Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Image Rights in Professional Basketball (Part II): Lessons from the American College Athletes cases. By Thalia Diathesopoulou

In the wake of the French Labour Union of Basketball (Syndicat National du Basket, SNB) image rights dispute with Euroleague and EA Games, we threw the “jump ball” to start a series on players’ image rights in international professional basketball. In our first blogpost, we discussed why image rights contracts in professional basketball became a fertile ground for disputes when it comes to the enforcement of these contracts by the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT). Indeed, we pointed out that clubs might take advantage of the BAT’s inconsistent jurisprudence to escape obligations deriving from image rights contracts.

In this second limb, we will open a second field of legal battles “around the rim”: the unauthorized use of players’ image rights by third parties. We will use as a point of reference the US College Athletes image rights cases before US Courts and we will thereby examine the legal nature of image rights and the precise circumstances in which such rights may be infringed. Then, coming back to where we started, we will discuss the French case through the lens of US case law on players’ image rights. 


Source: http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/09/27/ea-sports-settles-college-likeness-case/ 


The American College Athletes image rights cases in a nutshell

The legal qualification of image rights varies in different jurisdictions. In the USA, image rights refer to the right of publicity: an intellectual property right, which gives the player an exclusive right on his image. The commercial exploitation of this image without permission constitutes an offence and practice of unfair competition.[1] Although the right of publicity is a creation of the common law not recognized under Federal law, many state courts and legislatures have embraced it.

The US legal system as a “true forerunner of marketing applied to sport”[2] considers, contrary to other legal systems, that image rights extends to the exploitation of players’ image rights linked to college championships. Indeed, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Basketball has acquired a monopoly power in the college sports entertainment market, with broadcast and cable television serving as powerful handmaidens.[3] This financially massive industry exploits the free labour of student-athletes’ due to their so-called amateur status.[4]  In fact, as a precondition to participate in NCAA Championships, student-athletes have to sign the ‘Form 08-3a’ authorizing NCAA to use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”.[5]

The NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights generates millions of dollars of profits through licensing agreements for their use in e.g. television broadcasts, advertising, DVDs or video games. The fact that student-athletes are not compensated for the use of their rights has given rise to a wave of lawsuits filed by former student athletes against the NCAA and video game makers. O’Bannon’s, Sam Keller’s and other former student athletes’ image is still making money for the NCAA through licensed merchandizing.

As a result of the NCAA’s exploitation of players’ image rights, an unprecedented legal battle started in 2009 before the Federal Courts of the US. In May 2009, Sam Keller, a former football player of the Arizona University sued NCAA and EA Games for unlawfully using his image and likeness in a video game. The case continued before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California which dismissed the appeal of EA Games on the grounds that EA was not protected by the First Amendment, which offers a shield to video games via freedom of speech. In fact, the Court concluded that the EA’s use of the player recreates him in the very setting in which he has achieved fame.[6] Similarly, in Ryan Hart’s case, a former Rutgers football player, the Federal Court of Appeals, overturning the district court’s ruling, concluded that players in video games are renditions of actual players who should be compensated.

Undoubtedly, the O’Bannon case is to be considered a milestone. It is the widest-ranging anti-trust lawsuit before US Courts with regards to college athletes’ image rights. On 21 July 2009, Ed O’Bannon, one of the most recognized collegiate basketball players of the last 30 years, along with another 19 former college athletes, filed a class action against EA Games, NCAA, and the Collegiate Licencing Company, the nation’s leading collegiate trademark licensing and marketing firm, seeking compensation from the unauthorized use of their image rights. Their claim implicated two core areas of law: (1) federal antitrust law and (2) intellectual property rights law. By requiring athletes to relinquish in perpetuity their image rights through the ‘Form 08-3a’ and fixing at zero the amount of compensation athletes could receive from the share of revenues, they contended that the NCAA has restrained trade and, thus, acted in violation of the Sherman Act, i.e. federal antitrust law. The athletes that signed this form had been deprived of their right to negotiate on their own with licensing firms after leaving college. Furthermore, they argued that they had been deprived of their right of publicity and their subsequent right to the commercial exploitation of their image, name, likeness or voice.

