Editor's note: Rhys is currently making research and writing contributions under Dr Antoine Duval at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law. Additionally, Rhys is the ‘Head of Advisory’ of Athlon CIF, a global fund and capital advisory firm specialising in the investment in global sports organisations and sports assets.

Rhys has a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) from the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. Rhys is an LL.M candidate at the University of Zurich, in International Sports Law. Following a career as a professional athlete, Rhys has spent much of his professional life as an international sports agent, predominantly operating in football.

Rhys is also the host of the podcast “Sportonomic”.

Introduction

In the following two-part blog series, I will start by outlining a short typology of investors in football in recent years, in order to show the emergence of different varieties of investors who seek to use football as a means to a particular end. I will then in a second blog, explore the regulatory landscape across different countries, with a particular focus on the regulatory approach to multi-club ownership. Before moving forward, I must offer a disclaimer of sorts.  In addition to my research and writing contributions with the Asser Institute, I am the ‘Head of Advisory’ for Athlon CIF, a global fund and capital advisory firm specialising in the investment in global sports organisations and sports assets. I appreciate and hence must flag that I will possess a bias when it comes to investment in football.

It might also be noteworthy to point out that this new wave of investment in sport, is not exclusive to football. I have recently written elsewhere about CVC Capital Partners’ US$300 million investment in Volleyball, and perhaps the message that lingers behind such a deal.  CVC has also shown an interest in rugby and recently acquired a 14.3 per cent stake in the ‘Six Nations Championship’, to the tune of £365 million.  New Zealand’s 26 provincial rugby unions recently voted unanimously in favour of a proposal to sell 12.5 per cent of NZ Rugby’s commercial rights to Silver Lake Partners for NZ$387.5 million.  Consider also the apparent partnership between star footballer’s investment group, Gerard Pique’s Kosmos, and the International Tennis Federation.  Kosmos is further backed by Hiroshi Mikitani’s ecommerce institution, Rakuten, and all involved claim to desire an overhaul of the Davis Cup that will apparently transform it into the ‘World Cup of Tennis’. Grassroots projects, prizemoney for tennis players and extra funding for member nations are other areas the partnership claims to be concerned with. As is the case with all investment plays of this flavour, one can be certain that a return on the capital injection is also of interest.

So, what are we to conclude from the trends of investment in sport and more specifically for this blog series, in football? A typology elucidates that a multiplicity of investors have in recent years identified football as a means to achieve different ends. This blog considers three particular objectives pursued; direct financial return, branding in the case of company investment, or the branding and soft power strategies of nations.

From Associations and Member Owned Clubs, to Corporate Structures

It is important to point out that the ability to use football as an investment tool is only possible due to the ways in which football has transformed from associations to corporations over recent decades. For the purpose of this short blog, I will give the simplistic and short story, though I would urge those interested to go beyond this blog on the history of football ownership models and trends.

Essentially what I hope to emphasise, is the influx of private ownership and the advent of substantial television rights deals cannot be divorced. At this pivotal turn for football ownership, private ownership had been taking place in some forms, often a hybrid model with members, and often the case was a private owner coming in and saving or at least supporting a club financially.  Whereas at the start of the 1990s when broadcast deals made headlines, private owners saw a commercial opportunity as football moved into a generation where broadcasting rights were the main source of revenue for clubs.  By the early 2010s in Europe, “approximately three of four professional clubs were majority owned by private investors, and one in six clubs were owned by foreign investors”.[1] Football club owners hence quickly became more business orientated and more market-driven due to the opportunities that broadcasters presented and the benefits leagues and organisers were able to conjure up. “The growing prize money of the UEFA Champions League, the escalating TV revenues for premium competitions, and the internationalization of marketing measures have strengthened the incentives”.[2]

Private owners saw member owned clubs as unable to maximise commercial opportunities, and it is the same kind of sentiment that is aimed towards the less commercially mature sports by Private Equity groups and other institutional players today.  That being, yes, you may know your sport, but you do not know how to take it to the heights it could achieve in the commercial sense.

Investing for Direct Return: Private Equity

Private Equity firms are notorious for being able to identify undervalued businesses that they can further improve the value of by trimming unnecessary or wasteful expenses, as well as reconstruct operations and other inefficiencies. The priority of course is to make money and a return for investors. 

