This is a follow-up contribution to my previous blog on human rights implications of the Olympic Games published last week. Together with highlighting some of the most serious Olympic Games-related human rights abuses, the first part has outlined the key elements of the Host City Contract ('HCC') as one of the main legal instruments regulating the execution of the Olympic Games. It has also indicated that, in February 2017, the International Olympic Committee ('IOC') revised the 2024 HCC to include, inter alia, explicit human rights obligations. Without questioning the potential significance of inserting human rights obligations to the 2024 HCC, this second part will refer to a number of outstanding issues requiring clarification in order to ensure that these newly-added human rights obligations are translated from paper to actual practice.

Implementation of Agenda 2020 into the HCC 

In December 2014, the IOC Session unanimously approved Olympic Agenda 2020 ('Agenda 2020'), a set of 40 recommendations intended to protect the uniqueness of the Games and strengthen Olympic values in society. Agenda 2020 makes five specific recommendations with respect to the HCC which should have been taken into account as of the 2022 HCC concluded between the IOC on the one hand and the City of Beijing and the Chinese Olympic Committee on the other hand.[1]

Most importantly, Agenda 2020 encourages the IOC to include in the HCC clauses reflecting the prohibition of discrimination as well as the protection of environmental and labour-related rights.[2] Fundamental Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter, now also reflected in Article 13.2. (a) of the 2024 HCC, reads as follows: ''The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.'' Non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation had been absent from the Olympic Charter prior to Agenda 2020. As far as environmental and labour-related matters are concerned, the Host City, the Host National Olympic Committee ('Host NOC') and the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games ('OCOG') are obliged under the 2024 HCC to ''ensure that their activities in relation to the organisation of the Olympic Games comply with any international agreements, laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country, with regard to planning, construction, protection of the environment, health and safety, labour and working conditions and cultural heritage''.[3] For the first time, the 2024 HCC also makes a specific reference to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.[4]

In addition to promoting non-discrimination, environmental protection and labour-related rights, Agenda 2020 also fosters transparency by demanding the IOC to: (i) make the HCC public; (ii) disclose details of the IOC's financial contribution to the OCOG; and (iii) provide the HCC at the outset of a bidding procedure.[5] Moreover, Agenda 2020 suggests that entities other than the Host City and the Host NOC may become signatories to the HCC in line with the local context.[6]

What exactly has been added to the 2024 HCC?

As indicated above, the prohibition of discrimination,[7] and to a certain extent also the protection of labour-related rights,[8] appeared for the first time in the 2022 HCC, reflecting the recommendations laid down in Agenda 2020.[9] Moving to the 2024 HCC, the core human rights provision inserted therein demands that the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG in their activities related to the execution of the Games ''protect and respect human rights and ensure any violation of human rights is remedied in a manner consistent with international agreements, laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country and in a manner consistent with all internationally-recognized human rights standards and principles, including the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, applicable in the Host Country''.[10] Of particular importance is the explicit reference to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ('UN Guiding Principles'), a non-binding legal framework intended to minimize adverse human rights impacts triggered by business activities. The UN Guiding Principles are based on three pillars, namely (i) the State duty to protect human rights; (ii) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and (iii) access to remedy.

The following sections will address some of the issues that remain outstanding even after the insertion of human rights obligations to the 2024 HCC.

No direct involvement of the Host Country

First and foremost, the Host Country itself is not directly obliged to protect and respect human rights under the 2024 HCC. Instead, the provision discussed above imposes human rights obligations on the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG. It is critical to note that the relevant provision requires the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG not only to respect, but also to protect human rights, suggesting that these entities shall take positive actions to facilitate the enjoyment of human rights. This begs the question whether the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG have the political, legal and financial capacity to effectively take such positive actions.

For instance, the Host City and the OCOG would be expected to include human rights obligations in their contracts with suppliers of public infrastructure and sporting facilities. However, even if they do so under the threat of contract's termination and further sanctions, it may not suffice to prevent Olympic Games-related human rights abuses from occurring. Unlike the Host Country Authorities, the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG do not possess the necessary powers to monitor and adjudicate the human rights compliance of their sub-contractors. Furthermore, much of the infrastructure build-up might be conducted by the Host Country directly and would therefore evade the scope of application of the HCC.

