Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 

The Headlines

The eagerly awaited FIFA Presidential elections of 26 February provided for a “new face” at the pinnacle of international football for the first time since 1998. One could argue whether Infantino is the man capable of bringing about the reform FIFA so desperately needs or whether he is simply a younger version of his predecessor Blatter. Both men are of course Swiss[1], and both were general secretaries of an international football governing body (UEFA and FIFA respectively) before becoming FIFA President. Only time will tell whether Infantino manages to cleanse FIFA from all the corruption and demonstrate that he is the right man for the job. In this regard, Infantino’s portrait by Sam Borden is definitely worth a read.

Though no FIFA official was lifted from his hotel bed by the police in the days before this FIFA Extraordinary Congress, the build-up was not entirely flawless. Two of the four Presidential Candidates, Prince Ali and Jérôme Champagne, turned to CAS prior to the elections with the aim of “incorporating transparent voting booths as well as independent scrutineers, in order to safeguard the integrity of the voting process and to ensure that the vote is conducted in secret. In addition, Prince Ali also asked for the FIFA Presidential Election to be postponed in the event the CAS could not rule on the request for provisional measures before the election.”[2] Unfortunately for the two candidates, on 24 February CAS rejected their requests (press releases are accessible here and here), promising that the “full order with grounds will be communicated in a few days”. Yet, the CAS website remained mute since then.

At that same Extraordinary FIFA Congress of 26 February, several reforms were also approved. The reforms include term limits for the FIFA President, FIFA Council members and members of the Audit and Compliance Committee and of the judicial bodies of max. 12 years, and the disclosure of individual compensation on an annual basis of the FIFA President, all FIFA Council members, the Secretary General and relevant chairpersons of independent standing and judicial committees. A summary of these reforms can be read here.

Another headline involving FIFA was the FIFA’s Appeal Committee’s decision to uphold the sanctions imposed on the Belgian club FC Seraing for infringing the rules on Third Party Ownership (TPO). The sanctions include a fine of CHF 150.000 and a complete transfer ban for four consecutive transfer windows starting in the summer of 2016. TPO (or FIFA’s decision to ban the practice) was once again making headlines in February, in large part thanks to the website of footballleaks (for more on the people behind this website, I recommend this interview published by Der Spiegel). On 1 February footballleaks published the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA) between Doyen Sport and the Spanish club Sevilla FC regarding the economic rights of the French football player Geoffrey Kondogbia. Another ERPA that was made accessible for the general public also involved Doyen and a Spanish club, namely Sporting de Gijón.

In addition to new agreement releases by footballleaks, the consequences of earlier releases were slowly being felt in February. For example, the release of the Gareth Bale transfer agreement between Tottenham Hotspur and Real Madrid on 20 January caused quite a few raised eyebrows throughout Europe. Most interestingly, three Members of the European Parliament officially asked the European Commission whether it is planning to “take action under its competition law and state aid responsibilities”, since one of the banks involved in the transfer agreement (Bankia) was previously saved by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with public money. The Commission’s answer to this question can be expected shortly.

As regards other issues involving EU law and sport, February was a relatively quiet month. The most interesting new development took place on 22 February with the Euroleague Basketball stating that it submitted a competition complaint before the European Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe. In a nutshell, Euroleague Basketball is attacking the “unacceptable and illegal threats and pressures that FIBA and its member federations are making against clubs, players and referees to force them to abandon the Euroleague and the Eurocup and only participate in FIBA competitions”. The point of view of FIBA on this issue can be read here. It remains open whether the Commission decides to investigate the matter formally.

This same question can be asked about FIFPro’s complaint against the transfer system. FIFPro has decided to launch #GameChangers campaign to support the complaint and pressure the European Commission into opening an investigation. For an in-depth analysis of the issue, I recommend this piece by Nick de Marco and Alex Mills. 

A report listing the sportslaw headlines would be incomplete these days without references to all the doping related news. It is worth remembering that the two reports by the WADA Independent Commission into doping in international athletics[3] lead to the IAAF banning for life three of its senior officials.[4] This IAAF decision was appealed by the three officials in front of CAS on 1 February. The outcome of this appeal is currently still pending. The Russian Government, meanwhile, heavily criticised the two reports, holding that there is no evidence that it was involved in State-supported doping.  

