Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Image Rights in Professional Basketball (Part II): Lessons from the American College Athletes cases. By Thalia Diathesopoulou

In the wake of the French Labour Union of Basketball (Syndicat National du Basket, SNB) image rights dispute with Euroleague and EA Games, we threw the “jump ball” to start a series on players’ image rights in international professional basketball. In our first blogpost, we discussed why image rights contracts in professional basketball became a fertile ground for disputes when it comes to the enforcement of these contracts by the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT). Indeed, we pointed out that clubs might take advantage of the BAT’s inconsistent jurisprudence to escape obligations deriving from image rights contracts.

In this second limb, we will open a second field of legal battles “around the rim”: the unauthorized use of players’ image rights by third parties. We will use as a point of reference the US College Athletes image rights cases before US Courts and we will thereby examine the legal nature of image rights and the precise circumstances in which such rights may be infringed. Then, coming back to where we started, we will discuss the French case through the lens of US case law on players’ image rights. 


Source: http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/09/27/ea-sports-settles-college-likeness-case/ 


The American College Athletes image rights cases in a nutshell

The legal qualification of image rights varies in different jurisdictions. In the USA, image rights refer to the right of publicity: an intellectual property right, which gives the player an exclusive right on his image. The commercial exploitation of this image without permission constitutes an offence and practice of unfair competition.[1] Although the right of publicity is a creation of the common law not recognized under Federal law, many state courts and legislatures have embraced it.

The US legal system as a “true forerunner of marketing applied to sport”[2] considers, contrary to other legal systems, that image rights extends to the exploitation of players’ image rights linked to college championships. Indeed, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Basketball has acquired a monopoly power in the college sports entertainment market, with broadcast and cable television serving as powerful handmaidens.[3] This financially massive industry exploits the free labour of student-athletes’ due to their so-called amateur status.[4]  In fact, as a precondition to participate in NCAA Championships, student-athletes have to sign the ‘Form 08-3a’ authorizing NCAA to use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”.[5]

The NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights generates millions of dollars of profits through licensing agreements for their use in e.g. television broadcasts, advertising, DVDs or video games. The fact that student-athletes are not compensated for the use of their rights has given rise to a wave of lawsuits filed by former student athletes against the NCAA and video game makers. O’Bannon’s, Sam Keller’s and other former student athletes’ image is still making money for the NCAA through licensed merchandizing.

As a result of the NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights, an unprecedented legal battle started in 2009 before the Federal Courts of the US. In May 2009, Sam Keller, a former football player of the Arizona University sued NCAA and EA Games for unlawfully using his image and likeness in a video game. The case continued before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California which dismissed the appeal of EA Games on the grounds that EA was not protected by the First Amendment, which offers a shield to video games via freedom of speech. In fact, the Court concluded that the EA’s use of the player recreates him in the very setting in which he has achieved fame.[6] Similarly, in Ryan Hart’s case, a former Rutgers football player, the Federal Court of Appeals, overturning the district court’s ruling, concluded that players in video games are renditions of actual players who should be compensated.

Undoubtedly, the O’Bannon case is to be considered a milestone. It is the widest-ranging anti-trust lawsuit before US Courts with regards to college athletes’ image rights. On 21 July 2009, Ed O’Bannon, one of the most recognized collegiate basketball players of the last 30 years, along with another 19 former college athletes, filed a class action against EA Games, NCAA, and the Collegiate Licencing Company, the nation’s leading collegiate trademark licensing and marketing firm, seeking compensation from the unauthorized use of their image rights. Their claim implicated two core areas of law: (1) federal antitrust law and (2) intellectual property rights law. By requiring athletes to relinquish in perpetuity their image rights through the ‘Form 08-3a’ and fixing at zero the amount of compensation athletes could receive from the share of revenues, they contended that the NCAA has restrained trade and, thus, acted in violation of the Sherman Act, i.e. federal antitrust law. The athletes that signed this form had been deprived of their right to negotiate on their own with licensing firms after leaving college. Furthermore, they argued that they had been deprived of their right of publicity and their subsequent right to the commercial exploitation of their image, name, likeness or voice.

Following a contentious five years trial proceeding and thousands of pages of filings, on 8 August 2014, the US District Judge Claudia Wilken in a 99-page decision shook the basketball world by ruling in favour of O’Bannon and the other plaintiffs.[7] The injunction issued allows college athletes to get a share of the licensing revenues via the creation of a trust fund available to them once they leave college.