Who determines when human rights obligations are violated? 

In practice, human rights obligations arising out of a contractual relationship are not easy to deal with, because it might be rather difficult to decide whether they have been observed or not. For this reason, it is essential to entrust an independent body with competence to decide whether the Host City, the Host NOC or the OCOG have complied with their human rights obligations under the HCC. Unfortunately, the 2024 HCC in its current form does not stipulate who is responsible for adopting a decision determining that the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG are in breach of their human rights obligations. 

It follows that the IOC itself (via the Coordination or Legal Affairs Commission) may take on this inquisitorial and quasi-judicial role. However, this would lead a very interested party to monitor and adjudicate the human rights compliance of the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG. The potential for a conflict of interests is evident, as the IOC could face negative financial and other consequences if it decides to withdraw the Games from the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG. In this configuration, the incentives will therefore be strongly opposed to finding for a lack of compliance.

Instead, we could imagine a separate, truly independent body consisting of NGO members, athletes' representatives, union representatives, CAS arbitrators and independent experts (such as academics or judges at the European Court of Human Rights). This body could have an investigative and an adjudicative chamber (not unlike the FIFA Independent Ethics Committee), ensuring a separation between monitoring and adjudicating. Should the Host City, the Host NOC or the OCOG consider sanctions imposed under such a mechanism arbitrary, they might still activate the CAS arbitration clause[11] and challenge the validity of these sanctions before the CAS.

Will the sanctions contemplated by the HCC be effective? 

As explained in the first part of this blog, the most severe sanction contemplated by the HCC in the event of non-compliance is the withdrawal of the Games from the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG with prior notice.[12] It should be emphasized, however, that a removal of the Games would result in both financial and reputational harm being incurred by the IOC.[13] Therefore, it is arguable whether the IOC would in practice be ready to withdraw the Games. In fact, the IOC has withdrawn the Games so far only due to the outbreak of the First and Second World War, when the Games were cancelled altogether.[14] Being aware of the IOC's unwillingness to withdraw the Games, the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG may not perceive the threat of losing the Games as credible. Consequently, these entities may not feel obliged to adhere to their human rights obligations under the HCC.

With regard to other enforcement measures, the IOC is entitled, inter alia, to retain all amounts held in the General Retention Fund[15] or withhold any payment due, or grant to be made to the OCOG pursuant to the HCC.[16] By not providing the relevant financial contribution to the OCOG, the IOC would risk delays in construction and other preparatory works – something the IOC certainly wants to avoid. Eventually, these sanctions might prove to be as inefficient as the threat of losing the Games, given that the IOC may turn a blind eye to violations of the HCC in order to safeguard its financial and other interests. Besides financial considerations, the IOC's reluctance to impose sanctions on the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG follows from the fact that the IOC would thereby implicitly acknowledge its mistaken decision to award the Games to a particular Host City in the first place.

Conclusion

This blog has identified three specific concerns potentially relativizing the impact of the human rights obligations recently added to the 2024 HCC. First, the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG as the formal addresses of these obligations may not have the capacity to ensure the human rights compliance of their sub-contractors. Second, the 2024 HCC in its current form lacks clarity as to when the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG are in breach of their human rights obligations and who is responsible for adopting a decision to that effect. Third, being aware of the IOC's unwillingness to withdraw the Games due to financial and other interests involved, it is likely that the Host City, the Host NOC and the OCOG might refuse to abide by their human rights obligations under the HCC. This is not to say, however, that introducing human rights requirements is not an important step forward, but as always with this type of decisions the devil will be in the implementation.

[1]    The 2022 HCC was executed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 July 2015.

[2]    Agenda 2020; Recommendation 1.5.

[3]    2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 15.2. (b).

[4]    Ibid., Article 15.1.

[5]    Agenda 2020; Recommendations 1.6., 1.7., 1.10.

[6]    Ibid., Recommendation 1.9.

[7]    2022 Host City Contract; Preamble (L.).

[8]    Ibid., Article 21.

[9]    Agenda 2020; Recommendation 1.5.

