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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: Dissecting the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Semenya Decision - By Marjolaine Viret

Editor's note: Marjolaine is a researcher and attorney admitted to the Geneva bar (Switzerland) who specialises in sports and life sciences.

 

On 25 August 2020, the Swiss Supreme Court (Swiss Federal Tribunal, SFT) rendered one of its most eagerly awaited decisions of 2020, in the matter of Caster Semenya versus World Athletics (formerly and as referenced in the decision: IAAF) following an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In short, the issue at stake before the CAS was the validity of the World Athletics eligibility rules for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (DSD Regulation). After the CAS upheld their validity in an award of 30 April 2019, Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation (jointly: the appellants) filed an application to set aside the award before the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] The SFT decision, which rejects the application, was made public along with a press release on 8 September 2020.

There is no doubt that we can expect contrasted reactions to the decision. Whatever one’s opinion, however, the official press release in English does not do justice to the 28-page long decision in French and the judges’ reasoning. The goal of this short article is therefore primarily to highlight some key extracts of the SFT decision and some features of the case that will be relevant in its further assessment by scholars and the media.[2]

It is apparent from the decision that the SFT was very aware that its decision was going to be scrutinised by an international audience, part of whom may not be familiar with the mechanics of the legal regime applicable to setting aside an international arbitration award in Switzerland.

Thus, the decision includes long introductory statements regarding the status of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, and the role of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in reviewing award issued by panels in international arbitration proceedings. The SFT also referred extensively throughout its decision to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rendered in cases related to international sport and the CAS.


1.     Standing to sue before the SFT & admissibility of the challenge

As a preliminary matter, the SFT considered the standing to sue of both Caster Semenya and the South African Athletics Federation. Both were found to have an interest worthy of protection. Caster Semenya was considered to be particularly affected by the CAS award, since the DSD Regulation require her to fulfil certain requirements in order to participate in certain categories of races at international athletics events. As for the South African Athletics Federation, the SFT considered that as a member federation of World Athletics, it has a duty to cooperate with the international sports governing body and to support it in the implementation of the DSD Regulation, including to alert the medical manager in case it has a suspicion that an athlete might be falling within the scope of the DSD Regulation, so that it had an interest worthy of protection separate and distinct from Caster Semenya’s (para. 4.1.2).

The SFT then examined the clause of waiver to appeal CAS awards, enshrined in the DSD Regulation. Based on its jurisprudence originating in the Cañas matter, the SFT confirmed that an athlete cannot, as a rule, validly waive the right to challenge an award in sports arbitration matters before the SFT:

“It is all the more imperious that the will to waive the appeal be not vitiated through any form of constraint, since such waiver would deprive its author from the possibility to challenge any future award, even if the award should breach fundamental principles inherent to a State operating under the rule of law [… ]” (para. 4.2.4).

 Interestingly, the SFT found that its jurisprudence, developed based on the lack of free consent on part of those athletes, can be equally invoked by a national member federation with respect to arbitration clauses contained in the rules of its international governing body (para. 4.2.4).


2.     Independence of the CAS & role of the SFT

Before entering the merits of the case, the SFT stressed that it was essential to delimit the legal framework of the dispute, the role of the SFT when reviewing an appeal in international arbitration matters and the scope of its power of review (para. 5).

Citing its own Latuzina jurisprudence as well as recent ECtHR decisions in Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland, and Platini v. Switzerland, the SFT concluded, as to the status of the CAS:

“One must keep in mind that the appellants have been able to bring their dispute against IAAF before CAS, which is not only an independent and impartial court, with full power of review in fact and in law, but also a specialised jurisdiction” (para. 5.1.3).

The SFT then summarised its role and power of review when dealing with an international arbitration award. In particular, the SFT cannot – save in exceptional circumstances – consider issues of fact, and is bound by the facts as set out in the arbitration award. In addition, the SFT only reviews the award from the perspective of a limited set of grounds, listed in Art. 190(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (SPILA). The SFT insisted that the ECtHR

“has emphasised that there is a distinct interest in disputes arising within professional sport, in particular those with an international dimension, being submitted to a specialised jurisdiction capable of ruling in a prompt and cost-efficient way” (para. 5.2.4).

According to the SFT judges, State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights enjoy wide discretion as to how to approach alleged breaches of substantive provisions ECHR within proceedings for setting aside awards in international arbitration cases. Citing the example of Art. 8 ECHR and the freedom to exercise a professional activity, the SFT further recalled that a sports association – as a private entity – is not directly subjected to the ECHR. Positive duties of a State party to the ECHR to take action only arise to a certain extent, where necessary to establish a legal framework that appropriately takes into account the various interests at stake (para. 5.2.5).

In the light of these findings, the SFT concluded that the current Swiss legal system whereby review of international arbitration awards is subject to a set of exhaustive grounds, with a review of the merits of the decision essentially limited to breaches of public policy, and with strict requirements on the parties to assert and substantiate these grounds, is compatible with the ECHR.


3.     Breach of public policy

The SFT briefly discussed the two grounds of irregular constitution (art. 190(2)(a) SPILA) and right to be heard (art. 190(2)(d) SPILA) invoked by the appellants, and rejected them.

The SFT then went into what can be viewed as the real core of its decision: the analysis of the ground of breach of substantive public policy (art. 190(2)(e) SPILA). For doing so, it divided the breaches asserted by the Appellants into three limbs: i.) prohibition of discrimination, ii.) personality rights and iii.) human dignity.

The SFT started by recalling the well-established notion of public policy within the context of international arbitration, and its boundaries:

“An award is incompatible with public policy if it disregards essential and widely accepted values which, according to the views prevailing in Switzerland, should constitute the foundation of any legal system” (para. 9.1).