The O’Bannon landmark ruling: What the French (and Europe) can learn?

The O’Bannon ruling, while under appeal, has been ground-breaking in that it questions the ‘sacrosanct’ NCAA notion of amateurism. Judge Wilken was clear: maintaining amateurism is not legitimate sufficient justification for implementing anticompetitive labour rules, which bar players from being compensated for the use of their image rights. The collapse of NCAA’s amateurism defence and the resulting establishment of an equitable bargaining relationship between student-athletes and NCAA could blow up the entire college basketball system. Nonetheless, this not the only important lesson we can derive from the O’Bannon ruling and the American cases.

The link between amateurism and image rights, which deprives student-athletes from any compensation, is a unique phenomenon of US college sports system and lies at the heart of the American cases. In Europe, as we extensively explained in our fist blogpost, some professional basketball players assign to their clubs the commercial use of their image rights and they receive an adequate compensation through an image rights contract concluded with a third party, an image rights contract. However, this sum cannot be deemed as an actual compensation for the use of their image, but rather it constitutes a part of their remuneration under the employment contract. Therefore, at the European level, the question that could be raised is whether basketball players can request further compensation, i.e. a compensation proportionate to the revenues generated by the exploitation of their image rights. In this light, the O’Bannon ruling has the potential to create an important precedent for image rights disputes in European professional basketball as well:

(1) The license agreement of image rights between players and basketball associations

The issue at heart of the O’Bannon case regarding the ownership of the student-athletes image and likeness is the NCAA ‘Form 08-3a’. By means of this form, student-athletes authorize the NCAA to use their image rights for the promotion of its activities.[8] O’Bannon strongly argued that this form is illegal for the following reasons: First and foremost, the language of Part IV, which provides that the NCAA can use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”, is vague and ambiguous. It does not define when, where, for how long, and how the NCAA may ‘generally’ promote events or activities. Secondly, as a result of student-athletes’ amateur status, this form is signed without representation. This can be considered as exploitative, since student-athletes’ are usually unaware of the legal consequences of signing such forms. Finally, this form is illegal, because it is coerced from student-athletes in exchange for their eligibility to play in the championship. Doug Szymul, former star football player at Northwestern University puts it clearly: “I had to sign it to be able to play, so it’s not like I’m going to argue about it”.[9]

Let’s transpose these arguments to the European professional basketball world and more particularly to the potential French case at hand. In fact, in the contracts between professional basketball players and National or European Basketball Associations, there is an image rights provision according to which players or their union agree, without further compensation, to the use of players’ image rights by the Club, the National or European League.[10] In this regard, the reference to the use of players’ image rights “in any manner” is quite ambiguous.[11]

In the French case, players transfer their image rights to the French Labour Union of Basketball (SNB). But, when players sign their contract with their club, they license the use of their image rights to their Club, French Basketball League and Euroleague, without further compensation. Can this agreement be interpreted as giving carte blanche to the Clubs, National Leagues or Euroleague to use basketball players’ image rights for an indefinite time period and indefinite manner, without further compensation? Well, if we follow the reasoning used in the O’Bannon ruling, this question should be answered in the negative: players and subsequently their labour union should have a share of licensing revenues. 

(2) The ‘without further compensation’ provision

A key issue raised during the O’Bannon trial was whether image rights (as well as name and likeness rights) even exist for the purposes of licencing agreements. The NCAA argued and provided supporting evidence[12] that although image rights are included in the contractual language, in practice, during the negotiation of broadcasting or licencing deals, they are not valued separately. The contractual provisions on image rights refer only to their use in event promotions and they play no further role during the licencing dealing.

Plaintiff’s witness, Edwin Desser, who was formerly the NBA head of broadcasting, disputed this argument by stating the ‘obvious’ from a commercial point of view: “ it’s simply impossible to conceive of sports telecast without being able to show the images of the participants”.[13] In other words, players’ image rights are a quid pro quo requirement of every broadcasting or licencing agreement.

This argument, which stems from commercial law practice, could serve as the perfect pick-n-roll in other image rights cases, including the French case. True, when, for example, EA Games negotiates with Euroleague for the conclusion of a licencing agreement, image rights are not separately calculated. However, in practice, the package of entitlements conveyed to video makers by the Clubs and Euroleague in exchange for exclusive licensing rights is essential for the deal. Realistically speaking, would it be possible for EA Games to create the NBA 2K 15 with Strasbourg and Nanterre playing, without including their players’ image rights? Clubs and Euroleague license players’ image rights and it goes without saying that they get significant revenues from the licencing agreement, while some players receive only a compensation which has been fixed in advance as part of their overall remuneration. It is this ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights provided by the contracts signed by players, therefore, that infringes their right to the commercial exploitation of their own image rights. 


