Asser International Sports Law Blog

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The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – September - October 2020 - By Rhys Lenarduzzi


The Headlines


Human rights and sport  

Caster Semenya

Human rights issues are taking the headlines in the sporting world at present. A short time ago, Caster Semenya’s appeal at the Swiss Federal Tribunal against the CAS decision was dismissed, perhaps raising more questions than answering them. Within the last few days however, the message from the Semenya camp has been that this is not over (see here).  See the contributions from a range of authors at Asser International Sports Law Blog for a comprehensive analysis of the Semenya case(s) to date.

Navid Afkari

As the sporting world heard of the execution of Iranian Wrestler Navid Afkari, a multitude of legal and ethical questions bubbled to the surface. Not least of all and not a new question: what is the responsibility of sport and the governing bodies therein, in the space of human rights?  And, if an athlete is to acquire a high profile through sporting excellence, does that render athletes vulnerable to be made an example of and therefore in need of greater protection than is currently afforded to them? There are differing views on how to proceed. Consider the following from the World Players Association (Navid Afkari: How sport must respond) and that from the IOC (IOC Statement on the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari) which shows no indication through this press releases and other commentary, of undertaking the measures demanded by World Players Association and other socially active organisations. (See also, Benjamin Weinthal - Olympics refuses to discuss Iranian regime’s murder of wrestler).

Yelena Leuchanka

As this is written and relevant to the above, Yelena Leuchanka is behind bars for her participation in protests, resulting in several sporting bodies calling for her immediate release and for reform in the sporting world around how it ought to deal with these issues. As a member of the “Belarus women's national basketball team, a former player at several WNBA clubs in the United States and a two-time Olympian”, Leuchanka has quite the profile and it is alleged that she is being made an example of. (see here)

Uighur Muslims and Beijing Winter Olympics

British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab does not rule out Winter Olympics boycott over Uighur Muslims. ‘The foreign secretary said it was his "instinct to separate sport from diplomacy and politics" but that there "comes a point where that might not be possible".’ Though Raab’s comments are fresh, this issue is shaping as a “watch this space” scenario, as other governments might echo a similar sentiment as a result of mounting pressure from human rights activist groups and similar, in lead up to the Winter Games.

 

Major International Sports Law Decisions

CAS Decisions (September)


Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

FIFA

FIFPro

IOC

UEFA

WADA

ITF

World Athletics

Other Civil Society Organizations/Unions

 

In the News

Cricket

Doping

Tennis

 

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

 

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

 Law in Sport

Play the Game

Sport and EU Blog

Sport Integrity Initiative

SportLegis

Podcasts

LawInSport

The Forward Line

 

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The 2006 World Cup Tax Evasion Affair in Germany: A short guide. By Gesa Kuebek

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The 2006 World Cup Tax Evasion Affair in Germany: A short guide. By Gesa Kuebek

Editor's note:

Gesa Kuebek holds an LLM and graduated from the University of Bologna, Gent and Hamburg as part of the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme in Law and Economics and now work as an intern for the Asser Instituut.


On Monday, 9 November, the German Football Association (DFB) announced in a Press Release the resignation of its head, Wolfgang Niersbach, over the 2006 World Cup Affair. In his statement, Niersbach argued that he had “no knowledge whatsoever” about any “payments flows” and is now being confronted with proceedings in which he was “never involved”. However, he is now forced to draw the “political consequences” from the situation. His resignation occurred against the backdrop of last week’s raid of the DFB’s Frankfurt headquarters and the private homes Niersbach, his predecessor Theo Zwanziger and long-standing DFB general secretary Horst R. Schmidt. The public prosecutor’s office investigates a particularly severe act of tax evasion linked to awarding the 2006 World Cup. The 2006 German “summer fairy-tale” came under pressure in mid-October 2015, after the German magazine “Der Spiegel” shocked Fußballdeutschland by claiming that it had seen concrete evidence proving that a €6.7 million loan, designated by the FIFA for a “cultural programme”, ended up on the account of Adidas CEO Robert-Louis Dreyfuß. The magazine further argued that the money was in fact a secret loan that was paid back to Dreyfuß. Allegedly, the loan was kept off the books intentionally in order to be used as bribes to win the 2006 World Cup bid. The public prosecutor now suspects the DFB of failing to register the payment in tax returns. German FA officials admit that the DFB made a “mistake” but deny all allegations of vote buying. However, the current investigations show that the issues at stakes remain far from clear, leaving many questions regarding the awarding of the 2006 World Cup unanswered.

The present blog post aims to shed a light on the matter by synthetizing what we do know about the 2006 World Cup Affair and by highlighting the legal grounds on which the German authorities investigate the tax evasion.


What’s the 2006 World Cup Affair all about?

The scandal centres on the payment of €6.7 million, which was, according to Der Spiegel, secretly loaned to the DFB by the private investor Louis Dreyfuß, at the time CEO of Adidas, prior to the Word Cup decision on 6 July 2000. Accordingly, the money was never recorded in either the balance sheets of the Bid Committee or, later, in the balance sheets of the German Organisation Committee of the World Cup. Der Spiegel argued that the money was used to buy the four votes of the Asian representatives of the 24-membered FIFA Executive Committee. The four Asians voted together with the European representatives at the elections in July 2000 in favour of Germany becoming the host of the 2006 World Cup. Due to the fact the New Zealand’s representative Charles Dempsey surprisingly refrained from voting in the last ballot, Germany won with 12:11 votes in favour. In a later article, Der Spiegel stated that Zwanziger and Schmidt discussed in a recorded telephone conversation to whom the Dreyfuß millions were transferred and mentioned the name of Mohamed Bin Hammam in this context. It is worth remembering that the Qatari Bin Hammam, a former member of the FIFA Executive Committee from 1996 to 2011, was charged with offering bribes for votes and banned for life from all football activities by FIFA on two occasions in 2011 and 2012. The DFB, however, denies all allegations of vote-rigging.