The SFT went on to insist that it is an extremely rare occurrence (“chose rarissime”) for arbitral awards to be set aside on this ground. The concept is more restrictive than arbitrariness, and the award must be incompatible with public policy not only in its reasoning, but also in its outcomes. Also, neither the breach of constitutional rights, nor of ECHR rights, can be invoked directly under this ground, even though principles underpinning the relevant provisions of the ECHR or of the Swiss Constitution can be taken into account to crystallize the concept of public policy (para. 9.2).

Critically, the SFT’s reasoning had to be based on the premises that the CAS award had set, whereby athletes targeted by the DSD Regulation enjoy – due to their levels of testosterone – an advantage over other female competitors that is ‘insurmountable’, in the sense that it would allow them to systematically beat female athletes without DSD (see e.g. para. 9.8.2). The SFT thus worked on the assumption that there were also two groups of interests in conflict, i.e. the ‘protected class’ (“classe protégée”) of the female category versus the class of the athletes with DSD. There are some indications within the decision, however, that the SFT judges probably largely endorsed the CAS findings (e.g. the extract: “the statistics are particularly compelling in this respect”, para. 9.8.3.3.).

Another important aspect of the case is that World Athletics – unlike many international federations – is not based in Switzerland but in Monaco, and is thus not organised as an association of Swiss law. Indeed, as the SFT stressed in several instances (e.g. para. 5.1.1, para. 9.1, para. 9.2), Swiss law was not applicable on the merits of the dispute and the case had no connection to Switzerland other than the seat of the arbitral tribunal that made the challenged award.

i.               Prohibition of discrimination

With respect to the first limb of discrimination, the SFT stressed that the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in art. 8(2) Swiss Constitution – aside from the fact that Swiss constitutional law was not applicable in the case in the first place – could only apply to the relationship between the State and individuals. The provision is aimed at protecting individuals from the State and does not deploy so-called ‘direct horizontal effect’ among private parties.

Thus, the SFT doubted that the prohibition of a discrimination originating from such private party could be characterised as part of the essential values that form public policy. The SFT did, however, find the appellants’ argument relevant whereby the “relationship between an athlete and a global sports federation shows some similarities to those between an individual and a State” (para. 9.4).

In the end, the SFT found that the issue could be left undecided, holding that, in any event, the award did not enshrine any discrimination contrary to public policy.

Indeed, even under Swiss constitution law, a discriminating measure based on one of the enumerated criteria (e.g. sex) can be justified if they rely on biological differences that categorically exclude an identical treatment (para. 9.5). The SFT found that the CAS had – in a 165-page award – conducted a thorough assessment of all arguments brought forward by the parties, dealing both with complex scientific issues and delicate legal questions (para. 9.8.3.1). The outcome reached by the CAS was, to the SFT, not only “not untenable, it was not even unreasonable” (para. 9.8.3.3).

To support its view, the SFT relied heavily on the notion of fairness of sports competition, referring in particular to the ECtHR decision on the whereabouts system (FNASS et al. v. France) in connection with anti-doping regulation. In a somewhat troubling parallel, the SFT summarised this decision as

“confirming thus that the search for a fair sport represents an important goal which is capable of justifying serious encroachments upon sportspeople’s rights” (para. 9.8.3.3).

Stressing that the case before it was not a doping matter (“no one challenges that athletes 46 XY DSD have never cheated”; para. 9.8.3.3), the SFT considered nevertheless that certain biological characteristics can also distort fairness of competition. Any binary division such as the one between male and female in athletics necessarily creates difficulties of classification (para. 9.8.3.3). In the SFT’s eyes, the DSD Regulation were a proportionate way of addressing these difficulties.

ii.              Breach of personality rights

With respect to the breach of an athlete’s personality rights under Art. 27 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code, the SFT recalled its jurisprudence whereby a breach of personality rights can, in certain circumstances, amount to a breach of public policy – i.e. if there is a clear and severe violation of a fundamental right – but that these circumstances were not realised in casu (para. 10.1).

In particular, the SFT found that the measures provided under the DSD Regulation were not such as to affect the essence of the athlete’s physical integrity: the required examinations were to be conducted by medical professionals and might also be beneficial to the athlete by revealing medical data to those who were unaware that they had DSD, the treatments (oral contraceptives) were not compulsory in the sense that an athlete could not be compelled to take such treatment.

From the viewpoint of economic freedom, the SFT found that the matter was not comparable to the Matuzalem case – nota bene the first matter in which the SFT annulled an arbitral award based on grounds of substantive public policy – since the DSD Regulation could not be considered to make participation in the ‘specified competitions’ impossible, and athletes remain free to participate in races outside those specified categories, including at international level, so that their economic existence was not jeopardised. In addition, the DSD Regulation was to be considered a measure capable of achieving the legitimate goals of fairness in sport and the preservation of the ‘protected class’ of female athletes, and were necessary and proportionate to these goals (para. 10.5).

iii.            Human dignity

Finally, the SFT found that the DSD Regulation were not contrary to human dignity. On the one hand, the SFT considered that the CAS award did not seek to question the female gender of the athletes, nor to assess whether these were ‘female enough’.

“In certain contexts that are as special as competitive sports, one can accept that biological characteristics can, exceptionally and for purposes of fairness and equal opportunities, eclipse legal sex or gender identity of an individual. Otherwise, the sheer notion of a binary division man/woman, which is present in the vast majority of sports, would lose its raison d’être” (para. 11.1). 

On the other hand, with respect to the treatments at stake, the SFT merely reaffirmed that there was no compulsory treatment, in the sense that athletes retained the option to refuse such treatment:

“While it is true that such refusal will result in the impossibility to take part in certain athletic competitions, it cannot be accepted that this consequence could, in and by itself, amount to a violation of an individual’s human dignity” (para. 11.2).