Conclusive Remarks

In our previous blogpost, we cited the SNB’s president words: the SNB motion against EA Games is not about the money, but rather to defend basketball players’ rights.[14] Undoubtedly, image rights are also about the money, even if in the European context the monetary compensation is limited. We have shown that the unauthorized use of players’ image rights or the loss of their exclusive use may deprive them from a fair share of the club’s lucrative endorsement contracts. Furthermore, the existence of products bearing a player’s image without his authorization can in some cases seriously damage the value of his licensing rights.[15] Moreover, irrespectively of the legal qualification of image rights as ‘right of publicity’ or ‘right to personality’, this is a right gained through hard work on the basketball courts and the player should in any events get a share of the licensing revenues it generates.

The ‘David against Goliath’ American college sports crusade shows the way for European professional basketball players: a ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights or the denial of liability of the Clubs for non-payment of image rights contracts can be (and should be) successfully fought against.


[1] L Colantuoni and C Novazio, ‘Intellectual Property Righs in Basketball’ (2011) 1-2 International Sports Law Journal, 59.

[2] Ibid, 58.

[3] http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/RobertLemonsHonorsThesis-May2014.pdf

[4] For an interesting insight on NCAA practice, see: B Starkey, ‘College Sports Aren't Like Slavery. They're Like Jim Crow’ where the author compares college athletes’ status to the status of “blacks after slavery”.

[5] Form 08-3a, Part Iv

[6] United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, NCAA Student-Athlete name & likeness litigation (No 10-15387)

[7] Edward O’Bannon et al v National Collegiate Athletics Association, Electronic Arts Inc and Collegiate Licensing Company (US District Court, 08.08.2014)

[8] M Zylstra, Ed. O’Bannon vs. NCAA: An examination of O’Bannon’s legal claim that the NCAA illegally uses the likeness and image of former student-athletes (2009) 205 Business Law, 5.

[9] Ibid, 6.

[10] See for example, Article 69  of the Euroleague Bylaws 2012-2013: “The Company and EP have the right to use the image of the club’s players, the players’ likeness (photograph, caricature, etc), name, number, or any combination thereof for any and all commercial and promotional purposes solely in connection with the Euroleague and provided that the image of the player appears linked to the club, the player wearing its apparel and footwear, or when the player participates in public events organised by the club or by the Company”.

[11] See, Standard Player Contract of SIG BASKET SAEMSL , Clause 9.1 :The Player agrees, without further compensation, to allow the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball and their respective sponsors to take pictures of the Player, during game action or posed, as necessary, alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion pictures, internet, TV or any other form of media whether presently known or unknown, at such times as the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball may designate. Such pictures may be used, without further compensation, in any manner desired by either the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball or their respective sponsors only for publicity or promotional purposes. The rights in any such pictures taken by the Club or by the National League or by Euroleague Basketball shall belong to the Club or to the National League or to Euroleague Basketball as their interests may appear.”

[12] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of the NCAA’s lead expert Neal Pilson (vol 4) 715-815

[13] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Edwin Desser (vol 4), 618-708.

[14] Johan Passave-Ducteil, the president of SNB remarks in l’Equipe:"Ce n’est pas une histoire d’argent, on défend le droit des joueurs".

[15] L Colantuoni and C Novazio (n1), 60

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Kosovo at the Court of Arbitration for Sport – Constructing Statehood Through Sport? By Ryan Gauthier (Thompson Rivers University)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Kosovo at the Court of Arbitration for Sport – Constructing Statehood Through Sport? By Ryan Gauthier (Thompson Rivers University)

Editor's Note: Ryan is Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University, he defended his PhD at Erasmus University Rotterdam in December 2015. His dissertation examined human rights violations caused by international sporting events, and how international sporting organisations may be held accountable for these violations. 


“Serious sport…is war minus the shooting.” – George Orwell

 

In May 2016, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) admitted the Football Federation of Kosovo (Kosovo) as a member. The voting was close, with 28 member federations in favour, 24 opposed, and 2 whose votes were declared invalid. The practical outcome of this decision is that Kosovo would be able participate in the UEFA Euro championship, and that Kosovo teams could qualify for the UEFA Champions’ League or Europa League.