Following a contentious five years trial proceeding and thousands of pages of filings, on 8 August 2014, the US District Judge Claudia Wilken in a 99-page decision shook the basketball world by ruling in favour of O’Bannon and the other plaintiffs.[7] The injunction issued allows college athletes to get a share of the licensing revenues via the creation of a trust fund available to them once they leave college.


The O’Bannon landmark ruling: What the French (and Europe) can learn?

The O’Bannon ruling, while under appeal, has been ground-breaking in that it questions the ‘sacrosanct’ NCAA notion of amateurism. Judge Wilken was clear: maintaining amateurism is not legitimate sufficient justification for implementing anticompetitive labour rules, which bar players from being compensated for the use of their image rights. The collapse of NCAA’s amateurism defence and the resulting establishment of an equitable bargaining relationship between student-athletes and NCAA could blow up the entire college basketball system. Nonetheless, this not the only important lesson we can derive from the O’Bannon ruling and the American cases.

The link between amateurism and image rights, which deprives student-athletes from any compensation, is a unique phenomenon of US college sports system and lies at the heart of the American cases. In Europe, as we extensively explained in our fist blogpost, some professional basketball players assign to their clubs the commercial use of their image rights and they receive an adequate compensation through an image rights contract concluded with a third party, an image rights contract. However, this sum cannot be deemed as an actual compensation for the use of their image, but rather it constitutes a part of their remuneration under the employment contract. Therefore, at the European level, the question that could be raised is whether basketball players can request further compensation, i.e. a compensation proportionate to the revenues generated by the exploitation of their image rights. In this light, the O’Bannon ruling has the potential to create an important precedent for image rights disputes in European professional basketball as well:

(1) The license agreement of image rights between players and basketball associations

The issue at heart of the O’Bannon case regarding the ownership of the student-athletes image and likeness is the NCAA ‘Form 08-3a’. By means of this form, student-athletes authorize the NCAA to use their image rights for the promotion of its activities.[8] O’Bannon strongly argued that this form is illegal for the following reasons: First and foremost, the language of Part IV, which provides that the NCAA can use their “name and picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”, is vague and ambiguous. It does not define when, where, for how long, and how the NCAA may ‘generally’ promote events or activities. Secondly, as a result of student-athletes’ amateur status, this form is signed without representation. This can be considered as exploitative, since student-athletes’ are usually unaware of the legal consequences of signing such forms. Finally, this form is illegal, because it is coerced from student-athletes in exchange for their eligibility to play in the championship. Doug Szymul, former star football player at Northwestern University puts it clearly: “I had to sign it to be able to play, so it’s not like I’m going to argue about it”.[9]

Let’s transpose these arguments to the European professional basketball world and more particularly to the potential French case at hand. In fact, in the contracts between professional basketball players and National or European Basketball Associations, there is an image rights provision according to which players or their union agree, without further compensation, to the use of players’ image rights by the Club, the National or European League.[10] In this regard, the reference to the use of players’ image rights “in any manner” is quite ambiguous.[11]

In the French case, players transfer their image rights to the French Labour Union of Basketball (SNB). But, when players sign their contract with their club, they license the use of their image rights to their Club, French Basketball League and Euroleague, without further compensation. Can this agreement be interpreted as giving carte blanche to the Clubs, National Leagues or Euroleague to use basketball players’ image rights for an indefinite time period and indefinite manner, without further compensation? Well, if we follow the reasoning used in the O’Bannon ruling, this question should be answered in the negative: players and subsequently their labour union should have a share of licensing revenues. 

(2) The ‘without further compensation’ provision

A key issue raised during the O’Bannon trial was whether image rights (as well as name and likeness rights) even exist for the purposes of licencing agreements. The NCAA argued and provided supporting evidence[12] that although image rights are included in the contractual language, in practice, during the negotiation of broadcasting or licencing deals, they are not valued separately. The contractual provisions on image rights refer only to their use in event promotions and they play no further role during the licencing dealing.

Plaintiff’s witness, Edwin Desser, who was formerly the NBA head of broadcasting, disputed this argument by stating the ‘obvious’ from a commercial point of view: “ it’s simply impossible to conceive of sports telecast without being able to show the images of the participants”.[13] In other words, players’ image rights are a quid pro quo requirement of every broadcasting or licencing agreement.