Thus, to the SFT, the appellants’ reference to “humiliating pharmacological experiments” or to the notion of “human guinea pigs” appeared inappropriate.

Having found that the award was not in breach of public policy, the SFT found that the appeal had to be dismissed on this ground also.


Conclusion

Over the next days and weeks, many commentators will dissect the SFT decision. Unsurprisingly, reactions already point at the responsibility of Switzerland for failing to protect sportspeople, and the unsuitability of the current sports dispute resolution system for dealing with human rights issues.

These issues undoubtedly deserve a debate, if decisions rendered in international sports matters are to maintain – or, rather at this point, regain – their credibility.

From the perspective of the current Swiss legal system and international arbitration law, the SFT only had little leeway to navigate the delicate issues before it: the grounds cited in art. 190(2) SPILA – which apply to all international arbitration proceedings in Switzerland, whether commercial or sports-related – are exhaustive, and the SFT has so far systematically refused to broaden the notion of substantive public policy to give it a ‘sports-specific’ meaning for arbitration award rendered by the CAS. Moreover, the SFT cannot question the facts as set forth in an arbitral award. Finally, the SFT was asked to review the decision because of the seat of the CAS in Lausanne, but neither the athlete nor the international federation that had adopted the rules in dispute were based in Switzerland, and Swiss law was not applicable to the merits.

The SFT judges may, however, have missed an opportunity that was available to them de lege lata, in failing to use the ‘escape door’ of the severe breach of personality rights, interpreted as part of public policy. The very broad wording of the SFT jurisprudence in this context leaves a lot of discretion to adapt to individual situations in which the SFT judges may feel that there is something ‘unfair’ at stake. Though the SFT went to great lengths to distinguish the case from the Matuzalem matter, the situation in which athletes subject to the DSD Regulation are placed could arguably have been construed and framed in a way that would have fitted the requirements of this ground, if it had been the SFT’s desire to reach such a conclusion. The general impression, however, is that the SFT judges became genuinely convinced of the justification for the ‘protected’ female category and the fact that competitors subject to the DSD Regulation would enjoy an insurmountable advantage over other female competitors if they were authorised to compete freely in the specified competitions. In any event, it was not within their power of review to question these findings of the CAS award.

It may come as a disappointment to many that these difficult questions raising complex scientific issues could not be addressed in the context of the SFT proceedings. However, it is essential to keep in mind that, like the CAS in its award, the SFT did leave the door open for future challenges:

“That being said, the CAS did emphasise that the DSD Regulations could, at a later point, reveal themselves to be disproportionate in case it should prove impossible or excessively difficult to apply them. One is bound to admit that the CAS did not give validation, once and for all, to the DSD Regulations, but, on the contrary, explicitly reserved the possibility to conduct, as the case may be, a new assessment under the angle of proportionality when applying the regulation to a particular matter” (para. 9.8.3.5).

Thus, regardless of what avenues Caster Semenya may decide to take immediately with respect to the SFT decision, we may soon see new developments and new legal proceedings around the implementation of the DSD Regulation. The jury is still out.


[1] The author was consulted on sports arbitration issues in connection with this application to set aside.

[2] All extracts quoted are private translations by the author of the original decision in French.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Kristoffersen ruling: the EFTA Court targets athlete endorsement deals - By Sven Demeulemeester and Niels Verborgh

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Kristoffersen ruling: the EFTA Court targets athlete endorsement deals - By Sven Demeulemeester and Niels Verborgh

Editor’s note: Sven Demeulemeester and Niels Verborgh are sports lawyers at the Belgium law firm, Altius.

 

Introduction

In its 16 November 2018 judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States (the EFTA Court) delivered its eagerly awaited ruling in the case involving Henrik Kristoffersen and the Norwegian Ski Federation (NSF). 

On 17 October 2016, Kristoffersen had taken the NSF to the Oslo District Court over the latter’s refusal to let the renowned alpine skier enter into a sponsorship with Red Bull. At stake were the commercial markings on his helmet and headgear in races organised under the NSF’s umbrella. The NSF refused this sponsorship because it had already granted the advertising on helmet and headgear to its own main sponsor, Telenor. Kristoffersen claimed before the Oslo District Court, that the NSF should be ordered to permit him to enter into an individual marketing contract with Red Bull. In the alternative, Kristoffersen claimed damages up to a maximum of NOK 15 million. By a letter of 25 September 2017, the Oslo District Court referred several legal questions to the EFTA Court in view of shedding light on the compatibility of the rules that the NSF had invoked with EEA law.

If rules do not relate to the conduct of the sport itself, but concern sponsorship rights and hence an economic activity, these rules are subject to EEA law. The EFTA Court ruling is important in that it sets out the framework for dealing with - ever more frequent - cases in which an individual athlete’s endorsement deals conflict with the interest of the national or international sports governing bodies (SGBs) that he or she represents in international competitions.


The Kristoffersen ruling: the EFTA Court targets athlete endorsement deals 

A. Facts and procedures

Henrik Kristoffersen, silver medalist at the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympic Games and a bronze medalist at the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, is a member of the Norwegian national alpine skiing team. Kristoffersen is not an employee of the Norwegian Ski Federation (NSF), but he did sign a standard athlete’s contract with the NSF to be able to participate in the national team.[1]

The Norwegian Ski Federation (NSF) - a non-profit organisation - is a sports organisation, which organises, among other things, activities in the discipline of alpine skiing. The NSF is a member of both the International Ski Federation (FIS) and of the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF). Therefore, the NSF is subject to the FIS’ and the NIF’s regulations. Only the FIS and its national federations, such as the NSF, organise alpine skiing races of financial value to alpine skiers in classic disciplines, such as the slalom and downhill skiing. The NSF is financed by public funds and marketing contracts. The revenues gained from marketing activities accounted for 71% of the NSF’s total income in 2015.[2]

Individual sponsorship agreements are subject to the NSF’s approval,[3] although the NSF’s standard athlete contract foresees an exception[4] in which the athlete may enter into individual sponsorship agreements with equipment providers in the NSF’s “skipool”. The NSF skipool is a pool scheme that is open to selected equipment suppliers without requiring the NSF’s approval. To become a member of the NSF skipool, suppliers must be approved as an equipment supplier by the FIS/NSF. In addition, they also must pay an annual fee to the NSF. Athletes are prohibited from entering into agreements with any supplier that is not a member of the NSF skipool.

