Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

WISLaw Blog Symposium - Stick to Sports: The Impact of Rule 50 on American Athletes at the Olympic Games - By Lindsay Brandon

Editor's note: Lindsay Brandon is Associate Attorney at Law Offices of Howard L. Jacobs


“Tell the white people of America and all over the world that if they don’t seem to care for the things black people do, they should not go to see black people perform.” – American sprinter and Olympic Medalist John Carlos

On 21 April 2021, the Athletes’ Commission (AC) of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) received the “full support of the IOC Executive Board for a set of recommendations in regard to the Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter and Athlete Expression at the Olympic Games.” This came over a year after the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games were postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and almost a year after the IOC and AC embarked on an “extensive qualitative and quantitative” consultation process to reform Rule 50 involving over 3,500 athletes from around the globe.

Since its introduction of the new guidelines in January 2020, Rule 50 has been touted by the IOC as a means to protect the neutrality of sport and the Olympic Games, stating that “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or radical propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues, or other areas.”  In other words, the Olympics are a time to celebrate sport, and any political act or demonstration might ruin their “moment of glory”.

In fact, the Rule 50 Guidelines say that a fundamental principle of sport is that it is neutral, and “must be separate from political, religious or any other type of interference.” But this separation is not necessarily rooted in totality in modern sports culture[1], particularly in the United States (“U.S.”).  This is evidenced by the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (“USOPC”) committing to not sanctioning Team USA athletes for protesting at the Olympics. The USOPC Athletes stated “Prohibiting athletes to freely express their views during the Games, particularly those from historically underrepresented and minoritized groups, contributes to the dehumanization of athletes that is at odds with key Olympic and Paralympic values.”

 

Athlete Demonstrations, Historically  

While, unfortunately, many countries have a troubling history of colonialism and slavery, the United States continues to grapple with its racist history. It was not that long ago that Jim Crow laws, legalized racial segregation that replaced slavery, were ended in the United States. Though in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act that legally ended segregation, de facto segregation has continued through voter suppression tactics, housing discrimination, and lack of access to education and healthcare.

Long before the passage of the Civil Rights Act, some Black athletes held prominence as successful athletes. Despite their fame on the field, they were not treated as equals in society. Naturally, sports became a platform for minorities to speak about the injustices of the racism that plagued America. The following are some examples of athlete-activism that have shaped American sports history.

In 1959, professional basketball player Elgin Baylor was scheduled to play in a game at a neutral site in West Virginia. After the hotel his team was staying at refused to serve him and two of his Black teammates, he sat out the game in protest stating that the game was not more important than his dignity. Mr. Baylor’s act is now considered a defining moment for athlete activism during the Civil Rights Movement. In 1961, following a similar experience by Bill Russell and his Black teammates at an exhibition game in Kentucky, they collectively sat out of the game while their white teammates still played. In response to their actions, Mr. Russell saidWe’ve got to show our disapproval for this kind of treatment or else the status quo will prevail.”

In recent times it is common for leagues to change venues for such events as All-Star Games due to the institution of policies perceived as discriminatory. To historians’ knowledge, the first change in venue was in 1965 when twenty-one African American athletes in the American Football League arrived in New Orleans, Louisiana only to find out they could not get service for transportation or food. After a unanimous vote to boycott the game, the AFL moved the location to Houston, Texas.

Shortly thereafter, Muhammad Ali famously refused the draft during the Vietnam War, citing his religious beliefs, and was subsequently stripped of his heavyweight title and banned from his sport of boxing for three years. Athletes such as Mr. Russell stood up to support Mr. Ali, who became an extremely polarizing figure as he was subsequently convicted of draft eviction and sentenced to jail time (which was ultimately overturned by the United States Supreme Court).

In 1967, Kathy Switzer famously ran the Boston Marathon, a male-only event. Despite being physically assaulted by race officials, Ms. Switzer finished the race but the Amateur Athletic Union officially banned women from racing alongside men across all covered events (which remained in effect for the next five years).

In 1968, American athlete activism became the hallmark of the Mexico City Olympic Games when sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos took the podium (as gold and bronze medal winners in the 200-meter dash, respectively) and raised their fists in the air as a symbol of Black Power and the racist mistreatment of Black athletes in America. Together with Mr. Carlos and Mr. Smith, Australian sprinter Peter Norman wore a patch on his jacket from the Olympic Project for Human Rights, an organization founded and comprised by prominent Olympic athletes to expose the mistreatment of Black athletes in America. As a result, Mr. Carlos and Mr. Smith were required to leave the games and suspended from the U.S. National Team (although they were ultimately allowed to keep their medals). Ironically, they are now memorialized at the IOC museum in Lausanne, Switzerland.