Case law

The German Appeal Court in Rheinland-Pfalz reached a decision in the Müller case on 17 February.  Contrary to what the Labour Court of Mainz held in March 2015[5], the Appeal Court argued that football players are employed under a fixed-term contract. The judgment has not been made public (yet), so we do not know the full extent of the Appeal Court’s legal argumentation. Further appeal options were available to Müller, but it is unclear whether he exercised them.

On 4 February, another German Appeal Court (the OLG Frankfurt) rendered its decision in the Rogon case (we commented the first ruling on provisory measure in June) involving the German implementation of the new FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries. Here again, the full text of the ruling is still missing and we can only elaborate on press reports (here and here). Yet, it seems that the Court has decided to partially uphold the new Regulations (especially the no-fee for minors provision), while it also stroke down some aspects of the new rules (especially the intermediary’s duty to register with the DFB). 

Official Documents and Press Releases

• CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber renders Galatasaray FFP decision

  Full Decision

WADA Statement on Kenyan Athletes Doping Bribery Allegations

FIFA Congress approves landmark reforms

FIFA Appeal Committee dismisses appeals from investigatory chamber, Joseph S. Blatter and Michel Platini; grants a reduction on sentences

FIFA rejects appeal of Belgian club sanctioned under third-party influence and third-party ownership rules

Euroleague Basketball presents a complaint before the European Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe

In the news

Athletics

• The Telegraph - Nestle terminate sponsorship programme with IAAF over doping and corruption scandals

Ben Bloom - Athletics world records blow as Wang Junxia 'admits' being part of Chinese state-sponsored doping regime

Australian Football

• Michelangelo Rucci - Some Essendon players to appeal two-year WADA in Swiss courts

Baseball

• UPI.com - New York Mets' Meija receives 162-game suspension after third failed doping test

Cycling

• Stuart Clarke - Spain ordered to pay Roberto Heras €720,000 over reversed doping ban

Football

• Paul Hayward - FIFA presidential election is beyond a joke - abolition is the only solution to their game of thrones

Sam Borden - A Guide to This Week’s Extraordinary FIFA Congress

Speed skating – Pechstein

• Amanda Coletta - Speedskater Is Poised to Upend Rule of Sports’ Highest Court

Tennis

• BBC - Tennis match-fixing claims: MPs to question authorities

Sean Ingle - Revealed: tennis umpires secretly banned over gambling scam

Other

• Transparency International - Global Corruption Report: Sport[6]

Academic materials

• Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren – ‘EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?’

Arnout Geeraert - 'The EU in international sports governance'

Drs Raffaele Poli, Loïc Ravenel and Roger Besson - Foreign players in football teams

Geoff Pearson - Review of Pijetlovic 'EU Sports Law and Breakaway leagues in football' 2016 Common Market Law Review

Schwell, A., Buchowski, M., Kowalska, M., Szogs – ‘New Ethnographies of Football in Europe’

Mark Giancaspro - 'Buy-out clauses in professional football player contracts: questions of legality and integrity'

[1] In fact, Infantino grew up in the town of Brig, less than 10 km from Visp, Blatter’s home town.

[2] Media Release by the Court of Arbitration for Sport of 24 February 2016, “CAS rejects HRH Prince Ali Al Hussein’s request for urgent provisional measures”, http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release_4459_decision.pdf accessed 23 March 2016.

[3] The Independent Commission Report #1 of 9 November 2015, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf accessed 24 March 2016; and The Independent Commission Report #2 of 14 January 2016, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_2_2016_en_rev.pdf accessed 24 March 2016.

[4] I.e. Papa Massata Diack, Valentin Balakhnichev and Alexei Melnikov.