A few days later, Kosovo, along with Gibraltar, were admitted into the Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA) as members. This marked the increasing recognition of Kosovo as an independent entity for sporting purposes, with Kosovo’s National Olympic Committee receiving recognition from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in December 2014.

The admission of Kosovo as an independent competitor in the sporting world has touched off controversy, particularly in Serbia. Kosovo has attempted to assert its independence from Serbia for more than two decades, with a formal declaration of independence in 2008 – a declaration that was referred to the International Court of Justice who found that the declaration was not a violation of international law (I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403). The Football Federation of Serbia (Serbia) sought review of UEFA’s decision, and took its case to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). CAS upheld UEFA’s decision in January 2017 (CAS 2016/A/4602).

 

The CAS Decision

Serbia’s argument to the CAS was that UEFA violated its own regulations by admitting Kosovo as a member. Other grounds, namely procedural grounds, and an alleged violation of Serbia’s freedom of association rights, were raised. However, the CAS denied Serbia relief on those grounds, and I’ll leave a discussion of those aside in order to get to the decision on the substance of UEFA’s regulations.

The main point of contention in the complaint was the interpretation of the UEFA Statutes Art. 5(1), which deals with the admission of new members:

Membership of UEFA is open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe, based in a country which is recognised by the United Nations as an independent state, and which are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country.

The CAS panel found this provision to be ambiguous based on the reality that the United Nations does not recognise states. Instead, an entity must be a state to become a member of the United Nations (UN Charter, Art. 4(1)). Since the part of the provision at issue, whether or not Kosovo could be admitted since it was not “recognised by the United Nations as an independent state”, was void, how was the provision to be interpreted?

The CAS turned to four principles of statutory interpretation, based on the Swiss Civil Code: the genesis of the law, a systematic interpretation, common practice and understanding, and the ratio (purpose) of the provision. The CAS found the first three principles to be unhelpful, as these principles ultimately uncovered elements that only led to the ambiguity in the first place.

The CAS finally turned to the ratio of the provision. It found that the purpose of the provision was to have one football federation per country, and to limit secessions of football federations only to instances where the secession was supported in a broader political sense. The CAS stated that: “the attempt to mirror the solutions and realities of the political map onto the sporting world makes a lot of sense” (para. 123). The panel also noted that the Olympic Charter and FIFA Statutes defined a “country” as “an independent state recognised by the international community”, and pointed out that Kosovo’s sports bodies had been recognised by the IOC and other international sporting federations under this definition. As a result, the CAS found that the definition of “country” had a common understanding in the sporting community, and it was one that did not require UN membership.

 

The Gibraltar Decision

Both UEFA’s decision, and the CAS case, have their roots in the late 1990s, but in regards to a territory on the other side of Europe – Gibraltar. Gibraltar is not an independent state, but is a territory of the United Kingdom. It is also a source of diplomatic conflict between the United Kingdom, and Gibraltar’s neighbour – Spain. Gibraltar applied for UEFA membership in 1997. Having had its own football association since 1895, and with the UEFA requirements then only requiring that a UEFA member have its own football association that oversees football in the territory, Gibraltar’s application looked to be a lock. Indeed, the application was initially positively received by UEFA, and looked to be a done deal by the year 2000.

However, UEFA repeatedly delayed making a final determination, in part because of Spanish opposition to Gibraltar’s membership (the English Football Association, for its part, was supportive of Gibraltar). After more than two years, UEFA still had not made a determination on Gibraltar’s membership. Yet, they had received, processed, and approved an application by Kazakhstan to join UEFA after it had left the Asian Football Confederation in 2001. UEFA remained pretty busy during this time, as they changed their rules regarding the admission of new members to UEFA. The new change was the language that was at issue in the Kosovo case – that a new member be recognised as an independent state by the United Nations.

The case was brought before the CAS (2002/O/410), where Gibraltar sought a declaration that its application be considered under the pre-2001 rules that it had initially applied under, and that its application be accepted by UEFA. The CAS agreed with Gibraltar that UEFA could not change its rules mid-stream, finding that upholding such a change would violate a presumption against retrospectivity in regards to substantive laws, and principles of good faith. The CAS ordered UEFA to decide on Gibraltar’s membership based on the pre-2001 rules. After two more arbitrations heard by the CAS in 2006 and 2013, Gibraltar was admitted as a UEFA member in 2013. Gibraltar’s status as a FIFA member was similarly accomplished through CAS decisions.