The current investigations of the public prosecutor focus on the supposed repayment of the €6.7 million loan in April 2005. The Organisation Committee officially declared the money as the German contribution to a “cultural programme” during the 2006 World Cup. As such, the German money went to a FIFA account in Geneva, Switzerland. However, the FIFA cultural programme never happened. Instead, FIFA allegedly transferred the money immediately to an account of Louis Dreyfuß in Zurich. Up to now, there are neither bills nor a receipt of payments at FIFA for the ominous €6.7 million. Furthermore, it remains unclear through which channels the DFB’s money was transferred back to Louis Dreyfuß.


How does the DFB react?

Initially, the DFB acknowledged in a Press Release of 16 October that evidence came to light “that a payment of the Organisation Committee in April 2005 amounting to €6.7 million attributed to FIFA may not have been used according to the indicated purpose”. On that same day, Der Spiegel published its article. The DFB promptly reacted in another Press Release, denying the existence of slush funds. It refuted the allegations of Der Spiegel as “completely untenable” and denied any accusations of vote-rigging. Niersbach added that the DFB “will refute Der Spiegel’s claims and take legal action against them”. In a similar manner, German football legend Franz Beckenbauer, who acted as the head of the Head of the 2006 World Cup Organisation Committee, repudiated the article’s claims publicly.

By contrast, on 23 October, Zwanziger described Niersbach, his well-known enemy and successor as DFB president, as a liar in a Spiegel interview, acknowledging for the first time the existence of slush-funds “during the German World Cup application”. He argued that it is, “similarly clear that the current DFB president has not just been aware of the matter for a few weeks, as he states, but at least since 2005”.

Shortly thereafter, Franz Beckenbauer admitted for the first time that “mistakes” had been made, but still denied vote buying. According to the DFB, the €6.7 million were indeed disguised under the false pretences of the “cultural programme” and used to repay the loan to Louis Dreyfuß. However, the DFB claims that the original payment to the German Organisation Committee led by Franz Beckenbauer was made in 2002, thus after Germany had already won the 2006 World Cup bid. According to the DFB, the money was used to fulfil a particular demand of FIFA: FIFA president Blatter requested an advanced payment of €6.7 million to guarantee a €170 million loan.[1] Beckenbauer acknowledged that the Organisation Committee should not have agreed to the proposal of the FIFA Finance Committee. Blatter, however, denies this version.[2]

By this time, the DFB had contracted the law firm ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer’ to investigate the matter. On 27 October, the law firm stated that the proceedings will probably take a long time.


Why is the German public prosecutor’s office investigating tax evasion?

On 19 October, the German Prosecutor’s office stated that they were in the process of verifying an initial suspicion before launching a preliminary investigation. Possible criminal wrongdoings involved deception, fraud and corruption. However, in a later Press Release, the public prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt stated that there would be no further investigation into the alleged crimes due to the expiration of the limitation period of proceedings. Instead, a preliminary investigation involving a particularly severe case of tax fraud was initiated.

By indicating the €6.7 million transfer as a contribution to the “FIFA cultural programme” on the DFB’s tax return, the transaction was classified as an “operating expense” under German tax law and was as such tax deductible. The public prosecutor’s office, however, thinks that the payment had in fact a different purpose. As a result of this requalification, the payment cannot be declared as a deducible operating expense anymore. Therefore, the suspects are accused of declaring wrongful tax returns within the limit of their prior responsibilities in the Organisations Committee, thereby evading corporate and commercial taxes as well as solidarity surcharges[3] for the year 2006 to a substantially high extent.

According to an article of the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, the falsified tax return were signed by Niersbach himself. Niersbach denies “any involvement whatsoever” in the affair.


What are the legal grounds under German Law?

The legal basis for prosecution of tax evasion is the eighth chapter (§§ 369-412) of the Abgabenordnung (Fiscal Code; abbr. AO). Here, tax offences are distinguished into tax crimes (Steuerstraftaten) and misdemeanours (Steuerordnungswidrigkeiten). Whilst the former is characterised as a deliberate act, the latter offence is triggered in case of gross negligence. Only tax crimes are punishable by penalties and imprisonment.[4] The core offence within the category of tax crimes is tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung) which is regulated under § 370 AO. A natural or legal person commits tax evasion by (i) misrepresenting or concealing relevant information regarding taxation to tax authorities; (ii) neglecting tax disclosure duties; or (iii) refraining from the compulsory use of tax stamps (§ 370 AO Abs. 1). As stated above, the act of tax evasion must be committed deliberately. In accordance with § 78 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Law Code; abbr. StGB), the statutory limitation period for prosecution of tax crimes is five years. However, the limitation period for tax repayment duties amounts to ten years; moreover, for tax repayment duties 6% interest per year is added. The potential sentence for tax evasion under German Law ranges from a financial penalty to a prison sentence of up to five years. In particularly serious cases of tax evasion in conjunction with abuse of an evader’s official authority or with fraudulent counterfeit the possible sentence ranges from minimally six month to maximally ten years of imprisonment (§ 370 AO Abs. 3 S. 1-5). If tax evasion is committed on a professional basis or as part of an organized crime (Gewerbs-/ Bandenmaessige Steuerhinterziehung) as stipulated in § 370a AO, the possible sentence ranges from one up to ten years of imprisonment.[5]

The search (Durchsuchungen) of private homes and business premises are primarily regulated in §§ 102 ff. Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure; abbr. StPO). Confiscation, or Beschlagnahmung, is regulated in §§ 98 ff. StPO. A search is conducted during preliminary investigations, and has to be based on “sufficient factual implications” (§ 152 Abs. 2 StPO). The preliminary investigation procedure can have three possible outcomes: First, one can decide to close the proceedings (§§386, 389 AO); second one can indorse a penalty order (Strafbefehl §§400; 407 StPO); and third, if enough evidence has been collected, the prosecutor can go to court and charge the defendant for tax evasion (§170 StPO).[6]


Against whom does the German prosecutor investigates?

