Since last year, Doyen Sports, represented by Jean-Louis Dupont, embarked on a legal crusade against FIFA’s TPO ban. It has lodged a competition law complaint with the EU Commission and started court proceedings in France and Belgium. In a first decision on Doyen’s request for provisory measures, the Brussels Court of First Instance rejected the demands raised by Doyen and already refused to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU. Doyen, supported by the Belgium club Seraing, decided to appeal this decision to the Brussels Appeal Court, which rendered its final ruling on the question on 10 March 2016.[1] The decision (on file with us) is rather unspectacular and in line with the first instance judgment. This blog post will rehash the three interesting aspects of the case.

·      The jurisdiction of the Belgian courts

·      The admissibility of Doyen’s action

·      The conditions for awarding provisory measures

I.      The jurisdiction of the Belgian courts

Doyen was not the only party to the dispute dissatisfied with the first instance ruling; FIFA and UEFA also appealed the decision challenging the territorial competence of the Belgian Court to hear the claims raised against FIFA’s TPO ban. They consider that the Swiss courts are solely competent to deal with civil disputes involving its rules and decisions.

As in first instance, the thrust of the ruling on this question turns on the interpretation of the Lugano convention of 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In principle, under Article 2(1) of the Convention: “Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.” Thus, translated to the present dispute this would imply that FIFA and UEFA, which are Swiss Associations, are in principle to be sued in front of Swiss courts.

Moreover, to support their view that Swiss Courts have an exclusive jurisdiction, FIFA and UEFA also invoke Article 22(2) Lugano Convention stipulating that “proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of the decisions of their organs, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the company, legal person or association has its seat. In order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private international law”. Yet, the Appeal Court is of a different opinion and refers to the jurisprudence of the CJEU indicating that Article 22(2) should be interpreted as referring to disputes lodged based on company law or their statutes against decisions of a company or association.

The principle enshrined in Article 2 Lugano Convention is not absolute, many exceptions are provided in the Lugano Convention itself. In particular, Article 5(3) Lugano Convention foresees that in delictual matters the court of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur is competent. This entails both the place were the harmful conduct was put in motion and the place where the harm was felt. In the present case, the Appeal Court argues that it is “difficult to contest that by hindering the appellant to execute their partnership agreement and enter in future TPO or TPI agreements over specific players, the attacked ban is producing harmful effects on the Belgian territory”.[2] Furthermore, the TPO agreement between Doyen Sports and the ASBL RFC Seraing is not deemed fictitious, as it has been invoked by FIFA to hand out disciplinary sanctions to the ASBL RFC Seraing.[3]

Additionally, the Court derives also its competence from Article 6(1) Lugano Convention. This article provides that a party can be sued “where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. The key question is whether there is sufficient connectedness between the claims raised against l’URBSFA, FIFA and UEFA. The Court refers to the recent case law of the CJEU, which is relevant to the interpretation of the Lugano Convention, on the identical provision in the Brussels Regulation (notably the case C-352/13 at para. 20). It is of the view that “FIFA and URBSFA share a regulatory and disciplinary power that enables them both, acting jointly or separately, to adopt the contested ban, to enforce it and to adopt an individual decision susceptible to block, compromise and/or restrict the execution of the contract signed by the appellants”.[4] Thus, “the autonomous regulatory power of the URBSFA justifies its participation in this proceeding, alongside FIFA in order (i) to obtain that both be prevented to act; (ii) that each of them be deprived of the opportunity to contest the opposability of a decision to which they would not have been part and lastly (iii) to deny FIFA the possibility to circumvent an interdiction pronounced against it by having recourse to the regulatory power of the URBSFA”.[5] Finally, the Court argues “if the appellant were forced to lodge a claim against FIFA in front of the Swiss courts and against URBSFA in front of the Belgian Courts, this could potentially lead to irreconcilable solutions”.[6] As far as the claims against UEFA are concerned, which has not contrary to FIFA explicitly banned TPO, the Appeal Court is also convinced of their connectedness. It is so because UEFA “imposes to the clubs needing a license to participate in its competitions that they comply with the statutes and regulations of FIFA and, thus, with the disputed TPO ban “.[7]

This is again a powerful reminder that Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) seated in Switzerland cannot evade the jurisdiction of the national courts of EU Member States when EU competition law is involved.[8] Under Article 5(3) Lugano Convention, EU Member States courts will be competent to deal with a civil liability claim based on EU competition law if the damage caused by the disputed measure/decision/regulation can be felt on the national territory of a Member State. Furthermore, if, as is usually the case for sports regulations, the rules have to be implemented by national sporting associations, the claims raised against the national SGBs will most likely be deemed connected to the original decisions/regulations of the international SGBs and justify the jurisdiction of the court of the domicile of the national SGB.[9]

