Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

UEFA’s betting fraud detection system: How does the CAS regard this monitoring tool? By Emilio García.

Editor’s note: Emilio García (emilio.garcia@uefa.ch)  is a doctor in law and head of disciplinary and integrity at UEFA. Before joining UEFA, he was the Spanish Football Federation’s legal director (2004–12) and an arbitrator at the CAS (2012–13).In this blog, Emilio García provides a brief review of a recent case before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)[1], in which he acted as main counsel for UEFA. 


Sport and match-fixing – A quick overview

Match-fixing is now legally defined as “an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others”.[2] It has been said that there has always been match-fixing in sport.[3] From the ancient Olympic Games to the most important global sports competitions of today, manipulation of results has always been an all-too-frequent occurrence.

We have seen a number of very prominent instances of this kind of issue over the years. One of the most remarkable examples, which was even the subject of a film,[4] was the match-fixing episode during the 1919 World Series, where several players from the Chicago White Sox were found guilty of accepting bribes and deliberately losing matches against the Cincinnati Reds.[5]

The situation has changed considerably since then. In particular, the globalisation of the sports betting industry has had a massive impact, with recent studies estimating that between €200bn and €500bn is betted on sport every year.[6] Match-fixing does not just affect football either;[7] it is also affecting other sports, most notably tennis.[8] More...


The Diarra Ruling of the Tribunal of Charleroi: The New Pechstein, Bosman or Mutu?

Yesterday the sports law world was buzzing due to the Diarra decision of the Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut (the Tribunal) based in Charleroi, Belgium. Newspapers were lining up (here, here and here) to spread the carefully crafted announcement of the new triumph of Jean-Louis Dupont over his favourite nemesis: the transfer system. Furthermore, I was lucky enough to receive on this same night a copy of the French text of the judgment. My first reaction while reading quickly through the ruling, was ‘OMG he did it again’! “He” meaning Belgian lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, who after a string of defeats in his long shot challenge against FIFA’s TPO ban or UEFA’s FFP (see here and here), had [at least I believed after rushing carelessly through the judgment] manufactured a new “it”: a Bosman. Yet, after carefully re-reading the judgment, it became quickly clear to me that this was rather a new Mutu (in the sense of the latest CAS award in the ‘Mutu saga’, which I have extensively analysed on this blog and in a recent commentary for the new Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration) coupled with some reflections reminding a bit (but not really as will be explicated below) the Pechstein case.

In this blog, I will retrace briefly the story behind the case and then analyse the decision of the Belgium court. In doing so, I will focus on its reasoning regarding its jurisdiction and the compatibility of article 17(2) RSTP with EU law.More...

The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IPC’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Paralympic Athletes

Editor's note: This blog is part of a special blog series on the Russian doping scandal at the CAS. Last year I analysed the numerous decisions rendered by the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio and earlier this year I reviewed the CAS award in the IAAF case.

Unlike the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) was very much unaffected by the Russian doping scandal until the publication of the first McLaren report in July 2016. The report highlighted that Russia’s doping scheme was way more comprehensive than what was previously thought. It extended beyond athletics to other disciplines, including Paralympic sports. Furthermore, unlike the International Olympic Committee (IOC) the IPC had a bit more time to deal with the matter, as the Rio Paralympic Games were due to start “only” in September.

After the release of the McLaren Report, the IPC president Sir Philip Craven was “truly shocked, appalled and deeply saddened at the extent of the state sponsored doping programme implemented in Russia”. He immediately announced the IPC’s intention to review the report’s findings and to act strongly upon them. Shortly thereafter, on 22 July, the IPC decided to open suspension proceedings against the National Paralympic Committee of Russia (NPC Russia) in light of its apparent inability to fulfil its IPC membership responsibilities and obligations. In particular, due to “the prevailing doping culture endemic within Russian sport, at the very highest levels, NPC Russia appears unable or unwilling to ensure compliance with and the enforcement of the IPC’s Anti-Doping Code within its own national jurisdiction”. A few weeks later, on 7 August, the IPC Governing Board decided to suspend the Russian Paralympic Committee with immediate effect “due to its inability to fulfil its IPC membership responsibilities and obligations, in particular its obligation to comply with the IPC Anti-Doping Code and the World Anti-Doping Code (to which it is also a signatory)”. Indeed, these “obligations are a fundamental constitutional requirement for all National Paralympic Committees (NPCs), and are vital to the IPC’s ability to ensure fair competition and to provide a level playing field for all Para athletes around the world”. Consequently, the Russian Paralympic Committee lost all rights and privileges of IPC membership. Specifically, it was not entitled to enter athletes in competitions sanctioned by the IPC, and/or to participate in IPC activities. Thus, “the Russian Paralympic Committee will not be able to enter its athletes in the Rio 2016 Paralympic Games”. More...


