Editor’s note: N. Emre Bilginoglu[1] is a lawyer based in Istanbul. His book entitled “Arbitration on Football Contracts” was published in 2015.

Introduction

With a total market value of approximately 911 million EUR, the Turkish Super League ranks as one of the prominent football leagues in Europe. Five of the eighteen teams that make up half of the total market value are based in Istanbul, a busy megalopolis that hosts a population of fifteen million inhabitants.[2] As might be expected, the elevated market value brings forth a myriad of disputes, mainly between the clubs and the players. However, other crucial actors such as coaches and agents are also involved in some of the disputes. These actors of the football industry are of all countries, coming from various countries with different legal systems.

One corollary of rapid globalisation is the development of transnational law, which is quite visible in the lex sportiva.[3] Like foreign investors, foreign actors of the sports industry look for some legal security before signing a contract. FIFA does protect these foreign actors in some way, providing players and coaches legal remedies for employment-related disputes of an international dimension. But what if the legal system of the FIFA member association does not provide a reasonable legal remedy for its national actors?[4]

That is why lawyers who are involved in sports related disputes have to guide their law-makers in improving their legal systems after thoroughly examining the dispute resolution mechanisms of other countries. Arbitration is indeed growing exponentially as a method of dispute resolution.[5] The renowned alternative dispute resolution is especially preferred in disputes arising from sports contracts, where both a rapid and a confidential resolution is of the essence.[6]  However, some legal systems oblige the parties of a sports related dispute to resolution by arbitration whereas some legal systems do not. This article gives the reader an insight about resolution of disputes arising from football contracts in Turkey. 

Turkish Method of Dispute Resolution

In August 2015, the Turkish Football Federation made certain changes in its Statute and guidelines. Since those changes, disputes arising from contracts between football clubs, players, coaches and agents are resolved within the Turkish Football Federation Dispute Resolution Board (“UCK”).[7] Therefore, applying to State courts for these disputes (the previous way of resolving disputes) is now impossible, which is a substantial legal issue.

Article 59 of the Turkish Constitution states that disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters should be resolved by mandatory arbitration.[8] Decisions of these kinds cannot be appealed to any court of the judiciary. The scope of this article does not include employment related disputes. Article 9 of the Constitution declares that judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. However, courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from football contracts because of the regulations of the Turkish Football Federation. Kelsen’s hierarchy of laws is indeed upside down, alas, the current practice without a proper legal basis is the actual practice. It does not seem like a change is scheduled in the near future, given that many are grateful for the rapid resolution of disputes.

The UCK consists of a “Board of Presidents” and arbitrators. It carries out a simple arbitration process and it involves two arbitrators and a UCK official. The applicant is responsible for the application fee (3% of the disputed amount) and paying the arbitrators' fees, which are decided by UCK (between about 450 and 1500 Euros per arbitrator). The UCK decides within four months (they have the right to extend the time limit for a month based on justified grounds). The decision of the UCK may be appealed to the Turkish Football Federation Appeals Board. However, this appeal does not obstruct the enforcement of the award. Although the statute of the Turkish Football Federation recognizes the competence of CAS, it also declares that the decisions rendered by the Appeals Board cannot be reviewed by CAS.[9]

Decisions of the UCK are not published. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are published without reasoning. Hence, it is impossible to know both the facts of the case and how the arbitral tribunal reached a verdict. This negatively impacts the predictability of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal.

The proper composition of the UCK is an important condition for fair and equitable proceedings.[10] Arbitrators are nominated by the Foundation of the Clubs, the Association of Football Players and the Association of Coaches. These three institutions may nominate up to 25 arbitrators each. However, the Turkish Football Federation board of directors appoints the arbitrators from the list of nominees, thus casting a shadow on the independence and the impartiality of the arbitral tribunal, which are crucially important for the right to a fair trial.[11] There are numerous links between the UCK, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Turkish Football Federation. The Federation finances the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal, can modify the Statutes of the UCK and the Arbitral Tribunal and it appoints the arbitrators of the UCK and the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The current formation of the UCK resembles CAS before Gundel reforms.