II.    The admissibility of Doyen’s action

In this proceeding, as well as in the one initiated in front of the Paris court (FIFA’s legal submission in the Paris procedure has been published by football leaks), FIFA argues that Doyen’s action is not admissible due to the fact that the wrong administrator has initiated it. Indeed, under article 11.1 of Doyen’s own statutes the judicial representation is to be exercised by the local administrator designated by shareholder A acting in conjunction with the local administrator designated by shareholder B or by any other person designated by the general assembly. Yet, in practice Nelio Lucas, who fulfils none of the relevant criteria and was thus not authorized to act in Doyen’s name in judicial matters, lodged the action. However, Doyen could have under Belgium procedural rules ratified the judicial initiative taken by an incompetent organ. Doyen tried to do so but failed to organize the general assembly necessary to ratify Nelio Luca’s decision. Thus, the Court deems the action initiated by Doyen inadmissible. Luckily for Doyen it was not the sole party to the proceedings as the ASBL RFC Seraing joined the procedure. The Court believes the intervention of RFC Seraing in the proceedings is admissible and its interest to act is acknowledged. On this latter point, FIFA was arguing that RFC Seraing’s interest to act was inexistent due to the fact that the partnership agreement between Doyen and Seraing was contrary to the public order. However, in light of the divergent positions regarding the legality of TPO/TPI and of the on-going proceedings before various national courts and the European commission, the Belgium court is reluctant to admit that the interest of Seraing to act in this matter is illegitimate.

III.  Doyen’s (un)likelihood to prevail

Concerning the likelihood to prevail, however, the Court sided with the federations and refused to admit that the TPO/TPI ban was likely to restrict article 101(1) TFEU. On the one hand, as indices of the compatibility of the ban with EU law, it pointed out that the Commission was inclined to support the TPO ban, that FIFPro was clearly opposed to TPO and invokes fundamental values in support of the ban, and that the ban was adopted after a collective reflection involving many stakeholders and is aimed at tackling the negative externalities listed by the first instance court.[12] On the other hand, it refers to an academic article authored by Marmayou contesting the compatibility of TPO with EU law (this reference appears poorly chosen as the article is dedicated primarily to the FIFA regulations for intermediaries, for a stronger challenge to the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law see Lindholm).[13] In any case, “it is obvious that a preliminary assessment cannot lead the Court to conclude, with sufficient certainty, that the ban would be contrary to EU competition rules”.[14] Finally, and this is the part of the ruling that seems to have been slightly misinterpreted by the press. The Court pointed out that Seraing and Doyen were asking in the main proceedings for a preliminary reference to the CJEU and that they were, therefore, conscious that they are not certain to prevail. However, the Appeal Court cannot, in the framework of a procedure involving provisory measures, ask a question to the CJEU, as it is unable to comply with the CJEU’s requirements for the admissibility of preliminary references (see the failed attempt in the UEFA FFP case). Hence, it is for the Commercial Court of Brussels, which is competent in the main proceeding, to decide whether it is necessary to do so. The Appeal Court (and the claimants as it cheekily points out) seems to believe that it could be needed, as it is not at all clear that the ban is contrary to EU competition law.

Conclusion

There are number of lessons that can be drawn from the judgment of the appeal court. Three stand out:

1. FIFA and UEFA cannot evade the jurisdiction of EU courts. Indeed, if an EU competition law violation of their rules is invoked they can be brought before the jurisdictions of the Member States
2. Doyen messed up in its original court filing by failing to abide by the procedure enshrined in its own statutes. This has no dire consequences in the Belgium proceedings due to presence of Seraing, but it might be a different story before the Paris court, where Doyen stands alone and the same procedural irregularity is invoked by FIFA.
3. To FIFA’s great satisfaction, the case against the TPO ban is not deemed strong enough to allow for the adoption of provisory measures blocking its implementation. As pointed out in our previous blog (and here) EU competition law is not a golden bullet that can be invoked easily to strike down FIFA or UEFA regulations. There is a high justificatory burden and the claimants will face an uphill battle to demonstrate that the ban is disproportionate (especially in light of the broad support for the ban amongst many key stakeholders).

