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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – January 2017. By Saverio Spera.

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 


The Headlines

The Diarra ruling of the Tribunal of Charleroi

On 19 January 2017, the Hainaut Commercial Tribunal – Charleroi rendered its decision on the lawsuit filed by the football player Lassana Diarra against FIFA and the Belgian FA (URBSFA) for damages caused by not being able to exercise the status of a professional football player during the entire 2014/2015 season. The lawsuit is linked to the decision, rendered by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) on April 2015, to support Lokomotiv’s decision to terminate the player’s contract and to order Diarra to pay Lokomotiv the amount of EUR 10,500,000 for having breached his contract. According to the plaintiff, Diarra’s opportunity to be recruited by Sporting Charleroi was denied due to the club being potentially considered jointly liable for Diarra’s compensation pursuant to Article 17 (2) RSTP. The Belgian court held strongly that “when the contract is terminated by the club, the player must have the possibility to sign a new contract with a new employer, without restrictions to his free movement”. This case highlighted, once again, the need to read the RSTP in the light of EU law. Moreover, the decision is laying further ground for broader challenges to the RSTP on the basis of EU law (for a deeper insight into the Diarra ruling, see the recent blog written by our senior researcher Antoine Duval)


The IAAF Decision on three of its employees in corruption linked to the Russian doping scandal

On 31 January 2017, IAAF Ethic Board released its decision on allegations of corruption linked to the Russian doping scandal involving three of its employees, Nick Davies, Jane Boulter-Davies and Pierre-Yves Garnier,. The decision of the Panel stems from an email released by the media, which was sent by Nick Davies, then IAAF’s Deputy General Secretary and Director of Communications, to Papa Massata Diack, marketing consultant to the IAAF and son of the IAAF’s then President Lamine Diack, on 19 July 2013, shortly before the commencing of the IAAF World Championships in Moscow. In the email Nick Davies outlined a plan to minimise the damage provoked by the news related to the positive doping tests of a number of Russian athletes, in light of the imminent IAAF World Championships. During the investigation commissioned by the Ethic Board, it emerged that Nick Davies received sums of money for corrupt purposes in relation to the aforementioned plan and that he subsequently concealed the remuneration; that his wife, Jane Boulter-Davies, misled the investigation carried out on behalf of the Ethic Board; and that Pierre-Yves Garnier, Medical and Scientific Senior Manager, received sums of money to the same end. The Panel, therefore, banned Mr Davies from his position at the IAAF, and suspended Mrs Boulter-Davies and Mr. Garnier from their IAAF positions for a period of 6 months.  


CAS award on UEFA Membership of Football Federation of Kosovo

In the dispute between the Football Association of Serbia (FAS) and UEFA over the admission of the Football Federation of Kosovo (FFK) as the 55th member association of UEFA, the CAS sided with UEFA and dismissed the appeal filed by the FAS. The CAS award confirms the FFK’s admission as a member association of UEFA. The CAS Panel analysed Article 5(1) UEFA Statues, which requires the recognition by the United Nations (UN) as an independent state in order for a football associations situated in the continent of Europe to obtain the membership of UEFA. It held that the provision has to be interpreted as requiring that the territory in which the football federation is located be recognised by the majority of the UN member states as an “independent state”. Given that this prerequisite was fulfilled with respect to FFK, FAS’ appeal was dismissed.


Ruling of the Commercial Court of Zurich on FIFA's responsibility for human rights violations in Qatar

Finally, on 3 January 2017, the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zurich dismissed the lawsuit filed against FIFA by the Dutch trade union FNV, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and the Bangladeshi citizen Nadim Shariful Alam for alleged human rights violations in connection with the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. The plaintiffs asserted that FIFA's legal responsibility for those violations arose out of FIFA's inaction to remedy them. First, when it selected Qatar as host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup without simultaneously demanding minimum human rights and labour rights for World Cup-related migrant workers. Second, when it failed and still is failing to take responsibility for the fate of migrant workers by not demanding Qatar to reform its labour system.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – May 2017. By Tomáš Grell

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – May 2017. By Tomáš Grell

Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

The Headlines

The end of governance reforms at FIFA?