The prosecutor’s investigation does not target the DFB as such. As stated in the introduction, suspects are the recently resigned DFB president Wolfgang Niersbach, who was the vice-president of the German Organisation Committee of the 2006 World Cup, his predecessor Theo Zwanziger, who acted as the treasurer of the Organisations Committee and Horst R. Schmidt, who was the managing Vice-President of the Organisations Committee and until 2007 General Secretary of the DFB. If Niersbach actually signed the falsified tax return papers, his role in the affair will most likely be difficult to deny.

The exact role of the other two officials in the putative tax evasion scheme remains unclear. Especially the role of Zwanziger raises questions. Not only did he publicly reveal Niersbach’s knowledge of the affair, he also gave evidence in front of ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer’ on 28 October. Although contracted by the DFB, the members of the law firm are supposed to act as external investigators. Zwanziger stated that he had “submitted all his documents [and] presented his annotations and assessments”. Six days later, the public prosecutor’s office initiated the preliminary investigation on tax evasion and searched the aforementioned premises. At this point in time, a linkage between Zwanziger’s testimony and the start of the preliminary investigations remains purely speculative.

It is further unclear why the investigators refrain from targeting Franz Beckenbauer, who acted as the president of the Organisations Committee. The prosecutor argued that Beckenbauer had “nothing to do” with the tax evasion. By contrast, the German journal “Handelsblatt” suggested that “the most likely explanation” is that Beckenbauer lives in Austria and is thus outside the jurisdictional reach of the investigators.


What potential charges are the accused facing?

As the topic of the missing €6.7 million arose prior to any of the statements of the FIFA officials and – as to my knowledge - no retroactive payments have been made, the accused will not be exempted from charges under § 371 AO. If enough evidence can be found and if the accused are proven guilty in front of a Court, the accused six months to ten years imprisonment in case of a severe tax evasion scheme (§ 370 AO Abs. 3).


Why does the combination of “tax evasion” “Germany” and “Louis Dreyfuß” rings a bell?

It is not the first time that Louis Dreyfuß has been involved in a “German football scandal”. In 2000, Dreyfuß provided a loan to Bayern Munich’s Uli Hoeneß of 5 million Deutschmark (around €2.56 million) as “play money” to speculate primarily on shares and current exchange rates, which was deposited in a Zurich financial institution. Subsequently, the bank reportedly granted Hoeneß a loan amounting to 15 million marks, for which Louis Dreyfus also acted as guarantor. Hoeneß refrained from declaring the proceeds of his gambling to the tax authorities. For this and other tax evasion offences, Hoeneß was sentenced to a total of three years and six month of imprisonment in 2014.


What’s next in the investigation on the 2006 World Cup Affair?

With regard to the tax evasion charges, it is likely that the case will either be closed (§§ 386, 389 AO) or – if enough evidence is collected against one or all three of the officials – the offenders will be charged for tax evasion in front of a court (§170 StPO). The outcome will depend on the evidence that comes to light during the preliminary investigation. As the FIFA “cultural programme” never took place, it is very obvious that the money was indeed used for a different purpose than indicated on the tax return and as such, the transaction should not have been deducible as an operating expense. Hence, proving tax evasion will most likely not be the public prosecutor’s office primary problem. Instead, the investigators have to find evidence tying Niersbach, Zwanziger and/or Schmidt to the crime. If the Sueddeutsche Zeitung is correct in stating that Niersbach signed the illegal tax return, it will be difficult for him to avoid prosecution.

In any case, it is to be expected that the 2006 World Cup Affair will occupy Fußballdeutschland for a while. The results of the investigation which the DFB confided to the law firm ‘Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer are not expected tomorrow. Moreover, the independence of the investigation is questioned after a personal connection between a Niersbach employee and a lawyer from the aforementioned firm became public. FIFA, too, has several external lawyers investigating the claims. In addition, the Sportausschuss (sport committee) of the German Bundestag started to look into the matter. However, the impartiality of the sport committee may also be questioned as one of the Bundestag’s members also acts as the treasurer of the DFB and is tipped to become the successor of Niersbach. As a result, the final word regarding the use, whereabouts and purpose of the €6.7 million is not to be expected soon.


[1] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:” Das Schweigen des Wolfgang Niersbach“, 04.11.2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/sport/fussball/dfb-praesident-wolfgang-niersbach-schweigt-nach-dfb-razzia-13893806.html

[2] Idem 1

[3] To finance the reunification of Germany a surcharge is levied from all taxpayers on their PAYE, income, withholding and corporation tax. The solidarity surcharge is currently 5.5 % of the relevant assessment basis.

[4] However, misdemeanours can be fined with up to €50 000

[5] See also L.P. Feld, A.J.Schmidt & F, Schneider: “Tax Evasion, Black Activities and Deterrence in Germany: An Institutional and Empirical Perspective”, Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Warwick, 2007.

[6] See also Christoph Bräuning: „Durchsuchung und Beschlagnahme durch die Steuerfahndung“, ROSE & PARTNER LLP, 2012, http://www.rosepartner.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Durchsuchung_Steuerfahndung__Christoph_Braeunig_01.pdf

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – October 2019 by Thomas Terraz

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – October 2019 by Thomas Terraz

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 


The Headlines

International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference 2019

The T.M.C. Asser Institute and the Asser International Sports Law Centre held the third International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ) Conference on October 24-25. The Conference created a forum for academics and practitioners to discuss, debate and share knowledge on the latest developments of sports law. It featured six uniquely themed panels, which included topics such as ‘Transfer systems in international sports’ and ‘Revisiting the (in)dependence and transparency of the CAS’ to ‘The future of sports: sports law of the future’. The ISLJ Conference was also honored to have two exceptional keynote speakers: Moya Dodd and Ulrich Haas. To kick off the conference, Moya Dodd shared her experiences from an athlete’s perspective in the various boardrooms of FIFA. The second day was then launched by Ulrich Haas, who gave an incredibly thorough and insightful lecture on the importance, function and legal basis of association tribunals in international sport. For a detailed overview of this year’s ISLJ Conference, click here for the official conference report.