The NSF covers all expenses (e.g. board and lodging, transport, equipment, medical support, insurance, etc.) of the members of the Norwegian national alpine skiing team for approximately 200 days a year, but the athletes do not receive any of the funds that the NSF collects from the main and co-sponsors as the athletes’ own income.[5]

This specific case concerns a dispute between Kristoffersen and the NSF relating to an individual sponsorship contract that Kristoffersen had with Red Bull[6] for helmet and headgear worn in races under the auspices of the NSF and the International Ski Federation (FIS). Kristoffersen and Red Bull had been seeking to enter into such an agreement since 2014, but the NSF had refused permission for Kristoffersen to sign the contract at the end of April 2018.[7] The NSF had already decided to include space upon its helmet and headgear in the contract with its main sponsor, Telenor.

B. Questions to the EFTA Court and its answers

The questions

In this dispute, the Oslo District Court referred six questions to the EFTA Court, the supranational judicial body responsible for interpreting the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) for the EFTA States that are parties to the EEA Agreement (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).[8]

The questions essentially covered two issues.

The first issue was whether rules, such as those in the NSF Joint Regulations, on prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts regarding commercial marking on the national team’s equipment, or the application of those rules, constitute a restriction under Article 36 EEA Agreement or the Services Directive.[9]

The second issue was whether such a restriction on an athlete’s right to enter into sponsorship agreements could be justified.

Prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts can constitute a restriction

Applicability of Article 36 EEA Agreement

The EEA Agreement’s free movement rules may also apply to the rules laid down by sports associations.[10] With reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union’s long-standing case law,[11] the EFTA Court has concluded that sport is subject to EEA law to the extent it constitutes an economic activity. Athletes’ sponsorship contracts entail marketing services, which constitute, as such, an economic activity.[12] The EFTA Court has also concluded that the cross-border element is present since the proposed sponsorship contract involved a Norwegian athlete and an Austrian company; and the professional competitions in which Kristoffersen participated took place in several EEA States.[13]

Next, the court has determined whether the present case concerns the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services. The court has stated that “the rules in question concern, at least predominantly, the freedom to provide services, as opposed to the freedom of establishment” since the NSF’s rules may grant or refuse permission to athletes to enter into individual marketing contracts, which will have an impact on Kristoffersen’s opportunities to provide marketing services. By contrast, the rules will not or only remotely, affect an athlete’s freedom to establish themselves as professional skiers, which is the activity from which their marketing activity derives.[14]

The prohibition of restrictions on the freedom of providing services

Article 36 EEA Agreement prohibits restrictions on the freedom of providing services within the EEA. Measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the EEA Agreements are an encroachment upon this freedom.

A system of prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts appears to make the exercise of Kristoffersen’s marketing activity less attractive. Under the EFTA Court’s settled case law, prior authorisation schemes amount to a restriction on the freedom to provide services.[15] However, this is ultimately for the referring court to determine.[16]

Justifications to restrictions

A restriction on the freedom to provide services (Article 36 EEA Agreement) may be justified on the grounds set out in Article 33 EEA Agreement[17] or by overriding reasons in the public interest, provided that it is appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective that it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.[18]

Legitimacy of the aims pursued by the measures at issue

Aims of a purely economic nature, such as the desire to increase profits, cannot justify a restriction on the freedom to provide services. The aim of the measure in this case appears, however, to be related to ensuring a stable basis for the NSF’s activities. The court has found it relevant that the NSF is a non-profit sports association, that the marketing revenues are by far its most important source of income (71% of the NSF’s total income in 2015) and that the overall revenue is not only used for professional sports, but also for recruitment, education and children’s and reactional sports.

The EFTA Court has indicated – with reference to the CJEU’s Bernard judgment[19] - that the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young athletes is legitimate. But, it is not sufficient for the restrictive measure to resort to a legitimate aim in general: it must be assessed whether the measure at issue actually pursues the invoked aim. The referring court must therefore identify, in the light of the facts of the case, the objectives that are in fact pursued by the contested measure.[20]

Suitability/Consistency

The party imposing the restriction must demonstrate that the measure is suitable to achieve the legitimate objective pursued along with genuinely reflecting a concern to attain that aim in a consistent and systematic manner.[21] The EFTA Court states that it is reasonable that some of the revenues are only dedicated to professional athletes, but that the income generated must also benefit the legitimate aims (such as recruitment, education, children’s and recreational sports).[22]

In this case, the EFTA Court has concluded that the rules on prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts, such as those laid down in the NSF Joint Regulations, are suitable to achieve that objective since a substantial part of the income is spent on the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young athletes.[23]

Necessity

The referring court must also assess whether the measure goes beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. The necessity test implies that the chosen measure must not be capable of being replaced by an alternative measure that is equally useful but less restrictive to the fundamental freedoms of EEA law.[24] In this case, it must be assessed whether there are other less restrictive measures that would ensure a similar level of resources.[25]