In 1973, tennis star Billie Jean King formed the Women’s Tennis Association and threatened to lead a boycott of the U.S. Open if the event refused to pay female prize winners as much as the men. In the early 1991, professional basketball player Craig Hodges tried to organize his fellow Chicago Bulls teammates – one of the greatest NBA teams in its history – to protest the Finals in response to the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police. He failed to do so, and after expressing his concerns about racism in the U.S. to President George H.W. Bush at his visit to the White House, was subsequently excluded from the NBA after the next season despite being a league-leader in 3-pointers.

Professional basketball player Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf was suspended in 1996 for failing to stand during the U.S. National Anthem before a game. Afterwards, Mr. Rauf was excluded from the League. Twenty years later, National Football League quarterback Colin Kaepernick took a knee during the anthem in response to racial injustice and police brutality in America. Following this, numerous WNBA players wore “Black Lives Matter” shirts in support of the movement that would become world renowned following the 2020 murder of George Floyd that sparked protests around the world and significant athlete activism in the midst of a global pandemic.

Impetus for Rule 50

During the 2019 Pan-American Games, American athletes Gwen Berry and Race Imboden both made symbolic protests as they took the podium to accept gold medals in their respective sports. Following the protests, USOPC CEO Sarah Hirshland sent letters of reprimand to both athletes and issued a 12-month probation but warned the athletes (and presumably their teammates) that any future acts of protest would be met with more severe consequences.

Though consequences have long been in place for political protests at the Olympic Games, the introduction of the new Rule 50 Guidelines, as outlined below, undoubtedly emerged after the demonstrations by U.S. athletes at the 2019 Pan-Am Games. Of course, the IOC does not want any politically-motivated distractions during the upcoming Tokyo Games, and certainly, at least part of this is motivated not just by the published intent of Rule 50, but also by the IOC’s business interests. Olympic Games organizers and host countries rely on financial investment from broadcast companies and corporate sponsors. That said, the majority of that money comes from U.S.-based companies – home to the demonstrating athletes. In fact, as long ago as 2008, former USOPC chairman Peter Ueberroth said “Make no mistake about it. Starting in 1988, U.S. corporations have paid 60% of all the money, period” when asked “Who pays the bill for the world Olympic movement?”.

Even before the pandemic, the Tokyo Games were to be the most expensive in Olympic history (to the official tune of $US15.4 billion). However, the Associated Press reported that a government audit reported it could be “at least twice that much,” only made worse by the postponement due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Certainly, with so much American corporate investment in the Olympics, and with an unprecedented visibility of American athlete activism, the attention to Rule 50, and its new guidelines, was no sudden coincidence. 

However, the May 25, 2020 murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis, Minnesota police and the subsequent demonstrations that followed changed everything, including public corporate stance on racism in America.

 

Application of Rule 50 to the Athletes

As Rule 50 is written, athletes are still able to express themselves through social media and official press conferences. There are no restrictions for athletes in non-Olympic venues; however, given the restrictions in place due to the pandemic, it is unlikely that the athletes will spend any time in Tokyo outside of an Olympic venue.

When it comes to what is actually prohibited, the examples are targeted and few, and as minority American athletes have rightly criticized – are unclear about what the punishment will be for any infringement or what an infringement might look like, as further explained below. The IOC has provided some non exhaustive examples:

  • Displaying any political messaging, including signs or armbands
  • Gestures of a political nature, like a hand gesture or kneeling
  • Refusal to follow the Ceremonies protocol.

Looking at the examples provided, the “gestures” are certainly reflected in specific demonstrations made by American athletes in response to human and civil rights violations in their home country. In other words, a direct line can be drawn to the rise of athlete activism amongst American athletes and the publishing of the above examples of Rule 50 violations.

For those that disregard Rule 50, the IOC says that “if an athlete or participant is in breach of Rule 50 and the Olympic Charter, each incident will be evaluated by their respective National Olympic Committee, International Federation and the IOC, and disciplinary action will be taken on a case-by-case basis as necessary”. In other words, unlike other global disciplinary codes in place for athletes, there may be inconsistent application of the Rule based upon how signatories decide to handle violations of the Rule.

In response, Ms. Berry, who was previously admonished by the USOPC, stated in July 2020 that “like black and brown people in America it’s unclear how the rules will apply to them and fear is the order of the day”. But, by the end of 2020, the USOPC changed its tone and said that it would decline to punish any other American athlete that demonstrated against racial injustice.