The main sports governance story that surfaced in the press (see here and here) during the last month is related to significant personal changes made by the FIFA Council within the organization’s institutional structure. In particular, the FIFA Council dismissed the heads of the investigatory (Mr Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Mr Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Mr Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. The decision to remove Mr Maduro was taken arguably in response to his active role in barring Mr Vitaly Mutko, a Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, from sitting on the FIFA Council due to an imminent conflict of interests. These events constitute a major setback to governance reforms initiated by the football’s world governing body in 2015. For a more detailed insight into the governance reforms at FIFA, we invite you to read the recent blog written by our senior researcher Mr Antoine Duval.

The CAS award in Real Madrid CF v. FIFA

At the end of the month, the CAS finally published its award delivered in the arbitration procedure between the Spanish club Real Madrid CF and FIFA regarding the transfer of minor football players. Mr Michele Bernasconi, sitting as a Sole Arbitrator, partially upheld the appeal filed by Real Madrid CF against the decision rendered by the FIFA Appeal Committee on 8 April 2016. The Sole Arbitrator reduced the ban (registering new players both on a national and international level) imposed on the Spanish club by the FIFA Appeal Committee from two to one entire transfer period. Moreover, Real Madrid CF is now obliged to pay CHF 240,000 instead of the original fine amounting to CHF 360,000. 

UEFA incorporates human rights and anti-corruption criteria into bidding requirements

UEFA has recently made available the Bid Dossier Template for the 2024 European Championship that will be held either in Germany or Turkey. Amongst other things, the two remaining candidates shall describe in their bid dossiers a global strategy for integrating the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in order to protect, respect and fulfil universal human rights, including child rights and the rights of workers. On this occasion, UEFA President Mr Aleksander Čeferin stated that ‘it was imperative […] to introduce specific articles on the respect and protection of human rights in the bidding requirements for all our competitions.’ By incorporating human rights criteria into bidding requirements, UEFA joins the International Olympic Committee and FIFA in their efforts to tackle human rights abuses associated with mega sporting events.

The return of Claudia Pechstein: Bundesverfassungsgericht edition

Claudia Pechstein is back! For those who have already forgotten the case, this is a dispute involving a German Speed Skater and Olympic gold medallist challenging the validity of a CAS award imposing a doping ban (for greater detail see our previous blogs here and here, and the article by Antoine Duval and Ben van Rompuy). Nothing less than the survival of the CAS, at least as we know it, is at stake. While Claudia Pechstein lost in front of the Bundesgerichtshof, the decision was harshly criticized (here and here) and she decided to challenge the ruling in front of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (constitutional court). Since last month, we know that the Bundesverfassungsgericht will hear and decide the claim, this as such is already a sign that the judges deem the case worthy of consideration and should be cause for concern for those wishing to keep the CAS as it currently is. The silver lining for CAS might be in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Solange jurisprudence, which could find a new expression in this peculiar context (as suggested here), it would preserve the CAS’s existence while forcing it to change.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The French “betting right”: a legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. By Ben Van Rompuy

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The French “betting right”: a legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. By Ben Van Rompuy

The European Commission has published the “Study on Sports Organisers’ Rights in the EU”, which was carried out by the ASSER International Sports Law Centre (T.M.C. Asser Institute) and the Institute for Information Law (University of Amsterdam). 

The study critically examines the legal protection of rights to sports events (sports organisers’ rights) and various issues regarding their commercial exploitation in the field of media and sports betting, both from a national and EU law perspective.  

In a number of posts, we will highlight some of the key findings of the study. 


“It was Hyde, after all, and Hyde alone, that was guilty.” 