The Court believes that the assessment of the system’s necessity must take account of the fact that the NSF and the athletes are mutually dependent on one another.[26] The system must ensure that the athletes receive a fair share of the revenues from sponsorship contracts. If not, that would constitute a disproportionate restriction on the athletes’ freedom to provide sponsorship services. The Court has argued that in this case it appears that revenue generated from marketing contracts constitutes the most important source of income for both the NSF and the athletes.[27] In addition to that, the Court has also taken into account that the NSF covers all the expenses of members of the Norwegian national alpine skiing team for approximately 200 days a year. Furthermore, the athletes may enter into individual sponsorship contracts with equipment providers in the NSF skipool without the NSF’s approval. Outside the NSF skipool, additional contracts may be entered into with the NSF’s approval.[28]

Kristoffersen concluded several of those contracts, which may have an impact on the assessment of the referring court about whether the athletes receive - through the system in place - a fair share of the revenue from the potential market for sponsorship contracts.[29]

C. Guidelines for concrete decisions and procedural aspects

A system of prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts may constitute a justified restriction on athletes’ freedom to provide sponsorship services, so long as it pursues a legitimate aim, is suitable and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the aim.[30]

While a system of prior control and consent for individual sponsorship contracts may be justified as such, it does not necessarily follow that every individual decision taken under that system is equally justified. Such individual decisions must pursue the legitimate aims of the system in a suitable and proportionate manner and there must be a fair balance between the interests of the NSF and the professional athletes.[31]

The existence, at the time of the athlete’s application for approval, of a collective sponsorship contract with the NSF’s main sponsor, Telenor, covering helmet and headgear, may be relevant to the assessment of whether the concrete refusal is justified. The assessment of proportionality may also include the issue of whether the NSF was aware of Kristoffersen’s intention to enter into a separate sponsorship agreement when NSF concluded its collective sponsorship contract, as well as the impact of such a collective sponsorship agreement on Kristoffersen’s ability to generate income from his profession. Furthermore, the referring court may also take account of the impact of individual sponsorship contracts on the NSF’s ability to achieve the legitimate aims invoked.

Besides that, the system and the decisions under a national sports federation’s approval scheme for individual marketing contracts may not be arbitrary and must satisfy certain procedural requirements (such as: the proper communication of an individual decision within a reasonable time; and a review of the decision before an independent body should be available).[32]

Striking the right balance between collective interests and individual ones can be difficult as the EFTA Court’s decision illustrates. Even though the EFTA Court sets out some key principles for evaluating advertising and sponsorship restrictions, it leaves the ultimate call for balancing those interests to the Oslo District Court.


Conclusion

The EFTA Court has drawn a clear ‘line in the sand’ for SGBs.

The Court’s ruling considers that a system of prior control and consent for athlete’s individual sponsorships, and potential refusal of such sponsorship, constitutes a restriction of the freedom to provide services, to the extent that the system makes less attractive the exercise of an athlete’s freedom to provide a marketing service. Such a restriction will be acceptable only if it pursues a legitimate aim, is suitable and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the aim.

Aims of a purely economic nature, such as the desire to increase profits, cannot justify such a restriction. The objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young athletes can however be a legitimate aim, to the extent that a substantial part of the income is indeed spent on encouraging the recruitment and training of young athletes. Also, a fair balance between the federation’s interests and the particular athlete’s interests is required. The EFTA Court considers that SGBs and athletes are often mutually dependent on one another. Athletes must receive a fair share of the revenues from sponsorship contracts. A decision to refuse an endorsement must be well-reasoned and communicated to the athlete within a reasonable timeframe. In addition, a review procedure before a body independent of the federation should be available.

In times where SGBs’ advertising and sponsorship restrictions are already under scrutiny from a competition law perspective,[33] the EFTA Court has added internal market arguments to the mix. Both the fundamental freedoms and the competition law arguments are likely to bolster individual athletes seeking to increase revenue from their sporting activities. The decision clearly indicates that SGBs should be careful when dealing with sponsorship deals.

At the same time, the ruling shows SGBs how to adopt sponsorship regulations that are the least likely to infringe EEA law. To justify restrictions, the SGBs will need to come up with a transparent, intelligent system in which restrictions are justified in view of (proven) redistribution of income to support the training of athletes and the funding of amateur sports. The presence of independent review procedures will be key. In that respect, the EFTA Court ruling may serve as ‘ammunition’ for those looking to increase transparency and good governance in the seat of SGBs.


[1] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 8.

[2] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 9-10.

[3] It follows from art. 200.3 and 204.1 of the FIS International Ski Competition Rules (joint regulations for alpine skiing), section 13-3(3) and chapter 14 of the Norwegian Olympic Committee’s Statutes, and Point 206.2.5 of the NSF Joint Regulations.

[4] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 17.

[5] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 19.

[6] Red Bull GmbH has its headquarters in Austria.

[7] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 20.

[8] Article 34 of the “Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice” foresees in the possibility for courts or tribunals in an EFTA State (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) to request the EFTA Court to give an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement.

[9] Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on service in the internal market.

[10] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 68.

[11] See among others: CJEU 12 December 1974, n° 36-74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; Walrave and Koch/Union Cycliste International, par. 4; CJEU 14 July 1976, nr. 13/76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, Donà/Mantero, par. 12; CJEU 15 December 1995, n° C415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, ‘Bosman’, par. 73; CJEU 18 July 2006, n° C-519/04 P, ECLI:EU:T:2004:282, Meca-Medina and Majcen/Commissie, par. 37-44.

[12] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 66.

[13] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 67.

[14] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 69.

[15] EFTA Court 10 May 2016, Case E-19/15, ESA/Liechtenstein, par. 85.

[16] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 76.

[17] Article 33 EEA Agreement “The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”

[18] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 114.

[19] CJEU 16 March 2010, n° C-325/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:143, Olympique Lyonnais

SASP/Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, par. 23.

[20] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 117.

[21] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 118.

[22] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 119.

[23] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 120.