This was only a small skirmish in a long legal war still before us. It will not be definitely over until the CJEU decides the matter (in 2018 at the earliest) or Doyen bows out of the game in the face of the high legal fees incurred. What is already certain is that the way EU law applies to sport is not straightforward and does not entail an economic/neoliberal logic blindly favourable to an unrestricted freedom to invest.

[1] Cour d’appel Bruxelles, Doyen Sports et ASBL RFC Seraing United c. URBSFA, FIFA et UEFA, 2015/KR/54, 10 mars 2016.

[2] “Il est difficilement contestable qu’en empêchant les appelantes de poursuivre l’exécution de leur convention de collaboration et la conclusion de nouvelles conventions « TPO » ou « TPI » spécifiques à des joueurs, l’interdiction litigieuse produit des effets dommageables sur le territoire belge.” Ibid, para.50.

[3] “C’est également en vain qu’il est soutenu que la convention de collaboration litigieuse ne serait qu’un artifice destiné à saisir les juridictions belges. En effet, elle a connu une exécution par des payements de sommes de Doyen Sports à l’ASBL RFC Seraing et surtout, son existence a été invoquée par la FIFA pour mener des poursuites disciplinaires contre le club dirigé par l’ASBL RFC Seraing et lui infliger une sanction.” Ibid.

[4] “L’URBSFA et la FIFA se partagent donc un pouvoir réglementaire et de contrainte qui leur permet, à l’une et à l’autre, agissant ensemble ou séparément, d’adopter l’interdiction litigieuse, de la mettre en œuvre et de prendre une mesure ou une décision à caractère individuel de nature à empêcher, compromettre et/ou entraver l’exécution du contrat conclu entre les appelantes.” Ibid, para.57

[5] “Le pouvoir règlementaire autonome de l’URBSFA et son pouvoir d’action propre justifient sa présence dans la procédure, en même temps que la FIFA afin (i) d’obtenir l’empêchement d’agir de l’une et de l’autre ; (ii) de priver chacune d’elles de la possibilité de contester l’opposabilité d’une décision judiciaire qui serait rendue dans une cause à laquelle elle serait demeurée étrangère et enfin (iii) d’empêcher la FIFA de contourner une interdiction qui serait prononcée à son encontre en recourant au pouvoir réglementaire de l’URBSFA.” Ibid.

[6] “Si les appelantes étaient dans l’obligation d’attraire la FIFA devant les juridictions suisses tout en citant l’URBSFA devant les juridictions belges, cette situation serait susceptible de conduire à des solutions inconciliables […]”, ibid. para.58.

[7] “En ce qui concerne l’UEFA, la connexité existe également. En effet, si elle n’est pas l’auteur des dispositions réglementaires et si elle n’est pas intervenue comme soutien dans l’exercice de poursuites disciplinaires menées contre le RFC SERAING, elle impose aux clubs qui doivent obtenir une licence pour participer aux compétitions qu’elle organise, de se plier aux statuts et aux règlements de la FIFA et à l’interdiction en cause.” Ibid., para.59.

[8] The same solution was adopted in 2012 by the French Cour de Cassation (Highest French Civil Court) in a dispute opposing the French agent Piau to FIFA. See Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 1 février 2012, publié au bulletin.

[9] This solution was also adopted by the OLG in the Pechstein ruling, see Oberlandesgericht München, 15 January 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart, para.A.I.1.a)aa) and bb).

[10] « L’urgence est établie. L’ASBL RFC Seraing est sous le coup d’une sanction disciplinaire dont seule l’exécution a été suspendue et elle est susceptible d’encourir de nouvelles poursuites et sanctions pour le cas où elle conclurait de nouvelles conventions TPO/TPI avec Doyen Sports ou toute autre société menant des activités de financement similaires.” Cour d’appel Bruxelles, Doyen Sports et ASBL RFC Seraing United c. URBSFA, FIFA et UEFA, 2015/KR/54, 10 mars 2016, para.78.

[11] « Ensuite, il n’est pas douteux que l’interdiction de poursuivre la convention de collaboration du 30 janvier 2015 et de conclure de nouvelles conventions TPO/TPI la prive d’une source de financement, sans qu’il soit démontré par les intimées qu’elle pourrait lui trouver un substitut adéquat par des emprunts classiques auprès de tiers.”Ibid.