[10]   2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 13.2. (b).

[11]   Ibid., Article 51.2.

[12]   Ibid., Articles 38.2., 38.3.

[13]   R. Gauthier, The International Olympic Committee, Law and Accountability, Routledge, 2017, at 144-145.

[14]   Ibid., at 144.

[15]   According to Article 8.2. (d) of the 2024 HCC, the General Retention Fund represents a percentage (5 %) of ''any sums of money or equivalent value-in-kind payable to the OCOG in relation to the International Programme''. It is maintained and controlled by the IOC.

[16]   2024 Host City Contract – Principles; Article 36.2. (a), (b).

Yesterday, the press revealed that the European Commission decided to reject the complaint filed by Jean-Louis Dupont, the former lawyer of Bosman, on behalf of a player agent Striani, against the UEFA Financial Fair Play (FFP) Regulations. The rejection as such is not a surprise. The Commission had repeatedly expressed support of the principles underlying the UEFA FFP. While these statements were drafted vaguely and with enough heavy caveats to protect the Commission from prejudicing a proper legal assessment, the withdrawal of its support would have been politically embarrassing.

Contrary to what is now widely assumed, this decision does not entail that UEFA FFP regulations are compatible with EU Competition Law. UEFA is clearly the big victor, but the legal reality is more complicated as it looks.

UEFA’s Austerlitz

UEFA, which most probably leaked the decision to the press, must have been enchanted by it. At a time when Europe is buzzing with rumours on the potential illegality of the UEFA FFP Regulations, it is fully vindicated by this decision. Indeed, at least in the short run, the UEFA FFP regulations will not be legally threatened anymore. Basically, for the time being, FFP is here to stay.

The European Commission’s Death Sentence to the Striani complaint

The Commission’s decision to reject the complaint is less far-reaching than one would think. The decision does not enter into the substance of the compatibility of the UEFA FFP regulations with EU Competition law. Rather, the EC has chosen the easy way out of what it must have perceived as a toxic case, with much political capital to lose for a single player agent. The elegant way out of a potential mess was to consider Striani not directly affected by the UEFA FFP Regulations. We can gather from the press reports that the Commission argued that Striani as a Player Agent was not an addressee of the FFP rules and was not substantially affected by them (as he was claiming only a symbolic euro of damages in front of the Belgian Courts), thus leaving him with no legitimate interest. Moreover, the fact that the UEFA FFP Regulations were welcomed by diverse groups of stakeholders (ECA, FIFPro) corroborates in the eyes of the Commission that there is no interest for it to act ex officio in light of such a consensus. This decision can now be contested in front of the EU General Court. However, the European Commission enjoys, in light of its very limited resources, a wide discretion in deciding which cases deserve to be investigated. Hence, it is very unlikely that the Court would annul this decision. But is it the end of the legal war?

Is a Waterloo still possible for UEFA?

After Austerlitz, came the Berezina and finally Waterloo: the war over the UEFA FFP regulations is far from done. The European Commission has not pronounced itself on the substantial merit of the claim and Dupont has still a case ongoing in front of the Belgium Courts. If it goes all the way up the legal ladder, it will most probably be referred, via the preliminary reference procedure, to the EU Court of Justice, giving it the opportunity to address the merits of the case. However, it is obvious that Player agents are perceived as the dark sheep of the football family. This is not a Bosman-like situation with a player barred from exercising his job because of a European-wide boycott and rules discriminating expressly on the ground of nationality. Therefore, we doubt that Striani will be more successful in front of the Courts. Nevertheless, if the players, for example via FIFPro, or the clubs decided to go after the UEFA FFP regulations (for now FIFPro and ECA are officially supporting FFP) it would be a completely different story. Such a complaint would be difficult to disregard by the Commission.

The Commission is certainly the guardian of Treaty, but not its interpreter. One would be ill-advised to throw caution to the wind and assume that the UEFA FFP regulations are definitely compatible with EU law. The European Commission conveniently avoided deciding on this matter. But, as Bosman reminded us, the Commission can also err in its evaluation of EU law’s bite and nothing precludes the Judges in Luxembourg from assessing the compatibility with EU law in a different way.