The Russian Doping Scandal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The IAAF’s Rio Ineligibility of Russian Athletes

Since the release of the earth-shattering ARD documentary two years ago, the athletics world has been in a permanent turmoil. The International Athletics Association Federation (IAAF) is faced with both a never-ending corruption scandal (playing out in front of the French police authorities) and the related systematic doping of Russian athletes. The situation escalated in different phases led by the revelations of Russian insiders. First, in December 2014 with the ARD documentary, which demonstrated how widespread (and organized) the recourse to doping was in Russian athletics. It triggered the Pound investigation financed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), which led to two damaging reports (available here and here) for the Russian anti-doping system and the IAAF itself. Thereafter, in November 2015, the IAAF had no other choice but to provisionally suspend the Russian athletics federation (ARAF then RusAF) and its members from IAAF competitions. Yet, this was only the beginning as shortly after the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory provided a detailed sketch to the New York Times of the operation of a general state-led doping scheme in Russia. The system was designed to avert any positive doping tests for top-level Russian sportspeople and was going way beyond athletics. These allegations were later largely confirmed and reinforced by the McLaren investigation initiated by WADA in May 2016, and which published its first report in July 2016 shortly before the Rio Olympics. In June 2016, the IAAF anticipated the conclusions of the report (it had received most of McLaren’s evidence beforehand) and decided to maintain the ineligibility of Russian athletes for IAAF competitions, and for the Rio Olympics. It did, however, foresee a narrow exception for Russian athletes able to show that they were properly tested outside of Russia. Nonetheless, the athletes using this exception were to compete under a neutral flag at the Olympics. Unsurprisingly, Russian athletes led by pole superstar (and now IOC member), Yelena Isinbayeva, and the Russian Olympic Committee decided to challenge this decision in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Interestingly, while the decision was rendered on 21 July 2016, the full text of the award was publically released only on 10 October 2016. In September, I analysed the Rio CAS Ad Hoc Decisions involving Russian athletes aiming to participate to the Olympics. I will now turn to the IAAF decision, which is of great importance to the future of the anti-doping system. Indeed, it lays out the fundamental legal boundaries of the capacity of international federations to impose sanctions on their members (and their members) in order to support the world anti-doping fight. More...

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – November and December 2016. By Saverio Spera.

Editor’s note: This report compiles all relevant news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. You are invited to complete this survey via the comments section below, feel free to add links to important cases, documents and articles we might have overlooked. 


The Headlines

The Russian State Doping Scandal and the crisis of the World Anti-Doping System

Russian doping and the state of the Anti-Doping System has been the dominant international sports law story in November and December. This is mainly due to the release of the second report of the McLaren’s investigation on 9 December 2016. The outcome of McLaren’s work showed a “well-oiled systemic cheating scheme” that reached to the highest level of Russian sports and government, involving the striking figure of 30 sports and more than 1000 athletes in doping practices over four years and two Olympic Games. The report detailed tampering with samples to swap out athletes’ dirty urine with clean urine.More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 3: The compatibility of Article 19 with EU law. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.

This final blog aims to provide some broader perspective, by sketching first the grander scheme in which Article 19 RSTP – FIFA's provision on the protection of minors – operates. Thereafter, the focus will shift towards testing Article 19 RSTP, thereby keeping in mind the previous blogs (Part 1: The Early Years and Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath), against EU free movement law.  


Putting Article 19 RSTP into perspective: The bigger picture

After having investigated the nuts and bolts of FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors in the first two parts of this blog, it might be useful to address its bigger picture.

Article 19 RSTP and its accompanying provisions regulate only a small share of the targeted activity. There is, unfortunately, also an illegal world. Circumvention of the prohibition is allegedly commonplace.[1] Visas and passports can be falsified.[2] Work permits can be obtained on the basis of jobs arranged by clubs.[3] More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 2: The 2009 reform and its aftermath. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming thesis, which he shall submit in order to complete his master’s degree.


