Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

12th round of Caster Semenya’s legal fight: too close to call? - By Jeremy Abel

Editor's note: Jeremy Abel is a recent graduate of the LL.M in International Business Law and Sports of the University of Lausanne.


1.     Introduction

The famous South African athlete Caster Semenya is in the last lap of her long legal battle for her right to run without changing the natural testosterone in her body. After losing her cases before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the Swiss Federal Tribunal, she filed an application before the European Court of Human Rights (Court). In the meantime, the Court has released a summary of her complaint and a series of questions addressed to the parties of the case.

As is well known, she is challenging the World Athletics’ Eligibility Regulations for the Female Classification (Regulations) defining the conditions under which female and intersex athletes with certain types of differences of sex development (DSDs) can compete in international athletics events. Despite the Regulations emanating from World Athletics, the last round of her legal battle is against a new opponent: Switzerland.

The purpose of this article is to revisit the Semenya case from a European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) perspective while considering certain excellent points made by previous contributors (see here, here and here) to this blog. Therefore, the blog will follow the basic structure of an ECHR case. The following issues raised by Semenya shall be analysed: the applicability of the ECHR, Semenya’s right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) and to non discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), as well as the proportionality of the Regulations. More...

[Conference] Towards a European Social Charter for Sport Events - 1 December - 13:00-17:00 - Asser Institute

Sport events, especially when they are of a global scale, have been facing more and more questions about their impact on local communities, the environment, and human rights. 

It has become clear that their social legitimacy is not a given, but must be earned by showing that sport events can positively contribute to society. During this half-day conference, we will debate the proposal of a European Social Charter for Sport Events in order to achieve this goal. 

In January 2021, a consortium of eight partners launched a three-year project, supported by the European Commission under the Erasmus+ scheme, aimed at devising a European Social Charter for Sport Events (ESCSE). The project ambitions to develop a Charter which will contribute to ensuring that sport events taking place in the European Union are socially beneficial to the local communities concerned and, more generally, to those affected by them. The project is directly inspired by the decision of the Paris 2024 bid to commit to a social charter enforced throughout the preparation and the course of the 2024 Olympics.

This first public event in the framework of the ESCSE project, will be introducing the project to a wider public. During the event we will review the current state of the implementation of the Paris 2024 Social Charter, discuss the expectations of stakeholders and academics for a European Social Charter and present for feedback the first draft of the ESCSE (and its implementing guidelines) developed by the project members. It will be a participatory event; we welcome input from the participants.

The Asser International Sports Law Centre, powered by the Asser Institute, is contributing to the project through the drafting of a background study, which we will introduce during the conference.

Please note that we can provide some financial support (up to 100 euros)  towards travel and/or accommodation costs for a limited number of participants coming from other EU Member States or the UK. To apply for this financial support please reach out to  `

Register HERE



New Event! Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Time for a Changing of the Guard? - Zoom In Webinar - 14 October - 4pm

On Thursday 14 October 2021 from 16.00-17.30 CET, the Asser International Sports Law Centre, in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret (University of Lausanne), will be launching the second season of the Zoom-In webinar series, with a first episode on Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Time for a Changing of the Guard?

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is a well-known mainstay of global sport. It has the exclusive competence over challenges against decisions taken by most international sports governing bodies and its jurisprudence covers a wide range of issues (doping, corruption, match-fixing, financial fair play, transfer or selection disputes) including disciplinary sanctions and governance disputes. In recent years, the CAS has rendered numerous awards which triggered world-wide public interest, such as in the Semenya v World Athletics case or the case between WADA and RUSADA resulting from the Russian doping scandal (we discussed both cases in previous Zoom-In discussion available here and here). In short, the CAS has tremendous influence on the shape of global sport and its governance.