A variety of Private Equity groups have found football appealing in recent years as clubs look for non-traditional means of funding and in some extreme instances, rescuing from bankruptcy. Larger Private Equity groups have come to be known to accrue a portfolio of football clubs and other sports asset investments in order to diversify their sports investment wings, and to maximise returns for investors.  For the boutique firms, the strategies might be more considered and to the observer less audacious, identifying undervalued and underperforming smaller clubs with a history at the top tiers of football or the potential to get there. There may of course be other commercial motivations for specific acquisitions, such as the location of clubs, though in a nutshell, these Private Equity plays are a matter of identifying undervalued football clubs with scope to grow in value, in turn providing an opportunity to make investments and acquisitions at a low entry point and to deliver substantial results for investors. 

Whilst examples of Private Equity investment into football are a plenty, conder the following few for the purpose of this short blog. As an example of a multi-club ownership portfolio, New City Capital, fronted by Chinese American, Chien Lee, now boasts investment and ownership in Barnsley F.C. (England), FC Thun (Switzerland), K.V. Oostende (Belgium), AS Nancy (France), Esbjerg fB (Denmark), and is the former owner of OGC Nice (France); selling the club at the time for a record price in the French context. Lee and his multiple co-investors bring strategies and philosophies to these clubs akin to the “Moneyball” strategies made famous by Billy Beane. With a business background, the investors involved clearly fancy their abilities to maximise value of the clubs, but Lee is additionally conscious of his ability to grow the value of the clubs by the ways in which he has been able to tap into Asia and create new fans and revenue streams based on these connections. “We will try to ‘internationalize’ Barnsley, as we did with Nice. Before we invested in Nice, not many people in Asia had heard of them. Now in Asia -- in China -- people know the club.”

In terms of opportunistic timing strategies, as well as funding arrangements in order to complete an acquisition, one may consider another noteworthy example in the Private Equity space, that of ALK Capital’s takeover of Burnley. A leveraged buyout play, the sports investment arm of ALK, Velocity Sports Partners, acquired majority and controlling shareholding of 84% late 2020. For its part, Redbird Capital has made a variety of investments into football, in a variety of ways. They took a direct stake into Toulouse FC, but have also made an interesting investment into the Fenway Sports Group that owns Liverpool FC. This ultimately highlights an overarching view that football is a good bet for the firm, yet also showing that investment into the world game may come in many shapes and sizes.

It is the case that with the aforementioned examples, the investments have been a success insofar as the assets and portfolios of these firms have experienced growth in value, for example New City Capital sold OGC Nice for a handsome return. However, one must also point at investment failures such as King Street Capital with Girondins Bordeaux. Some of the identifiable distinctions between those firms able to achieve their objectives or at least stay the course, and the King Street Capital debacle, appears to be among other things, a fractured relationship with local government and the distance between the firms ambitions, control over that ambition and those running the club (COVID-19 to an extent as well).

Investing for Nation Branding: Qatar & UAE, Soft Power & Sports Diplomacy

Insofar as football remains the world game, nations are acutely conscious of the consequent power in nation branding via football investment. Nation branding according to Dinnie’s summary, consists of three key objectives; to attract tourists, to stimulate inward investments and to boost exports.[3] For a nation like Qatar, it is additionally about security and standing on the international scene.  To attain such objectives though of course requires certain image and branding achievements. In recent years, it is notable that a variety of states have been using their financial power to invest in football, not for the sake of profit, but in order to improve their image internationally.

State branding via soft power strategies like investment in football has come to be known widely as sports diplomacy. A variety of nations have identified sports diplomacy as way in which to be viewed favourably by other nations and to create positive imagery around an investment that in turn reflects positively on the nations image. Soft power and sports diplomacy has been endorsed by scholars as legitimate strategies, given it is a non-military instrument to compete with much larger and militarily capable states.[4] This is of course key to a nation like Qatar, that desires to move away from oil dependency and has to compete with much larger neighbouring nations. Branding is to make a distinction between one brand and another. For Qatar, it is perhaps it’s ultimate struggle to differentiate and distinguish itself from its neighbouring countries.