The Asser International Sports Law Centre was delighted to have been able to host another great edition of the ISLJ Conference and is thankful to all the participants and speakers who made this edition such a success.

Moving towards greater transparency: Launch of FIFA’s Legal Portal

On October 31, FIFA announced that it was introducing a new legal portal on its website that will give greater access to numerous documents that previously were kept private. FIFA explains that this is in order to help increase its transparency, which was one of the key ‘Guiding Principles’ highlighted in FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future released in 2016. This development comes as many sport governing bodies face increasing criticism for the opacity of its judicial bodies’ decisions, which can have tremendous economic and societal impacts. The newly available documents will include: ‘decisions rendered on the merits by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee and the FIFA Appeal Committee (notified as of 1 January 2019); decisions rendered on the merits by the FIFA Ethics Committee (notified since 1 January 2019); decisions rendered on the merits by the FIFA Players’ Status Committee and the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber; non-confidential CAS awards in proceedings to which FIFA is a party (notified since 1 January 2019); list of CAS arbitrators proposed by FIFA for appointment by ICAS, and the number of times they have been nominated in CAS proceedings’. The list of decisions from all the aforementioned bodies are updated every four months, according to their respective webpages. However, time will ultimately tell how consistently decisions are published. Nevertheless, this move is a major milestone in FIFA’s journey towards increasing its transparency.

Hong Kong Protests, Human Rights and (e)Sports Law: The Blizzard and NBA controversies

Both Blizzard, a major video game developer, and the NBA received a flurry of criticism for their responses to persons expressing support for the Hong Kong protests over the past month. On October 8, Blizzard sanctioned Blitzchung, a professional Hearthstone player who expressed support of the Hong Kong protest during a post-match interview, by eliminating the prize money he had won and suspending him for one year from any Hearthstone tournament. Additionally, Blizzard will cease to work with the casters who conducted the interview. With mounting disapproval over the sanctions,  J. Allen Brack, the president of Blizzard, restored the prize money and reduced the period of ineligibility to 6 months.

The NBA controversy started when Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, tweeted his support for the protests in Hong Kong. The tweet garnered much attention, especially in China where it received a lot of backlash, including an announcement from CCTV, the official state broadcaster in China, that it was suspending all broadcasts of the NBA preseason games. In attempts to appease its Chinese audience, which is a highly profitable market for the NBA, Morey deleted the tweet and posted an apology, and the NBA responded by saying that the initial tweet was ‘regrettable’. Many scolded these actions and accused the NBA of censorship to which the NBA Commissioner, Adam Silver, responded that the NBA remains committed to freedom of expression.

Both cases highlighted how (e)sport organizations may be faced with competing interests to either guarantee greater protection of human rights or to pursue interests that perhaps have certain financial motivations.


Major International Sports Law Decisions

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

FIFA

IAAF

IOC

UEFA

WADA

Other

In the News

Football

Doping

Other

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

SSRN

Blog

Law in Sport

Upcoming Events

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – November and December 2019- By Thomas Terraz

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

International and European Sports Law – Monthly Report – November and December 2019- By Thomas Terraz

Editor's note: This report compiles the most relevant legal news, events and materials on International and European Sports Law based on the daily coverage provided on our twitter feed @Sportslaw_asser. 

 

The Headlines

WADA Conference and the Adoption of 2021 WADA Code Amid Calls for Reform

On November 5-7, WADA held its Fifth World Conference on Doping in Sport where it faced a busy schedule, including the adoption of the revised 2021 World Anti-Doping Code and the election of a new WADA President and Vice-President by the Foundation Board. Concerning the latter, Witold Bańka, Poland’s Minister of Sport and Tourism, was elected as WADA President and Yang Yang, a former Chinese speed skater, elected as Vice-President, replacing Sir Craig Reedie and Linda Helleland respectively.  As Helleland leaves her position, she has expressed some strong views on the state of sport governance, particularly that ‘there is an absence of good governance, openness and independence in the highest levels of international sports’. Helleland was not the only one to recently voice governance concerns, as Rob Koehler, Director General of Global Athlete, also called for a ‘wholesale structural change at WADA’, which includes giving ‘independent’ athletes a vote in WADA’s Foundation Board, ensuring a greater ‘separation of powers’ and ensuring greater protection of athletes’ rights.

In the midst of the calls for reform, the amended 2021 WADA Code and the amended International Standards were also adopted after a two year, three stage code review process. Furthermore, a major milestone in athletes’ rights was achieved with the adoption of the Athletes’ Anti-Doping Rights Acts (separate from the WADA Code), which enumerates certain basic rights to help ‘ensure that Athlete rights within anti-doping are clearly set out, accessible, and universally applicable’. On the other hand, the Act ‘is not a legal document’, which clearly circumscribes some of the potential effects the Act may have. Nonetheless, athlete representative groups have ‘cautiously welcomed’ some of the changes brought by the 2021 WADA Code, such as the ‘modified sanctions for substances of abuse violations’.

Sung Yang’s Historical Public Hearing at the CAS

After much anticipation, the second public hearing in CAS history occurred on November 15 in Montreux, Switzerland in the Sun Yang case (details of this case were discussed in August and September’s monthly report), which was livestreamed and can be seen in its totality in four different parts (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4). This was an extremely unique opportunity, which hopefully will become a more common occurrence, to see just how CAS hearings are conducted and perhaps get a taste of some of the logistical issues that can emerge during live oral hearings. One of these problems, accurate translations, rapidly became apparent as soon as Sun Yang sat in the witness chair to give his opening statements. The translators in the box seemed to struggle to provide an intelligible English interpretation of Sun Yang and other witnesses’ statements, while Sun Yang also seemingly had trouble understanding the translated questions being posed to him. The situation degenerated to such an extent that ultimately one of WADA’s officials was called to replace the translators. However, the translation drama did not end there, since during Sun Yang’s closing statements an almost seemingly random person from the public appeared next to Sun Yang who claimed to have been requested from Sun Yang’s team to ‘facilitate’ the translation. Franco Frattini, president of the panel, questioned the identity of the ‘facilitator’ and explained that one could not just simply appear before the court without notice. Interestingly, Sun Yang’s legal team also rapidly intervened claiming that it had not been made of aware of the inclusion of the supporting translator, further complicating the matter. In the end, Sun Yang concluded his statements with the translation from the WADA official.