However, as we will discuss during this webinar, recent work has shown that the arbitrators active at the CAS are hardly reflective of the diversity of people its decisions ultimately affect. This in our view warrants raising the question of the (urgent) need to change the (arbitral) guard at the CAS. To address these issues with us, we have invited two speakers who have played an instrumental role in putting numbers on impressions widely shared by those in contact with the CAS: Prof. Johan Lindholm (Umea University) and attorney-at-law Lisa Lazarus (Morgan Sports Law). Johan recently published a ground-breaking monograph on The Court of Arbitration for Sport and Its Jurisprudence in which he applies empirical and quantitative methods to analyse the work of the CAS. This included studying the sociological characteristics of CAS arbitrators. Lisa and her colleagues at Morgan Sports Law very recently released a blog post on Arbitrator Diversity at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which reveals a stunning lack of diversity (based on their calculations, 4,5% of appointed CAS arbitrators are female and 0,2% are black) at the institution ruling over global sport.

Guest speakers:


Register for free HERE.

Zoom In webinar series

In December 2020, The Asser International Sports Law Centre in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret launched a new series of zoom webinars on transnational sports law: Zoom In. You can watch the video recordings of our past Zoom In webinars on the Asser Institute’s Youtube Channel.

Investment in Football as a Means to a Particular End – Part 2: The Multiple Layers of Multi-Club Ownership Regulation in Football - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Editor's note: Rhys was an intern at the T.M.C. Asser Institute. He now advises on investments and Notre acquisitions in sport (mainly football) via Lovelle Street Advisory. Following a career as a professional athlete, Rhys has spent much of his professional life as an international sports agent, predominantly operating in football. Rhys has a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) and a Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) from the University of Dame, Sydney, Australia. He is currently completing an LL.M at the University of Zurich in International Business Law / International Sports Law.

Having looked at the different types of investors in football in part one of this two-part blog series, “A non-exhaustive Typology”, it is fitting to now consider the regulations that apply to investors who seek to build a portfolio of football clubs.

One way to measure the momentum of a particular practice and how serious it ought to be taken, might be when that practice earns its own initialism. Multi-club ownership or MCO as it is increasingly known today, is the name given to those entities that have an ownership stake in multiple clubs. Within the little research and writing that has been undertaken on the topic, some authors submit that investors with minority stakes in multiple clubs ought not to be captured by the MCO definition.  This position appears problematic given some of the regulations draw the line at influence rather than stake.

There are now approximately 50 MCO’s across the football world that own approximately 150 clubs.[1] Given the way MCO is trending, one might consider it important that the regulations keep up with the developing MCO practice, so as to ensure the integrity of football competitions, and to regulate any other potentially questionable benefit an MCO might derive that would be contrary to football’s best interests.

In this blog, I focus on the variety of ways (and levels at which) this practice is being regulated.  I will move through the football pyramid from member associations (MA’s) to FIFA, laying the foundations to support a proposition that FIFA and only FIFA is positioned to regulate MCO. More...

New Event! Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter and the Right to Free Speech of Athletes - Zoom In Webinar - 14 July - 16:00 (CET)

On Wednesday 14 July 2021 from 16.00-17.30 CET, the Asser International Sports Law Centre, in collaboration with Dr Marjolaine Viret, is organizing a Zoom In webinar on Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter and the right to free speech of athletes.

As the Tokyo Olympics are drawing closer, the International Olympic Committee just released new Guidelines on the implementation of Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter. The latter Rule provides that ‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas’. The latest IOC Guidelines did open up some space for athletes to express their political views, but at the same time continue to ban any manifestation from the Olympic Village or the Podium. In effect, Rule 50 imposes private restrictions on the freedom of expression of athletes in the name of the political neutrality of international sport. This limitation on the rights of athletes is far from uncontroversial and raises intricate questions regarding its legitimacy, proportionality and ultimately compatibility with human rights standards (such as with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).

This webinar aims at critically engaging with Rule 50 and its compatibility with the fundamental rights of athletes. We will discuss the content of the latest IOC Guidelines regarding Rule 50, the potential justifications for such a Rule, and the alternatives to its restrictions. To do so, we will be joined by three speakers, Professor Mark James from Manchester Metropolitan University, who has widely published on the Olympic Games and transnational law; Chui Ling Goh, a Doctoral Researcher at Melbourne Law School, who has recently released an (open access) draft of an article on Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter; and David Grevemberg, Chief Innovation and Partnerships Officer at the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, and former Chief Executive of the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF). 