[5] For more information on the Müller case in first instance, read the blogs by Piotr Drabik: “Compatibility of Fixed-Term Contracts in Football with Directive 1999/70/EC. Part.1: The General Framework”, http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/part-1-compatibility-of-fixed-term-contracts-in-football-with-directive-1999-70-ec-the-general-framework-by-piotrek-drabik accessed 24 March 2016; and “Compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with Directive 1999/70/EC. Part 2: The Heinz Müller case”, http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/compatibility-of-fixed-term-contracts-in-football-with-directive-1999-70-ec-part-2-the-heinz-muller-case-by-piotr-drabik accessed 24 March 2016.

[6] Prof. Ben Van Rompuy of the Asser Institute contributed tot his report with his piece “The role of the betting industry”, pages 236-241.

Our first report on the FIFA business dealt with FIFA’s revenues and highlighted their impressive rise and progressive diversification. In parallel to this growth of FIFA’s income, it is quite natural that its expenses have been following a similar path (see Graph 1). However, as we will see FIFA makes it sometimes very difficult to identify precisely where the money is going. Nonetheless, this is precisely what we wish to tackle in this post, and to do so we will rely on the FIFA Financial reports over the last 10 years.

The question of the final destination of FIFA’s money is a contentious one. Many allege that FIFA executives may be profiting directly or indirectly from the revenues amassed. In order to better understand to what end FIFA’s money is disbursed, we have gathered the data contained in FIFA’s Financial Reports over a 10 year time frame and we have adjusted the numbers for inflation, thus easing any comparison. This data is synthetized in Graphs 2 and 3.

Graph 2 provides a comparative overview of the evolution of the expenses of FIFA in absolute numbers. This shows that event-related and personnel expenses (to a lesser extent also other operating costs) have been rising, while FIFA’s expenses on development and committees and congresses have remained more or less stable. Graph 3 confirms that the evolution of FIFA’s expenses is not linear, but general lessons can be drawn. The event-related expenses have been representing more than 50% of FIFA’s expenses for 4 years out of the last 5 (2010 stands out as an outlier). The trend towards the reduction of the share of FIFA’s development expenses is clearly observable (from 25% of total expenses in 2003 to 15% in 2013). This trend was only reversed in the particular context of the South-Africa World-Cup in 2010. Besides that, the share of expenses linked to wages and personnel has remained fairly stable (from 7% in 2003 to 8% in 2013). Finally, the share of the other operating costs is difficult to compare across the years, as FIFA has changed its accountancy system. Nonetheless, one can assume that from 2007 onwards, other operating expenses and Football governance (Legal costs and Committees and Congress expenses) expenses should be read together to match the previous understanding of the notion of operating expenses. Thus, read together, operating expenses would have risen from a 16% share in 2003 to a 20% one in 2013. 

Graph 2: FIFA Expenses (per stream) in USD million (adjusted for inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 3: Share FIFA expenses over 2003-20013

FIFA’s expenses are concentrated on the organization of its events (see Graph 4). In 2013, 58% of the expenses incurred by FIFA were event related (Graph 3). Indeed, since 2003 FIFA’s expenses on its events have increased from USD 286 million in 2003 to USD 728 million in 2013. However, it is very difficult to extract from the reports provided by FIFA the precise objects of these expenses. It should be noted that the organizing country is tasked with the financing of the main infrastructural investments (stadium, transportation etc…), leaving little infrastructural costs bearing on FIFA. The event-related expenses can be traced back to the financing of the local FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee (the Brazilian committee received up to USD 221.6 million), prize money, travel and accommodation costs of the FIFA officials and the participating teams and other expenses. Furthermore, they also include the FIFA Club Protection programme that compensates clubs in case of injuries suffered by players while on duty with their national teams.

Graph 4: FIFA Event-related Expenses in USD million (adjusted for inflation), 2003-2013

FIFA is often keen on trumpeting its development-related investments. It is even a key argument to justify its public utility: FIFA is to favour the development of football worldwide. This myth falls partially apart when one looks at the numbers and at their recent trajectory. Indeed, as shown in Graph 5, since 2003 (omitting the exceptional South-African peak of 2010) the Development-related expenses of FIFA have remained fairly stable (139 USD million in 2003, 185 USD million in 2013), in spite of the tremendous growth of both its overall revenues and expenses. Thus highlighting that FIFA has not been very keen on developing redistribution streams in favour of its members, the players or the supporters. Furthermore, the development schemes of FIFA are notoriously lacking transparency and their ability to achieve any real trickle-down effect is not warranted. The recent corruption scandals surrounding former FIFA vice-president Jack Warner, have highlighted the risks of this development aid getting lost in the pockets of corrupted local football officials. If FIFA is serious about football development, and not only interested in PR, it should overhaul its development funding scheme, both in terms of absolute numbers and of its institutional set-up.