While it was Sun Yang’s legal team that had provided the original translators in the box, it still raises the question as to how translation at CAS could be improved to ensure a certain standard of translators. After all, quality translation is critical to the parties’ right to be heard under Article 6 (e) ECHR. Regardless, in the end, neither parties made an objection that their right to be heard was violated.

Russian Doping Saga Continues: WADA Compliance Review Committee Recommends Strong Sanctions

As was already discussed in August and September’s monthly report, WADA uncovered numerous inconsistencies concerning data taken from the Moscow Laboratory. After further investigation, WADA’s Compliance Review Committee has recommended that the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) be found non-compliant with the WADA Code. Accompanying the recommendation, the Compliance Review Committee also suggested several sanctions, which include prohibiting Russian athletes from participating in major events like the Olympic Games and ‘any World Championships organized or sanctioned by any Signatory’ for the next four years unless they may ‘dmonstrate that they are not implicated in any way by the non-compliance’. It would also see an embargo on events hosted in Russia during the same period. However, these sanctions did not go far enough for some, like Travis Tygart, chief executive of USADA, who wishes to prevent a repeat of Rio 2016 and PyeongChang 2018 ‘in which a secretly-managed process permitting Russians to compete – did not work’. On the other hand, the IOC has advocated for a softer, individual based approach that pursues ‘the rules of natural justice and respect human rights’. In the midst of these developments, the Athletics Integrity Unit also decided to charge several members of the Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF), including its President Dmitry Shlyakhtin, after a 15 month investigation for ‘tampering and complicity’ concerning a Russian athlete’s whereabouts violations.

Following many calls for strong consequences, the WADA Executive Committee met on December 9th and adopted the recommendations of the Compliance Review Committee. Athlete representatives have expressed their disappointment with the sanctions, calling the decision ‘spineless’ since it did not pursue a complete ban on Russian participation at events such as Euro 2020 and the 2020 Olympics. At this point, RUSADA has sent notice to WADA that it will be disputing the decision of WADA’s Executive Committee’s decision at the CAS.

 

Major International Sports Law Decisions

Court of Arbitration for Sport – Sun Yang Public Hearing Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4

Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS 2019/A/6110 Liam Cameron v. UK Anti-Doping Limited (UKAD)

Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS 2018/A/5989 IAAF v. Qatar Athletics Federation & Musaeb Abdulrahman Balla

 

Official Documents and Press Releases

CAS

FIFA

IOC

WADA

Other

 

In the News

Football

Doping

Other

 

Academic Materials

International Sports Law Journal

Other

 

Blog

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Law in Sport

Play the Game

Sports Integrity Initiative

SportLegis

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | New Video! Zoom In on World Anti-Doping Agency v. Russian Anti-Doping Agency - 25 February

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

New Video! Zoom In on World Anti-Doping Agency v. Russian Anti-Doping Agency - 25 February

Dear readers,

If you missed it (or wish to re-watch it), the video of our third Zoom In webinar from 25 February on the CAS award in the World Anti-Doping Agency v. Russian Anti-Doping Agency case is available on the YouTube channel of the Asser Institute:



Stay tuned and watch this space, the announcement for the next Zoom In webinar, which will take place on 31 March, is coming soon!

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: TPO and Spanish football, friends with(out) benefits?

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Unpacking Doyen’s TPO Deals: TPO and Spanish football, friends with(out) benefits?

Update: On 14 April footballleaks released a series of documents concerning Sporting de Gijón. Therefore, I have updated this blog on 19 April to take into account the new information provided.  

Doyen Sports’ TPO (or TPI) model has been touted as a “viable alternative source of finance much needed by the large majority of football clubs in Europe". These are the words of Doyen’s CEO, Nélio Lucas, during a debate on (the prohibition of) TPO held at the European Parliament in Brussels last January. During that same debate, La Liga’s president, Javier Tebas, contended that professional football clubs, as private undertakings, should have the right to obtain funding by private investors to, among other reasons, “pay off the club’s debts or to compete better”. Indeed, defendants of the TPO model continuously argue that third party investors, such as Doyen, only have the clubs’ best interests in mind, being the only ones capable and willing to prevent professional football clubs from going bankrupt. This claim constitutes an important argument for the defendants of the TPO model, such as La Liga and La Liga Portuguesa, who have jointly submitted a complaint in front of the European Commission against FIFA’s ban of the practice.[1]

The eruption of footballleaks provided the essential material necessary to test this claim. It allows us to better analyse and understand the functioning of third party investment and the consequences for clubs who use these services. The leaked contracts between Doyen and, for example, FC Twente, showed that the club’s short term financial boost came at the expense of its long-term financial stability. If a club is incapable of transferring players for at least the minimum price set in Doyen’s contracts, it will find itself in a financially more precarious situation than before signing the Economic Rights Participation Agreement (ERPA). TPO might have made FC Twente more competitive in the short run, in the long run it pushed the club (very) close to bankruptcy.

More than four months after its launch, footballleaks continues to publish documents from the football world, most notably Doyen’s ERPAs involving Spanish clubs. For this blog, our dataset will cover the two ERPAs between Doyen and Sporting de Gijón (found here and here); the ERPAs between Doyen and Sevilla FC for Kondogbia and Babá; the ERPAs between Doyen and Getafe for Abdelazziz Barreda and Pedro León; the ERPA between Doyen and Granada CF for Luís Martins; the ERPA between Doyen and Atlético Madrid for Josuha Guilavogui; and the ERPA between Doyen and Valencia CF for Dorlan Pabón.