This argument, which stems from commercial law practice, could serve as the perfect pick-n-roll in other image rights cases, including the French case. True, when, for example, EA Games negotiates with Euroleague for the conclusion of a licencing agreement, image rights are not separately calculated. However, in practice, the package of entitlements conveyed to video makers by the Clubs and Euroleague in exchange for exclusive licensing rights is essential for the deal. Realistically speaking, would it be possible for EA Games to create the NBA 2K 15 with Strasbourg and Nanterre playing, without including their players’ image rights? Clubs and Euroleague license players’ image rights and it goes without saying that they get significant revenues from the licencing agreement, while some players receive only a compensation which has been fixed in advance as part of their overall remuneration. It is this ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights provided by the contracts signed by players, therefore, that infringes their right to the commercial exploitation of their own image rights. 


Conclusive Remarks

In our previous blogpost, we cited the SNB’s president words: the SNB motion against EA Games is not about the money, but rather to defend basketball players’ rights.[14] Undoubtedly, image rights are also about the money, even if in the European context the monetary compensation is limited. We have shown that the unauthorized use of players’ image rights or the loss of their exclusive use may deprive them from a fair share of the club’s lucrative endorsement contracts. Furthermore, the existence of products bearing a player’s image without his authorization can in some cases seriously damage the value of his licensing rights.[15] Moreover, irrespectively of the legal qualification of image rights as ‘right of publicity’ or ‘right to personality’, this is a right gained through hard work on the basketball courts and the player should in any events get a share of the licensing revenues it generates.

The ‘David against Goliath’ American college sports crusade shows the way for European professional basketball players: a ‘without further compensation’ use of image rights or the denial of liability of the Clubs for non-payment of image rights contracts can be (and should be) successfully fought against.


[1] L Colantuoni and C Novazio, ‘Intellectual Property Righs in Basketball’ (2011) 1-2 International Sports Law Journal, 59.

[2] Ibid, 58.

[3] http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Theses/RobertLemonsHonorsThesis-May2014.pdf

[4] For an interesting insight on NCAA practice, see: B Starkey, ‘College Sports Aren't Like Slavery. They're Like Jim Crow’ where the author compares college athletes’ status to the status of “blacks after slavery”.

[5] Form 08-3a, Part Iv

[6] United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, NCAA Student-Athlete name & likeness litigation (No 10-15387)

[7] Edward O’Bannon et al v National Collegiate Athletics Association, Electronic Arts Inc and Collegiate Licensing Company (US District Court, 08.08.2014)

[8] M Zylstra, Ed. O’Bannon vs. NCAA: An examination of O’Bannon’s legal claim that the NCAA illegally uses the likeness and image of former student-athletes (2009) 205 Business Law, 5.

[9] Ibid, 6.

[10] See for example, Article 69  of the Euroleague Bylaws 2012-2013: “The Company and EP have the right to use the image of the club’s players, the players’ likeness (photograph, caricature, etc), name, number, or any combination thereof for any and all commercial and promotional purposes solely in connection with the Euroleague and provided that the image of the player appears linked to the club, the player wearing its apparel and footwear, or when the player participates in public events organised by the club or by the Company”.

[11] See, Standard Player Contract of SIG BASKET SAEMSL , Clause 9.1 :The Player agrees, without further compensation, to allow the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball and their respective sponsors to take pictures of the Player, during game action or posed, as necessary, alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion pictures, internet, TV or any other form of media whether presently known or unknown, at such times as the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball may designate. Such pictures may be used, without further compensation, in any manner desired by either the Club or the National League or Euroleague Basketball or their respective sponsors only for publicity or promotional purposes. The rights in any such pictures taken by the Club or by the National League or by Euroleague Basketball shall belong to the Club or to the National League or to Euroleague Basketball as their interests may appear.”

[12] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of the NCAA’s lead expert Neal Pilson (vol 4) 715-815

[13] Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, Testimony of Edwin Desser (vol 4), 618-708.

[14] Johan Passave-Ducteil, the president of SNB remarks in l’Equipe:"Ce n’est pas une histoire d’argent, on défend le droit des joueurs".