[24] EFTA Court, 16 May 2017, Case E-8/16 Netfonds Holding ASA, Netfonds Bank AS and Netfonds Livsforsikring AS/the Norwegian Government.

[25] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 122.

[26] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 124.

[27] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 124.

[28] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 125.

[29] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 125.

[30] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 125.

[31] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 127-128.

[32] EFTA Court 16 November 2018, Case E-8/17, Kristoffersen/NSF, par. 129-133.

[33] Cf. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/21_12_2017_DOSB_IOC.html.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: The Final Whistle

Asser International Sports Law Blog

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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: The Final Whistle

Footballleaks is now operating since nearly half a year and has already provided an incredible wealth of legal documents both on TPO (and in particular Doyen’s contractual arrangements) and on the operation of the transfer system in football (mainly transfer agreements, player contracts and agents contracts). This constant stream of information is extremely valuable for academic research to get a better grip on the functioning of the transfer market. It is also extremely relevant for the shaping of public debates and political decisions on the regulation of this market. As pointed out on the footballleaks website, it has triggered a series of press investigations in major European news outlets.

In this blog, I want to come to a closure on our reporting on Doyen’s TPO deals. In the past months, we have already dealt with the specific cases of FC Twente and Sporting Lisbon, reviewed Doyen’s TPO deals with Spanish clubs, as well as discussed the compatibility of the TPO ban with EU law. In the Sporting Lisbon case, Doyen has since earned an important legal victory in front of the CAS (the ensuing award was just published by Footballleaks). This victory should not be overstated, however, it was not unexpected due to the liberal understanding of the freedom of contract under Swiss law. As such it does not support the necessity of TPO as an investment practice and does not threaten the legality (especially under EU law) of FIFA’s ban.

In our previous blogs on Doyen’s TPO deals we decided to focus only on specific deals, Twente and Sporting Lisbon, or a specific country (Spain). However, nearly six months after the whole footballleaks project started, we can now provide a more comprehensive analysis of the TPO deals signed by Doyen. Though, it is still possible that other, yet unknown, deals would be revealed, I believe that few of Doyen’s TPO agreements are still hidden. Thanks to footballleaks, we now know how Doyen operates, we have a precise idea of its turnover, its return on investments and the pool of clubs with which it signed a TPO agreement. Moreover, we have a good understanding of the contractual structure used by Doyen in those deals. This blog will offer a brief synthesis and analysis of this data.


I.              Doyen’s “geoeconomics” 

A.    The Iberian base

If you trust the veracity of Doyen’s map of deals,[1] Doyen had signed 31 TPO deals before March 2015, of which many ERPAs are published on the footballleaks website. It started operating in August 2011, with a deal involving Abdellaziz Barrada, which was then a player at Getafe and is now playing at Olympique de Marseille. Until the end of 2013, and the signing of the controversial deal with FC Twente, Doyen was only operating in the Iberian Peninsula (with the exception of an isolated contract involving Felipe Anderson from the Brazilian club Santos in September 2011). The clubs involved were Sporting Gijón, Atlético Madrid, FC Porto, Sporting Lisbon, Getafe, Sevilla FC, Benfica, and Valencia. Those deals concerned a wide range of players, from the highly profitable stars Falcao, Mangala or Rojo to a series of unknown players. Based on the aforementioned ‘map of deals’, Doyen has extracted substantial profit margins from those deals. The maximum of 524% profit being reached on Kondogbia’s transfer from Sevilla to Monaco (Doyen invested €1.5 million and recouped €9.358.653 one year later!).

What drove Spanish and Portuguese clubs into the arms of Doyen? The first openly acknowledged reason for TPO deals is enshrined in many of the ERPAs signed during this first phase of Doyen’s operation: it’s the financial crisis, stupid! Spain and Portugal were directly affected by the crisis. Their financial systems broke down as well as their public finances. At once many Spanish and Portuguese clubs (like most of the local businesses) must have been cut off from their usual credit lines and unable to rely on the traditional patronage of local authorities. In 2012, the outstanding debt of Spanish football clubs with the public authorities was restructured. A recent economic study shows the depth of the financial difficulties faced by a majority of the Spanish clubs in the BBVA League at that time. Barcelona and Madrid are the two lone trees that are hiding a very poor forest. This is a fertile ground for risk-averse investors like Doyen to supplement traditional lenders. As far as the three Portuguese top clubs (Benfica, Sporting Lisbon and FC Porto) are concerned a different dynamic might be at play. Indeed, they have a (quasi) secured spot in the most prestigious European club competition, the UEFA Champions League. There is obviously no better competition to feature the qualities of a player and boost his market value. Their collaboration with Doyen is, thus, less risky than for mid-level Spanish clubs (Getafe, Gijón, Sevilla or Valencia), which were unlikely (or at best uncertain) of ever participating in the Champions League.

In 2014 and 2015, this Iberian bias progressively faded. Doyen entered in new deals only with Granada (Luis Martins), FC Porto (Brahimi) and Cadiz FC (multiplayers). As FIFA announced its decision to ban TPO in September 2014, this might have cooled off the interest of the most prominent Spanish and Portuguese clubs. It is also possible that since the Eurozone crisis came to a slow end and the European central bank flooded the financial markets with cheap money, football clubs progressively recovered access to more traditional (and less risky) sources of credit.

B.    Doyen’s internationalization

This disaffection of its traditional market has probably incentivized Doyen to internationalize its investments beyond its Iberian basis, starting with the infamous multiplayer deal with FC Twente in December 2013. Since August 2013 and a first TPO deal with a Mexican investment company, Twente’s management seems to have been desperately looking for cash to finance its unlimited ambitions. The fire sale of Twente’s key players to Doyen was probably urgently needed to cover the club’s short-term deficits. In practice, some of the players concerned (Tadic and Promes) were sold only six months after the deal. Doyen made a huge profit out of those sales, reaching 300% for Promes’ transfer. In that case Doyen’s intervention was triggered by the financial despair of an overambitious mid-level club, with an insufficiently solid source of stable revenues to support its activity on the transfer market. Doyen was no white knight. It is an investment fund, not a charity! The group was interested in the worthy assets of Twente and bought them at cheap value. This was probably the most destructive intervention of Doyen, as it was not aimed at supporting the recruitment of a specific player but at temporarily propping up the finances of a bankrupt club in return for its only solvable assets.