One of Qatar’s headline soft power through investment in football strategies is the acquisition of, and post-acquisition operation of European giants, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG). It is almost impossible however to disconnect Qatar’s sports diplomacy strategies with PSG, from its strategies with BeIN Sports the broadcaster, along with being awarded World Cup 2022.  

The Qatari’s acquired PSG in a less than ideal state but have since managed to turn the club into one of the richest and most successful on the planet. PSG’s image remains a priority, because in turn it is seen that Qatar’s image is the beneficiary. The importance of this for Qatar might be best measured by the size of the spend on players since taking over the club. Putting the likes of David Beckham and Zlatan Ibrahimovic aside for the moment, PSG paid both the number one and number two world record transfer fees for Brazilian superstar Neymar (a reported 220 million Euro) and French wonderkid, Kylian Mbappe (a reported 180 million Euro). One media report said “The colossal Neymar deal, funded by Qatar Sports Investments, shows how far governments will go to secure global influence.” That article was headlined - “A £198m transfer is not about football. It’s about soft power”. 

Now consider the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and how it yields power through the following subsidiaries and stakes therein: Manchester City F.C. (100%), Melbourne City FC (100%), Montevideo City Torque (100%), Lommel S.K. (99%), New York City FC (80%), Mumbai City FC (65%), Girona FC (44.3%), Sichuan Jiuniu F.C. (29.7%), Yokohama F. Marinos (20%), Troyes AC (100%), City Football Academy, City Football Marketing, City Football Services, City Football Japan, City Football Singapore, City Football China, City Football India, CFG Stadium Group, Goals Soccer Centers.

Manchester City FC is certainly the golden child of the group and much like PSG for Qatar, the successful imagery around Manchester City cannot be disconnected from the desired branding in a global sense for the UAE. The growing list of investments of CFG highlights that the UAE is intent on soft power strategies and using sports diplomacy to brand itself widely as a legitimate and well organised nation. Was it a coincidence that just as the City Football Group was arranging its stake in the Chengdu based football club, Sichuan Jiuniu, the UAE’s national airline Etihad announced it “would be enhancing its links with Chengdu’s airport”? That is to say nothing of the Chinese investment into CFG.

Questions remain about whether these soft power strategies have been successful in light of for instance, the widely reported atrocious treatment and deaths of migrant workers in Qatar, or the ongoing reports of slavery in the case of the UAE. In an ugly sense, the success of the soft power investments of these nations in football, is whether they are loud enough to drown out the noise of the atrocities associated with their nations. The paradox for Qatar, is that before using football as a diplomatic tool and winning the right to host the World Cup, the exploitation of migrant workers was not making headlines. Ironically, it is this active use of football as a diplomatic instrument that has shone a light on the issue and effected Qatar’s image substantially.

Black and Peacock point out, when it comes to soft power sports diplomacy one ought to be aware that the values publicly portrayed and associated with an investment in football (i.e. success, courage, commerciality, aspiration) will often not be the actual values of a state but rather merely the values with which a state would preferred to be associated with to fulfil wider objectives.[5]

Investing for Company Branding: Red Bull

The other type of investment aimed primarily at improving the image of the investor (and not recouping a profit directly from the club as an entity) is company branding. In a way, it is the ultimate move of a sponsor, instead of paying an annual yearly contribution to the club, the sponsor takes control of the management of the club in order to maximise the image return for its brand. The paramount example of such a strategy is embodied by Red Bull’s investment in football clubs around the world. The regulatory complexities will be left for blog 2, but it is Red Bull’s stake and influence in four clubs (Red Bull Salzburg, RB Leipzig, Red Bull New York, Red Bull Brasil) that renders it the ultimate example of a company that found investing in football as way to brand at scale. Despite the success that Red Bull football clubs have experienced, sporting and commercial, the purpose for Red Bull investing in football is of course to further promote the brand and sell energy drinks.

Red Bull had previously and in a revolutionary way, tapped into branding via sport and had worked out a way to brand at large using the content production arm of the company. Utilising extreme sports, Red Bull campaigns focussed on associating itself with elite sport, perhaps thus conflating the alleged performance enhancing capabilities of its beverages or at least that its product was trendy and fashionable to drink in the context of sport.