The first part of this blog will provide background information on the recent economic history of Spanish football. The posterior in-depth analysis of the ERPAs will thus be placed in context. The blog will also include a table with the relevant facts from the ERPAs completed with the information included in an Excel document showing a map of deals and transactions allegedly conducted by Doyen and recently published on footballleaks. Relevant facts and figures that are not found in the ERPAs or in the Excel document, will be taken from the website www.transfermarkt.de. Based on the outcome of the analysis, we will attempt to conclude whether, and to what extent, the ERPAs have been profitable for the clubs involved, from a financial and competitive perspective.

 

Financial misery and TV rights inequality off the field

The financial misery

Spain was one of the countries most affected by the global financial crisis that commenced in 2008. The unemployment rate was above 25% for a long period of time and its budget deficit was about 10% from 2008 to 2012. The (professional) football sector also suffered from this general financial crisis. A study on the financial situation of Spanish clubs during the period 2007-2011 shows that by June 2011, 80% of La Liga clubs had a negative working capital. This meant that the clubs’ short term assets were not enough to cover the short term debts. The study further explains that the main reason for the financial difficulties is the excess of expenditures on players, i.e. paying transfer fees and salaries that clubs cannot afford. Not surprisingly, by 2011, half of the clubs from the Spanish first and second division had entered bankruptcy proceedings. A large part of the total debt was owed to the Spanish public authorities. In 2012, clubs in Spain's top two divisions collectively owed some €750 million to the tax authorities and another €600 million to the social security system. One of the teams who signed ERPAs with Doyen, Atlético Madrid, was known to have a tax debt which accounted for a fifth of the entire league’s tax debt. In fact, their tax debt of over €120 million amounted to over 60% of their annual revenue. Almost 40% of the clubs in the top two divisions presented negative equity, meaning that they were in clear need for funds from other parties. The general economic crisis prevented clubs to get these funds through normal means, like shareholders, members, sponsorships and bank loans. Local authorities were many times willing to aid their clubs. For example, the municipality of Gijón had rescued Sporting de Gijón by relocating its youth training facilities and subsequently buying the facilities for €12 million. Another example is that of Valencia CF. In its ambition to grow, the club decided to build a new stadium. The idea was to finance the new stadium by selling the old stadium. Once again, due to the financial crisis, and particularly the collapse of the housing market, it suddenly was incapable of selling the old stadium for the required price. The construction on the new stadium had already commenced with loaned money which could not be paid back. The municipality’s decision to place a State guarantee on this loan has been the subject of a formal State aid investigation by the European Commission.

 

TV Rights income inequality

One of the most important ways to generate income for professional football clubs is through the selling of TV rights. The Spanish clubs combined generated roughly €700 million per year from the selling of TV rights between 2010 and 2015.[2] This is slightly more than the €628 million the German Bundesliga was making per year between 2013 and 2016, but less than €940 million the Italian league was making in the 2012-13 season. The English Premier League is in a league of its own in this regard, which is making about €1.2 billion per year from the 2013-14 season onwards.[3]

Notwithstanding the total €700 million a year, most Spanish clubs do not derive enough money from selling the TV rights to compensate their losses. One has to keep in mind that where the clubs of Europe’s other major football leagues (e.g. England, Germany, France and Italy) were selling their TV rights jointly, Spanish clubs were still selling their TV rights individually. By means of the individual selling system, Spain’s two most popular clubs, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, were capable of selling their TV rights for much more money than the other clubs. In the 2010/11 season for example, out of the €641 million generated in total, FC Barcelona got €163 million, whereas Real Madrid got €156 million. The remaining 16 clubs of La Liga had to share the remaining €322 million, which is slightly more than €20 million per club on average. By contrast, the ‘smaller clubs’ of the English Premier League were still making at least €49 million in that same season, which is two-and-a-half times as much as their Spanish counterparts.[4] Even the club that was earning least money in Italy in 2012, Pescara, was earning more per year from the selling of TV rights than the average Spanish club (€25 million).

Calls for a fairer distribution of TV rights income in Spain have been heard for years, particularly from the smaller clubs, but the switch to a joint selling system will only take place as of the start of the 2016-17 season. It is believed that continuous lobbying by Real Madrid and FC Barcelona against the joint selling system is the main reason for this delay. In a way, it could be argued that apart from reckless risks on the transfer market and the effects of the Spanish financial crisis, the dominant position of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona is what led to many Spanish clubs being in severe financial difficulties. The urge of these clubs to turn to investment companies like Doyen becomes more understandable, given that the system itself did not allow them from obtaining funds from other ‘normal’ sources.    

 

The ERPA’s and its aftermaths explained

On the day of writing this blog (12 April 2016), nine ERPAs between Doyen and Spanish football clubs were published on the website of footballleaks. The ERPAs are divided in two groups: Firstly, the ERPAs that proved to be successful for both the club and Doyen are analysed; the second part combines all the ERPAs in which the players concerned were either not sold for high enough profit, or not transferred at all. As will be shown, these ERPAs had mostly negative financial consequences for the clubs.

 

The successful ERPAS: Kondogbia and Barrada

Sevilla’s recent sporting successes, most notably winning the Europa League four times since 2006, are said to have been the result of a high level youth academy combined with an excellent scouting network. However, it has never been a secret that Sevilla made use of the services provided by Doyen, including the signing of ERPAs. In a well-publicised seminar on TPO that took place in April 2015, Sevilla defended the TPO model and made clear that it was against an outright ban of the practice. The ERPA concerning Geoffrey Kondogbia and his subsequent transfer to AS Monaco can explain why Sevilla is in favour of the TPO model. Kondogbia was transferred from RC Lens to Sevilla on the same date as the signing of the ERPA (26 July 2012) for €3 million. With the objective of obtaining 100% of the Economic rights, Doyen paid RC Lens the full amount of the transfer fee. In turn, Sevilla would buy from Doyen 50% of the economic rights for €1.65 million. Even though the minimum transfer fee was set by the parties at €6 million, Kondogbia was sold only one year later to AS Monaco for a staggering €20 million. An excellent deal for Doyen, which registered a profit of €7.89 million.[5] This ERPA is an example of a collaboration between a club and an investment fund, which has been highly profitable for both. With the “help” of Doyen, Sevilla managed to sign a young player and sell him for a profit not long after. However, as can be seen below, even Sevilla has signed ERPAs that have not been very beneficial for the club.