In recent years, numerous national and European sports organisers have called for the adoption of a specific right to consent to the organisation of bets (“right to consent to bets”), by virtue of which no betting operator could offer bets on a sports event without first entering into a contractual agreement with the organiser. 

A sports organisers’ right to consent to bets was first introduced in Victoria (Australia) in 2007. Yet it was the recognition of a similar right in France that created the true momentum for sports organisers to advocate its adoption at the EU or EU-wide national level. The argument is twofold. First, a right to consent to bets would entitle sports organisers to demand a “fair financial return” for the commercial exploitation of theirs sports events by betting operators. Second, it would establish a statutory obligation for betting operators to work in partnership with sports organisers to preserve the integrity of sports events. According to the contractual provisions agreed upon by the involved parties, mutual obligations (for e.g. fraud detection) and conditions of information exchange can be identified. 


A restriction to the freedom to provide services? 

From an EU internal market law perspective, it is important to note that the conditions implementing a right to consent to bets are capable of constituting a restriction of the free movement of services within the Union (within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU). Indeed, the requirement for betting operators to obtain consent for the organisation of sports bets could impede or render less attractive the free provision of gambling services.[1] 

The Court of Justice (CJ) has consistently held that restrictions on gambling activities are acceptable only if justified by an imperative requirement in the general interest and compliant with the principle of proportionality. The CJ has accepted the prevention of fraud as a legitimate objective justification. The financing of public interest activities through proceeds from gambling services, on the other hand, can only be accepted as a beneficial consequence that is incidental to the restrictive policy adopted.[2]  

It follows that a strict regulatory framework that genuinely reflects a concern to prevent the manipulation of sports events must accompany the introduction of a right to consent to bets. 


The origins of the French betting right 

With the enactment of a new gambling law in 2010, the French legislator, following case law precedent recognizing sports bets as a form of commercial exploitation of sports events, introduced a right to consent to bets in the French Sports Code. 

Interestingly, the concept of the right to consent to bets evolved considerably during the course of the legislative process.  

When the draft law opening up online gambling and betting to competition and regulation was introduced in the French parliament, the rationale of the right to consent to bets was solely expressed in terms of generating a “fair financial return” to sport. Under Chapter IX (“Provisions concerning the exploitation of sports events”) of the original draft law, the following addition to Article L.334-1 of the Sports Code was proposed: 

“The use, for commercial purposes, of any characteristic element of sporting events or competitions, notably names, calendars, data or results, requires the consent of the owners of the exploitation rights under conditions, in particular of a financial nature, defined by contract, subject to the provisions of articles L. 333-6 to L.333-9”.[3]

On 5 March 2009, the French authorities notified the draft law to the European Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1988.[4] In its detailed opinion, the Commission stressed that several provisions of the draft law would infringe Article 56 TFEU if they were to be adopted without due consideration of the Commission’s objections. Amongst other things, the Commission rightly observed that the financing of sport through gambling revenues could not justify an obstacle to free movement, in this case the requirement to obtain consent from the sports organiser. The Commission further noted that the characteristic elements that are already in the possession of sports organisers, such as calendars, data or results, could not qualify for sui generis database right protection.  

It was only during the subsequent first reading of the draft law in the French National Assembly that the statutory recognition of the right to consent to bets was presented as a means of preserving sports integrity. On 21 July 2009, the French Minister for the Budget declared: 

“in reality, the interest of this right for sport is not financial but ethical, by requiring commercial agreements between gambling operators and the organisers of sports competitions, this right finally will give professional sport the means to make the operators share their concerns in matters of competition ethics”.[5]

 Accordingly, the relevant provision was substantially amended to address the concerns about its compliance with the EU internal market rules. First, it no longer mentioned that the consent to the organisation of bets was related to the use of fixtures and schedules. Second, the title of Chapter IX was changed to “Provisions concerning the exploitation of sports events and the fight against fraud and cheating in the context of these events” (emphasis added). Third, multiple paragraphs were added, so as to stipulate that (1) the betting right contracts should impose obligations on betting operators concerning fraud detection and prevention and (2) the financial contribution is intended to compensate for costs incurred by sports organisers for anti-fraud mechanisms.[6]


The proof of the pudding is in the eating  

On the basis of an in-depth assessment of the exploitation of the French right to consent to bets, the study concludes that the rationale of safeguarding the integrity of sports events did not really override its economic rationale. 