When it came to football, Red Bull followed an ownership strategy rather than a traditional sponsorship method, opening up both the benefits of the ownership over traditional sponsorship models, and, the size, scale and reach of football as opposed to the more niche extreme sports.

Branding through football is seen as almost more covert, as the consumer is less aware that when they watch a branded club in a branded stadium, they are being advertised to;

“the consumer does not perceive that the content is branded. Sport content is predestined for branded entertainment. Engaging sports fascinate and attract people and have proven to be capable of transferring positive images… many niche sports still lack the attention of sport consumers or sponsors and are not covered extensively by the media. Branded entertainment, therefore, can provide niche sport enterprises, athletes, and teams as well as sponsors with consumer attention and prosumer engagement.”[6]

Conclusion & a note on Member Owned Clubs

Per the title of this blog, the typology of investors listed above is not exhaustive, though perhaps the most relevant as I segue into the regulations around multi club ownership. However, a short note on the membership model clubs is worthwhile. Member owned clubs still exist widely and some are in fact popping up in protest over a perceived hyper commercialisation of football. SV Austria Salzburg is a newer member owned club, established in response and in protest to the Red Bull ownership of the former SV Austria Salzburg, that Red Bull subsequently changed the name and colours of. Member owned clubs can be funded by paid memberships and more traditional revenue streams like ticket sales and sponsorship.  Control wise however, the members maintain the controlling stake and more importantly perhaps, the controlling vote. The hybrid model between private ownership and member ownership remains interesting, given what can be maintained in terms of history and culture, and what can be brought in in terms of commercial expertise and the reality that the need and desire for profits can drive success of a football Club.

As is hopefully apparent from the above, the types of investors and indeed the motivations come in all shapes and sizes. It is also worth pointing out, when it comes to the Private Equity groups and the nations and companies concerned with branding, the main reasons for investment does not render it the exclusive reason. Qatar will take the commercial benefits of PSG, BeIN sports and the World Cup. Part owners of CFG, China Media Capital/CITIC Capital (12%) and Silver Lake (10%) would not have invested with such alacrity based on the soft power strategies and state branding aspirations of the UAE, and rather those groups are of course more interested in the commercial benefits. Separate from selling more energy drinks than ever, Red Bull is undoubtedly pleased with taking RB Leipzig from the 5^th tier to the Bundesliga, and now valued at EUR560 million, Red Bull has an extremely valuable asset. Likewise, the big funds and institutional players are aware of the positive branding that sport affords them when their football investments are successful.

In the next blog, I consider the current regulatory landscape regarding investment in football with a particular focus on regulations that address multi-club ownership.

[1] Marc Rohde and Christoph Breuer, “The market for football club investors: a review of theory and empirical evidence from professional European football Institute of Sport Economics and Sport Management”, (German Sport University Cologne, Köln, Germany) European Sport Management Quarterly, 2017 VOL. 17, NO. 3, 265–289.

[2] Ibid P267.

[3] Keith Dinnie, “Nation Branding, Concepts, Issues, Practices”, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.

[4] Romain Herbreteau, “The use of a football club as a means of state branding: The mixed results of Qatar’s promotion in France” Leiden University - Master Thesis, Master of Arts International Relations, Supervisor: Dr Camillo Erlichman (2018)

[5] David Black and Byron Peacock. "Sport and Diplomacy." Oxford Handbooks Online (2013) 1-21

[6] Reinhard Kunz & Franziska Elsässer & James Santomier, “Sport-related branded entertainment: the Red Bull phenomenon” (2016)  Sport, Business and Management: An international Journal, 6, 520-541.

On October 24^th and 25^th 2019, the T.M.C. Asser Institute and the International Sports Law Centre hosted the International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference for a third year in a row, bringing together a group of academics and practitioners from around the world. This year’s conference celebrated the 20^th year of the International Sports Law Journal, which was originally started by Robert Siekmann. Over the past 20 years, the ISLJ has aimed to be a truly international journal that addresses global topics in sports law while keeping the highest academic standards.

With this background, the conference facilitated discussions and exchanges over six differently themed panels on international sports law’s most pertinent issues and gave participants wide opportunities to engage with one another. Additionally, this year’s edition also had the great honor of hosting two distinguished keynote speakers, Moya Dodd and Ulrich Haas, who were able to share their wealth of experience and knowledge with the conference participants.