 

A second “successful ERPA” signed between Doyen and a Spanish club was the ERPA between Doyen and Getafe for Barrada. Similar to many other ERPAs, it stipulated that Getafe was not able to obtain financial support from the banking system due “to the current financial crisis”. Therefore, Getafe decided to sell 60% of the economic rights of one of its most promising young players for €1.5 million to Doyen. Both parties agreed that the minimum transfer value of Barrada was €5 million. Consequently, as can be deducted under paragraph 7 of the ERPA, Doyen’s minimum return would always be at least €3 million (60% of €5 million), guaranteeing Doyen a profit of €1.5 million (€3 million minimum return minus €1.5 million grant fee). The minimum return was easily surpassed after Barrada was transferred to Al-Jazira for €8.5 million in 2013. In accordance with Doyen’s own figures, the investment fund obtained €3.35 million for this transfer, a profit of 223%.[6]

 

The many “failed” ERPAs

Atlético Madrid was no novice to the practice of TPO when it sold 50% of Joshua Guivalogui’s economic rights for €5 million to Doyen. As can be seen from the ‘Map of Deals’, Atlético had previously sold 33% of the economic rights of the highly successful Atlético player, Falcao, to Doyen for €10 million. His later transfer to AS Monaco for €43 million was probably also economically beneficial for Atlético. Guivalogui, however, has been less successful wearing an Atlético shirt. He has played seven games in total for the club in two-and-a-half years, having been loaned to St-Étienne for the 2013-14 season, and to VfL Wolfsburg for the 2014-15 and 2015-16 seasons. If Wolfsburg decides to lift the option it has to buy Guivalogui for €4 million[7], Atlético Madrid will probably need to pay an additional amount to Doyen in order to reach the agreed minimum fee of €6.5 million.[8]

As regards Sevilla FC, where the ERPA concerning Kondogbia can be seen as “successful”, Babá’s ERPA tells a completely different story. Sevilla sold 20% of Babá’s economic rights for €660.000 to Doyen in 2012. Nonetheless, Babá never managed to secure a spot in the Sevilla squad and he was loaned out to Getafe and Levante between 2013 and 2015. After his contract expired with Sevilla in the summer of 2015, he moved back to his former club Marítimo as a free agent. Although Sevilla did not receive a fee for this transfer, Doyen still obtained a guaranteed profit of €148.000, as can be seen from the ‘map of deals’.

The Guivalogui ERPA and the Babá ERPA tell a similar story. Both players did not fulfil the expectations the clubs had of them at the moment Doyen bought parts of their economic rights. As a result, they were transferred, or are going to be transferred, for an amount well below the agreed minimum return. A similar run of events occurred with Luís Martins and Dorlan Pabon. Both players were not successful at Granada and Valencia respectively, and were transferred at a loss for the club. The exact figures of the transfers can be found in the table below.

The ERPA’s signed between Doyen and Sporting de Gijón are particularly interesting in terms of “failure”, because they illustrate perfectly the desperate situation the club found itself in. Sporting has been on the verge of disappearing not once, but several times in the last 10 to 15 years. In 2005, its total debt amounted to €51 million, with more than half owed to the public authorities. As a result, the club entered bankruptcy proceedings. In 2007, a settlement was reached between the club and its creditors. Even though the club still had a debt of €35.8 million, a Spanish court decided to terminate the bankruptcy proceedings. By the second half of 2011, the club presented a positive balance sheet at the shareholders’ general assembly for a fifth year in a row, but in reality Sporting was still acute financial difficulties, as the club would admit later on. It is this acute need for money that made the club turned to Doyen twice in less than a year. The fact that Sporting de Gijón is still alive today (albeit in danger of relegating to the second division), makes one wonder whether the ERPA with Doyen actually aided the club in its fight for survival or whether it worsened the situation in a similar way as FC Twente’s.

The first agreement concerns the purchase for €2 million of part of the economic rights of nine players who, at the time of signing, were registered as Sporting players.[9] Future transfers of one or more of these players would need to generate a profit of €7 million for Doyen.[10] The lifespan of the first agreement was not very long, as it was replaced by a second ERPA on 22 March 2012. Indeed, Sporting de Gijón stated officially on 23 February 2016 that the first ERPA never deployed any legal effects.

The first ERPA and the second ERPA between Doyen and Sporting show some clear similarities. For an amount of €2 million, Doyen buys 25% of the economic rights of all the players of both the first team and Sporting B (the second team).[11] This percentage remains 25% until Doyen obtains an amount of €7 million from the transfers of Sporting players to other clubs. Once this amount is reached, the percentage will be reduced to 15% until a further €3 million is earned by Doyen. Therefore, the minimum return Doyen should get is that of €10 million. Should Doyen not have received €7 million or more by 31 January 2015, the percentage of the economic rights owned by Doyen of all the Sporting and Sporting B players will be increased to 35%. Doyen's share of the economic rights would also increase to 35% if the club relegates from the first division (clause 2.5). A further important element of the ERPA is clause 4.1, by which Sporting names Doyen as the exclusive agent (intermediary) of the club for all transfer and loan operations of Sporting players. 

By using the ‘map of deals’ and transfermarkt, we have listed all Sporting and Sporting B players sold after March 2012. These players were:

-          Davud Barral – sold for €2 million to Orduspor on 5 July 2012;

-          Alberto Botía – sold for €3 million to Sevilla FC on 11 August 2012;

-          Miguel de las Cuevas – sold for €1.2 million to CA Osasuna on 1 July 2013;

-          Óscar Guido Trejo – sold for €2.7 million to FC Toulouse on 19 July 2013;

-          Borja López - sold for €2.2 million to AS Monaco on 2 August 2013;

-          Stefan Scepovic - sold for €2.56 million to Celtic FC on 1 September 2014.