In 2014 and 2015, Doyen decided also to heavily invest in the South American market. It made a number of deals (11) involving mostly Brazilian players (from Santos FC, Sao Paulo, Atletico Paranense and Flamengo) and also two Columbians (from Deportivo Estudiantil). Those deals are for the most part still on-going. They are also probably riskier for Doyen than the European deals because of the limited guarantees that South American clubs can provide. The Leandro Damiao case is there to remind us that those deals are in any case risky for the clubs. Damiao was a great prospect when he was transferred for €15 million to Santos in December 2013. Based on the map of deals Doyen loaned €12 million to Santos in return for 80% of the economic rights attached to him. Yet, after three years, Damiao’s contract was rescinded in December 2015 and he moved on a free transfer to Betis Seville, leaving Santos with an €18 million debt to pay to Doyen (which was recently upheld by the Brazilian justice). This is a good reminder that TPO, on whichever continent, is everything but risk-free for clubs. The sweet feeling of short-term cash might very well turn into the (very) sour taste of long-term debt.

Finally, in 2015 Doyen entered into a surprising deal with an unknown Belgian club: Seraing United (or RFC Seraing). The relatively small deal (€300.000) concerns three of Seraing’s players. It is definitely an unusual investment for Doyen with very little potential to extract substantial profit. One hypothesis is that this contract is used as a legal Trojan horse to support Doyen’s legal challenge against FIFA’s TPO ban in front of Belgian courts. Indeed, Doyen has hired (for €200.000 in 2015 as indicated in the ‘map of deals’) star lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, who was Jean-Marc Bosman’s lawyer in the eponym case, to entertain complaints in front of the European Commission and simultaneously the Belgian courts against FIFA’s TPO ban. In that regard, it has successfully used the sanctions imposed by the URBSFA (the Belgium Football Federation) and FIFA against Seraing to justify the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts over the case (see our blog on the latest ruling in this case). Doyen’s TPO investment in Seraing has probably more to do with a smart legal stratagem than a long-term investment.

II.            Doyen’s Contractual System

A.    Doyen’s guarantee: the Put Option or Free Agency Fee

Doyen’s contractual system has been relatively stable since it started operating. The principle is always the same: Doyen provides a lump sum (for various purposes, often the recruitment of the player) and gets a percentage of the economic rights attached to a player in return. However, what it does not do, and that is decisive in making it a rewarding business model, is share with the club the risk that the player fails to become a star or that the player leaves on a free transfer at the end of his contract. For the latter scenarios, Doyen quickly developed a bulletproof contractual system structured around a number of contractual clauses limiting its exposure. Be it named ‘Free Agency Fee’ or ‘Put Option’, the idea is that if a profitable transfer of the player fails, Doyen will secure a minimum return on its investment (often the original grant plus 10% of interests each year). This minimum return on investment is usually secured with a ‘hard’ warrantee, a pledge on a share of fixed revenue. This ‘deed of pledge’ (as it was called in Twente’s case) is often attached to the future revenues derived from the broadcasting rights to which the club is entitled as a member of a professional league or its future ticketing proceeds. It is this secured minimum return on investment that makes it a low risk economic endeavour for Doyen. Basically, Doyen’s only risk is that a club would go bankrupt and disappears, but football clubs are a bit like systemic banks, they are too popular to fail and have the tendency to be rescued by public authorities when they face deep financial trouble.[2]

B.    The ‘Reasonable Transfer Offer’ and Doyen’s influence on the transfer policy of clubs

Doyen’s TPO system also guarantees that in case a player is successful, a club will be forced to transfer him if a ‘Reasonable Transfer Offer’ is made. The ‘Reasonable Transfer Offer’ is defined as a minimum amount. If an offer matches or exceeds this amount, Doyen can force the club into choosing either to sell the player or to buy back Doyen’s share for a price equivalent to Doyen’s share of the transfer proceeds if the player would have been transferred. This is a mechanism that ensures that clubs will not be able to keep an outstanding player and pay the minimum fee due at the end of his contract (or the put option fee), rather than sell the player for a more substantial amount. As the clubs having recourse to Doyen are, as it is argued in its own submissions to the French and Belgian courts, unable to afford recruiting these players in the first place, they are more than unlikely to be able to buy back the share of the economic rights owned by Doyen when their price has tripled or quadrupled. The alternative is simple: sell or go bankrupt. Until now few clubs have chosen the latter option. The mechanism of the ‘Reasonable Transfer Offer’ is in itself aimed at influencing the transfer policy of the clubs signing a TPO deal with Doyen. They have their hands doubly tied: if the player fails to materialize as a star they will have to repay at least Doyen’s investment plus healthy interests; if he does become a star they will lose him as soon as the right transfer offer comes. And Doyen’s TPO contracts ensure that the right transfer offer will come. 

