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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The EU State aid and Sport Saga – Setting the scene

The last years has seen the European Commission being put under increasing pressure to enforce EU State aid law in sport. For example, numerous Parliamentary questions have been asked by Members of the European Parliament[1] regarding alleged State aid to sporting clubs.  In reply to this pressure, on 21 March 2012, the European Commission, together with UEFA, issued a statement. In this statement, the Commission held that the objectives of the UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) Regulations are consistent with the aims and objectives of European Union policy in the field of State aid. Moreover, the Commission highlighted that it is willing to cooperate with UEFA when enforcing the rules on EU State aid onto professional football. According to the Commission, when football clubs experience financial difficulties, there is a particular risk that public authorities may be tempted to grant State aid. Thus, enforcing EU rules on State aid will ensure prudent economic management by football clubs that will serve to protect both the interests of individual clubs and players as well as the football sector in Europe as a whole.

Now that UEFA is in the process of enforcing its FFP regulations on football clubs, the question remains whether the European Commission has kept its word about its part of “the deal”. In other words, is there a visible change regarding the enforcement of the EU State aid rules by the European Commission?

Article 107 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) foresees that a Member State may not aid or subsidize private parties in distortion of free competition. The State aid rules constitute one of the four policy areas forming EU competition law. The others being the rules on cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers. The European Court of Justice established long ago that EU competition Law was also applicable to sporting entities[2], but very little has ever been done or said about State aid in sport. In fact, one could easily get the impression that the Commission deliberately avoided to get its hands dirty with such problems. One famous example concerns a terrain qualification change in Madrid in the late 90’s that proved hugely advantageous for Spanish football club Real Madrid[3]. In this case, the Commission, even though agreeing that an advantage was conferred to the club, simply stated that the new qualification of the terrain in question does not appear to involve any transfer of resources by the State and could therefore not be regarded as State aid within the meaning of article 107 TFEU.

So has anything changed since then, or more specifically, since 21 March 2012? The Commission has never been famous for its celerity, meaning that it could take another few years before true change can be witnessed. The continuous delays in coming to decisions has also been one of the main points of criticism by the European Ombudsman on the way the Commission is dealing with State aid in sport. However, on a close look, one can distinguish the beginning of a shift towards active enforcement of EU State aid law in sports.

On the day of the joint statement, the Commission published a decision indicating that it would initiate a formal investigation into alleged State aid granted by Sweden for the construction of a sporting arena for ice hockey and other indoor sports in the town of Uppsala. The Swedish State notified the Commission that it had planned to grant EUR 16.5 million directly plus EUR 1.7 million for 25 years for the construction because the arena would fulfil an objective of common interest. Moreover, due to its multifunctional character, the arena would also be used for other sports and events, such as concerts. Nonetheless, the Commission had doubts as regards the necessity to use public funding for this projects and the reasons advanced by Sweden to justify the need of a completely new arena instead of renovating an old one.

The Commission’s scrutiny of State aid in the field of sport did not end there. Since March 2012 the Commission has dealt with 12 cases in which it had to decide whether to launch an official investigation or not. The cases included possible State aid to over 30 beneficiaries in six different Member States, the latest one published 9 April of this year (see table). The aid measures varied from grants for renovating old stadiums or constructing new ones, debt waivers and reduced tax-rates for certain clubs, to acquisition of a stadium by the municipality, guarantees on bank loans by the club and suspected advantageous property transfers between a club and the municipality. In five out of the 12 cases, the Commission has decided to launch an official investigation in accordance with article 108(2) TFEU.

TableStateAidInSport.pdf (95.1KB)


Launching an official investigation does not mean that the Member State in question will get sanctioned for granting unauthorized State aid. Article 108(2) TFEU allows the Member States and concerned parties, such as the beneficiaries, to submit comments and to respond to any doubts the Commission might have regarding the legality of the aid. Indeed, on 2 May 2013, in its final decision regarding the construction of a sporting arena in the town of Uppsala, the Commission concluded that the granted aid is compatible with the internal market in accordance with article 107(3)(c) TFEU[4] and is therefore authorized. Nonetheless, four cases, which will be analyzed in future blog posts, are still pending a final decision by the Commission. For now, it is fair to say that the Commission has shifted towards an active enforcement of EU State aid law in sports. However, whether the Commission is prepared to “show its teeth” and sanction the Member States who granted unlawful aid to sporting clubs remains unclear.





[1] See for example: E-005417/2011, E-004360/2011 and P-4699/09

[2] Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch, (1974)

[3] The qualification change allowed Real Madrid to sell its old training grounds. Though the exact price for the grounds remains unknown, Real Madrid was suddenly capable of buying players like Figo and Zidane for record fees.

[4] Article 107(3)(c) TFEU: “The following shall be compatible with the internal market: aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | I’m A Loser Baby, So Let’s Kill Transparency – Recent Changes to the Olympic Games Host City Selection Process - By Ryan Gauthier (Thompson Rivers University)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

I’m A Loser Baby, So Let’s Kill Transparency – Recent Changes to the Olympic Games Host City Selection Process - By Ryan Gauthier (Thompson Rivers University)

Editor's Note: Ryan Gauthier is Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University in Canada. Ryan’s research addresses the governance of sports organisations, with a particular focus on international sports organisations. His PhD research examined the accountability of the International Olympic Committee for human rights violations caused by the organisation of the Olympic Games.


Big June 2019 for Olympic Hosting

On June 24, 2019, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) selected Milano-Cortina to host the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. Milano-Cortina’s victory came despite a declaration that the bid was “dead” just months prior when the Italian government refused to support the bid. Things looked even more dire for the Italians when 2006 Winter Games host Turin balked at a three-city host proposal. But, when the bid was presented to the members of the IOC Session, it was selected over Stockholm-Åre by 47 votes to 34. 