UEFA may have won a crucial battle, but there is still a legal war to fight.

Editor's note: This is the second part/act of our blog series on the Russian eligibility cases at the CAS ad hoc Division in Rio.

• Act I: Saved by the Osaka Déjà-Vu

Act II: On being implicated

Paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision: “The IFs to examine the information contained in the IP Report, and for such purpose seek from WADA the names of athletes and National Federations (NFs) implicated. Nobody implicated, be it an athlete, an official, or an NF, may be accepted for entry or accreditation for the Olympic Games.”

The second, and by far largest, wave of complaints involved Russian athletes barred from the game under paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision. None of those were successful in their appeals as the CAS sided with those IFs which took a tough stance with regard to the Russian State doping system. The first set of cases turned on the definition of the word “implicated” in the sense of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision. In this regard, on 2 August the IOC sent a communication to the IFs aiming at providing some general guidelines. It reads as follows:

"In view of the recent appeals filed by Russian Athletes with CAS, the IOC considers it necessary to clarify the meaning of the notion "implicated" in the EB Decision.

The IOC does not consider that each athlete referred to in the McLaren Lists shall be considered per se "implicated. It is for each International federation to assess, on the basis of the information provided in the McLaren lists and the Independent Person Report, whether it is satisfied that the Athlete in question was implicated in the Russian State-controlled doping scheme.

To assist the International Federations in assessing each individual case, the IOC wishes to provide some information. In the IOC's opinion, an athlete should not be considered as "implicated" where:

·       The order was a "quarantine".

·       The McLaren List does not refer to a prohibited substance which would 
have given rise to an anti-doping rule violation or;

·       The McLaren List does not refer to any prohibited substance with respect 
to a given sample."

The CAS went on to address this question concretely in three cases analysed below. [1]

A.    CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF

Podolskaya and Dyachenko are two canoeists from Russia who were suspended by the International Canoe Federation (ICF) and removed from the Rio Games as they were deemed implicated in the IP Report. In an affidavit to the CAS, referred to in the award, Richard McLaren disclosed the facts that led to both athletes being considered implicated.

Regarding Podolskaya, McLaren indicated that he has retrieved electronic evidence that “reveals that on 31 July 2013 at 00:50 hours, in contravention of the International Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to email address av@sochi2014.com that sample member 2780289, belonging to a female canoe athlete taken at the Russian Championships in Moscow, was suspected for EPO and further inquired what should be done”.[2] In a quick response on 1 August 2013, Alexey Velikodniy, then vice-minister for sports, “communicated back to Laboratory that the sample number 2780289 belonged to Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and instructed the Laboratory to "SAVE"”.[3] Similarly, as far as Dyachenko is concerned, the “electronic evidence reveals that on 5 August 2014 at 12:09 hours, in contravention of the International Standard Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to Alexey Velikodniy that pre-departure sample number 2917734, collected at a Training Camp on 3 August 2014, contained a lot oftrenbolone and a little methenolone. Alexey Velikodny's response to the laboratory on 6 August 2014 at 1%:26 [sic] was that sample number 2917734 from 3 August 2014 pre-departure test belonging to Mr Alexander Dyachenko, and on instruction from "llR", should be a "SAVE".”[4] McLaren concludes that for both “Ms. Natalia Podolskaya and Alexander Dyachenko, the "SAVE" instruction signalled to the Laboratory that no further analytical bench work was to be done on the samples and the Laboratory filed a negative ADAMS report for each athlete”. [5]

In its assessment of the application of paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision by the ICF, the CAS Panel finds that the “Applicants were among five athletes so [as implicated in the IP Report] named” and that the “ICF was entitled to conclude that the Applicants failed to meet the criteria in paragraph 2”.[6] Moreover, this “conclusion has been reinforced by the evidence made available to the Panel by Professor Mclaren” and “is justified on the standard of comfortable satisfaction”.[7] The applicants, unsuccessfully, argued that they were never sanctioned for an anti-doping rule violation, and that the samples referred to in the IP Report cannot be tested anymore to prove their innocence. They also claimed that other contemporary samples returned negative and “that if they had used prohibited substances, all the tests would have returned positive”.[8] Nonetheless, WADA pointed out that “due to the nature of the substances concerned and the timing of the provision of the samples, this cannot be concluded”.[9] The Panel accepted “WADA's submission, not contradicted by the Applicants, that there are explanations consistent with the Applicant's assertion but also consistent with the taking of the prohibited substances at the relevant time”.[10]