Indeed, since the USOPC’s announcement, it appears that NOCs more favorable to free speech (such as the USOPC) might help “pare back” Rule 50, as it realizes that its survey of global athletes about demonstrations at the Games might not have accurately reflected athletes’ true feelings about its impact, nor perhaps entirely understood that some athletes actually fear mistreatment by their own governments for even answering such a question in a truthful manner.

2020 Changed Athlete Activism in America Forever

On 25 May, 2020, as the pandemic was in full swing and sports were largely on hold, the entirety of America’s focus was on the murder of George Floyd. Even though he was one of over 1,000 people that die by police force in the U.S. each year, Mr. Floyd’s murder was particularly gruesome, and documented in full. What followed was months-long protests and demonstrations all over America, and even worldwide.

As the protests continued, sports resumed and athletes began to compete again, including in the NBA and tennis. With a captive audience desperate for sports content, many of these athletes knew they had a platform to speak out about the injustices and how – despite their fortune as professional athletes – what being a minority in America was like. Given the racial justice reckoning in the U.S., the leagues and event organizers were supportive. For example, Naomi Osaka was allowed to wear masks to each of her U.S. Open matches bearing the names of Black individuals killed by police. Even NASCAR, with arguably the most conservative fan base in America, banned the Confederate flag (the flag of the pro-slavery south that lost the American Civil War) from all of its events.

Indeed, while there was nothing controversial about condemning racism in the U.S., for the first time not only were organizations backing their athletes that engaged in public dialogue about the racism., but countless U.S. companies took to any and every public forum to condemn racism.  Many of these companies are the Olympic Games’ biggest sponsors, including Intel, whose webpage on social equity states that “standing on the sidelines is not an option” and features a photo of protested both kneeling and raising a fist in the air.

With overwhelming acknowledgment of systemic racism in the U.S., the USOPC too changed its tune in its approach to Rule 50. But the IOC persists, holding up its Athletes Commission in defense of punishment of athletes demonstrating against the injustices of their home countries. However, the fact that corporate America now publicly supports such demonstrations only shows how out of touch the IOC’s Rule 50 is. How any potential conflicts between the USOPC and IOC on this issue might play out remains to be seen, and any consequences would be purely speculative.

Conclusion

The Olympics have always demonstrated how sports are a unifying force, but they are not insulated from the global events that impact the lives of Olympic athletes every day. Rule 50, it could be said, as outlined by the IOC Executive Board for the 2020 Games, is in response to the rise of U.S. athlete activism, despite the fact that they have the support of Olympic corporate sponsors.  At face value, Rule 50 seeks to protect the Olympics from “divisiveness” but only furthers the legitimate criticism that the IOC undervalues the voices of athletes that make the Olympic Games possible.


[1] It is also noted that historically, there have been protests at Olympic games from various athletes for various reasons. See, e.g., https://time.com/5764614/political-protests-olympics-ioc-ban/.


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Asser International Sports Law Blog | The Reform of FIFA: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The Reform of FIFA: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

Since yesterday FIFA is back in turmoil (see here and here) after the FIFA Council decided to dismiss the heads of the investigatory (Cornel Borbély) and adjudicatory (Hans-Joachim Eckert) chambers of the Independent Ethics Committee, as well as the Head (Miguel Maduro) of the Governance and Review Committee. It is a disturbing twist to a long reform process (on the early years see our blogs here and here) that was only starting to produce some tangible results.

This journey to a new FIFA started in 2015 after the events that eventually pushed Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini out, and Gianni Infantino in. As noted by the FIFA Reform Committee in its final report, it became clear FIFA needed to undertake “significant modification to its institutional structure and operational processes […] to prevent corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the organisation more transparent and accountable”.[1] The Reform Committee put forward a series of recommendations, which later culminated in a set of reforms approved during the Extraordinary FIFA Congress held in Zurich the 26 February 2016. Greater transparency and accountability were the leading mantras of the reform, which – broadly speaking – hinged on (i) generating a cultural change at FIFA, (ii) fostering greater participation of member associations and stakeholders in FIFA and, most importantly, (iii) reforming the principles of governance at FIFA. The essence of the reform process was about changing the governance structures and ethos at FIFA. This was to be done mainly by:

  • Separating the political and management functions
  • Financial Transparency and Transparency of Compensation
  • Term Limits and Eligibility Checks
  • Promotion of the role of women in football

And, to be fair to FIFA, on paper at least, things changed quite dramatically over last year, here is how.