This is the second part of a three-piece blog on FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. The contribution in its entirety aims to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. The previous (first) part has shed light on the “birth” and “first years” of the provision, and as such illustrated the relevant developments from 2001 till 2009. This second part covers the rule’s “adolescent years”, which span from 2009 to the present. The major changes put forward in the 2009, 2015 and 2016 versions of the RSTP will be addressed. Thereafter the important CAS decisions concerning Article 19, Muhic, Vada I and II, FC Barcelona, RFEF, and the FIFA decisions relating to Real Madrid and Atlético Madrid, will be scrutinized. The third, and final, part will constitute a substantive assessment of the provision under EU Internal Market law.

Given that the version adopted in 2008 left Article 19 untouched, the 2009 RSTP represented the next significant step in the regulation of the protection of minors. It had become clear that the system as used up to that point was inadequate to achieve its goal,[1] most notably because several national associations still neglected to strictly apply the rules.[2] More...


FIFA’s provision on the protection of minors - Part 1: The Early Years. By Kester Mekenkamp.

Editor’s note: Kester Mekenkamp is an LL.M. student in European Law at Leiden University and an intern at the ASSER International Sports Law Centre. This blog is, to a great extent, an excerpt of his forthcoming master thesis. 


On 24 November 2016, a claim was lodged before a Zurich commercial court against FIFA’s transfer regulations by a 17-year-old African football player.[1] The culprit, according to the allegation: The provision on the protection of minors, Article 19 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players.[2] The claimant and his parents dispute the validity of this measure, based on the view that it discriminates between football players from the European Union and those from third countries. Besides to Swiss cartel law, the claim is substantiated on EU citizenship rights, free movement and competition law. Evidently, it is difficult to assess the claim’s chance of success based on the sparse information provided in the press.[3] Be that as it may, it does provide for an ideal (and unexpected) opportunity to delve into the fascinating subject of my master thesis on FIFA’s regulatory system aimed at enhancing the protection of young football players and its compatibility with EU law. This three-part blog shall therefore try to provide an encompassing overview of the rule’s lifespan since its inception in 2001. More...


The entitlement to Training Compensation of “previous” clubs under EU Competition Law. By Josep F. Vandellos Alamilla

Editor’s note: Josep F. Vandellos is an international sports lawyer associated to RH&C (Spain). He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the publication Football Legal and a guest lecturer in the ISDE-FC Barcelona Masters’ Degree in Sports Management and Legal Skills.


Article 6 of Annexe IV (Training compensation) of the FIFA-RSTP (Ed. 2016) contains the so-called “Special Provisions for the EU/EEA” applicable to players moving from one association to another inside the territory of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA).
The provisions regarding training compensation result from the understanding reached between FIFA and UEFA with the European Union in March 2001[1], and subsequent modifications introduced in the FIFA-RSTP revised version of 2005 to ensure the compatibility of the transfer system with EU law.[2]
This blog will focus on the exception contained in article 6(3) Annexe IV of the FIFA-RSTP. According to this article, when “the former club” fails to offer a contract to the player, it loses its right to claim training compensation from the players’ new club, unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. Instead, the right of “previous clubs” to training compensation is fully preserved irrespective of their behaviour with the player.[3] From a legal standpoint, such discrimination between the “former club” and the “previous clubs” raises some questions that I will try to address in this paper. More...



The EU State aid and sport saga: The Real Madrid Decision (part 2)

This is the second and final part of the ‘Real Madrid Saga’. Where the first part outlined the background of the case and the role played by the Spanish national courts, the second part focuses on the EU Commission’s recovery decision of 4 July 2016 and dissects the arguments advanced by the Commission to reach it. As will be shown, the most important question the Commission had to answer was whether the settlement agreement of 29 July 2011 between the Council of Madrid and Real Madrid constituted a selective economic advantage for Real Madrid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.[1] Before delving into that analysis, the blog will commence with the other pending question, namely whether the Commission also scrutinized the legality of the operation Bernabeú-Opañel under EU State aid law. By way of reminder, this operation consisted of Real Madrid receiving from the municipality the land adjacent to the Bernabéu stadium, while transferring in return €6.6 million, as well as plots of land in other areas of the city. More...

Asser International Sports Law Blog | The ISU Commission's Decision and the Slippery Side of Eligibility Rules - By Stefano Bastianon (University of Bergamo)

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The ISU Commission's Decision and the Slippery Side of Eligibility Rules - By Stefano Bastianon (University of Bergamo)

Editor’s note: Stefano Bastianon is Associate Professor in European Law at the University of Bergamo and lawyer admitted to the Busto Arsizio bar. He is also member of the IVth Division of the High Court of Sport Justice (Collegio di Garanzia dello sport) at the National Olympic Committee.