Finally, the Russian applicants tried to fight their ineligibility under the implication criteria laid down in paragraph 2 of the IOC Decision by arguing that it was not compatible with natural justice.[11] Yet, The CAS refused to follow this line of reasoning. Instead, the Panel found that the “Applicants have challenged that decision in the CAS and have been given the opportunity to rebut that evidence”, thus they “have not been denied natural justice or procedural fairness”.[12]

B.    CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF 

Anyushina and Korovashkov are also two canoeists from Russia. Similar to Podolskaya and Dyachenko, they were suspended on 26 July 2016 by the ICF and removed from the Rio Games as they were deemed implicated in the IP report. However, Anyushina was quickly reinstated and declared eligible to compete at the Games by the IOC.[13] The procedure was, consequently, limited to Korovashkov. He was deemed implicated because, as outlined by Richard McLaren in his affidavit:

"On 15 August 2014 at 09:22 hours, in contravention of the International Standard for Laboratories, the Moscow Laboratory reported to Alexey Velikodniy that sample number 2916461, collected 10 August 2014 in connection with an International Competition being held in Moscow, contained a lot of marijuana that was certainly above the threshold. (The /CF website reflects that the /CF Canoe Sprint World Championships took place in Moscow from the 8-10 August 2014)Alexey Velikodniy's response to the Laboratory on 18 August 2014 at 08:59 identified that sample number 2916461 belonged to Mr. Alexey Korovashkov and instructed that it should be a 'SAVE." Alexey Velikodniy also notes that Mr. Alexey sample is under investigation. Mr. Korovashkov's sample number 2916461 was reported negative in ADAMS."[14]

The Russian canoeist argued that the “evidence concerning the relevant sample on which the ICF relies to support its decision is unreliable”, because “there is no "threshold" provided for marijuana in WADA Technical Document TD 2013DL of 11 May 2013 concerning Decision Limits for the Confirmatory Quantification of Threshold Substances”.[15] In his view, “[i]f there is no threshold, it is unlikely that the laboratory would have provided such odd information to Alexey Velikodniy rather than reporting the threshold itself; the evidence does not resemble a laboratory report
Correspondence could not have been authored by the laboratory's employees, who are fully aware that they would be required to calculate and then state the actual result”.[16] The Panel rebutted this argument by pointing out that, in fact, the relevant WADA document included a threshold for Cannabinoids.[17] The Panel concluded that “the evidence is that the State sponsored doping system was applied to the Second Applicant so as to prevent a positive report of marijuana over the threshold for that substance”.[18] Consequently, Korovashkov was deemed implicated in the IP Report. The Panel did display its sympathy with the Russian athlete, as it pointed out that “[t]he ICF indicated that marijuana is not, in its view, a performance enhancing drug and the Panel notes that there is no suggestion of any other substance involved”.[19] 

The Panel further rejected Korovashkov argument that the ICF’s decision to declare him ineligible for the Rio Olympics amounted to a wrongful anti-doping sanction.[20] The applicant argued that the use of the word “suspended” in the original letter to the ICF was the terminology used under the WADA Code. The Panel finds that even though “suspended” “is a word used, and a sanction provided for, in the WADA Code, this does not mean that its inclusion means that the decision is made under that Code”.[21] Moreover, the CAS arbitrators consider it “clear that the letter was in direct response to the IOC Executive Board’s decision and concerned the eligibility of Russian athletes to compete in the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro Games and to be accredited to those Games”. [22] Thus, it “was not a decision under the WADA Code and was not bound by the provisions of that Code”. [23] In other words, the Decision should not and could not be misconstrued as a doping ban based on the WADA Code, but found its legal basis in the IOC Decision and in Article 12.3 of the ICF Anti-doping Rules.