Guest speakers:

  • Prof. Mark James (Metropolitan Manchester University)
  • Chui Ling Goh (PhD candidate, University of Melbourne)
  • David Grevemberg (Centre for Sport and Human Rights)


Free Registration HERE

Investment in Football as a Means to a Particular End – Part 1: A non-exhaustive Typology - By Rhys Lenarduzzi

Editor's note: Rhys is currently making research and writing contributions under Dr Antoine Duval at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on Transnational Sports Law. Additionally, Rhys is the ‘Head of Advisory’ of Athlon CIF, a global fund and capital advisory firm specialising in the investment in global sports organisations and sports assets.

Rhys has a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) and Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.) from the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, Australia. Rhys is an LL.M candidate at the University of Zurich, in International Sports Law. Following a career as a professional athlete, Rhys has spent much of his professional life as an international sports agent, predominantly operating in football.

Rhys is also the host of the podcast “Sportonomic”.


In the following two-part blog series, I will start by outlining a short typology of investors in football in recent years, in order to show the emergence of different varieties of investors who seek to use football as a means to a particular end. I will then in a second blog, explore the regulatory landscape across different countries, with a particular focus on the regulatory approach to multi-club ownership. Before moving forward, I must offer a disclaimer of sorts.  In addition to my research and writing contributions with the Asser Institute, I am the ‘Head of Advisory’ for Athlon CIF, a global fund and capital advisory firm specialising in the investment in global sports organisations and sports assets. I appreciate and hence must flag that I will possess a bias when it comes to investment in football.

It might also be noteworthy to point out that this new wave of investment in sport, is not exclusive to football. I have recently written elsewhere about CVC Capital Partners’ US$300 million investment in Volleyball, and perhaps the message that lingers behind such a deal.  CVC has also shown an interest in rugby and recently acquired a 14.3 per cent stake in the ‘Six Nations Championship’, to the tune of £365 million.  New Zealand’s 26 provincial rugby unions recently voted unanimously in favour of a proposal to sell 12.5 per cent of NZ Rugby’s commercial rights to Silver Lake Partners for NZ$387.5 million.  Consider also the apparent partnership between star footballer’s investment group, Gerard Pique’s Kosmos, and the International Tennis Federation.  Kosmos is further backed by Hiroshi Mikitani’s ecommerce institution, Rakuten, and all involved claim to desire an overhaul of the Davis Cup that will apparently transform it into the ‘World Cup of Tennis’. Grassroots projects, prizemoney for tennis players and extra funding for member nations are other areas the partnership claims to be concerned with. As is the case with all investment plays of this flavour, one can be certain that a return on the capital injection is also of interest.

So, what are we to conclude from the trends of investment in sport and more specifically for this blog series, in football? A typology elucidates that a multiplicity of investors have in recent years identified football as a means to achieve different ends. This blog considers three particular objectives pursued; direct financial return, branding in the case of company investment, or the branding and soft power strategies of nations.More...

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter: the wind of changes or a new commercial race - By Rusa Agafonova

Editor's note: Rusa Agafonova is a PhD Candidate at the University of Zurich, Switzerland   

The Olympic Games are the cornerstone event of the Olympic Movement as a socio-cultural phenomenon as well as the engine of its economic model. Having worldwide exposure,[1] the Olympic Games guarantee the International Olympic Committee (IOC) exclusive nine-digit sponsorship deals. The revenue generated by the Games is later redistributed by the IOC down the sports pyramid to the International Federations (IFs), National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and other participants of the Olympic Movement through a so-called "solidarity mechanism". In other words, the Games constitute a vital source of financing for the Olympic Movement.

Because of the money involved, the IOC is protective when it comes to staging the Olympics. This is notably so with respect to ambush marketing which can have detrimental economic impact for sports governing bodies (SGBs) running mega-events. The IOC's definition of ambush marketing covers any intentional and non-intentional use of intellectual property associated with the Olympic Games as well as the misappropriation of images associated with them without authorisation from the IOC and the organising committee.[2] This definition is broad as are the IOC's anti-ambush rules.More...