1.     The new FIFA Council                                                                          

First, the reform changed the political and administrative structure of FIFA. The Executive Committee being replaced by the Council, a new body with a different composition and set of competences. The Council’s larger size is aimed at ensuring broader participation and representativeness. While the Executive Committee comprised 24 members plus the FIFA President, the Council is composed of 36 members plus the FIFA President. The Congress elects the President, whereas the other members of the Council represent the confederations. Each Confederation president is ex officio a vice-president of the Council. UEFA has three vice-presidents at the Council and the other Confederations one each, for a total of eight vice-presidents. The rest of the members are divided as follows: four from CONMEBOL and CONCACAF, six from AFC, UEFA and CAF, and two from OFC. 

One of the main objectives of the governance reform was to reduce the possibility of conflicts of interests. To this end, a firm separation between political decision-making and management was considered crucial. Even though the Council’s role is supposed to be confined within the boundaries of supervising FIFA’s administration and defining strategic directions, it retains strong steering powers through its competence, enshrined in Article 34 FIFA Statutes, to nominate and dismiss the members of FIFA’s Committees as well as FIFA’s Secretary General. Nevertheless, the executive functions are delegated to the Secretary General, who has the duty to carry out the day-to-day business and implement the strategies outlined by the Council. While, the Chief Compliance Officer, oversees this activity and reports to the independent Audit and Compliance Committee.

 

2.     The introduction of eligibility checks

The FIFA reform committee recognized that a trustworthy governance of FIFA requires that the executives be, as much as possible, free of conflicts of interest. Hence, all the members of the Council are now subject to eligibility checks carried out by the Review Committee, a special commission within the newly created Governance Committee, formed by its chairperson, its deputy chairperson and one independent member. The members of the Governance Committee are in turn subject to eligibility checks carried out by the investigative chamber of the Ethics Committee. According to Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes: “candidates for the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of each of the Audit and Compliance Committee and the judicial bodies must pass an eligibility check carried out by the Review Committee”.[2] The Secretary General is required to fulfil an eligibility check as well[3] and so do the candidates for standing committees.[4] This new check is the cornerstone of FIFA’s governance reform. In the absence of truly open and fair democratic elections to determine who exercises power inside FIFA, the eligibility checks are a fundamental brake to control the pool of potential executives and ensure a modicum of ethical virtue amongst them.


3.     The strive for financial transparency

The FIFA Reform Committee Report proposed to make public the compensation packages of FIFA’s executives. Thus, the new Art. 51(10) FIFA Statues imposes a duty to disclose the individual compensation of the FIFA President, the members of the Council and the Secretary General. The compensation of the said members and the Compensation Rules are determined by the Compensation Sub-Committee within the Audit and Compliance Committee.[5] Indeed, in its 2016 Governance Report, published in April 2017, FIFA disclosed the compensation packages of its executives. This was a much-needed development in light of the way Blatter, Platini and co were playing with FIFA’s finances, sometimes/often to their own benefits.

                                                      

4.     The limited role of the FIFA President

The reformed Statutes reduced the role and discretionary power of the FIFA President, who is now depositary of a more ambassadorial than executive role. Pursuant to Art. 35 FIFA Statutes, the President has no right to vote at the Congress and has one ordinary vote in the Council. The new provision repealed the possibility for the President to have a casting vote whenever votes are split equally inside the FIFA Council.[6] And yet, due to his capacity to set the agenda of the FIFA Council and to steer the Council’s appraisal of the Secretary General, his influence inside the constitutional structure of FIFA should not be underestimated.

 

5.     The introduction of term limits

The need to answer to transparency and accountability demands also resulted in the provision of term ceilings for the most prominent figures within the Organisation. The President, the members of the Council and the members of the independent committees can serve their office for no more than three terms, whether consecutive or not, of 4 years each.[7]

 

6.     The representation of women

FIFA recognised that “football governance at all levels needs to include more women in order to create a more diverse decision-making environment and culture”.[8] It has aimed to achieve this goal in two ways. First, FIFA adopted gender equality as an explicit statutory objective.[9] Second, and more visibly, each Confederation has to reserve for women at least one seat at the FIFA Council.[10]

 

7.     The reform of the standing committees

In order to improve efficiency the number of standing committees was reduced from 26 to 9. The current standing committees, which “advise and assist the Council in their respective fields of function”[11] are: the Governance Committee, the Finance Committee, the Development Committee, the Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions, the Member Associations Committee, the Player’s Status Committee, the Referees Committee, the Medical Committee and the Football Stakeholder Committee. The latter was freshly created to foster greater engagement with the football stakeholders.