[12] « D’un côté, il faut constater que :
- la Commission paraît s’être orientée vers la condamnation de la TPO;
- la FIPpro y est clairement opposée et invoque à cette fin des valeurs essentielles;
- l’interdiction est le résultat d’une réflexion collective à laquelle ont participé de nombreux interlocuteurs - et non pas seulement l’UEFA ou certains de ses membres - et elle est l’aboutissement de plusieurs constats que relève le premier juge dans son ordonnance : opacité, absence de contrôle des instances dirigeantes, importance du phénomène puisqu’il concerne le marché mondial, environnement ouvert à la corruption et aux pratiques frauduleuses, importance des sommes en jeu, etc...” Ibid, para.81.

[13] « De l’autre, de sérieuses réserves sont émises à propos de la légalité de l’interdiction de la TPO/TPI (voir ainsi l’article de J.M. MARMAYOU, « La compatibilité du nouveau règlement FIFA sur les intermédiaires avec le droit européen » Les cahiers de droit du sport, 2015, p. 15, pièce 38bis des appelantes).” Ibid.

[14] « Il est patent qu’un examen en apparence ne permet pas de conclure, avec la force nécessaire, que l’interdiction porte atteinte aux règles de la concurrence.” Ibid, para.82.

 Editor's note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser.

The Headlines

ISLJ Annual Conference on International Sports Law 

On 26 and 27 October 2017, the T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague will host the first ever ISLJ Annual International Sports Law Conference. This year's edition will feature panels on the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the world anti-doping system, the FIFA transfer regulations, human rights and sports, the labour rights of athletes, and EU law and sport. We will also welcome the following distinguished keynote speakers:

• Miguel Maduro, former Advocate General at the European Court of Justice and former head of the FIFA's Governance Committee;
• Michael Beloff QC, English barrister known as one of the 'Godfathers' of sports law;
• Stephen Weatherill, Professor at Oxford University and a scholarly authority on EU law and sport;
• Richard McLaren, CAS Arbitrator, sports law scholar and former head of the World Anti-Doping Agency's investigation into the Russian doping scandal.

You will find all the necessary information related to the conference here. Do not forget to register as soon as possible if you want to secure a place on the international sports law pitch! [Please note that we have a limited amount of seats available, which will be attributed on a 'first come, first served' basis.]

FC Red Bull Salzburg and RB Leipzig given the green light to participate in the 2017/2018 UEFA Champions League

In July, UEFA published the decision on eligibility of FC Red Bull Salzburg and RB Leipzig to participate in the 2017/2018 edition of the UEFA Champions League, handed down by the Adjudicatory Chamber of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body ('CFCB') on 16 June 2017. Having examined the clubs' submissions and, in particular, taking note of multiple personal and other changes made by FC Red Bull Salzburg, the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber concluded that the company Red Bull did not have a decisive influence over the Austrian club in the sense of Article 5.01(c)(iv) of the UEFA Champions League Regulations 2015-2018 Cycle, 2017/2018 Season. Simultaneously, the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber held that FC Red Bull Salzburg was not able to exercise by any means a decisive influence in the decision-making of RB Leipzig (or vice versa) at the time when the decision in question was delivered. In the end, both clubs were given the green light to participate in the 2017/2018 edition of the UEFA Champions League as the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber believed it would not threaten the integrity of the UEFA's flagship club competition.

The CAS award in International Ski Federation v. Therese Johaug and the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports

On 22 August 2017, the CAS published its award rendered in the dispute featuring the International Ski Federation, the Norwegian cross-country skier Therese Johaug and the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederations of Sports ('NIF'). By way of reminder, the seven-time world champion tested positive for Clostebol in September 2016. Consequently, the NIF Adjudication Committee imposed a 13-month period of ineligibility on Johaug, effective as of 18 October 2016. Not satisfied with the length of the sanction, the International Ski Federation filed an appeal with the CAS on 6 March 2017, asking the latter to lengthen Johaug's ban to at least 16 months. Despite the Norwegian's otherwise clean anti-doping record, the CAS eventually sided with the International Ski Federation and lengthened Johaug's ban to 18 months, effective as of 18 October 2016. As a result, she will now miss the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang.

Sara Errani banned from professional tennis for two months

The Italian female tennis player Sara Errani is currently serving a two-month ban imposed on her by an Independent Tribunal appointed under Article 8.1 of the 2017 Tennis Anti-Doping Programme. This sanction is a direct consequence of an out-of-competition doping control test which took place on 16 February 2017 and revealed the presence of Letrozole in the body of the former French Open finalist. Apart from not being eligible to enter any tournament before 3 October 2017, Errani is also obliged to return prize money she earned at events played during the period between 16 February 2017 and 7 June 2017, given that all her results achieved during the said period were disqualified. It should be noted, however, that the Italian Anti-Doping Agency reportedly petitioned the CAS to lengthen Errani's ban, and thus it will be the CAS that will have the final word on the matter.