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the ECHR and Rule 50 of the IOC Charter: Are these polar opposites? - By Nuray Ekşi

Editor's note: Prof. Dr. Ekşi is a full-time lecturer and chair of Department of Private International Law at Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. Prof. Ekşi is the founder and also editor in chief of the Istanbul Journal of Sports Law which has been in publication since 2019.

While Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) secures the right to freedom of expression, Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter of 17 July 2020 (‘Olympic Charter’) restricts this freedom. Following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) relating to sports, national and international sports federations have incorporated human rights-related provisions into their statutes and regulations. They also emphasized respect for human rights. For example, Article 3 of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (‘FIFA’) Statutes, September 2020 edition, provides that “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights”. Likewise, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which are listed after the Preamble of the of the Olympic Charter 2020 also contains human rights related provisions. Paragraph 4 of Fundamental Principles of Olympism provides that the practice of sport is a human right. Paragraph 6 forbids discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In addition, the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’) inserted human rights obligations in the 2024 and 2028 Host City Contract.[1] The IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration even goes further and aspires to promote the ability and opportunity of athletes to practise sport and compete without being subject to discrimination. Fair and equal gender representation, privacy including protection of personal information, freedom of expression, due process including the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial panel, the right to request a public hearing and the right to an effective remedy are the other human rights and principles stated in the IOC Athletes’ Rights and Responsibilities Declaration. Despite sports federations’ clear commitment to the protection of human rights, it is arguable that their statutes and regulations contain restrictions on athletes and sports governing bodies exercising their human rights during competitions or in the field. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the right to freedom of expression on which certain restrictions are imposed by the federations even if it done with good intentions and with the aim of raising awareness. More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | Stepping Outside the New York Convention - Practical Lessons on the Indirect Enforcement of CAS-Awards in Football Matters - By Etienne Gard

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Stepping Outside the New York Convention - Practical Lessons on the Indirect Enforcement of CAS-Awards in Football Matters - By Etienne Gard

Editor’s Note: Etienne Gard graduated from the University of Zurich and from King's College London. He currently manages a project in the field of digitalization with Bratschi Ltd., a major Swiss law firm where he did his traineeship with a focus in international commercial arbitration.

1. Prelude

On the 10th of June, 1958, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, widely known as the “New York Convention”, was signed in New York by 10 countries.[1] This rather shy figure progressively grew over the decades to now reach 157 signatory countries, turning the New York Convention into the global recognition and enforcement instrument it is today. As V.V. Veeder’s puts it, “One English law lord is said to have said, extra judicially, that the New York Convention is both the Best Thing since sliced bread and also whatever was the Best Thing before sliced bread replaced it as the Best Thing.”[2]

However, among the overall appraisal regarding the New York Convention, some criticisms have been expressed. For instance, some states use their public policy rather as a pretext not to enforce an award than an actual ground for refusal.[3]  A further issue is the recurring bias in favor of local companies.[4] Additionally, recognition and enforcement procedures in application of the New York Convention take place in front of State authorities, for the most part in front of courts of law, according to national proceeding rules. This usually leads to the retaining of a local law firm, the translation of several documents, written submissions and one, if not several hearings. Hence, the efficiency of the New York Convention as a recognition and enforcement mechanism comes to the expense of both money and time of both parties of the arbitral procedure.

In contrast with the field of commercial arbitration, where the New York Convention is often considered the only viable option in order to enforce an award, international football organizations, together with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), offer an effective enforcement alternative. This article aims at outlining the main features of the indirect enforcement of CAS awards in football matters in light of a recent case.

2.  Facts of the Case

The dispute at hand involved a football club affiliated with the United Arab Emirates Football Association (“UAEFA”) and a player’s agent. The club at hand owed a commission to the agent following the completion of a player’s transfer. The agent ultimately won the case before the CAS and the latter awarded him monetary compensation against the football club.

Shortly thereafter, means of enforcement against the club were sought.

It is widely recognized that the awards rendered by the CAS do qualify as awards under the New York Convention and may thus be subject to the classic enforcement provided therein.[5]

Whilst this is to be welcomed because it offers alternatives to the prevailing party seeking recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, the following will show that another route exists, which may prove just as effective whilst saving both time and money.