The following report aims to give an overview of the ISLJ Conference 2019 to extract and underline the fundamental ideas raised by the different speakers.

Day 1:

Opening Speech: Moya Dodd

The conference was kickstarted by Moya Dodd, a former FIFA Council member and current ICAS member, who gave an engaging presentation on her experiences as an athlete in boardrooms of FIFA. After retiring from the Australian National Team, she began to become involved in sport governance, starting as a member of the AFC Executive Committee. She eventually made her way to the FIFA Executive Committee where she made it a priority to represent groups who did not have a voice in FIFA’s governance. In this vain, she launched a task force for women, which helped spearhead reforms that brought gender issues into light. Ms. Dodd also explained how she worked hard to keep connections with persons outside of the sports governing structures in order to represent them from the inside. In the end, she explained how the experience playing sports helped develop skills that became invaluable in the boardroom. This includes, teamwork skills, constantly striving to improve oneself, valuing persons for their capabilities, and the ability to deal with setbacks. This discussion led particularly well into the first panel of the conference, which took a magnifying glass to the role of athletes in sports governance.

Panel 1: Where is the athletes’ voice? The (il)legitimacy of international sports governing bodies

Antoine Duval and Marjolaine Viret began the first panel of the conference by exploring the athletes’ voice in the fight against doping and particularly within WADA. They explained that in order for the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) and WADA to be considered legitimate, the actors most affected by its policies, athletes, would need to be participating meaningfully and have a real input in the decision-making process. This input requires an actual reflection in the regulatory output of WADA, and it entails not only consulting with athlete stakeholders but that representatives have voting powers on both the code revision process and the administrative bodies of WADA. Their study examines to what extent the current operation of WADA is in line with these ideals by examining the role of athletes in WADA’s bodies and its actual regulatory output.

Mark Conrad studied the issue from a wider lens by explaining how the current representation of athletes in sports governing bodies is inadequate and why there needs to be a fundamental rethinking of the current athlete committee model. This model, he explains, is ineffective in truly representing athletes’ interests, since their mandates are not clearly defined and greatly rely on the good favor of the federations’ management. As an alternative model, he presented a collective bargaining approach, which already is widespread in North America, in which athlete unions would represent athletes’ interests in a bargaining process with the sports governing bodies. Such a model would give the athletes ‘real’ representation by relying on their strength in numbers and by negotiating agreements that would entitle them to specific rights. These agreements could cover salary standards, salary controls, free agency, drug testing and many other aspects of the employment relationship. He concluded by discussing the general pros and cons of such a model but that overall, since athletes would actually have an effective representation, it would overcome any of the negative effects of such a model.

Panel 2: Criminal law and sports – criminal law of sports

The day’s conversation then shifted from sports governance structures to the application of criminal law in sports. Björn Hessert kicked off the panel with a presentation on the cooperation and reporting obligations in sport investigations. He began by illustrating the catch-22 situation in which athletes may find themselves during an investigation. On the one hand, they are required to ‘cooperate fully’ with the investigation authorities, including providing self-incriminating evidence, or face sanctions. If they choose not to cooperate, then they also receive sanctions. This state of affairs may have had a direct impact on the skyrocketing number of sanctions over the past few years involving reporting and cooperation violations. Hessert argued that this situation could be significantly improved by introducing fundamental procedural rights found in criminal law systems to these investigations, such as the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination. These rights are found in article 6 (1) and (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Such a regime would force sports governing bodies to be creative in finding new strategies to investigate and prosecute alleged sports rule violations.

After Hessert’s presentation on procedural rights in sports investigations, Jan Exner took the podium to discuss the proportionality of the sanctions in the anti-doping code. He began by giving an overview of the characteristics of the sanctions in the WADC, which include a fixed sanction framework and limited flexibility for panels hearing alleged doping rule violations. He explained that due to the rigid sanction framework of the WADC, panels hearing a doping dispute are unable to go below limits set therein and that in certain exceptional cases, these sanctions may be disproportionate. Exner then illustrated some of the negative effects of the current system in which CAS panels hearing similar factual circumstances end up with delivering different sanctions. Such a predicament, Exner argues, goes against any equality of outcome of the proceedings. In the end, he contended that there should be a revised sanction framework that would allow hearing panels to go below the limits set in the WADC as long as certain criteria are met in order to ensure that the sanction is proportionate to the rule violation.