Sports Law Related Decisions

• CAS – Award delivered in the arbitration between Chunhong Liu and International Olympic Committee
• CAS – Award delivered in the arbitration between Lei Cao and International Olympic Committee
• CAS – Award delivered in the arbitration between Paolo Barelli and Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)
• CAS – Award delivered in the arbitration featuring the International Ski Federation (FIS), Therese Johaug and The Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports
• Sport Resolutions (UK) – Decision rendered in the case between ITF and Sara Errani
• UEFA – Decision rendered in the case concerning Rasenballsport Leipzig and FC Red Bull Salzburg

Official Documents and Press Releases

• Athletics Integrity Unit – Statement regarding the provisional suspension of two Ukrainian athletes
• CAS – Appeal filed by Tatyana Chernova dismissed
• CAS – Bulletin 2017/1
• CAS – The CAS confirms ranking of the Romanian football league 1 2016/2017
• CAS – The CAS confirms the decision rendered by the International Canoe Federation (ICF) in the case of Serghei Tarnovschi
• CAS – The CAS dismisses the appeals filed by the Bolivian Football Federation
• CAS – The CAS imposes four-year ban on Russian triple-jumper Anna Pyatykh
• CAS – The CAS reduces the ban imposed on Harold Mayne-Nicholls from three to two years
• CAS – The CAS rejects urgent application for provisional measures filed by Peter Sagan and Denk Pro Cycling GmbH
• CAS – The CAS suspends the IAAF Hyperandrogenism Regulations until the end of September 2017
• CAS – The CAS upholds the life bans imposed by the IAAF on Valentin Balakhnichev, Alexei Melnikov and Papa Massata Diack
• CAS – The CAS upholds the two-year period of ineligibility imposed on Roman Eremenko
• Deloitte – Annual Review of Football Finance
• FIFA – 2026 FIFA World Cup bidding process: FIFA receives expressions of interest
• FIFA – FIFA appoints monitoring committee to ensure oversight of Greek FA
• FIFA – FIFA suspends Sudan Football Association
• FIFA – FIFA lifts suspension of Sudan Football Association (SFA)
• FIFA – Normalisation committee appointed for Cameroonian FA
• FIFPro – Neymar deal is tip of the iceberg
• IOC – 2028 Host City Contract
• IOC – IOC approves new candidature process for Winter Olympic Games 2026
• IOC – IOC Executive Board confirms gender equality and more innovation for Winter Youth Olympic Games Lausanne 2020
• IOC – IOC makes historic decision in agreeing to award 2024 and 2028 Olympic Games at the same time
• IOC – Los Angeles declares candidature for Olympic Games 2028: IOC to contribute USD 1.8 billion to the Local Organising Committee
• IOC – Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission 2024
• IOC – Six candidates approved for IOC Athletes’ Commission elections in Pyeongchang
• Swiss Federal Tribunal – Appeal filed by Michel Platini rejected
• Tennis Integrity Unit – Briefing Note July 2017
• UNESCO – From ‘declaration to action’ at Ministerial Conference for Sport and Physical Education
• Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) – Cycling Canada, Ontario Cycling Association, UCI and Canadian athlete Kristen Worley settle human rights application to promote inclusive sporting environments
• Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) – Statement on Samuel Sánchez Gonzalez
• WADA – Annual report 2016
• WADA – Sierra Leone ratifies UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention
• WADA – Statement from WADA Athlete Committee
• WADA – WADA publishes RUSADA Roadmap to Code Compliance

In the news

Doping

• Nina Berglund Johaug drops doping appeal
• Andy Brown Russian Federal Government approves National Anti-Doping Plan
• Nick Butler IOC Executive Board approve plans for Independent Testing Authority in time for Pyeongchang 2018
• Nick Butler IOC target October for results of Schmid and Oswald Russian doping reports
• Daniel Etchells iNADO urges principled approach from IOC to Russia sanctions
• Nick Harris Russia’s football drugs cover-up: Eight months on and still no action as ethics team are ‘denied access to evidence’
• Martha Kelner Ethiopian pharmacy given trading ban for the illegal sale of EPO
• Martha Kelner Inside the doping hotspot of Ethiopia: Dodgy testing and EPO over the counter
• Martha Kelner and James Rudd Caster Semenya could be forced to undertake hormone therapy for future Olympics
• Duncan Mackay Olympic 50km race walk gold medallist to miss World Championships after IAAF doping investigation
• The Moscow Times Russia’s Sports Minister says no chance of Winter Games doping ban
• Michael Pavitt WADA Director General claims progress being made after visiting RUSADA headquarters
• Play the Game Paralympic committees boost Russia’s bid to be reinstated in time for Pyeongchang 2018
• Radio Poland New Polish Anti-Doping Agency launched
• Reuters Suspended Russian Anti-Doping Agency appoints new director