 

Sport as a Playground for International Law

With all apologies to this blog’s Editor-in-Chief Antoine Duval, sport is not just a playground for transnational law, but also for international law. Scholars of international relations and international law are frequently surprised with the complexity and the depth of sports’ legal system. But perhaps more surprising is the consistent surprise that sports is more than simply “low politics”, and something that can be safely ignored in light of other areas such as military force, international trade, and the like.

I suggest that a case such as Kosovo’s quest for recognition by sporting bodies does matter for international law and international relations more generally. On the merits, these cases are administrative law exercises, whereby the CAS is merely ensuring that UEFA has complied with its own procedures, and the Kosovo case is a statutory interpretation exercise. However, I think that these cases – particularly the Kosovo case, should help shape our understanding of establishing a state.

There is a debate in international law over when a political entity becomes a “state” – with the attendant rights and obligations. The “constitutive” theory argues that an entity can only become a state when other states recognize it. The “declaratory” theory argues that so long as certain “facts on the ground” are established (usually the Montevideo Convention requirements of territory, population, government, and the capacity to enter into foreign relations), recognition is merely a declaration of what is already the case.

Kosovo is in the midst of attempting to establish its statehood. Currently, 110 UN member states recognise Kosovo. However, Serbia, Russia, and China, amongst others, do not. In establishing its statehood, Kosovo is unlikely to obtain UN membership anytime soon, with two of the permanent members of the Security Council likely to veto any attempt by Kosovo to join.

However, Kosovo appears to be taking a page from the playbook of states that went through de-colonization – not only obtain a seat at the UN, but obtain recognition from the IOC (and other sporting bodies). Next to having a seat at the UN, participation in the Olympic Games is one of the most visible signifiers of statehood. What could a more powerful signal of independence than having one’s athletes march in the opening ceremonies of an Olympic Games, waving the state’s flag, and having its anthem play upon winning a gold medal in front of thousands of people live and billions of people watching from home?

 


Source: http://www.nbcolympics.com/news/judo-day-2-preview-majlinda-kelmendi-eyes-olympic-history.

If you are skeptical that states care about who participates in international sporting events, Taiwan remains a prime example. Taiwan does not compete as “Taiwan”, or as the “Republic of China” along with its national flag – but instead its athletes compete under “Chinese Taipei”, using a different flag with the Olympic Rings on it. This was as a result of a deal brokered by the IOC and the People’s Republic of China in 1979 to get the People’s Republic of China to participate in the Olympic Games – a deal eventually accepted by Taiwan in 1981.

What cases like Chinese Taipei and Kosovo suggest is that although recognition is important in establishing statehood, it may not be limited to state recognition. While states may be the only organisations that have international legal personality, there are cracks forming in that monolithic conceptualization of international law. It is clear that sporting organizations such as the IOC, FIFA, and UEFA do not have international legal personality. However, they act as global administrative bodies, responsible for the organization of much of global sport. As such, these bodies have the reach and arguably, influence of the UN bodies – creatures of states that have international legal personality.

A real concern over constructing statehood through, inter alia sporting competition is that it may create a “slippery slope”. After all, if Gibraltar – certainly not a state – and Kosovo – questionably a state – can join UEFA, FIFA, or have a National Olympic Committee recognized, what is to stop other entities from doing the same? “Alternative” competitions involving entities that are not recognized as states, such Northern Cyprus, or ethnic groups such as the Sami of Scandinavia or the Romani of Europe, have taken place. Could one of these entities apply to join the international sporting community? The line-drawing by international sporting organisations has thus far proven to be problematic. However, this is a question perhaps best left for future research.

So, in the end, does the UEFA admission and CAS decision make Kosovo a state? Legally-speaking, probably not. Becoming a state entails not only rights at international law, but also obligations. It seems perhaps a stretch to say that a decision by a private arbitral body that oversees a specialized area would be determinative of a highly-contentious issue. However, one step below that is the political question of whether recognition by these sporting bodies helps Kosovo’s claims to statehood. I think the answer is as follows: If you ask the “man on the street” whether Kosovo was a state as Majlinda Kelmendi (the flag-bearer in the photo above) stood on the podium after winning a gold medal in judo at the 2016 Summer Games, or while that man watches the Kosovo team participate in the UEFA Euro and FIFA World Cups – that answer is more and more likely to be “yes”.

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