Graph 5: FIFA Development related expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation) 2003-2013

On the other hand, FIFA’s own personnel costs have grown over the last 10 years (Graph 6) from 37 USD million in 2003, to 103 USD million in 2013. FIFA employs 400 staff members at its administrative centre in Zurich. The administration of FIFA is a costly enterprise. In 2013 the operating expenses reached 219 USD million (Graph 8), this includes the personnel expenses (Graph 6), but not the football governance expenses (the Committees and Congress expenses in Graph7 and legal expenses), overall the operating cost reaches 276 USD million! Those costs, especially the one dubbed other operating costs (Graph8) are relatively obscure. What do they include? Personnel (102 USD million in 2013), information technology, buildings and maintenance (22 USD million in 2013), taxes and duties (17 USD million in 2013), depreciation and amortization (12 USD million in 2013), communications (31 USD million in 2013) and other non determined expenses (32 USD million in 2013); but without providing any more details about the concrete content of those categories. This lack of explanation can only play in the hand of those that dismiss FIFA altogether as an organization interested solely in its own wealth and well-being. One is left puzzled by the amount of the operating costs, which are neither disbursed for the organization of specific events (those are the event-related expenses in Graph 4), nor for the organization of important meetings (those are the Congress and Committees expenses in Graph 7). It may be that the FIFA building’s toilet are made of gold or that its canteen is a three-star Michelin restaurant, but if so we would like to know.

Graph 6: FIFA Personnel Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 7: FIFA Committees and Congress Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to Inflation) 2003-2013

Graph 8: FIFA Other Operating Expenses in USD million (Adjusted to inflation)

Finally, FIFA has constituted a richly dotted war chest. Over the last 10 years of economic success it has amassed huge financial reserves (Graph 9), reaching up to 1453 USD million in 2013. Money lying still at a Swiss bank instead of being invested in the development of football. This money is making money for FIFA through the interests it produces. However, one can wonder why FIFA would need to hold onto such a mountain of cash, instead of redistributing in (in one way or another) to the ‘football family’. This perceived need is illustrative of the transformation of FIFA into a proper business, far remote from the interests of football and its actors.

Graph 9: FIFA reserves in USD million (Adjusted to inflation)

Conclusion: Follow the money…

We have tried to follow FIFA’s money, in order to better understand if some of the criticisms raised against the management of FIFA were justified. From a macro point of view one fact needs to be highlighted: FIFA has been making a lot more money over the last 10 years and very few of this additional money has been redistributed via its football development schemes. In fact, it is the only stream of outgoings that has seen its share in FIFA’s overall expenses drastically cut from 25% to 15% over the last 10 years. FIFA should take its development programmes seriously if it is to continue relying on them to argue its good faith and willingness to contribute to global welfare.

Moreover, one characteristics of FIFA’s financial report is the lack of transparency and readability of the data. One is challenged to figure out what certain categories concretely mean. FIFA is spending a lot for things that cannot be traced easily. At a micro-level, there is an urgent need for external observers to be able to go through the detailed account of FIFA. One of the trigger for rumoured, but also probably for real, instances of corruption lies in the fact that the supervisory mechanisms provided by public scrutiny (through the press and other institutions) is rendered moot by the accounting walls built by FIFA to isolate its spending from the public’s eye.

Eventually, FIFA must let us (and help us to) follow its money. This would be a giant step towards countering the corruption allegations being made and also legitimating the role of FIFA as the governing institution of world football. If the ‘football family’ is able to see and control the path followed by FIFA’s money, the trust in FIFA as an institution will most likely improve.