Football

•  Mohamed Fajah Barrie The crisis in Sierra Leone football deepens as FIFA suspends congress

• David Conn Paris St-Germain signing of Kylian Mbappé looks like defiance of UEFA
• James M. Dorsey The Gulf crisis: Qatar’s 2022 World Cup moves into the firing line
• ESPN FIFA places onus on Football Federation Australia to sort out governance issues with stakeholders
• Joseph Evans Spanish, French and Brazilian firms advise on record-breaking £200 million Neymar transfer to PSG
• The Guardian Spanish FA President Ángel María Villar Llona arrested on corruption charges
• Nicholas Hirst Spanish league wants EU to referee Neymar transfer saga
• Paul MacInnes UEFA’s Aleksander Ceferin talked about a salary cap – but could it ever happen?
• Liam Morgan Cameroon official accuses FIFA of ignoring CAS verdict on disputed FECAFOOT elections
• Liam Morgan FIFA threaten to take over running of Football Federation Australia as impasse continues
• Rory Smith The owner brought the money. The agent delivered the players. Now what?
• Peter Staunton Coutinho, Van Dijk and Diego Costa: Transfer market horribly stacked against players
• Stefan Szymanski Neymar transfer exposes football’s modern-day trafficking scheme
• Andrew Warshaw Ceferin warns Euro giants that FFP still has teeth, and floats possibility of salary cap
• Joe Wright FIFA investigating Neymar complaint over unpaid Barcelona loyalty bonus

Other

• Rizwan Ali Pakistan cricketer Sharjeel Khan banned for five years
• Aaron Bauer Coates welcomes Australian Olympic Committee’s report, but defiant on bullying claims
• Ben Bloom IAAF consider formal action against BBC for grilling medical expert on live TV
• Nick Butler IOC members unanimously support 2024 and 2028 joint awarding plans
• David Conn How Bahrain uses sport to whitewash a legacy of torture and human rights abuses
• Nicholas Hirst Sports bosses on thin ice in EU antitrust probe
• Marina Hyde Los Angeles has signed up but rapacious IOC is running out of conquests
• Sean Ingle Sebastian Coe alarmed by ‘human trafficking’ revelations in athletics
• Martha Kelner General public is losing faith in scandal-ridden sports, survey claims
• Juliet Macur What qualifies a woman to compete as a woman? An ugly fight resumes
• Reuters IOC snubs Infantino and Coe in new members list
• John Varano Major sports events: Are they worth it?
• Stephen Wade Rio Olympics look to IOC for help with USD 40 million debt
• Johnny Watterson and Sarah Bardon The Olympic Council of Ireland acting to remove Pat Hickey from Olympic positions

Academic Materials

• Steven A. Bank Will U.S. Soccer Be Forced to Adopt Promotion and Relegation?
• Stéphane Bermon and Pierre-Yves Garnier Serum Androgen Levels and Their Relation to Performance in Track and Field: Mass Spectrometry Results from 2127 Observations in Male and Female Elite Athletes
•  Ian S. Blackshaw International Sports Law: An Introductory Guide
• Philippe Broda Europe Versus Emerging Countries Within FIFA: Using Inflation as a Conflict Regulation Mechanism
• Namrata Chatterjee, Chiheb Kaibi, Ivan Kraljević and Adrienne Lerner A Proposal for Sport Governance Oversight
• Sherman J. Clark Why Sports Law?
• Pierre Cornu, Sabrina Cuendet and Laurent Vidal Disciplinary and Arbitration Procedures of the Sport Movement
• Despina Mavromati Disciplinary Sanctions for Misconduct in Tennis
• Rolf Ulrich et al. Doping in Two Elite Athletics Competitions Assessed by Randomized-Response Surveys

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

• Mario Vigna Mitigating Circumstances and Strict Liability of Clubs in Match-fixing: Are We Going in the Wrong Direction? An Analysis of the Novara and Pro Patria Cases
• Frans de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk Overdue Payables in Action: Reviewing Two Years of FIFA Jurisprudence on the 12bis Procedure – Part I
• Frans de Weger and Frank John Vrolijk Overdue Payables in Action: Reviewing Two Years of FIFA Jurisprudence on the 12bis Procedure – Part II