Decree No. 2010-614 requires the betting right marketing contracts to specify information and transparency obligations imposed on operators to detect fraud and prevent the risk of harm to the integrity of sports events.[7] Contrary to the relatively strong language about the stipulation of “information and transparency obligations” imposed on the operators, Decree No. 2010-614 merely requires the holder of the right to consent to bets to specify in the contracts the measures it “intends” to introduce for preventing the risk for the integrity of the events in question. However, the law does not mandate the effective implementation of these integrity measures. Furthermore, although the compensation paid for the right to organise bets must take account “in particular the costs incurred in detecting and preventing fraud”, there is no guarantee that the income is allocated to fraud prevention and detection. 

If Member States would consider introducing a right to consent to bets, it appears critical from an EU law perspective that it is genuinely designed to protect a non-economic public interest objective in a proportional manner. The Victorian (Australia) regulatory regime is recommended as a best practice model. Here, the financial return is truly a compensation for the integrity assurances given by the sports bodies. Before a sports body is legally entitled to exercise the right to consent to bets, it must first invest time and resources into developing adequate integrity mechanisms. Furthermore, in case the sports body fails to fulfil its contractual obligations, the gambling regulator may revoke its ability to exercise the right to consent to bets. Indeed, the rights and obligations in the betting right agreements must work both ways: sports betting operators are also entitled to expect that the sports organisers truly implement the integrity policies.  

For a detailed exploration of the virtues of a right to consent to bets and the challenges of adopting such a mechanism from a legal, institutional, and practical perspective, check out the full study available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/2014/study-on-sport-organisers-rights_en.htm.


[1] All measures that prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms must be regarded as restrictions, see e.g. C-439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, para. 22; Case C-205/99 Analir and Others v Administratión General del Estado [2001] ECR I-271, para. 21.

[2] See e.g. Joined Cases C 316/07, C 358/07 to C 360/07, C 409/07 and C 410/07 Markus Stoß and Others v Wetteraukreis and Others [2010] ECR I-8069, para. 104; C-67/98 Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, para. 36; Judgment of the EFTA Court in Case 3/06 (Ladbrokes) para. 63.

[3] Unofficial translation by the research team (“L’utilisation, à des fins commerciales, de tout élément caractéristique des manifestations ou compétitions sportives, notamment leur dénomination, leur calendrier, leurs données ou leurs résultats, ne peut être effectuée sans le consentement des propriétaires des droits d’exploitation, dans des conditions, notamment financières, définies par contact, sous réserve des dispositions des articles L. 333-6 à L. 333-9”).

[4] Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (1998) OJ L 204/37. This “Transparency Directive” requires Member States to notify their rules on information society services in draft form, and generally observe a standstill period of at least three months before formal adoption, in order to allow other Member States and the European Commission to raise concern about potential trade barriers within the EU.

[5] Assemblée Nationale, Audition de M. Éric Woerth, ministre du budget, des comptes publics, de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'État au cours de la réunion du 21 Juillet 2009.

[6] In the context of the second reading of the draft law in the French Senate, the rapporteur of the Finance Committee welcomed this solution to accommodate the European Commission’s concerns regarding Article 52. Sénate, Rapport n° 209 (2009-2010) de M. François Trucy, fait au nom de la commission des finances, déposé le 19 janvier 2010.