Some specific requirements to be fulfilled by the members of the committees are laid out in Art. 39 FIFA Statutes. Paragraph 3 of that provision states that, while the general rule is that members of the committees can be at the same time members of the Council, the members of the Governance Committee, the independent members of the Finance Committee and the independent members of the Development Committee cannot simultaneously belong to the Council.[12]

Furthermore, at least 50% of the members of the Governance Committee, Development Committee and Finance Committee need to fulfil the independence criteria as defined in the FIFA Regulations.[13] These independence criteria need to be fulfilled also by the chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the FIFA judicial bodies, i.e. the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee (both its investigatory and the adjudicatory chambers) and the Appeal Committee.[14] Furthermore, the members of the Audit and Compliance Committee must not belong to any other FIFA body.[15] The same applies to all the members of the FIFA judicial bodies.[16]


Conclusion: Plus ça change, moins ça change?

To sum up, on paper FIFA did change. It is undeniably a bit more transparent (but we are still waiting for the publication of the Garcia Report or of the decisions of the Ethics Committee) and its executives are a bit more likely to face independent counter-powers (e.g. Ethics Committee or the Governance Committee). FIFA’s reforms rely on a double strategy:

·       independent ex ante control on who is to exercise power inside the organization and;

·       independent ex post review of how this power is exercised.

And yet, with Blatter becoming a phantom of an almost forgotten past, the urge to reform is quickly receding. In fact, reform at FIFA is a bit like the ebb and flow. Its urgency, rises with the tide of public outrage at corruption scandals, and diminishes with public indifference in the face of a new business as usual.

Yesterday, 9 May 2017, we ebbed anew. It seems that the FIFA Council has decided that the time for reforms has past. New sponsors are lining up for the next world cups, the old guard is gone and the time seems ripe to turn the page. However, the institutional changes introduce over the last year made sense only if they are being monitored by strong independent institutions (the Ethics Committee and the Governance Committee), whose members do not feel that they are at the mercy of the power of the FIFA Council. Their role is to be disagreeable and to act as counter-powers, if they are dismissed at will when they do their job then the whole house of cards of FIFA reforms falls apart and we are back to square one. The dismissal and departure of independent and highly qualified academics like Miguel Maduro (with whom I  had the pleasure to work with at the European University Institute during my PhD) and Joseph Weiler are a sign that the Governance Committee and its capacity to control access to FIFA’s most powerful positions is being curtailed. Maybe it’s due, as some seem to think, to the Committee’s decision to bar access to the FIFA Council to Russia’s infamous former sports minister Mutko. In any event, it’s seems that FIFA’s strong (mostly) men are unimpressed by the benefits of “good governance”.

The tide will certainly turn again. Scandals will arise and force through new changes. Nonetheless, one is left to wonder whether the Swiss State and/or the European Union should not forcefully intervene to impose once and for all certain basic “constitutional” requirements  (e.g. independence, transparency, separation of powers) to a global body that exercises a strange form of public-private authority.


[1] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 1.

[2] Art. 27(8) FIFA Statutes.

[3] Art. 37 (3) FIFA Statutes.

[4] Art. 39(5) FIFA Statutes.

[5] Art. 51 FIFA Statutes.

[6] Art. 35 FIFA Statutes.

[7] Art. 33 FIFA Statutes.

[8] 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, p. 9.

[9] Art. 2 f) FIFA Statutes includes “the full participation of women at all levels of football governance” among the objectives of FIFA. The heading of Art. 4 FIFA Statues was amended to explicitly include ‘gender equality’.

[10] Art. 33(5) FIFA Statutes.

[11] Art. 39(2) FIFA Statutes.

[12] Art. 39(3) FIFA Statutes.

[13] Art. 40(1), Art. 41(2) and Art. 42 (1) FIFA Statutes.

[14] Art. 52(4) FIFA Statutes.

[15] Art. 51(1) FIFA Statutes.

[16] Art. 52(5) FIFA Statutes.

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | 20 Years After Bosman - The New Frontiers of EU Law and Sport - Special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

20 Years After Bosman - The New Frontiers of EU Law and Sport - Special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

Editor's note: This is a short introduction written for the special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law celebrating the 20 years of the Bosman ruling and dedicated to the new frontiers of EU law and Sport (the articles are available here). For those willing to gain a deeper insight into the content of the Issue we organize (in collaboration with Maastricht University and the Maastricht Journal) a launching event with many of the authors in Brussels tomorrow (More info here).