Law in Sport

• Nick De Marco Betting and football’s ticking time bomb: Joey Barton v. FA
• Tiran Gunawardena, Carol Couse and Mark Hovell Trends in digital brand engagement, image rights and sponsorship deals in sport
• Andrew Haywood The lifecycle of an international athlete: Part I: Finding an agent and signing with a sports club
• Rebecca O’Kelly-Gillard and Chris Lavey Top of the league: How football clubs protect and exploit their brands in a global marketplace
• John Shea Six key lessons for clubs on the protection of minors from the FC Barcelona and Real Madrid appeals
• Dan Smith #Sport: The digital battle between sponsors, rights holders and ambush marketers
• Lloyd Thomas A brief review of China’s new 100% ‘transfer tax’ on footballers
•  Gemma White and Louis Weston Why sport needs a unified approach to sanctions for corruption offences

Others

• Andy Brown Why life bans for doping will not work
• Nick De Marco Corruption in football: Player transfers, agents and the ‘privatisation of regulation’
• Kelsey Erickson and Susan Backhouse Doping: Why some athletes are reluctant to speak out
• Howard Jacobs The latest anti-doping hysteria and the problem of reducing complicated issues to 140 characters
• Ruth Kennedy Barcelona’s claim against Neymar: Valid claim or smoke and mirrors?
• David Owen IOC likes to say it redistributes 90% of revenues, but does it? And who to?
• Roger Pielke, Jr. Inconsistencies between Johaug vs. Sharapova at CAS
• Ed Thompson Neymar’s PSG transfer and the break-even test
• Ross Tucker Testosterone, performance and intersex athletes: Will the IAAF evidence be enough?

Upcoming Events

• 26-27 October – ISLJ Annual Conference on International Sports Law, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, the Netherlands
• 26-30 November – Play the Game 2017: Riding Waves of Change, Eindhoven, the Netherlands

Editor's note:

Dr Borja García joined the School of Sport, Health and Exercise Sciences at Loughbourough University in January 2009 as a Lecturer in Sport Management and Policy. He holds a PhD in Politics, International Relations and European Studies from Loughborough University (United Kingdom), where he completed his thesis titled ‘The European Union and the Governance of Football: A game of levels and agendas’.

In this leafy and relatively mild autumn, we are celebrating two important anniversaries. Recently, we just passed ‘Back to the Future day’, marking the arrival of Marty McFly to 2015. In a few weeks, we will be commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Bosman ruling. Difficult to decide which one of the two is more important. As we move well into the 21st century’s second decade, these two dates should mark a moment to consider innovation. They are perhaps occasions to take stock and reflect how much sport has evolved to reach this new future… or not.

When Marty McFly ‘landed’ on October 21st 2015, at 4.29 PM, he found a whole new world. Flying skateboards, holograms, massive jumbo screens… There was not much reference to sport governance in Back to the Future, although in the vein of the rest of the film, one would anticipate a modern, innovative and decidedly better sporting world. However, if Marty McFly, coming from the 1980s or 1990s, had arrived into the real October 21^st 2015 and looked at the present state of sport governance, he may have thought his De Lorean was not working properly! Twenty years on from Bosman, and more than a decade since major scandals that were supposed to change the landscape of sport (so we were told back then), a familiar feeling of déjà-vu emerges when reading the sport news nowadays.

The late 1980s and 1990s were characterised by legal insecurity, scandals and transformation in the governance of sport. There were legal challenges to the legitimacy of governing bodies. Bosman was just one of them, but on the back of the ruling the European Commission was inundated with questions related to the application of EU law to the rules of sport governing bodies. Those were also days of major public opinion upheaval against the institutionalised doping or the mismanagement of the IOC.

Fast forward to 2015 and we find ourselves in a very similar situation! After a period of relative calm, legal challenges from stakeholders against rules and regulations of governing bodies have flourished everywhere. Dutch skaters against ISU, Mr. Striani against UEFA, FIFPro against the international transfer system, the Spanish and Portuguese leagues against FIFA... just to name a few. Moreover, it seems as if doping and corruption never left us. It was cycling back then, and Russian athletics now. It was the Olympics and Salt Lake City in the 1990s, football, Russia and Qatar now. It seems not much progress has been achieved in 20 years.