Indeed, though the United Arab Emirates did ratify the New York Convention, the general critics mentioned above also applied in the case at hand. This meant that going down the route of direct enforcement against the UAE-based football club would have had several drawbacks. First, the translation workload in order to comply with the local procedural rules was significant. Second, since the recognition procedure was due to take place in front of national courts, a local law firm would have had to be retained. Finally, there was no clear timeline as to when exactly the due compensation would effectively be paid.

3. The Indirect Enforcement

Luckily, the world of football organizations provides for an alternative path, which proved to be highly effective at hand. Indeed, as a result of the deep-rooted integration of CAS and of its decisions in effectively all organizational layers of national and international football, the New York Convention is not the only global enforcement mechanism available to a prevailing party in that field. Although it requires to take steps outside that Convention and, as a result, of the entire ‘state-supported’ enforcement system, the indirect enforcement described below nonetheless proves to be a viable alternative for parties involved in football-related arbitration.

3.1 The Statutory Basis of Indirect Enforcement

It all starts with art. 15 para. 1 let. f of the FIFA Statutes which stipulates that the statutes of the member associations shall ensure that, inter alia, all relevant stakeholders must agree to recognize the jurisdiction and authority of CAS.[6] Art. 23 para. 1 let. f provides for a similar obligation with regard to the confederations’ statutes.[7]

Pursuant to art. 61 para. 1 of the Statutes of the Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”), to which the UAEFA is a member, the AFC recognizes the CAS to resolve disputes between, inter alia, clubs and intermediaries.[8] Further, according to art. 62 para. 1 of said Statutes, the member associations, among which the UAEFA, shall agree to recognize CAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members and clubs comply with the decisions passed by CAS. Any violation of these provisions will trigger a sanction on the breaching party, according to art. 62 para. 3 of the AFC Statutes.

Finally, art. 19 para. 4 of the UAEFA Statutes provides that each club, upon application for affiliation, shall provide a declaration whereas it undertakes to accept and implement the decisions rendered by the CAS.[9]

In light of the above, the rules of football organizations put in place a terraced indirect enforcement mechanism regarding CAS awards, whereas each club undertakes to comply with such awards vis-à-vis its home association, each such association being in turn similarly obligated vis-à-vis FIFA and its own Confederation. The latter finally has the duty to ensure that its affiliated associations recognize the authority of CAS, thereby closing the loop.

The broad sanction mechanism at every stage leaves considerable discretionary powers to the competent bodies in order to appropriately pressure the breaching stakeholder, on whichever link in the chain the latter may be, into complying with CAS decisions.

3.2 The Indirect Enforcement Procedure

The FIFA Statutes do not provide for any particular body directly tasked with the enforcement of CAS awards against FIFA’s affiliates and their stakeholders. Nor is there any particular procedure enshrined in the FIFA Statues as to how the indirect enforcement of CAS awards shall take place. In particular, art. 64 FIFA Disciplinary Code only applies to CAS decisions in appeal arbitration proceedings regarding the decisions of FIFA and not to CAS decisions rendered in an ordinary arbitration procedure.[10]

However, art. 45 of the FIFA Statutes does provide that the Member Associations Committee shall deal with relations between FIFA and its member associations as well as the member associations’ compliance with the FIFA Statutes. The same is true at the level of the AFC, whereas art. 54 of its Statutes provide that the Associations Committee shall be responsible for relations between the AFC and its Member Associations as well as Member Association’s compliance with FIFA and AFC Statutes and Regulations.

In other words, both at FIFA and AFC level, a standing committee is responsible for ensuring that the Members comply with the applicable statutes and thus, inter alia, with awards rendered by CAS.

Based on the above, we concluded that in order for the competent FIFA and AFC standing committees to examine the case of a club not complying with a CAS award, they needed to be first convinced that (i) a final and binding CAS award had been rendered against a club affiliated with a member association and that (ii) such club refused to comply with said award. Second, the above-mentioned committees would need to be shown that the national football association has been notified of such occurrence and been asked to take appropriate actions against the club according to its own statutes.