 20 Years After Bosman - The New Frontiers of EU Law and Sport

By Antoine Duval

The Bosman ruling is not just another ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), it is by far the most well-known decision of the Court outside of the Euro-bubble.[1] In the UK the phrase ‘a Bosman’ is commonly used to qualify the free move of a football player to a new club at the end of his contract. Beyond its anchoring in the English idiom, Bosman stands out as a shared European reference. However, it is often – misleadingly - credited for all the ills and wrongs of football. In any case, it is part and parcel of the European (even worldwide) public debate on football and its regulation. If a European public sphere is to emerge at some point, the heated public discussion that was triggered in Europe by Bosman is probably an avant-goût of it. Therefore, 20 years after the ruling, the least a European sports lawyer and academic can do, is to acknowledge ones indebtedness and, to some extent, gratitude for this ruling.

One aspect that needs to be emphasized is that Bosman is not an instrument with the paramount objective to deregulate the football market or the world of sport in general. It is not, as many on the side of the Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), and FIFA and UEFA in particular, have portrayed it, a decision aimed at destroying the transnational legal system (also known as lex sportiva) they had put in place to coordinate the organization and unfolding of transnational sporting competitions. On the contrary, SGBs have the possibility to justify their rules and regulations. As Stephen Weatherill rightly pointed out long ago, the only requirement SGBs have to fulfil to ensure that their regulations comply with EU law is to explain convincingly why they are needed.[2] Thus, a constructive (and positive) perspective on Bosman stresses its constitutional over its deregulatory function. Private regulations adopted by private powers, which are not particularly renowned for the quality of their governance, need to be subject to checks and balances. After Bosman, the EU free movement rights and competition law have impersonated such a check on (or counter-power to) the rules privately adopted and enforced by SGBs. In fact, it is here that the true, long-lasting legacy of Bosman lies.

This issue brings together a mixed line-up of both young and established scholars, sports law experts and EU law specialists, to discuss the legacy of Bosman and the future of the relationship between EU law and sport. Besides the synthetic and comprehensive introductory piece of Stefaan Van Den Bogaert that brings us back to the original crusade of Mr Bosman, all the contributions are geared towards the recent and future legacies of the ruling. A broad range of legal problems raised by the interaction of EU law and sport is touched upon. 

In the first article, Ben Van Rompuy builds on Advocate General Lenz’s conclusions in Bosman, the following practice adopted by the EU Commission as well as on the case law of the CJEU on competition law and sport to argue that competition law can be a powerful tool to impose a legal check on the regulatory practices of SGBs.

In the second piece, Phedon Nicolaides analyses a relatively new front line between EU law and sport: state aid. Although not directly connected to Bosman, state aid cases are taking a prominent place in the practice of the EU Commission in the field of sport. In fact, state aid law has become a useful legal proxy to control the way public authorities decide to support economically sporting organizations and their events.

The third piece by the editor of this issue is dedicated to the interaction between the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and EU law. Indeed, the emergence of the CAS is probably the most important institutional legacy of Bosman, and EU law now has a role to play in exercising a form of ‘Solange’ control over CAS’s judicial activity.

In the fourth article, which follows most clearly into the footpath of Bosman, Richard Parrish discusses the compatibility of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (RSTP) with EU law. He suggests that the RSTP as it stands can be deemed contrary to EU law.

The fifth article of the issue by Jacob Kornbeck, a former member of the sports unit of the European Commission, analyses the role of the Commission in the drafting process of the new World Anti-Doping Code recently adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency. He highlights that the ethos of Bosman spread to other spheres of action of the EU in sport and shows concretely in what way it influenced the position of the EU in the negotiations over the new Code that entered into force in January 2015. Finally, Anna Sabrina Wollmann, Olivier Vonk and Gerard-René de Groot look at the growing problem of nationality requirements in sports. If Bosman stands more particularly for an Europeanization of football, globalization and the ease of cross-border movement for professional sportspeople have heightened the question of the sporting nationality of athletes worldwide. This contribution critically analyses the many calls for a separate sporting nationality and proposes an alternative path.


[1] Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, EU:C:1995:463.

[2] ‘The ECJ has collapsed the idea that there are purely sporting practices unaffected by EC law despite their economic effect, but it has not refused to accept that sport is special. Its message to governing bodies – explain how!’, S. Weatherill, European Sports Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), p. 353.


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