Ruby Panchal closed the panel by shining a light on match-fixing. She argued that sports governing bodies have been so concerned with doping that match fixing has not been sufficiently addressed. Much like how anti-doping rules have been significantly developed over time, anti-match-fixing laws also need to be made far more robust. Panchal explained that certain factors essential for the development of lex sportiva will be essential in the growth of this field. These factors include the validity of unilateral action clauses, a growing relationship between sports governing bodies and state courts, the creation of evidentiary processes in disciplinary proceedings, and co-operation between sports governing bodies and investigative authorities. Panchal closed her talk by examining the approach of the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (Macolin Convention) in addressing this regulatory void. While the Convention takes a ‘hopeful approach’, the question remains open as to how effective it will be in combatting match-fixing.

Panel 3: Transfer systems in international sports

The last panel of day one of the conference took a deep dive into transfer systems in international sports. Jan Łukomski opened the panel by studying the finalization of international football transfers and professional football players’ contracts. There are many kinds of agreements that could be potentially involved in the transfer of a football player, including offers, pre-contracts, definite contracts, that have significantly different legal effects. For example, the CAS explained in CAS 2008/A/1589 MKE Ankaragücü Spor Külübü v. J. that the difference between a pre-contract and a contract ‘is that the parties to the ‘precontract’ have not agreed on the essential elements of the contract or at least the “precontract” does not reflect the final agreement’. This is just one example of a growing CAS case law on issues of contractual validity of football contracts. In the end, Łukomski explains that often times disputes on contractual validity stems from ‘mistakes’ that were made by clubs and players during the negotiation process.

Following the examination of the transfer system in football, Xavier Mansat gave the participants a small peek into the archaic transfer model currently in place in volleyball. He took the audience on a journey of the transfer of one volleyball player by emphasizing all the different steps and actors participating in the process. Mansat also elucidated the various administrative and transfer fees that are taken out at every step by the involved actors. He closed the panel by explaining that the current system is in the process of being challenged by a new stakeholder group, Association des Clubs Professionels de Volleyball (ACPV) and that it is likely that some of the components in the current transfer framework are incompliant with EU law.

Day one ended with an opportunity for the conference participants to unwind over a dinner in the charming harbor of Scheveningen.

Day 2:

Keynote lecture: Ulrich Haas

Day two of the ISLJ Conference was launched by a lecture from Ulrich Haas, who gave an in-depth lecture on the nature and function of association tribunals in international sport. Haas underlined that while association tribunals are the most important dispute resolution mechanism in practice, legal literature on them is scarce. The sheer volume of the decisions made by association tribunals is staggering. In the case of FIFA, the decisions are around 10000-11000 per year. After having demonstrated the incredible importance of association tribunals to the functioning of sports governance, he outlined their legal basis, which is based in the freedom of association (in Switzerland and Germany). Austria, on the other hand, makes association tribunals mandatory. Haas then began to unpack the differences between authoritarian decision-making, used by association tribunals, compared to other forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. Interestingly, he concluded that while all these differences can serve as indications of whether a body is an association tribunal or an arbitration panel, there is no set international standard to make this determination. Hence, there is a need to refer to national law in order to fill this void. In conclusion, Haas endorsed a procedural law approach over a substantive law approach to determine the appeals status of an association body’s decision.

Panel 4: Rethinking sports arbitration

The first panel of day two of the ISLJ Conference took to rethinking the current framework of sports arbitration. Veronica Lavista was first to go and presented her findings on the influence of international dispute settlement on sports. She took an empirical approach to her study by going through CAS’ case law and placing the arbitrators in those cases into different categories based on their background, such as a sports law, corporate law, or international law specialist. Based on this determination, Lavista was then able to identify that the makeup of the panel had an appreciable influence on the extent certain legal issues were discussed in the award. Lavista also underlined some of the overlaps between international dispute resolution and the CAS, including the voluntary nature of their jurisdiction, the use of ad hoc panels, and the explosion of case law over the past few decades.