A closer look at the ‘map of deals’ shows one important discrepancy compared to the ERPA of 22 March 2012. The share of economic rights owned by Doyen were not 25% (as stipulated in the ERPA), but 45%. Thanks to footballleaks' release of the so-called 'Escritura de Liquidación' on 14 April we now know what caused this increase. Firstly, in accordance with clause 2.5 of the ERPA, the economic rights owned by Doyen of all the Sporting players (except Botía and De las Cuevas) increased to 35%, since Sporting relegated to the second division in May 2012. Secondly, being an intermediary in all of these transfers, Doyen was entitled to an additional 10% of all the income generated from the transfers.[12] The ‘map of deals’ shows that the transfers of Sporting players has so far led to Doyen receiving more than €3.5 million, a profit of about €1.5 million for their €2 million investment. Nonetheless, this figure is still well short of the minimum return Doyen expects to get of €10 million. In other words, should the ERPA still be in force, Sporting is still required to sell more players if it is to meet its obligations towards Doyen.

Table summarizing the analysed ERPA’s signed between Doyen and Spanish clubs


Conclusion

The reason that many Spanish clubs decided to sell economic rights of players to companies like Doyen from about 2011 to 2015 (the year FIFA banned the practice) is relatively straightforward: The financial crisis was heavily felt in Spanish football, with many clubs incapable of paying off high debts owed to the public authorities. Moreover, the difference between the financial and competitive power of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona on the one hand, and all the other clubs on the other was only getting bigger. Not only did competing at national level become close to impossible, even smaller clubs from England were generating more than twice the revenues of Spanish clubs. The chances of being successful at European level were at risk.

Doyen was basically at the right place, at the right time. The ‘small’ Spanish clubs were in desperate need for money, either to compete or simply to survive, and Doyen was willing to give them this money in return for (part of) the economic rights of their football players. From the outside, it looks like a perfect match between club and investment fund. However, was TPO profitable for Spanish football clubs from a competitive and financial perspective?

From a financial perspective, the business is clearly lucrative for Doyen. As can be seen in the table, by investing €19.335 million it so far made a profit of €15.757 million.[13] In other words, an 81.5% profit! The same cannot be said for the clubs. Only the transfers of Barrada from Getafe to Al-Jazira and Kondogbia from Sevilla to AS Monaco were profitable. For all the other ERPAs, it appears that an a posteriori compensation to Doyen was necessary, because the amount obtained through the transfer could not cover the minimum return secured to Doyen in the ERPAs.

The legal discussions on TPO to a large extent focused on whether the practice leads to an unauthorized influence of third parties on the internal governance and policies of a club; and on whether a complete ban is contrary to (EU) competition law. Yet, the aspect that remains underexposed in the author’s opinion is the severe negative financial effect TPO can have on a football club. As we have discussed a couple of months ago in a blog on FC Twente, the financial position of the Dutch club deteriorated after signing the ERPA to such an extent that the club is now in serious danger of disappearing all together.

It is possible, though unlikely, that FC Twente’s downfall was an exception.  However, one should not underestimate Sporting de Gijon’s current financial situation, for example. A closer look at the ‘map of deals’ tells us that in March 2015 Sporting had only paid €250.000 of the €3.5 million it owed Doyen. A total debt of at least €3 million was confirmed in an official joined statement, dated 29 February 2016. The statement further holds that this debt has to be repaid before 2019, but one cannot help thinking that, for a club like Sporting de Gijón, this is easier said than done. Getting the money from future transfers should be complicated if Sporting only partially owns the economic rights of its own players, plus a looming relegation to the second division at the end of this season will not be beneficial either.[14]



[1] More information on the TPO ban can be found in our previous Blogs, such as “Blog Symposium: FIFA’s TPO ban and its compatibility with EU competition law – Introduction”.

[2] The total amount generated for the 2010/11 season was €641, see Mail Online, “Barca and Real consider sharing TV rights to make La Liga more competitive”; The total amount generated for the 2014/15 season was €742.5 million, see Marca, “Así será el reparto del dinero televisivo”.

[3] As of the 2016-17 season, The English Premier League will make €2.1 billion per year, see Mail Online, "Premier League set for £3bn windfall from global TV rights as rival broadcasters slug it out to screen England-based superstars"

[4] More information on the selling of TV rights in football can be found in our previous Blogs, such as “Why the European Commission will not star in the Spanish TV rights Telenovela”.

[5] See: Map of deals and transactions updated until 10 March 2015.

[6] See: Map of deals and transactions updated until 10 March 2015.

[7] Transfermarkt - Josuha Guilavogui.

[8] The original minimum return of €5.5 million set in September 2013 was increased every year by €500.000 until 1 September 2015, since Doyen continued to own 50% of the Guilavogui’s economic rights.

[9] The players concerned were Roberto Canella Suárez, Álvaro Bustos Sandoval, Alejandro Serrano García, Abdou Karim Tima, Mendy Formose, Juan Muñiz Gallego, Sergio Álvarez Díaz, Óscar Guido Trejo and David Barral Torres.

[10] In the first phase, Doyen receives a percentage of 50% of the economic rights of the nine players until Doyen received an amount of €5 million for the transfer of one or more of those players. After Doyen receives its first €5 million, Doyen’s ownership of the economic rights of the remaining players is to be reduced to 40% until Doyen received an additional €1 million. Once Doyen receives this additional €1 million, Doyen’s ownership of the economic rights of the remaining players would be reduced to 30% until Doyen again receives €1 million from the selling of those players. Consequently, the agreement stipulates that Doyen is to receive an amount equal or superior to €7 million for the transfer of players in which it partly owned the economic rights.

[11] As an exception, Doyen only gets 10% of the economic rights of the players Alberto Botía and Miguel de las Cuevas.

[12] Moreover, the 20% of the transfer fee for De las Cuevas that Sporting owed Doyen consisted of 10% for the economic rights and 10% as an agency fee.

[13] This figure might even get higher when taking into account that Doyen had a share in all Sporting de Gijón players and the fact that Pedro León is still registered as a Getafe player.

[14] With seven matches to go, Sporting finds itself in 17th place.

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