and again a record high ever.” - Soccerex Transfer Review Winter Edition 2016, Prime Time Sport, page 4.

[27] See, for example, Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, para. 69: “As regards, first, the concept of an association of undertakings, and without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of the arguments put forward by an intervener which go against the claims made by the party in support of which it is intervening, it is common ground that FIFA's members are national associations, which are groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an economic activity. These football clubs are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC and the national associations grouping them together are associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision.”

[28] For an in-depth economic data analysis see, e.g., FIFA T.M.S., Global Transfer Market 2012 Highlights, pages 14 and 15 – Overall Market Activity - and pages 23 and 24 - Player Age.

[29] David Nilsson, “The Revised FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfers of Players’ Compatibility with EU competition law – the Transfer System revised”. Master Thesis. Faculty of Law - University of Lund, (September 2006).

[30] Supra, 30.

[31] Doping rules under EU competition law.

[32] See para. 20 page 7 of the award: “The Panel does not share the DRC’s view that the purpose of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 3 is to penalise clubs which do not offer professional terms to their amateur players. Rather, in the Panel’s opinion, the purpose of the above provision is to ensure that no player, whether amateur or professional, in whom the training club has no interest is impeded to accept the offer of another club because he carries some sort of “compensation price tag”.