Just two days later, the IOC killed the host selection process as we know it. The IOC did this by amending two sections of the Olympic Charter in two key ways. First, the IOC amended Rule 33.2, eliminating the requirement that the Games be selected by an election seven years prior to the Games. While an election by the IOC Session is still required, the seven-years-out requirement is gone.

Second, the IOC amended Rule 32.2 to allow for a broader scope of hosts to be selected for the Olympic Games. Prior to the amendment, only cities could host the Games, with the odd event being held in another location. Now, while cities are the hosts “in principle”, the IOC had made it so: “where deemed appropriate, the IOC may elect several cities, or other entities, such as regions, states or countries, as host of the Olympic Games.”

The change to rule 33.2 risks undoing the public host selection process. The prior process included bids (generally publicly available), evaluation committee reports, and other mechanisms to make the bidding process transparent. Now, it is entirely possible that the IOC may pre-select a host, and present just that host to the IOC for an up-or-down vote. This vote may be seven years out from the Games, ten years out, or two years out.

 

Why the Changes? 

To hear IOC President Thomas Bach put it, these changes were necessary to prevent “too many losers”. Bach voiced this concern in December 2016, and again in May 2019. The essence of Bach’s concern seems to be that a city will put time and effort into a bid, only for it to not be selected by the IOC.

However, the harm caused by losing a bid is unclear. Is the fear that a losing city’s bid will be a one-and-done affair? To be fair, most are. The cities that bid multiple times before winning, such as PyeongChang (2010, 2014, 2018), and Paris (2012, 2024), are rare. But it is difficult to see how the changes will affect this.

Losing an Olympic bid certainly does not make a city a “loser”. While feelings may be hurt in the short run, cities keep on running. Toronto has lost five bids to host the Olympics, with the most recent loss in 2001 for the 2008 Games. But no one seriously thinks of Toronto as a “loser” city – particularly after the Raptors’ NBA championship victory. Legacies can still be created from losing bids. Developing a bid allows the city to re-imagine itself, and market itself to the world. It might even be in a city’s best interest to bid for the Olympics, but not win, to get the benefits without having to invest the billions of dollars to host the Games.

 

The IOC may be changing the process to eliminate this “winner’s curse”. Currently, bidding cities try to out-promise each other, driving up complexity and costs. Under the new system, the IOC could work more closely with a potential city or region from the outset, organizing and delivering an Olympics that truly fits. The IOC has stated that it would work less like franchisors, and more like partners with future Games hosts, and has formalised this approach in their “New Norm” modifications to Olympic Games delivery.

Finally, the IOC may be hoping that this new approach will encourage cities that might see themselves as “long-shots” to come forward and host the Games. But the last “long-shot” selected as host of the Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro, was plagued with allegations of corruption, displacement of vulnerable people from the favelas, and poor legacy outcomes.

 

Back to Salt Lake City? 

This new process, with the IOC possibly presenting only one possible city to the IOC Session for an up-and-down vote has the possibility to undermine transparency in the host selection process. If the IOC is unwilling to announce possible candidates until a deal is already done, the promises made by a city or region may not even be known by its own public until the IOC Session votes on it.

Robert Livingstone, who runs the website GamesBids.com, worries that these changes will lead to “a devolution back to the 1980s and 1990s when a translucent bid process eventually led to the Salt Lake City bribery scandal.” I share that same fear. With Salt Lake City looking to host the 2030 Games, history is rhyming a little to closely.

Even if the return to lavish visits, gift-giving, influence-buying, and outright corruption don’t come to pass, this is a reversal of the general direction since the IOC published Agenda 2020 in 2014. Agenda 2020 called for more transparency, such as publishing Host City Contracts. To their credit, the IOC has followed through on many of the Agenda 2020 reforms.

A reduction in transparency will likely lead to less public participation. And that may be the IOC’s goal. The IOC is sensitive to referendums. The general public is more critical of the Games than it was in the past. In recent years, hosting the Games has been subject to more referendums than ever, with almost all of those referendums saying ‘no’ to the Games.

IOC Member Dick Pound stated that he has “no hesitation in allowing a [future host] commission to have discussions that are out of the public eye that perhaps occur with sports authorities or interested groups even before the governments had been engaged in this, and can be done on a very confidential basis.” This type of process, without even government knowledge, effectively undercuts public consultation and participation in any bid process.

This new bid process has not happened, yet. It is possible that IOC’s approach will continue to be ever-more transparent, and to allow for public input into the bid process. Naturally, until the IOC shares more of its thoughts about the process, and until we see a host selection process in action, which may be years away (under the old process, the selection process for the 2030 Games would take place between 2021–2023), any commentary about the process is admittedly speculative.

 

Is the IOC Afraid of Losing?

The IOC is facing a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis is no more apparent than when no city seems to want to host the Olympic Games. Of course, there are many reasons that cities are wary of the Games. High costs, poor legacies, perceptions of corruption, and other problems regularly plague the Games.

The IOC’s Agenda 2020 reforms were positive steps forward in addressing some of these issues. Instead, the IOC has seemingly decided that it would rather take the process out of the public eye under the guide of the cities being afraid of being “losers”. But it seems that the IOC is the one afraid of “losing”. Afraid of hearing that “Nobody Wants to Host the Olympics Anymore”. Afraid of the Games coming out on the losing end of referendums. Afraid of having to choose between a bad and worse option to host the Games. The only loser here might be the Olympic Games.

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