From this point in time onwards, the FIFA and AFC standing committees will have been notified that a member’s association has been asked to remedy a matter of non-compliance of an affiliated club with a CAS award and thus such association is now under a statutory obligation to ensure compliance from the club, as described above, or else may itself be found to have breached the FIFA and/or AFC Statutes and sanctioned accordingly.

4. Epilogue and Conclusion

Shifting the focus back to the case that prompted the idea of this blog, once the route leading to indirect enforcement was mapped, we proceeded with gathering the evidence needed, i.e. that the CAS award was final and binding upon the football club.

Section 193 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – which applies to international CAS proceedings – enables the parties to request an enforceability certificate from the competent state court regarding an award rendered by an international arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland. This document certifies that the award in question is final and that no appeal can be filed against it. In the case of the CAS, the state court competent for the issuance of an enforceability certificate is the Tribunal cantonal, in Lausanne.

Once this certificate was obtained, we filed it together with a copy of the award to the competent national association, the UAEFA, urging the latter in writing to request from the club that it complied with the CAS award, or else the club would be sanctioned. Both the competent standing committees of the FIFA and of the AFC received a copy of that letter.

From this moment onwards, the machinery of the indirect enforcement mechanism was switched on and we knew that leverage existed at every level, up until FIFA, to ensure that each stakeholder, be it the UAEFA or the AFC, pressures its affiliated bodies, and, ultimately, the club, into complying with the CAS award.

In the case at hand, this method proved to be successful. Indeed, as a result of the aforementioned steps, the AFC promptly contacted the UAEFA, requesting this matter to be solved and the football agent received the awarded compensation from the club within a few weeks after the UAEFA, the AFC and the FIFA were notified as described above.

This case shows how operating outside the New York Convention can prove both cost- and time-effective. When used properly, the indirect sanction mechanism put in place by football organizations proves to be a proper alternative to classic enforcement proceedings and shall in any event be considered as a viable option under similar circumstances.

[1] Flannery/Merkin, Arbitration Act 1996, 5th Ed., Oxon, 2014, p. 356.

[2] V.V. Veeder, Is There a Need to Revise the New York Convention - Key note speech, in: ‘The Review of International Arbitration Awards – IAI Forum’, International Arbitration Institute, 2008, p. 183 et sqq., p. 186.

[3] V.V. Veeder, p. 191.

[4] Gaillard, ‘The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention’, in: The New York Convention at 50, 2008, p. 689 et seqq., p. 690.

[5] Nafziger/Ross, Handbook on International Sports Law, Edward Elgar 2011, p. 40; Rubno-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., JurisNet, 2014, p.1709; Nolon, Arbitration and the Olympic Athlete, in: McCann, ‘The Oxford Handbook of American Sports Law’, OUP 2017, p. 444.

[6]Art. 15 para. 1 let. f of the FIFA statutes reads as follows: “Member associations’ statutes must comply with the principles of good governance, and shall in particular contain, at a minimum, provisions relating to the following matters: […] all relevant stakeholders must agree to recognise the jurisdiction and authority of CAS and give priority to arbitration as a means of dispute resolution […].

[7] Art. 23 para. 1 let. f of the FIFA statutes reads as follows: “The confederations’ statutes must comply with the principles of good

governance, and shall in particular contain, at a minimum, provisions relating to the following matters

[8] Art. 61 para 1 of the Asian Football Confederation Statutes reads as follows: “The AFC recognises the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between the AFC and the other Confederations, Member Associations, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, Intermediaries and licensed match agents.”

[9] Art 19 para 4 of the UAEFA Statutes reads as follows (tentative translation): “Each applicant should provide the following documents: […] A declaration that it will to accept and implement the resolutions and decisions issued by the Court of Arbitration for sport in Lausanne (CAS).”

[10] Art. 64  para 1 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code  reads as follows (emphasis added): “Anyone who fails to pay another person (such as a player, a coach or a club) or FIFA a sum of money in full or part, even though instructed to do so by a body, a committee or an instance of FIFA or a subsequent CAS appeal decision (financial decision), or anyone who fails to comply with another decision (nonfinancial decision) passed by a body, a committee or an instance of FIFA, or by CAS (subsequent appeal decision): […].”

Comments are closed