C.     Doyen’s double-game as an agent

In many of the ERPAs published by footballleaks one will find a provision indicating that Doyen has the right to act as an agent to promote the transfer of the player of which it owns a share of the economic right.[3] Doyen, which has intimate knowledge of the key legal conditions enshrined in the ERPA, is in a position to market the players to new clubs and force a transfer by disclosing (informally) the level of the ‘Minimum Transfer Offer’. The potential for conflicts of interests between Doyen acting as an investor and owner of a share of the economic rights attached to a player and Doyen acting as mandated agent to promote the transfer of the same player is obviously high. Nelio Lucas, who was and still is active as an agent, impersonates these ties between Doyen and the shady world of agents. His personal contacts in the milieu are well-known and have been instrumental to the success of his enterprise. Doyen’s unhindered double game as an agent and an investor is one of the reasons why TPO needs at least to be strictly regulated or even banned. When engaging in TPO deals, financially distressed clubs are basically handing over to Doyen the management of parts of their squad. Indirectly the player’s freedom is also impaired. Who can doubt that a club will be able to incentivize his player to leave if it needs him to do so due to Doyen’s financial Sword of Damocles pending over its head.

Conclusion: Thank you footballleaks!

Doyen’s business model is smart and has to be acknowledged as a cynical embrace of the intrinsic logic of FIFA’s transfer system. It plays on each club’s natural drive for grandeur and the propensity of the clubs’ management to throw caution to the wind to get there at least once. Doyen’s head, Nelio Lucas, is no criminal. There is no indication that he engages in match fixing or money laundering. He is a dead-set investor hunting for the grail: secure financial returns on investments. And he (with many others[4]) has found a way to play the transfer system to his advantage and to game irrational clubs and managers. This does not imply that this business model should go on, however.

Instead, it must be acknowledged that this extreme form of ‘financiarisation’ of football brings with it important risks for clubs. Not only football fans are sometimes (often) irrational, more dramatically the management of clubs are often acting irrationally when they take on huge financial risks to achieve short term sporting success. It must also be acknowledged that public authorities have the tendency, for right or for wrong, to bail out football clubs when they face financial troubles. Thus, in turn, raising the potential of moral hazard and free riding from the part of reckless investors. Finally, it is clear that the transfer market due to its intrinsic transnational structure and the role played by inter-subjective networks is prone to conflicts of interests, which are heightened when the ownership of the economic rights attached to a player are distributed in an opaque fashion amongst a set of different actors.[5] The problem must be understood as structural. New legal mechanisms must be devised to avoid that the transfer system is abused for the purpose of speculation and to ensure that clubs are not incentivized to have recourse to creative financing to achieve competitive balance. 

All this calls for strong regulatory intervention. But, can FIFA truly regulate a complex set of transactions that span a variety of jurisdictions? Personally, I doubt it.[6] It needs to simplify the market to better control it. The TPO ban is a form of simplification. Another option would be to use FIFPro’s current complaint against the FIFA transfer system in front of the EU Commission to reinvent the transfer system and put a negotiated end to the artificial commodification of football players’ contracts.

In any event, we would not have been able to discuss all of this without footballleaks. In a complex world where markets ignore borders and economic actors operate from opaque jurisdictions, exceptional actions are needed to supervise those transactions and ensure that the visible hand of the general interest supports the (sometimes truly) invisible hand of the market.


[1] This document is susceptible to being easily forged, as it is a simple excel sheet. Therefore, I crosschecked the data included on the excel sheet with Doyen’s ERPAs published on Footballleaks, which confirmed the likely veracity of the information provided in the map of deals.

[2] This is where the EU State aid rules might also come into play to protect the public purse. See R. Craven, ‘Football and State aid: too important to fail?’, International Sports Law Journal (2014) 14:205–217 and B. Van Rompuy & O. van Maren, ‘EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?, Forthcoming in: A. Duval & B. Van Rompuy (eds.) The Legacy of Bosman. Revisiting the relationship between EU law and sport (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016).

[3] See for example: ERPA Guilavogui, para.7 ; ERPA Ola John, para.10.6 ; ERPA Luis Martins, para 14.2 ; or ERPA Kondogbia, para.7.

[4] Numerous investment firms and agents/intermediaries relied on a similar business model. Footballleaks has released fewer documents as far as they are concerned, but see for examples: Gestifute; Gol Football Luxembourg S.A.R.L; Representaciones Internacionales Vijai SA; Quality Football Ireland Limited; Leiston Holding limited.

[5] The “opacity” of the transfer system was recently flagged by an excellent Harvard study: M. Andrews and P. Harrington, ‘Off Pitch: Football’s financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen them’, CID Working Paper No. 311 January 2016.

[6] Andrews and Harrington (at p.99) believed before footballleaks’ releases “that the lack of knowledge about TPO affords it room to hide and that a general ban will force more ‘hiding’, which will limit opportunities to gather information about the practice and effectively regulate it in future.” Yet, I think FIFA would had a very hard time to create the transparent register they dream of, compliance with a duty to disclose would be extremely difficult to police and the case-by-case assessment of an incredible number of contractual arrangements would be needed. With the full ban FIFA reduces the administrative burden and partially externalizes enforcement to whistle-blowers (as footballleaks) and the press.

Comments (3) -

  • IR

    4/21/2016 6:35:40 PM |

    Good read, thanks for the coverage on Doyen. I'm just wondering if they (or other compnies) are still active in player investment at all since the TPO ban? e.g. are they attempting to make similar deals but restructuring contracts so that they comply with FIFA rules?

    • Antoine

      4/25/2016 10:06:55 AM |

      Thanks for your kind words. Doyen is still active in football (as an agent, image rights holder, or based on old TPO contracts from before the ban), but is apparently not engaging into new TPO deals (besides Seraing probably for the purpose of the legal challenge against FIFA's ban). It is also possible that they moved into traditional investment into clubs (or try to buy a club), but this is way more risky than TPO investment...

  • yeahbutno

    5/25/2016 2:48:41 PM |

    Good article.

    "(Getafe, Gijón, Sevilla or Valencia), which were unlikely (or at best uncertain) of ever participating in the Champions League."

    that part however.... Sevilla has already featured in the CL (and will next year) amd Valencia has been to finals in recent history...

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