[15] L Colantuoni and C Novazio (n1), 60

Comments are closed
Asser International Sports Law Blog | Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the prism of the FIFA Statutes. By Tine Misic

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the prism of the FIFA Statutes. By Tine Misic

…and everything under the sun is in tune,

but the sun is eclipsed by the moon…[1] 


The issue

Ruffling a few feathers, on 30 May 2015 the FIFA Executive Committee rather unsurprisingly, considering the previous warnings,[2] adopted a decision to suspend with immediate effect the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI) until such time as PSSI is able to comply with its obligations under Articles 13 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[3] Stripping PSSI of its membership rights, the decision results in a prohibition of all Indonesian teams (national or club) from having any international sporting contact. In other words, the decision precludes all Indonesian teams from participating in any competition organised by either FIFA or the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). In addition, the suspension of rights also precludes all PSSI members and officials from benefits of any FIFA or AFC development programme, course or training during the term of suspension. This decision coincides with a very recent award by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in this ambit, which shall be discussed further below.[4]

The former decision, substantiated upon the alleged governmental infringement of the independence of PSSI, is the latest in a line of similar decisions adopted by FIFA in recent years. It succeeds inter alia the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation and subsequent non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[5] and the suspensions of the Cameroonian Football Association[6], the Football Federation of Belize,[7] the Kenya Football Federation,[8] and the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation.[9]

The common denominator of all these decisions is the alleged impediment of third parties, usually governments or their related bodies, in the affairs of national football associations. In the Indonesian case, the trigger was the imposition of additional licensing criteria for football clubs by BOPI, an agency of the Indonesian Ministry of Youth and Sports, which resulted in two clubs (Arema and Persebaya) being precluded from competing in the Indonesian Super League (ISL) and subsequent measures adopted by the ministry aimed at relieving PSSI of all of its responsibilities.[10] While in the Nigerian case, an initial High Court injunction prevented the elected Executive Committee from taking office, and a later intervention from the Nigerian Department of State Security Service (SSS), resulted in the suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation[11] and subsequently in the non-recognition of its General Assembly decisions,[12] the other cited cases include violations in the form of, among others, “blatant government interference”,[13] non-provision of security services from government forces,[14] and violation of the independence of the decision-making process of the national football governing body.[15] 


Grounds for intervention by FIFA

The normative basis for the aforementioned interventions lies primarily within Articles 13, 14 and 17 of the FIFA Statutes.[16] The Members’ obligation of an independent management of their affairs is embedded in Article 13(1)(i), which states that: ”Members have the following obligations... to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties...” Strengthening that notion, Article 17(1) provides that: “Each Member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third parties.” Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 17 explicitly points out that all the bodies need to be elected or appointed within each respective Member, which prima facie appears even more stringent than Article 7 bis of the UEFA Statutes, that constitutes:”...their executive body is freely elected and that their other bodies are elected or appointed in a completely independent way.”[17]

Enjoying full discretion that stems from its Statutes, FIFA acts upon information received about the alleged violations, usually from the Members themselves. Prior to the adoption of a decision, a “prevention” phase takes place, during which FIFA, through means of correspondence with respective Members or/and third parties involved, addresses the alleged infringements and usually allows for a deference period for compliance with specific conditions. Members and/or third parties are warned that non-compliance may result in possible sanctions. Article 13(2) of the Statutes expressly provides that: “Violation of the above-mentioned obligations by any Member may lead to sanctions provided for in these Statutes.”

One of the most daunting repercussions FIFA may avail itself of is the suspension of a Member. In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Statutes, the primary responsibility for suspending a Member lies with the Congress. However, and as seen in the cases cited above, when violations are deemed to be so serious to require prompt attention, the Executive Committee or even the Emergency Committee may step in and adopt the relevant decision.[18] If not lifted beforehand, such a decision must be confirmed by a three-quarter majority at the next Congress, otherwise it is automatically lifted. A suspension leads to a loss of all membership rights, which effectively prevents other Members from entertaining any sporting contact with the suspended Member. Moreover, the suspension does not preclude the Disciplinary Committee from imposing further sanctions (e.g. fines, return of awards, deduction of points, etc.).[19]

Another measure for addressing an eventual non-compliance with the obligation of independent management of affairs is the non-recognition of wrongfully elected bodies or decisions passed by such bodies in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Statutes. In other words, FIFA has the authority not to recognize an election of a body of one of its Members, if such an election lacks uncompromised independence vis-à-vis third parties, as was the case with the Nigerian Football Federation.