Next up, Daniela Mirante and Artur Flaminio da Silva offered a case study in the Portuguese context of sports arbitration to argue that perhaps switching to a mandatory arbitration scheme would alleviate many of the issues currently present in the ‘voluntary’ arbitration model. Portugal created a permanent sport arbitration center in the Portuguese Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAD), which has a mandatory jurisdiction for ‘all sports disputes related to administrative law’. After underlining many of the issues plaguing the TAD, such as institutional independence and arbitrators’ impartiality, the confidentiality of the awards, and the high costs of arbitration, they explained the advantages of mandatory sports arbitration. First, it would get rid of the concept of consent, which they argue is a fiction since athletes must consent to arbitration or else not be able to participate in the sport. It would also reduce the time needed to render a decision since there would be less room for parties to challenge the jurisdiction of arbitration panels. They concluded that mandatory arbitration definitely could be a future path for sports arbitration but that it would have to follow a different path than the current Portuguese model.

To close the panel, Massimiliano Trovato brought forth his three ‘radical’ proposals to ensure the legitimacy of the CAS. Before unveiling the three proposals, Trovato gave a brief historical overview of the CAS and its relationship with the Olympic Movement to contextualize his arguments. He highlighted the interactions between the two and how certain individuals have held top positions in the CAS bodies and other sports governing bodies, like the IOC, leading to potential conflicts of interest. At this point, Trovato revealed his first proposal that article S4 and S6 of the CAS Statutes be amended to make the ICAS into a body ran by the arbitrators themselves, since they have both the ability and expertise to run the CAS for the interests of all the parties involved. Second, Trovato argued that the closed-list system of arbitrators be abolished under article S14 and move towards an open system. The quality of the arbitrators, Trovato explained, could still be assured by introducing certain minimum eligibility requirements for the arbitrators. The third proposal Trovato presented was that Article R65 be altered to make sports governing bodies responsible for the costs of arbitration, not the parties.  Shifting the burden would make sports governing bodies more disciplined and would help compensate for the fact that athletes are essentially forced into arbitration.

Book L(a)unch: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry Into Lex Sportiva by Johan Lindholm

During lunchtime, the conference participants were treated to a very special book launch from the ISLJ’s chief editor, Johan Lindholm. His book, The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its Jurisprudence: An Empirical Inquiry Into Lex Sportiva, is an exhaustive and thorough empirical study into the CAS’ jurisprudence, its arbitrators, and its parties. Covering a period of 30 years (1984-2014), the book tries to unpack some of the most often raised arguments against the CAS and puts these claims to the ultimate test. For example, whether particular arbitrators are more likely to be chosen by certain parties. Furthermore, the book, through impressive data visualization graphics, illustrates a variety of intriguing data samples, including what kind of cases the CAS has deliberated and to what extent the CAS can call itself a global international sports tribunal.

Panel 5: Revisiting the (in)dependence and transparency of the CAS

Following the book l(a)unch, the next panel treated conference participants to a fascinating debate on the (in)dependence and transparency of the CAS. Velislava Hristova launched the panel by exploring the intersection between human rights and sports arbitration and in particular, the right to a public hearing in sport cases. She used the ECtHR case of Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland to illustrate the topic. Before jumping into the legal issues, Hristova gave an overview of the nearly 10-year legal history of the Pechstein Saga. She explained that the case boiled down to four main issues: whether Article 6 (1) ECHR (right to a fair and public hearing) could be applicable to sports arbitration, whether Pechstein waived this right, whether the CAS is sufficiently independent and impartial, and whether the lack of a public hearing in this case actually violated Article 6 (1). Next, Hristova analyzed the findings of the ECtHR on these four issues and explained how the ECtHR concluded that while the right to a public hearing is not absolute, the lack of a public hearing in Pechstein’s case was a violation because of the compulsory nature of sports arbitration, the fact that a public hearing was requested, the ‘nature and complexity’ of the case, and since the factual background had been contested. In the end, athletes, arbitrators and the CAS will have to take this landmark ruling into account moving forward.