Sporting sanctions and training compensations are also within the scope of the UCK.[12] Decisions of the UCK may only be appealed to Arbitral Tribunal of the Turkish Football Federation. The lack of a judicial review for these decisions is disconcerting. I believe the involvement of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the CAS process could serve as a good model. CAS decisions may be appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal but there is no court in Turkey to appeal to once the Arbitral Tribunal decides on the matter. A general court or the Turkish Court of Cassation must review the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding disputes on football contracts. Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal related to sports administration and disciplinary matters are accurately not appealable, as stated by Article 59 of the Constitution. However, Article 59 of the Constitution does not include personal actions. Article 9 of the constitution declares that the judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts. The right to access to courts that is granted by the Constitution cannot be breached by an amendment of the Turkish Football Federation. Therefore, courts are wrong for denying jurisdiction for disputes arising from football contracts. 

Players

The rights and obligations between clubs and players are determined by an employment agreement.[13] In Turkey, labour courts have jurisdiction on disputes arising from employment agreements. However, the Turkish Labour Code does not apply to players, thus surprisingly excluding the jurisdiction of labour courts for disputes regarding them. Article 4 of the Labour Code states that the Code does not apply to athletes. The reason behind this exclusion is not to grant certain rights and benefits to athletes, such as severance payments. Before the amendments of August 2015 came into force, disputes regarding players were resolved in general courts, not labour courts. The debate whether general courts or labour courts have jurisdiction is now obsolete, as the players have to apply to the UCK for the disputes arising from football contracts.

The FIFA DRC adjudicates on cases regarding employment related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension, therefore foreign players do not have to apply to the UCK. In a case of dual citizenship (the player was British/ Turkish), CAS awarded that someone who benefits from Turkish citizenship should also accept its possible burdens, thus refusing jurisdiction.[14]

Arbitration is indubitably more preferable compared to courts for players. The UCK decides within four months and the decision is enforced by the Turkish Football Federation right away. This promptitude surely provides an advantage for players. Nevertheless, arbitrators’ fees are a hefty burden for destitute amateur players or pro players of the third league. On the contrary, application fees that are three percent of the disputed amount is a supernumerary amount for high earning players. High arbitration cost is a concern, as it is strictly related to right of access to courts. Costs should not victimize the plaintiff. 

Coaches

The FIFA PSC adjudicates on disputes between a club and a coach of an international dimension. Turkish coaches working in Turkey do not have that option. Before the implementation of the mandatory arbitration, labour courts had jurisdiction over the disputes arising from employment agreements of coaches. As of August 2015, coaches may only apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts.

The Turkish Super League clubs do not prefer stability with regard to their coaches, as only one team in the league started the 2016-2017 season with the same coach for the third consecutive year. Coaches seem content with the rapid resolution of their contractual disputes and the confidentiality provided by arbitration, however, arbitrators within UCK are seldom appointed by them.

Agents

The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players state that the PSC has no jurisdiction to hear any contractual dispute involving intermediaries. Agents, foreign or not, have to apply to the UCK for disputes arising from their contracts. This is overall problematic for agents, because they do not have any say on the appointment of arbitrators. Therefore, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is suspicious, especially for agents. It is highly recommended for foreign agents to work with Turkish lawyers doing business in Turkey. If not, they will have to hire one at some point.  

Conclusion

Arbitration does truly offer a structure that is football-oriented and more aware of the realities of modern football, as stated in the preamble of FIFA NDRC Standard Regulations. “National” arbitration of football related disputes is evolving. The fact that this is genuinely a developing method of dispute resolution should encourage practitioners to improve their national legal systems. Practitioners and those who are in the football business may quite easily benefit from such improvement because it would only influence the business positively. In the Turkish context I would advise the following:

First, decisions not regarding disputes related to sports administration and disciplinary matters of the Arbitral Tribunal should be appealable. This would provide the right to access to courts, as granted by the Constitution.

Second, the independence and the impartiality of the UCK is still a problematic issue that needs to be tackled. The UCK should not be within the structure of the Turkish Football Federation. The process of the appointment of arbitrators should be revised. Clubs, players, coaches and agents must have an equal say on the matter.