[7] Décret no. 2010-614 du 7 Juin 2010 relatif aux conditions de commercialisation de droits portant sur l’organisation de paris en relation avec une manifestation ou compétition sportives, Article 2.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Time to Cure FIFA’s Chronic Bad Governance Disease

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Time to Cure FIFA’s Chronic Bad Governance Disease

 After Tuesday’s dismissal of Michael Garcia’s complaint against the now infamous Eckert statement synthetizing (misleadingly in his eyes) his Report on the bidding process for the World Cup 2018 and 2022, Garcia finally decided to resign from his position as FIFA Ethics Committee member. On his way out, he noted: “No independent governance committee, investigator, or arbitration panel can change the culture of an organization”. It took Garcia a while to understand this, although others faced similar disappointments before. One needs only to remember the forgotten reform proposals of the Independent Governance Committee led by Prof. Dr. Mark Pieth.

FIFA is the world’s government of football. It decides who should get to organize the World Cup every four years, but it also imposes the rules applying to international transfers of football players and redistributes a massive amount of money to the various layers of the football pyramid. Those are no mundane tasks. But, despite its relentless display of an entrenched culture of bad governance and corruption, the timidity of public authorities in confronting FIFA is striking. In fact, opacity and a dramatic lack of accountability characterize FIFA’s decision-making processes.

 

FIFA’s Opacity Culture

Transparency is one of the key requirements of “good governance”. Transparency implies that the public sphere can scrutinize the acts of government and criticize them in full knowledge of their contents. To the contrary, FIFA’s daily governmental work is marred in opacity. Disciplinary decisions, as the one handed out on Tuesday, are never released in full. Thus, it disables any critical checks on the way justice is rendered by FIFA’s disciplinary bodies. The two Garcia reports, the first on the ISL Corruption scandal and the second on the World Cup 2018 and 2022 bids were not publically released (Michael Garcia did not complain over the non-publication of his first report). In an ironical twist, FIFA regulations bar FIFA from releasing these reports supposed to restore credibility of FIFA in the eyes of the world. Hence, FIFA publically trumpets investigations into the most controversial and sensitive issues, while knowing that the findings will be buried forever. But beyond the Garcia reports, opacity is a pervasive feature of FIFA’s governance. For example, the two academic studies ordered by FIFA on the legality and desirability of third-party ownership were similarly kept in a drawer, despite the fact that they are to serve as a basis for upcoming legislation on the matter. In this way, FIFA is able to keep the public debate at bay. Maintaining the public uninformed on the substance of legislative or judicial decisions is the surest way to avoid any controversies and to distance the world government of football from its “citizens”. 

 

FIFA’s Accountability Deficit

Accountability is another keyword for anybody interested in Good Governance standards. In short, it implies that a decision-maker can be held responsible in front of a forum (legal or political) for the decisions she (or most likely he in the case of FIFA) is taking. FIFA has a huge accountability deficit for two reasons: internally no strong accountability mechanisms have been put in place; externally no societal accountability is imposed. Internally FIFA has been at pain to paint the emergence of its “independent” Ethics Committee as a revolution. However, the Garcia Report saga was prompt to display it as a farce. The Ethics Committee’s investigation as such seems to have been fundamentally flawed, suffice here to recall that the Russian Federation got away with a simple “computers destroyed”. If the Ethics Committee is incapable of inquiring seriously into those matters, it should simply be discarded as an instance of whitewashing. Moreover, despite Blatter being a finalist for this year’s edition of the world’s most hated human being, he will most likely be re-elected by FIFA’s member (the leaders of the national associations) at the upcoming congress in May 2015. Indeed, FIFA’s members are accountable to nobody as FIFA shields them from any national legal or political challenges on the pretext of protecting the autonomy of football.