Lastly, it is also worth mentioning that sanctions may be imposed regardless of the grounds and fault for interference of third parties since Article 13(3) of the Statutes, by going beyond the actual interference, provides that: “Violations of par. 1(i) may also lead to sanctions even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the Member concerned.” This basically means that FIFA shall not entertain explanations of third party interventions that may possibly even be justified under the provisions of national law. 


To comply, or not to comply – the CAS escape route

Since a suspension decision virtually ostracises and isolates a Member, a valid point to raise is, whether apart from yielding and fulfilling the imposed conditions, other means remain available to the disgraced Member to challenge such a decision. The same could be said for the situation pertaining to the non-recognition of elected bodies of particular Members.

In accordance with Article 66 of the Statutes any dispute arising between FIFA and its Members shall be resolved by CAS applying the relevant FIFA regulations and subsidiarily Swiss law. The exclusive jurisdiction of CAS is further strengthened in Article 67 of the Statutes which also outlines the procedural requirements for an appeal against a final decision passed by one of the FIFA bodies. Moreover, the Members explicitly agree not to avail themselves of recourse to ordinary courts of law, which significantly narrows their options down.[20]

Given that jurisprudence in named cases is relatively scarce, it is worth having a closer look at the above mentioned award rendered by CAS in the joined cases brought before it by the Nigerian Football Federation.[21] Notwithstanding the previous FIFA decision to suspend the appellant, which was later lifted, the form of relief sought with the appeal was the annulment of two decisions in the form of letters, addressed at the appellant by FIFA. Considering the Court’s conclusion, stemming from the relevant CAS jurisprudence,[22] to dismiss the appeal against the second letter because it did not constitute an appealable decision since it did not contain a ruling affecting the rights of the appellant, hence lacking the animus decidendi,[23] the onus of the award was on the first challenged letter.

In its preliminary remarks the Panel narrowed down the subjective and the objective scope of the review saying that it:”...may only assess de novo, putting itself in FIFA’s place, whether FIFA had sufficient factual and legal grounds, in terms of Article 17 of its Statutes, to adopt the decisions allegedly set forth in the letters challenged by the Appellant.[24] By abstaining from assessing the eventual legality of the third party infringement, and despite harbouring some doubts about the (non)compliance of the elections with the national law, it further stated that:”...this Panel may not assess the validity of the various NFF elections on the basis of the NFF rules or of Nigerian law, because such appraisal falls outside the scope of FIFA’s authority under Article 17 of its Statutes and, thus, falls outside of the Panel’s scope of review.[25]

By observing that none of the parties challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, applying the FIFA regulations and additionally Swiss law pursuant to Article R58 of the CAS Code, and by dismissing the Respondent’s arguments pertaining to the admissibility and the Appellant’s active standing, the Panel addressed the legitimacy of FIFA’s non-recognition of the elections pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes in the merits of the award.[26]

As per the legal grounds of the decision, the Panel stressed that: “The purpose of Article 17 is to grant FIFA the power to not recognize an election where the member association’s electoral process does not guarantee the complete independence of the election.[27] It went further saying: “...the Panel is of the view that the requirement of “complete independence” found in para. 2 must be understood in the light of para. 1 of Article 17, forbidding “influence from third parties”. Accordingly, an electoral process does not guarantee such complete independence where the election is not managed in a totally independent manner and, in particular, where it is influenced by third parties of any kind (e.g. government officials or bodies).[28]

Having established FIFA’s authority, the Panel subsequently assessed the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. After determining the relevant factual circumstances, the Panel noted that the intervention from the State Security Services (SSS) influenced the unfolding of the election and consequently of the General Assembly itself, constituting a manifest insufficiency of the independence of the election from the influence of third parties pursuant to Article 17 of the Statutes.[29] The appeal was thus duly dismissed on merits as well.

By dismissing the appeal, and in spite of recognizing the connection of the dispute with “a longstanding struggle occurring in Nigerian football between different personalities and factions fighting for leadership within the NFF”,[30] the Court, by setting a precedent to a certain extent, distanced itself from assessing the compliance of the interference with national law, hence virtually affirming FIFA’s discretion in the evaluation of the circumstances leading to its intervention, which appears to leave an eventual appeal by the Indonesian Football Federation with very slim chances of success. 


Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?[31]

When it comes to independence and third party influence issue, the Members are subject to instant scrutiny from FIFA and are swiftly held accountable, even when they hold no responsibility for a third party intervention, as may be seen in the above cited cases. The same cannot be said when the situation is reversed. FIFA is often not submitted to the same levels of accountability checks as those who are affected by its decisions.[32]

While in some instances FIFA’s prompt intervention appears well-grounded, since interference from a third party is manifestly ill-founded, as may be seen in the case of the Nigerian Football Federation (interventions from State Security Forces and unidentified armed individuals seem to go way beyond the borders of necessity, and can hence hardly be justified), other cases, namely the latest suspension of the PSSI, show that FIFA may have been slightly too quick when pulling the trigger. All the more so, given the circumstantial background of the case (e.g. pressing issues related inter alia to financial, tax and ownership issues of the clubs participating in national leagues which the PSSI, despite previous warnings, was unable or unwilling to cope with, and which in some extreme cases resulted in players losing their lives due to lack of medical care owed to arrears of health care contributions by the clubs), and the government’s intervention could arguably to a certain extent be seen as necessary.[33]

However, as seen above, under the existing rules FIFA is not inclined to look beyond the mere interference of third parties and verify whether such actions might be justified, thus possibly breaching the principle of proportionality which is recognized as a general principle by CAS.[34] Since such discretion seems to have been condoned by the latest CAS decision,[35] one may wonder whether there is actually any room for a more thorough and systematic factual assessment of the background of such interferences in the light of a possible justification, which inevitably raises questions of the eventual (over)restrictive nature of the relevant Statutes provisions themselves. Furthermore, the fact that any government intervention, regardless of the eventual acceptability and consideration of local specificities of each respective Member, is to be seen as a punishable infringement, puts the issue within the frame of the perpetual conundrum of the legitimate boundaries of the lex sportiva.

Since FIFA is virtually accountable to no-one from the hierarchical point of view, and given that governments, with the exception of the Swiss government, have no supervisory powers over it (some would argue that FIFA may itself be seen as a government),[36] the only plausible route for the assessment of the proportionality of the Statutes would seem to be through the legal accountability channel, using EU law, especially its provisions on competition and internal market.[37] In fact, given the precedents (e.g. Charleroi)[38] and the recent legal challenge of FIFA’s decision to ban Third-Party Ownership,[39] these rules appear to have become an increasingly important tool to hold the organization accountable, regardless of the latest developments regarding the prosecution of its officials.[40] A further analysis as to whether such a route remains available to potential appellants from outside of the European Union would, however, go beyond the scope of this paper. 


Conclusion

As presented throughout this brief overview, FIFA has seemingly developed a zero-tolerance policy for any governmental interference regarding the affairs of its Members, thus arguably safeguarding their independence. It has consistently availed itself of one of the most stringent corrective measures for alleged violations envisaged by its Statutes, suspending the non-compliant Members, hence often provoking strong emotional response within the pertinent countries.[41] Whereby such sanctions might be deemed necessary in certain cases, non-consideration of factual background and eventual justifications in others has led to accusations of double standards,[42] and raised questions of proportionality of the relevant Statutes provisions and the borders of the rules governing “purely sporting issues”.

The outcome of the deadlock in the latest case of PSSI remains to be seen, with the government’s intention to thoroughly reform the Indonesian football suggesting that a swift solution might not quite lie around the corner.[43] Given that compliance with the imposed conditions appears to be the route that will be taken in this case, and as long as provisions of the Statutes are not submitted to scrutiny of a competent judicial body, arguably in the form of the European Court of Justice, any future third party interferences shall most likely continue to be dealt with strictly by FIFA and the non-compliant Members will keep finding themselves “on the dark side of the moon”.[44]



[1] Pink Floyd, Eclipse (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

[2] Letter of FIFA to the Republic of Indonesia Minister of Youth and Sports, written in Zurich and sent on 10 April 2015.

[3] Decision of the FIFA Executive Committee: Suspension of the Indonesian Football Federation (PSSI), adopted in Zurich on 30 May 2015.

[4] Joined cases CAS 2014/A/3744 and CAS 2014/A/3766 Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, award of 18 May 2015.

[5] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), adopted in Zurich on 9 July 2014.