The current Turkish system is preferable compared to everlasting court process. Four months to receive an award and the assurance of the enforcement of the award by the Turkish Football Federation is quite encouraging. Mandatory arbitration of UCK is very recent and hopefully the novel system will evolve to fulfil the criteria of FIFA.

[1] Nurettin Emre Bilginoglu, LLM, Attorney-at-law

 Istanbul, Turkey

 e-mail: emre@caglayanyalcin.com

[2] http://www.transfermarkt.com/super-lig/startseite/wettbewerb/TR1

[3] Duval (2013) Lex Sportiva: a playground for transnational law. Eur Law J 19:822-842.

[4] Preamble of the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations points at this issue:

 “Currently, only a limited number of member associations have a national dispute resolution chamber or a body structured along similar lines that fulfils the criteria of article 22 paragraph b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. This means that the vast majority of international employment-related disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and that the majority of “national” cases may not find appropriate solutions.”

[5] See Ashford (2014) Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration. JurisNet LLC, New York and Karton (2013) The Culture of International Arbitration and the Evolution of Contract Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[6] See Rigozzi (2005) L’arbitrage international en matière de sport. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel.

[7] See Eksi N (2015) Spor Tahkim Hukuku. Beta, Istanbul and Bilginoglu N (2015) Resolution of Disputes Arising From Football Contracts. Beta, Istanbul.

[8] Artıcle 59- The State shall take measures to develop the physical and mental health of Turkish citizens of all ages, and encourage the spread of sports among the masses. The State shall protect successful athletes. (Paragraph added on March 17, 2011; Act No. 6214) The decisions of sport federations relating to administration and discipline of sportive activities may be challenged only through compulsory arbitration. The decisions of Board of Arbitration are final and shall not be appealed to any judicial authority.

[9] “…the TFF Statutes and the Turkish Football Law expressly exclude any appeal against national arbitral tribunals’ decisions, i.e. against such a decision like the Appealed Decision which is the object of the present case. The particular trumps the general. Therefore the argument of the Player that he has an express right of appeal to the CAS under the TFF Statutes must be rejected.” See CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF).

[10] CAS 2015/A/4172 Association of Unions of Football Players and Coaches v. Football Union of Russia.

[11] Although the formation of the arbitral tribunal was different, see CAS 2006/O/1055 Del Bosque, Grande, Miñano Espín & Jiménez v/ Besiktas. For European Court of Human Rights decisions, see Terra Woningen B.V. v. Netherlands, Application N:     20641/92, Date: 17/12/1996; Tsfayo v. UK, Application N: 60860/00, Date: 14/11/2006.

[12] See de Weger (2016) The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, T.M.C. Asser Press for extensive information on sporting sanctions and training compensations.

[13] De Weger (2016) p. 132; For the German practise, see Frodl C (2016) Neuer, Hummels, Muller, Gotze & Co: the legal framework governing industrial relations in German professional football, Int Sports Law J (2016) 16:3–21.

[14] CAS 2010/A/1996 Omer Riza v. Trabzonspor Kulübü Dernegi & Turkish Football Federation (TFF). 

The first part of this two-part blog examined the new bidding regulations adopted by the IOC and UEFA, and concluded that it is the latter who gives more weight to human rights in its host selection process. This second part completes the picture by looking at FIFA's bidding regulations for the 2026 World Cup. It goes on to discuss whether human rights now constitute a material factor in evaluating bids to host the mega-sporting events organised by these three sports governing bodies.