As pointed out by Garcia, FIFA is incapable of reforming itself and until now it has been immune to the pressure of public outrage. All the expertise of the world would be incapable of changing this state of affairs, unless it is matched with hard legal constraints. This pressure has to come from the states, the first among those being the Swiss state. The Swiss public authorities have the duty to use all legal tools available (especially criminal law) to clean up this Swiss association seated in Zurich, they should collaborate with Europol, Interpol and the FBI in doing so (the new anti-corruption laws are a first step in that direction). In the end, the Swiss state is the sole capable of putting an end to FIFA’s corrupt politics. Would this be an inadmissible intrusion in the autonomy of sport? Even the IOC acknowledged, in the background paper to the Agenda 2020 recommendation, “autonomy has to be earned” and must be exercised “responsibly and in accordance with the basic standards of good governance”. There is no way FIFA can be seen as complying to any good governance standards. The time to clean-up FIFA has come.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – February 2017. By Tomáš Grell

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – February 2017. By Tomáš Grell

 Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked.

 

The Headlines 

The CAS award in Hakan Çalhanoglu v. Trabzonspor FC

The dispute between the Turkish football player Hakan Çalhanoğlu and the Turkish club Trabzonspor FC dates back to April 2013, when the latter lodged a claim before the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber ('FIFA DRC') alleging that, by signing a contract with the German club Karlsruher SC, Hakan Çalhanoğlu breached the terms of his employment contract (with Trabzonspor FC) without just cause. In January 2016, the FIFA DRC upheld the claims advanced by Trabzonspor FC and imposed a four-month period of ineligibility on the Turkish international. Both the player and the club decided to appeal the FIFA DRC decision before the CAS. In its press release dated 2 February 2017, the CAS reports that it has delivered its award which confirms the four-month ban imposed on Hakan Çalhanoglu by the FIFA DRC (provisionally suspended by the CAS upon the request made by Hakan Çalhanoglu) and orders the Turkish international to pay Trabzonspor FC the sum of EUR 100,000.

The CAS award concerning Russian athlete Mariya Savinova-Farnosova

On 10 February 2017, the CAS rendered its award in the ordinary arbitration procedure between the International Association of Athletics Federations ('IAAF'), the Russian Athletics Federation and Russian 800 metres runner Mariya Savinova-Farnosova. The CAS held that, during the period between 26 July 2010 and 19 August 2013, Ms. Savinova-Farnosova was engaged in using doping, and thus violated Rule 32 (2) (b) of the IAAF Competition Rules. Consequently, the CAS imposed a four-year period of ineligibility on Ms. Savinova-Farnosova, starting from 24 August 2015. In addition, all results achieved by her in the respective period were annulled and she must now return her gold medals from the London 2012 Summer Olympics and the Daegu 2011 IAAF World Championships.

The CAS rejected the urgent requests for provisional measures filed by five Russian cross country skiers 

On 21 February 2017, the CAS refused to order provisional measures requested by five Russian cross country skiers, namely Evgeniy Belov, Alexander Legkov, Alexey Petukhov, Evgenia Shapovalova and Maxim Vylegzhanin, in the appeal arbitration procedure against the International Ski Federation ('FIS'). The athletes requested the CAS to stay the execution of the decisions adopted by the FIS Doping Panel on 25 January 2017 (Evgeniy Belov and Alexander Legkov) and on 6 February 2017 (Alexey Petukhov, Evgenia Shapovalova and Maxim Vylegzhanin) respectively. It is worth recalling that the FIS Doping Panel provisionally suspended the athletes in question on account of the evidence presented in Part II of the McLaren Independent Investigation Report, which unveiled that doping samples of several Russian medallists at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics may have been manipulated.

The International Olympic Committee modified the Host City Contract 2024 

In its press release dated 28 February 2017, the International Olympic Committee ('IOC') communicated that, as part of the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020, it is making specific changes to the Host City Contract 2024 with regard to human rights, anti-corruption and sustainable development. The IOC President Thomas Bach stated that ''this latest step is another reflection of the IOC's commitment to embedding the fundamental values of Olympism in all aspects of the Olympic Games.'' Although the Host City of the 2024 Summer Olympics is scheduled to be announced only in September this year, it is now clear that, be it either Los Angeles or Paris (as Budapest has recently withdrawn its bid), the it will have to abide by additional range of human rights obligations.

 

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