Antonio Rigozzi further delved into the issue of the (in)dependence of the CAS by not only looking at the Pechstein case but also the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s (SFT) decision in the Seraing case and how these rulings could potentially impact the CAS. Concerning the Seraing case, he explained how the SFT had to determine whether the CAS is structurally independent, which differs from the Lazutina case because the SFT had to determine whether it was independent from FIFA, not the IOC. In the end, the SFT did not find it necessary to depart from its analysis in the Lazutina case and deemed the CAS to be independent so long there were no overriding reasons indicating that FIFA is given special treatment. Furthermore, the SFT noted that the CAS had made significant efforts to strengthen its independence by improving its structure and functioning. Rigozzi finished by drawing some conclusions from the Pechstein and Seraing cases. First, the Pechstein case has made public hearings at the CAS an inevitability now that Article 6 (1) ECHR is fully applicable to its proceedings, and the CAS will have to improve the optics concerning its rules on the appointment of the president of the panel. Secondly, the SFT in the Seraing made clear that while CAS could be further ‘perfected’, it was not the proper institution to take on such a project. Instead, it placed the responsibility in the hands of the Swiss legislator, and it is yet to be seen whether they will actually take the initiative to introduce change.

The panel was brought to a close by Tom Seamer, who plunged into the issue of the independence and impartiality of CAS arbitrators. He argued that there could be two main areas of improvement in this regard, the ICAS and the appointment of arbitrators. Concerning the ICAS, only minor changes would be necessary to drastically improve the status quo, such as ensuring that its president be neutral and has no connections with any sports governing body, athlete or clubs. Secondly, Seamer supported the contention that certain arbitrators are repeatedly nominated by the same parties and often make decisions in favor of that particular party. He explained that in order to test this theory, one must only look at the period in which the particular arbitrator was on the approved CAS list and then determine the proportion of cases they were called upon by a particular party during that same period. Seamer closed by asserting more needed to be done in order to tackle these issues, while acknowledging some of the challenges ahead.

Panel 6: The future of sports: sports law of the future

The last panel of the conference took the opportunity to look forward into the future of sports law and discussed the growing fields of e-sports and extreme sports. On e-sports, Cedric Aghey tackled the issue of e-sports governance and how it could be potentially integrated into the current sports governing structures, since currently there is an unharmonized e-sport structure. At the moment, e-sports relies on a variety of stakeholders operating at different levels, such as games publishers, e-sports governing bodies, and investors. In order to address this situation, Aghey argued that the e-sports definition should be narrowed only to video games that seek to emulate ‘traditional’ sports. This would allow for a rather seamless integration of these e-sports into the already existing sports federations. For example, FIFA would absorb its FIFA e-sport counterpart.

Nick Poggenklaas also presented on e-sports but instead took a wider definition of e-sports by not only limiting e-sports to games based on ‘traditional’ sports. He contended that the current regulatory framework present in e-sports is inadequate to sufficiently protect minors from the negative aspects of sport. This issue is particularly pertinent, since minors make an exceptionally large share of the e-sport athletes, which is especially worrying since there have been cases of doping and sexual and financial abuse. Such cases question whether enough is being done to really combat these problems. Thus, Poggenklaas put forth several proposals that could substantially improve the situation of minor’s rights in e-sports. He submitted that by creating an overarching e-sport governing body that would manage an abuse hotline, minors would be subject to a more rigid regulatory regime that would at least provide them with the opportunity and means to raise their concerns. Furthermore, Poggenklaas believes that the creation of players unions and further parent involvement would also help to ensure that minors’ interests are sufficiently protected.

Lastly, Angela Busacca examined extreme sports and the kind of civil liability applicable to these activities. She first described the elements and different classifications of extreme sports under Italian law. For instance, extreme sports have a component of risk and require a certain interaction with nature. They can also be placed on a scale ranging from sports that have a set of pre-defined rules to those where there are no pre-defined rules and consequently giving a free range for the athlete’s actions. In addition, extreme sports are categorized by those that have a clear governance organizational structure to those who do not have a defined structure. All these aforementioned components can have an impact on the establishment of civil liability and whom is responsible in case of an accident.

Conclusion

After two intense days of discussion and debate of international sports law’s most pressing topics through six differently themed panels, two keynote lectures, eighteen invited speakers, and many other highlights, the ISLJ Conference 2019 came to a close. The Asser International Sports Law Centre was honored to have been able to host another successful edition. On behalf of the organizers, we would like to thank all the speakers and participants who made this conference such a success and look forward to seeing you all back at the Institute soon!