FIFA: 2026 World Cup

About the host selection process

The United States, Mexico, and Canada together on the one side and Morocco on the other are bidding to host the 2026 World Cup. The bidders must now prepare and submit their Bid Books to FIFA by no later than 16 March 2018, providing the world's governing body of football with information regarding their hosting vision and strategy, the country's political system and economic situation, technical matters, other event-related matters, or human rights and environmental protection.[1] FIFA will then commission a Bid Evaluation Task Force,[2] composed of the chairman of the Audit and Compliance Committee, the chairman of the Governance Committee, one member of the Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions, and certain members of the General Secretariat with relevant expertise, to prepare a written report evaluating each bid. This report will be split into three sections, namely (i) compliance assessment; (ii) an assessment of the risks and benefits of each bid, including the risks of adverse impacts on human rights; and (iii) an assessment of key infrastructural and commercial aspects of each bid, including stadiums, transport infrastructure, organising costs, or estimated media and marketing revenues.[3] The Bid Evaluation Task Force will apply a scoring system that might eventually lead to the exclusion of a bid from the host selection process in the event of its failure to reach a required minimum score.[4] It is critical to note, however, that this scoring system will only be used to evaluate infrastructural and commercial aspects of each bid.[5] In other words, human rights or environmental protection are not subject to this scoring system.

The Bid Evaluation Task Force will forward its report to the members of the FIFA Council who will determine whether or not each bid qualifies to be voted on by the FIFA Congress.[6] While until now the decision on the venue for the FIFA's flagship event has been taken by the Council (formerly the Executive Committee), the host of the 2026 World Cup will be elected for the first time by the members of the Congress.[7] The Congress will meet for this purpose in June 2018 and it may either award the right to host the tournament to one of the candidates or reject all bids designated by the Council.[8] In the latter case, FIFA will launch a new procedure that will culminate with a final decision in May 2020.[9] It is also worthwhile noting that the entire host selection process will be overseen by an independent audit company.[10]

Human rights as selection criteria

A number of human rights requirements could be found across different bidding documents relating to the host selection process for the 2026 World Cup. This section takes a closer look at the content of these requirements. 

First, each member association bidding to host the tournament must undertake to respect all internationally recognised human rights in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles).[11] Importantly, this commitment covers not only the member association's own activities, but also the activities of other entities that are in a business relationship with the member association, be it for the production of goods or provision of services. In this respect, FIFA acknowledges that ''a significant part of human rights risk may be associated with the activities of third parties''.[12]

Second, FIFA requires that each bidder provide a human rights strategy outlining how it is going to honour its commitment mentioned above.[13] While a similar requirement also appears in the UEFA's bidding documentation for the Euro 2024, FIFA is much more specific in defining the essential elements of this strategy. Accordingly, the strategy shall include a comprehensive report ''identifying and assessing any risks of adverse human rights impacts […] with which the member association may be involved either through its own activities or as a result of its business relationships''.[14] Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the entire host selection process is the follow-up requirement that this report be complemented by an independent study carried out by an organisation with recognised expertise in the field of human rights.[15] This independent expert organisation will examine to what extent does the national context, including the national legislation, influence the member association's capacity to respect all internationally recognised human rights.[16] As part of their strategy, the bidders should further explain what measures they intend to take in order to mitigate any human rights risks identified in the comprehensive report.[17] Moreover, the strategy should contain information about the implementation of an ongoing due diligence process, the plans for meaningful community and/or stakeholder dialogue and engagement,[18] the protection of human rights defenders' and journalists' rights, or grievance mechanisms.[19]

Third, each bidder must provide a report summarising its ''stakeholder engagement process implemented as part of the development of the […] human rights strategy''.[20] Fourth and last, the government of each country bidding to host the 2026 World Cup shall express its commitment to: (i) respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights in connection with the hosting and staging of the tournament; and (ii) ensuring that victims of human rights abuses will have access to effective remedies.[21] To this effect, each of the involved governments is required to sign a separate declaration.

A comparative overview

It remains to be seen whether the new bidding regulations will help reduce the number and severity of adverse human rights impacts linked to mega-sporting events. For the time being, it is essential to identify the strong and weak points of these regulations.

When discussing strengths, FIFA and UEFA come to mind. Both organisations should be applauded for demanding that the bidders pledge to respect and protect internationally recognised human rights independently of the locally recognised human rights.[22] FIFA moreover extends this obligation to the activities of third parties that are in a business relationship with the bidding member association. Both FIFA and UEFA also ask for a human rights strategy that should include some crucial information such as evidence of meaningful consultation with potentially affected communities. Again, FIFA goes one step further by requiring that this strategy be accompanied by an independent expert study.