Why is that? One of the reasons is that, despite some changes and mild modernisation, the governance structures are still very similar. No flying skateboards around FIFA or the IOC, I am afraid. Sport continues to be regulated by international federations trying to keep their place at the top of a pyramid that, however, is no longer there because it has given place to a much more complex network. The transformation from vertical governance to horizontal structures, that caused many problems in the public sector as described by Rod Rhodes[1] (among others), has not been correctly addressed in sport.

As Jack Anderson has correctly pointed out, perhaps one of the problems is that the current political governance structures of sport are not fit for purpose. They lack real separation of powers. For example, when the Spanish athlete (now a senator!) Marta Domínguez is allegedly accused of doping due to irregularities in her blood passport, WADA sends the dossier to the Spanish Athletics Federation, in which Domínguez was a vice-president for a few years, serving under the current president (who has been in charge since 1989, so probably Marty McFly knows him well!). Can the disciplinary committees of such a body be really independent and be expected to pass a clear and decisive judgment? Of course, they cannot and have not done so!

But the questions are perhaps more systemic. Are international sport federations really fit for the purpose of modern sport? The new reality of sport is one where the commercial dimension is increasingly divorcing from the coveted grassroots or sport-for-all Holy Grail. ISFs, and most public sport policies, are still attempting to house these two different realities under one common roof. Questions need to be asked as to whether this confusion des genres is even possible. There was a time in which the European Commission suggested that international federations had to separate their regulatory and commercial roles. But not much has been done in that respect since the Formula 1 case. Perhaps it should be accepted that elite and professional sport needs a new approach. If ISFs are serious, they need to start putting in place much more modern management and governance structures. Executive committees need to stop being ‘representative’ of the stakeholders, turning to be ‘skills based’. They need, of course, to be much more age, race and gender diverse. Independent directors need to be fully incorporated to councils, boards and federations’ EXCOs. Standing committees need to be more independent and need to have targets… This is nothing new, but it reads as a revolution in the world of international sport.

Given the governance failures of sport, it is often questioned whether public authorities could/should/ought to regulate or bring sport to account. Here, it seems fair to say that following the political ‘backlash’ of Bosman, aptly articulated by some sport bodies, politicians have erred on the cautious side. The idea that the EU “was trying to kill club football in Europe”, as put forward by Lennart Johanson on 16 December 1995 was powerful enough to discourage the EU, and other public authorities for that matter, to regulate sport. The reality is that, to date, perhaps the EU is the only public body that has managed to bring to account international sport, even in a limited fashion, as I have argued in a recent article[2]. The mainstreaming of the autonomy and specificity of sport into EU policies, however, has deterred EU institutions from pursuing a much more proactive approach in the control and regulation of sport.

After Bosman, there was a period in which both sport and EU law found each other. There were negotiations and some changes in both sides. There were even positive noises coming from different social dialogue committees. The calm, however, has been broken abruptly. And we have woken up back to the future, as if 1995 had never passed. ASSER’s very own Antoine Duval, and some authors such as Arnout Geeraert have recently argued that the EU should be much stronger in its application of EU law to sport. The problem is: can they really do it? In an increasingly Eurosceptic environment amongst the peoples of Europe, can the EU really risk trying to have a go at sport? It can be argued, that sport as an area of ‘soft politics’ and popular culture may give the EU some of its lost legitimacy back. But I am not so sure. In a recent survey, part of the FREE Project, we asked Europeans in nine countries whether they trusted the EU (amongst other bodies) to regulate the governance of football. The answer was clear: No, they do not. Of the nine different organisations offered in the survey, the EU was the third least trusted body, only above the media and national governments. In the survey, only 40% of the Europeans in the nine countries polled trusted the EU in this respect. This goes down to 21% when the survey is restricted to core football fans, not the general public. In other words, Europeans do not trust the EU, nor national governments to improve the governance of football. So, if the EU tries to have a stronger position in the application of European law and policies to sport, it may well backfire.

Normally, I have refrained from such a normative approach to governance. As a political scientist, I prefer to analyse what actors do, rather than to tell them, what to do. However, it is clear to me that what they have done so far is not working. Twenty years on from Bosman, and a visit of Marty McFly after, the ‘future’ of international sport governance looks conspicuously similar to the past. And it is not good. We need a solution that brings us to the future, to a real future where the past is finally put to rest.

[1] Rhodes, RAW. (1997) Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

[2] Meier, HE and García, B. (2015) ‘Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention: The power of FIFA over national governments’. Public Administration, Early view, September 2015, doi: 10.1111/padm.12208.