This case demonstrates the willingness of CAS arbitrators to adopt an objective reading of the notion of implication. If an athlete benefitted from the Russian doping scheme, even in case of a relatively harmless substance like cannabis, it was considered legitimate for an IF to remove him or her from Russia’s Olympic team.

C.    CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC

Ivan Balandin is a rower from Russia who was declared ineligible to compete at the Rio Olympics by the World Rowing Federation (FISA) on 27 July 2016, due to his implication in the IP Report. More precisely, he appears in the Report as having been “saved” by the Russian Deputy Minister of Sport and his test was later reported as negative in the ADAMS system.[24] 

The athlete first argued, as did Korovashkov, that this was an anti-doping sanction, which did not follow the appropriate procedure. WADA clarified “that the Athlete may yet face proceedings relating to an ADRV, however, the nature of these could yet to be determined [sic]”[25] and added that the “matter at hand concerns eligibility for the Rio Games”.[26] The Panel concurred and concluded that the “dispute at hand concerns the Athlete’s eligibility for the Rio Games alone”.[27]

The next question was whether Balandin was implicated in the IP Report. The Panel notes, as pointed out in the IOC letter from 2 August 2016, that a simple implication in the Report does not necessarily indicate that an athlete benefited from the State-doping scheme. In his defence, the athlete singled out that a date of collection was missing for the sample, in order to attack the validity of the information provided by McLaren. FISA responded that it had taken “the necessary steps to establish this date by calling UKAD”.[28] Moreover, Richard McLaren revealed in his amicus curiae “the exact date and times of the message from the Moscow Laboratory that the screen of the Athlete’s A sample revealed positive for the prohibited substance GW 1516 and the response from the Deputy Minister to change the positive into a negative, following the DPM” .[29] In any event, “the Panel is satisfied that the information provided to FISA and the additional checks it took with UKAD, were sufficient to show the Athlete was “implicated” in this scheme”.[30] The athlete was deemed implicated, but did he actually benefit from the scheme? The Panel “notes that the substance GW 1516 is a metabolic modulator and a non-specified substance and is prohibited at all times (without a threshold)”.[31] Additionally, “the instruction from the Deputy Minister was “save””[32]. Thus, the CAS arbitrators were “comfortably satisfied” that Balandin had benefitted from the scheme.

In all three cases, the athletes mentioned in the Report as ‘saved’ were recognized as implicated by the CAS. The court clearly distinguished the notion of implication from the fact that the athletes committed an anti-doping violation as defined by the WADA Code. However, it is unclear whether the arbitrators would have deemed an athlete implicated, if he or she was not named in the evidence provided by McLaren. As the disappearing positive methodology implemented by the Moscow laboratory was an ultima ratio, this still entails that many Russian athletes competing in Rio might have profited from Russia’s State doping scheme by escaping a positive test altogether. Hence, the IOC’s choice to narrow down on implicated athletes seems rather inadequate to tackle the generalized doping system unveiled by the IC and IP reports. 

[1] CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF; CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF; CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC. A fourth case, CAS OG 16/18 Kiril Sveshnikov et al. v. UCI & IOC, was declared inadmissible.

[2] CAS OG 16/19 Natalia Podolskaya & Alexander Dyachenko v. ICF, para. 2.11.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., para. 7.13.

[7] Ibid., para. 7.14.

[8] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[9] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[10] Ibid., para. 7.26.

[11] Ibid., paras 7.15-7.26.

[12] Ibid., para. 7.18.

[13] CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF, para. 3.13.

[14] Ibid., para. 2.6.

[15] Ibid., para. 7.10.

[16] Ibid., para. 7.12.

[17] Ibid., paras 7.15-17.

[18] Ibid., para. 7.20.

[19] Ibid., para. 7.21.

[20] Ibid., paras 7.23-7.27.

[21] Ibid., para. 7.24.

[22] Ibid., para. 7.25.

[23] Ibid.

[24] CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, para.2.9.

[25] Ibid., para. 7.13.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., para. 7.15.

[28] Ibid., para 7.28.

[29] Ibid., para 7.29.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., para 7.30.

[32] Ibid.