All three sports governing bodies reserve the right to assign a role to independent human rights experts in evaluating or preparing bids.[23] And while this is in itself commendable, it should be noted that such a role is limited because it does not entail decision-making competences. For instance, the expert institution responsible for developing an independent study in the host selection process for the 2026 World Cup will not have the power to exclude a bid if it ascertains that the national context significantly undermines the member association's capacity to respect internationally recognised human rights. This expert institution will certainly put more pressure on FIFA in the sense that any action contrary to the institution's recommendations will have to be publicly justified by compelling reasons, but FIFA may nevertheless decide to consider a bid even if it entails serious human rights risks. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why only infrastructural and commercial aspects of a bid are subject to the scoring system applied by the Bid Evaluation Task Force. If the main reason for this is the fact that the members of the Bid Evaluation Task Force lack expertise in the field of human rights, then the assessment of human rights aspects should perhaps be left to independent experts only. It would be crucial to give these human rights experts some power to decide whether or not a bid qualifies for the next stages of the host selection process. A greater role for independent human rights experts in evaluating bids to host mega-sporting events could come with the establishment of an independent Centre for Sport and Human Rights in 2018. However, this will probably not affect the host selection processes that are currently underway.

Conclusion 

Including human rights within the criteria for evaluating bids to host mega-sporting events may deter many countries, especially those with a negative human rights record, from launching a bid. However, as Professor John Ruggie makes clear, human rights requirements in bidding regulations for mega-sporting events are not aimed at ''peremptorily excluding countries based on their general human rights context''.[24] Indeed, a country where human rights abuses occur can nevertheless deliver an abuse-free event. To do so, it will need to develop an effective strategy and, if selected, guarantee the implementation of this strategy from day one.

[1]    FIFA, Structure, Content, Presentation, Format and Delivery of Bid Book for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

[2]    FIFA, Bidding Registration regarding the submission of Bids for the hosting and staging of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, pp. 23-28.

[3]    Ibid. pp. 24-25. See also FIFA, Guide to the Bidding Process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, p. 7.

[4]    FIFA, Bidding Registration, pp. 25-27.

[5]    Ibid.

[6]    Ibid. p. 31. See also FIFA Statutes, Article 69(2)(d).

[7]    FIFA, Bidding Registration, pp. 31-32. See also FIFA Statutes, Article 69(1).

[8]    FIFA, Bidding Registration, p. 31.

[9]    FIFA, Guide to the Bidding Process, p. 13.

[10]   FIFA, Bidding Registration, pp. 22-23.

[11]   FIFA, Structure, Content, Presentation, Format and Delivery of Bid Book, Section 23 – Human Rights and Labour Standards. In addition to international treaties and instruments mentioned in Principle 12 of the UN Guiding Principles, FIFA concedes that ''the scope […] of internationally recognised human rights may be enlarged to include, for instance, the United Nations instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples; women; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; children; persons with disabilities; and migrant workers and their families''. See FIFA, Bidding Registration, p. 74.

[12]   FIFA, Structure, Content, Presentation, Format and Delivery of Bid Book, Section 23 – Human Rights and Labour Standards.

[13]   Ibid.

[14]   Ibid.

[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Ibid.

[17]   Ibid.

[18]   The community and/or stakeholder dialogue and engagement should be in line with relevant authoritative standards such as the AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Process.

[19]   FIFA, Structure, Content, Presentation, Format and Delivery of Bid Book, Section 23 – Human Rights and Labour Standards.

[20]   Ibid.

[21]   FIFA, Overview of Government Guarantees and the Government Declaration, pp. 11-12.

[22]   In this regard, FIFA also notes that ''where the national context risks undermining FIFA's ability to ensure respect for internationally recognised human rights, FIFA will constructively engage with the relevant authorities and other stakeholders and make every effort to uphold its international human rights responsibilities''. See FIFA's Human Rights Policy, para. 7.

[23]   IOC, Report of the IOC 2024 Evaluation Commission, p. 7. UEFA, Bid Regulations for the UEFA Euro 2024, Article 14. As mentioned earlier in this blog, FIFA demands that the bidders put forward a human rights strategy complemented by an independent expert study.  

[24]   John G. Ruggie, For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights, p. 32.