1. From the very beginning, the outcome of the ISU case was highly predictable, at least for those who are familiar with the basics of antitrust law. Nevertheless, more than twenty years after the Bosman judgment, the sports sector has shown the same shortsightedness and inability to see the forest for the trees. Even this attitude was highly predictable, at least for those who know the basics of sports governance. The final result is a clear-cut decision capable of influencing the entire sports movement.

2. On the 8th of December 2017, the European Commission ruled that ISU’s eligibility rules breached EU competition law. In particular, the Commission focused on the ISU’s eligibility rule, according to which speed skaters participating in competitions that were not approved by the ISU face severe penalties up to a lifetime ban from all major international speed skating events. The Commission found that such rules restrict competition and enable the ISU to pursue its own commercial interests to the detriment of athletes and organizers of competing events[1]. In sharp contrast with the Commission’s decision is the ISU’s statement published the same day. Indeed, according to the ISU the Commission’s decision is wrong because it fails to consider the specific nature of sports by putting commercial interests ahead of the principles of integrity, health and safety that protect fair play in sport. For this reason the statement ends with the ISU’s reserve to appeal the decision.

3. As it often occurs, small cases (that is cases involving almost unknown athletes or less popular sports and for this reason often underestimated) are able to generate consequences of great importance, presenting many aspects of interest to scholars of EU sports law: this is the case of the ISU affair.

4. First of all, it is a matter of common knowledge that the Commission tends not to intervene in cases dealing with regulatory and organizational aspects of sport. To this regard, it is sufficient to consider that in the 1999 Mouscron case the Commission took the view that the UEFA Cup rule requiring that each club must play its home match at its own ground ("at home and away from home" rule) was a sports rule that did not fall within the scope of the Treaty's competition rules and therefore rejected the complaint. In the 2001 FIA case the Commission closed various anti-trust investigations into certain regulations and commercial arrangements involving Formula One after the parties agreed to make changes which limited the FIA to a regulatory role, so as to prevent any conflict of interests and remove certain commercial restrictions imposed on circuit owners and TV broadcasters. Similarly, in the 2002 FIFA case, the Commission closed its investigation into the rules governing international transfers of football players, in which it formally rejected the complaints related to FIFA in the light of the adoption of new rules capable of balancing a player’s fundamental right to free movement and stability of contracts together with the legitimate objective of integrity of the sport and the stability of championships. Lastly, in the 2002 UEFA multi-ownership rule case the Commission established that the purpose of the rule was not to distort competition, but to guarantee the integrity of the competitions it organizes and rejected the complaint. More recently, in the 2011 Formula One Engine Manufacturers case and the 2014 Financial Fair-Play case the Commission rejected the complaints because of a lack of community interest. In this context, even from a purely statistical point of view, the ISU decision cannot be underestimated.

5. Secondly, one aspect of the importance of the ISU decision lies in the specific matter dealt with. Indeed, eligibility rules (although sometimes differently named) are a common element of many sports. For example the FINA General Rule 4, under the heading “Unauthorised relations”, states that

«no affiliated Member shall have any kind of relationship with a non-affiliated or suspended body (…). Any individual or group violating this Rule shall be suspended by the affiliated Member for a minimum period of one year, up to a maximum period of two years. (…). Each Member that conducts a competition shall strictly enforce the FINA Rules governing eligibility».

The FIG Technical Regulations, Appendix B (Rules of Eligibility for the International Gymnastic Federation) state that

«an eligible gymnast is any gymnast who abides by the eligibility rules of the FIG and the gymnast's National Federation. In any competition sanctioned or conducted by the FIG, each National Federation is responsible for certifying the eligibility of gymnasts from its country. Only gymnasts meeting the requirements of Regulation I are authorised to participate in official competitions and particularly those competitions which qualify gymnasts for Olympic Games and Youth Olympic Games (…). A gymnast may not: (…); b) take part in any gymnastic competition or exhibition which is not sanctioned by the FIG or his/her National Federation (…). Any gymnast infringing these rules, after their enforcement, may not claim to be eligible to participate in the Olympic Games and Youth Olympic Games or qualifying tournaments for the Games».