[6] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Cameroonian Football Association, adopted in Zurich on 4 July 2013 (FIFA Circular no. 1367, Zurich, 4 July 2013).

[7] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Football Federation of Belize, adopted in Zurich on 17 June 2011.

[8] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Kenya Football Federation, adopted in Zurich on 2 June 2004.

[9] Decision of the FIFA Emergency Committee: Suspension of the Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation (IRIFF), adopted in Zurich on 23 November 2006.

[10] FIFA Decision of 30 May 2015, cited supra note 3.

[11] FIFA Decision of 9 July 2014, cited supra note 5.

[12] Letter of FIFA to Nigerian Football Federation (NFF), written in Zurich and sent on 29 August 2014.

[13] FIFA Decision of 2 June 2004, cited supra note 8.

[14] FIFA Decision of 17 June 2011, cited supra note 7.

[15] FIFA Decision of 23 November 2006, cited supra note 9.

[16] FIFA Statutes (Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes, Standing Orders of the Congress), adopted in São Paulo on 11 June 2014.

[17] UEFA Statutes (Rules of Procedure of the UEFA, Congress Regulations governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes), adopted in Astana on 24 March 2014.

[18] FIFA Statutes, cited supra note 16, Art. 33.

[19] Ibid., Arts. 63, 65.

[20] Ibid., Art. 68.

[21] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[22] Case CAS 2005/A/899 FC Aris Thessaloniki v. FIFA & New Panionios N.F.C., award of 15 July 2005, para. 12; Case CAS 2004/A/659 Galatasaray SK v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Club Regatas Vasco da Gama & F. J., award of 17 March 2005, paras. 23-25.

[23] Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, cited supra note 4, paras. 192,196.

[24] Ibid., para. 160.

[25] Ibid., para 160.

[26] Ibid., paras. 160-182.

[27] Ibid., para. 200.

[28] Ibid., para. 200.

[29] Ibid., paras. 203-211.

[30] Ibid., para. 213.

[31]Who guards the guardians?” (translation mine); Juvenal, Satires, (Book II, Satire VI, 1st and early 2nd centuries AD), lines 347–8.

[32] R. Pielke Jr., How can FIFA be held accountable? (Sport Management Review, Issue 16, 2013), pp. 258.

[33] FIFPro, Death of Mendieta must be the turning point for Indonesia, http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/death-of-mendieta-must-be-turning-point-for-indonesia (last visited 28 June 2015).

[34] See inter alia Cases CAS Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830 S. v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005, CAS 2009/A/2012 Doping Authority Netherlands v. N., award of 11 June 2010, CAS 2012/A/2740 Marcelo Carracedo v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 18 April 2013.

[35] Nigerian Football Fedration v. FIFA, cited supra note 4.

[36]S. Bradley, FIFA reforms face resistance – and huge support (swissinfo.ch, 5 December 2012), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/football-scandals_fifa-reforms-face-resistance---and-huge-support/34067104 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[37] R. Pielke, cited supra note 32, pp. 259-262.

[38] Case A/05/03843, SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi ao v FIFA, Tribunal de Commerce de Charleroi, 15 May 2006 (Case was referred to the European Court of Justice, but did not reach a judgment since the parties reached a settlement out of court),

[39] A. Duff, Portugal, Spain Said to Complain to EU on Soccer Finance Rules (BloombergBusiness, 4 February 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-04/portugal-spain-said-to-complain-to-eu-on-soccer-finance-ban (last visited 28 June 2015).

[40] BBC News, Fifa corruption inquiries: Officials arrested in Zurich (bbc.com, 27 May 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32895048 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[41] ESPN, Iranian Federation suspended by FIFA (espn.com, 23 November 2006), http://www.espnfc.com/story/393454/iranian-federation-suspended-by-fifa (last visited 28 June 2015).

[42] M. Zandi, Is FIFA's Decision in the Best Interest of Football (Association Internationale De La Presse Sportive),http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?cod=551&page=news&tp=n#.VZAhwRuqqko (last visited 28 June 2015).

[43] Reuters, Indonesia government takes responsibility for ban (uk.reuters.com, 31 May 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/31/uk-soccer-fifa-indonesia-idUKKBN0OG03920150531 (last visited 28 June 2015).

[44] Pink Floyd, Brain Damage (Dark Side of the Moon, EMI, 1973).

Comments are closed