The FIH Regulations on Sanctioned and Unsanctioned Events state that

«it is prohibited for any National Association, and for any organisation or individual (including Athletes, technical officials, umpires, coaching or management staff) under the jurisdiction of a National Association, to participate in any manner in an Unsanctioned Event. Any Athlete or other individual who participates in any capacity in an Unsanctioned Event is automatically ineligible for twelve months thereafter to participate in any capacity in any International Event».

The UCI Cycling Regulations, under the heading «Forbidden Races», state that

«no licence holder may participate in an event that has not been included on a national, continental or world calendar or that has not been recognised by a national federation, a continental confederation or the UCI».

As a consequence, the ISU decision goes far beyond the specific sport considered (speed skating) and represents a clear message sent by the Commission to the entire sports world.

6. From this point of view, it is important not to forget that before the Commission there are still pending two complaints lodged respectively by the Euroleague Basketball and by FIBA. The dispute between FIBA and Euroleague Basketball goes back to the end of 2015 when FIBA announced the creation of a basketball Champions League in direct competition with the two European professional clubs’ competitions organized by the ECA. In order to force professional clubs to participate in the new Basketball Champions League, FIBA did not hesitate to put pressure on national federations threatening the possibility of excluding their national teams from participation in main competitions such as EuroBasket and the Olympic Games. According to the Euroleague Basketball the complaint «targets the unacceptable and illegal threats and pressures that FIBA and its member federations are making against clubs, players and referees to force them to abandon the Euroleague and the EuroCup and only participate in FIBA competitions. The complaint's objective is to guarantee that clubs, players and referees can freely make the choice to participate in the competitions that they consider appropriate without being subject to threats or pressures. FIBA is violating European Union law because, in a blatant conflict of interest, FIBA has rules on its books that provide for sanctions against those who are involved in competitions not approved by FIBA». In a completely specular way, FIBA has lodged a complaint against the Euroleague Basketball alleging an abusive tying by imposing undue pressure on leagues and clubs, as well as threatening exclusion from the Euroleague unless they commit to the EuroCup (…); a “syndication agreement” circulated among the 11 A license clubs who hold the majority of votes in ECA, meaning that six clubs control ECA, including all Euroleague and EuroCup decisions in sporting and commercial matters; arbitrarily cherry-picking clubs for Euroleague and EuroCup, which means destroying any commercial and sporting value of domestic leagues and undermining the competitive balance in European basketball; abusively discriminating against financially weaker clubs, thereby placing them at a further competitive disadvantage». However, the FIBA/Euroleague dispute involves another fundamental aspect related to the scheduling of competitions. According to FIBA, the new Euroleague calendar does not include windows of time for national team competitions in February or November, and for this reason, the Euroleague is preventing the release of players to national team competitions. On the contrary, according to the Euroleague, FIBA’s new windows in February and November represent a change from the past where international competitions, including the World Cup qualifiers, were held in the summer, during the offseason for most leagues.[2]

Although different in many respects compared to the ISU case, the FIBA/Euroleague affair raises again the problem of conflict of interest when sports federations pretend to exercise autonomously their regulatory power for the sake of the organization of sport and to simultaneously carry out an economic activity related to the organization of sporting events. In consideration of the dual nature of sports federations, the basic problem to be solved is to clarify if and to what extent the conduct of a sports federation is legitimate when it uses its regulatory power to exclude or marginalize third parties from the market of the organization of sporting events. 

7. Going back to the merit of the ISU affair and waiting to read the decision, the Commission’s press release and the statement by Commissioner Vestager are very important in order to better understand the scope and limits of the decision. The decision is not about the pyramid structure of European sports. The principle of a single federation for each sport and the right of the federations to organise competition from local to international levels is a milestone of the European model of sport. In this context the decision does not question the right of sports federations to enact rules necessary to achieve those goals. However, the ISU decision confirms that sport is not just for fun, but it is also a business. Therefore, although the Commission does not intend “to be the referee in every dispute about sport”, in matters dealing with the economic dimension of sport, sports federations must understand that the business of sports has to comply with competition rules. This means that the sole fact that eligibility rules or any other rule enacted by sports federations pursue a legitimate objective (for example, the protection of athletes’ health, the integrity and the proper conduct of sport, the fight against doping) does not represent a valid justification to put those rules outside the scope of EU law. Indeed, according to the Court of Justice’s case law, sporting rules set up by sports federations are compatible with EU law only if they pursue a legitimate objective and the restrictions that they create are inherent and proportionate to reaching this objective. Therefore, in cases relating to the exercise of regulatory power by sports federations the problem does not concern the legitimate nature of the objectives pursued. Generally speaking, in all the cases examined by the Commission and National antitrust authorities, the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by the federations has never been questioned. On the contrary, in those cases the problem was the inherent and proportionate character of the restrictions created by the federations through the exercise of their regulatory power. From this point of view, therefore, it can be said that it must certainly be considered inherent and proportionate to the objective of ensuring the integrity of the sport the rule requiring the athletes who participate in an event not authorized by the respective federation to undergo, at their own expense, an anti-doping tests before being able to attend an event organized by the federation. Quite the reverse, a clause sanctioning the athlete who participates in a competition not authorized by the federation with a lifetime ban from all the events organized by the federation appears totally disproportionate. Similarly, it must certainly be considered inherent and proportionate to the objective of ensuring the integrity of the sport the rule requiring anyone who intends to organize a sporting event outside the federation to ensure compliance with the rules of the game, as elaborated by the federation, and the anti-doping controls. In contrast, the clause that imposes on the organizer of an event the obligation to respect the rules of the federation in regards to the choice of the athletes or teams admitted to participate in such competition must be considered disproportionate. Although it is true that the European model of sport expressly refers to the mechanism of promotion and relegation as a distinguishing feature compared to the US model, it is equally true that the Commission has never qualified the structure of open leagues as a legitimate objective capable of justifying the provision of rules restricting competition or the free movement of persons. Moreover, even considering the model of the open leagues a necessary feature of the European sports model, it must be emphasized that the organization of a sporting event based on a system of special licenses is not in itself in contrast with the founding values ​​of the European sports model. On the one hand, the existence of other events (national and European) characterized by the traditional mechanisms of promotion and relegation represents the best safeguard of the European model of sport. However, it is clear that in order to protect the meritocratic criterion behind the mechanism of promotion and relegation it is sufficient to provide a mixed system where some athletes or teams are admitted on the basis of a licence and other athletes/teams are admitted on the basis of the results achieved on the pitch.

8. We can imagine the ISU’s disappointment regarding the Commission’s decision.  On the contrary, what is really difficult to understand is the ISU’s position shown in the statement published on the same day of the Commission’s decision. The idea that the Commission’s decision fails to consider the specific nature of sport is simply nonsense considering the rather vague nature of the notion of specificity of sports, especially in the post Meca Medina era. Similarly, the idea that the Commission’s decision puts commercial interests ahead of the principles of integrity, health, and safety that protect fair play in sports has no legal basis. In the same way, the idea that the decision is contrary to the Treaty, which recognizes the voluntary, social, and educational functions of sports reveals a serious lack of knowledge of the basics of EU law applied to the sports sector. On the other hand, the ISU correctly affirms that its eligibility rules—similar to the eligibility rules of many other international sports federations—ensure the protection of the health and safety of athletes at all authorized events as well as the integrity of sports events, and that these rules are essential to the role of international federations as the guardians of sports movement. However, it is easy to assert that the Commission’s decision does not question this argument and the fundamental role of international federations to organize the proper and correct conduct of sport.  To this regard, the decision not to impose a fine on the ISU is a clear signal. Another signal is represented by the recognition that there are many disputes which have little or nothing at all to do with competition rules as they raise primarily issues related to the governance of a sport. In other words, sports federations must understand that the sole fact that they are charged to guarantee the integrity and proper conduct of their sport, the protection of athletes’ health, and other fundamental values related to sports does not automatically mean that the rules enacted to pursue these objectives cannot be scrutinized through the lens of EU law. Once and for all, it should be understood that when the exercise of regulatory power by sports federations is able to affect the distinct market of the organization of sports events, in which sports federations compete with other sports events organisers, EU law applies. This new context should have been evident following the Bosman ruling and, above all, after the Meca Medina judgment. Unfortunately, the ISU decision (and the ISU’s reaction) confirms that this is not yet the case.


[1] For more details, see http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/what-can-eu-competition-law-do-for-speed-skaters 

[2] On this subject it is worthy to note that the statement by Commissioner Vestager on the ISU decision clearly highlights that things like the penalties for doping or match-fixing, or deciding the precise scheduling have little or nothing at all to do with antitrust. For these, sports organisations must live up to their responsibilities and find solutions and mechanisms for solving disputes that deliver the results that the public and the athletes deserve.

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