Over the last twenty years, professional cycling has developed the reputation of one of the “most drug soaked sports in the world”.[1] This should not come as a surprise. The sport’s integrity has plummeted down due to an unprecedented succession of doping scandals. La crème de la crème of professional cyclists has been involved in doping incidents including Tyler Hamilton, Floyd Landis, Alejandro Valverde and Lance Armstrong. The once prestigious Tour de France has been stigmatized as a race of “pharmacological feat, not a physical one”.[2]

In view of these overwhelming shadows, in 2008, the International Cycling Union (UCI), in cooperation with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) took a leap in the fight against doping. It became the first International Sports Federation to implement a radical new anti-doping program known as the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP).^[3] The ABP signalled a paradigm shift in drug testing with its reliance upon tracking biological variables in a cyclist’s blood and urine which are considered to indirectly reveal the effects of doping and particularly of the so called blood doping rather than directly detecting a prohibited substance or method in a cyclist’s system.[4] It constitutes an indirect method for the detection of an anti-doping rule violation[5] which triggers the imposition of doping sanctions under Article 2.2 World Anti-doping Code (WADC) based solely on the longitudinal profiling of the athlete’s sample.

Albeit a “monumental step for cycling”[6], the seven years of application of ABP have sparked a vigorous debate in the cycling community from a legal and scientific standpoint. The Kreuziger case is the most recent incarnation of the legal uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of finding cyclists guilty of doping based on the ABP alone. In August 2014, Roman Kreuziger, a professional Czech cyclist and member of the Tinkoff Saxo professional cycling team, was provisionally suspended after anomalies detected in his ABP dating back to 2011 and 2012. The UCI’s decision was confirmed by the CAS who dismissed the athlete’s appeal against his provisional suspension. In September 2014, he was cleared of doping by the Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral panel which decided on the merits of the case pursuant to Chapter IX UCI ADR. With the appeal of the UCI and WADA  pending before the CAS and Kreuziger, if found guilty, being under the sword of Damocles of a four-year ban, we grasp the opportunity to offer a thorough reading of the Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral award which seems to distil the most pertinent legal issues dealing with the ABP: (1) the ABP’s reliability as indirect means of evidence in proving a doping violation and (2) the latent tension between the national federations, which on one side, clear the cyclists from doping violations  and the UCI and WADA, on other side, appealing these awards before the CAS, based on its readiness to accept indirect biological-passport evidence in finding cyclists guilty of doping, adding thereby to the legal uncertainty. 

The starting point: Kreuziger’s ABP abnormalities in a nutshell

While this blogpost does not intend to delve into the obvious complexities of the blood profiling methods, the assessment of the factual background of the Kreuziger case requires an elementary examination of how the ABP functions.

The ABP is an individual electronic record for professional athletes, where biological markers of doping have been profiled and results collated over a period of time.[7] Its novelty lies in the development of an individualized baseline for each athlete, whose individual longitudinal profile becomes the point of reference itself.[8] In fact, the individual blood sample is compared to the athlete’s historical parameters with the application of a statistical model that uses Bayesian inference techniques. The current operational component of the ABP is the haematological profile, which monitors blood markers and aims to detect blood manipulation by either transfusion or erythropoiesis stimulating agents like recombinant erythropoietin (rhEPO). Among the blood markers used in the haematological profile are haemoglobin and reticulocytes. Haemoglobin is a protein located on red blood cells that is responsible for binding oxygen so it can be transported through the bloodstream.[9] During a stage race, athletes are expected to show a consistent decrease in the haemoglobin concentration due to plasma volume expansion.[10] Reticulocytes are immature red blood cells. When blood is withdrawn from the body or in case of rhEPO injections, the bone marrow is stimulated to produce these immature blood cells. As a result, rhEPO injections can be a possible explanation for high reticulocyte levels.[11] On the other hand, when the blood is re-infused into the body, the body recognizes the subsequent increase in red blood cells and decreases the production of reticulocytes. In this sense, decreased reticulocyte levels can be indicators of a recent blood transfusion or previous treatment of erythropoiesis stimulating agents.[12]

In the case at hand, the Kreuziger ABP abnormalities consisted of the detection of raised haemoglobin level during the 2012 Giro d’Italia and raised reticulocyte level in the period from March to August 2011 and from April 2012 to the end of the 2012 Giro d’Italia, according to the UCI Expert Panel report dated 14 June 2012. It is noticeable that the mentioned indicators did not go beyond the baseline values. However, as the UCI Expert panel remarked, it was not the haemoglobin values themselves but the actual trend of increasing haemoglobin levels during a race that was problematic.[13] As a result, the UCI concluded that it is very likely that these abnormalities were a result of blood doping and consequently initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kreuziger on the grounds of violating Article 21.2 of the UCI ADR for using a prohibited substance or a prohibited method. 

The Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral panel decision on the Kreuziger case

- Questioning the fair trial guarantees under the UCI ADR

The first issue raised by Kreuziger is the breach of his right to fair trial due to the short deadlines in the proceedings provided under the UCI ADR. In fact, the athlete claims that he did not have sufficient time to properly prepare and respond to the statements submitted by the UCI and requests that this evidence is not taken into consideration. On the other hand, the UCI claims it did not have enough time to reply to the additional statements submitted by the Athlete and asks the panel not to take into account the new evidence. [14]

In view of these objections, the panel decides to accept all evidence adduced by the parties in order to assess the case in the fairest manner possible. The panel also seized the opportunity to voice a strong criticism with regard to the short duration of the proceedings provided under the UCI ADR. The panel does not only express its concerns that the UCI procedural terms cannot guarantee a fair trial due to the “excessively short deadlines for rendering the decision, entirely absent basic procedures and unilateral preference for UCI’s procedural position” but it goes a step further by characterizing the process of the UCI ADR as “a caricature of fair trial”.[15] In the same vein, the panel notes that UCI’s concern to conduct disciplinary proceedings according to the principles of fair trial “appeared rather hypocritical”.

-Reconciling conflicting evidence

Before evaluating the evidence, the panel acknowledges that it is faced with a conflict of expert evidence and that, due to its lack of expertise in the area under examination, it has to be cautious. Indeed, the reports of the UCI expert panel suggest that it is highly likely that the Athlete had used a prohibited substance or method, while the three expert reports presented by the Athlete question the UCI’s expert panel conclusions and provide various explanations of the detected ABP abnormalities.[16] By reference to the Roman law principle iudex peritus peritorun (‘the judge is the expert of the experts’), the panel assumes its role to determine whether the experts’ reports are plausible based on the factual elements available.[17] However, coming back to its severe criticism towards the short deadlines of the UCI ADR proceedings, the panel remarks that it would normally appoint an impartial, and unprejudiced by the course of the dispute, expert to provide a “review expert report” evaluating the conflicting conclusions drawn from the evidence available.

In cases related to the application of the ABP the federation which aims to establish an ADR violation committed by the athlete should bring the violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the arbitral panel.[18] As a first step, the panel notes that Kreuziger’s ABP haemoglobin and reticulocytes indicators did not go beyond the baseline values and, as a result, the assumption that the likelihood of violation of an anti-doping rule by Kreuziger is 99,9% cannot be considered as proven to the panel’s “comfortable satisfaction”. Therefore, the panel concludes that it cannot find an anti-doping rule violation based solely on Kreuziger’s ABP, but that it rather needs to further examine the expert reports and statements.[19]

With regard to the raised haemoglobin levels, the panel finds guidance in Dr Hampton’s expert statement. Although he acknowledges the general trend of decreased haemoglobin levels for riders during long stage races supported by the UCI expert panel he provides evidence, i.e. the Corsetti paper, that individual deviations are possible and particularly that the haemoglobin levels rose in some riders during the second half of the race. Furthermore, he remarks that increased haemoglobin levels during races were detected in the athlete’s ABP not only during the alleged period (i.e., 2012 Giro d’ Italia) but also during the 2011 Tour de France. This reinforces his argument that Kreuziger’s ABP should be considered as falling within the possible deviations from the general trend in haemoglobin levels. In view of this evidence, the panel considers that it was not proven to its “comfortable satisfaction” that the increased haemoglobin levels had been a consequence of the use of a prohibited substance or method.[20]

As far as the raised reticulocyte levels are concerned, the panel once again notes that it has to evaluate conflicting expert reports, whose assessment should “preferably the subject of a review expert report”. On one hand, the expert report presented by the athlete suggests that there is clear evidence –i.e. the report of Kim et al.- that the athlete’s overt hypothyroidism and the treatment by thyroxin justifies the substantial increase in the value of reticulocytes, while the UCI expert panel states that this evidence should not be taken into consideration, since the said study did not examine athletes. Furthermore, in evaluating the witness examination, the panel remarks that the UCI expert panel was not aware of Kreuziger’s proven severe overt hypothyroidism and, as a result, it did not take into consideration this factor when evaluating his raised reticulocyte levels. In view of this evidence, the panel concludes that it was not proven to its “comfortable satisfaction” that the elevated reticulocyte levels are the result of the use of a prohibited substance or method, since the athlete’s overt hypothyroidism was a crucial element in explaining this increase. In view of these findings, the panel cleared Kreuziger to race. 

The ABP’s controversial aspects through the lens of the Kreuziger case

The Czech Olympic Committee’s arbitral award on the Kreuziger case, although not questioning the ABP as a method capable of proving doping as such, adds to the concerns raised with regard to the validity of using biological-passport evidence as the sole basis for doping violations. It suggests that the evaluation of the ABP results requires that many factors pertaining both to the given sport and to the specific functioning of the athlete’s body should be taken into consideration. Two interesting remarks can be derived from this award: 

1)        The role of the panel in evaluating expert evidence in ABP cases

The use of the ABP as a reliable means of evidence to establish a doping violation requires that the analysis and results management of the ABP be thoroughly understood and evaluated.[21] The procedure is more technical and complicated than in other doping-detection techniques since the ABP results have to be analysed by a panel of experts.[22] This is further complicated by the fact that it is very likely that contradictory expert reports and testimonies are brought before the arbitral panel. The role of panels, therefore, in evaluating expert evidence is crucial.

The Kreuziger case is illustrative of the arbitral panel’s daunting task of understanding, evaluating and legally enforcing complex scientific issues. In this respect, following the well-established CAS jurisprudence[23], the Kreuziger panel assumed its duty to weigh differing expert opinions on Kreuziger’s ABP abnormalities and assess the plausibility of their conclusions, while keeping in mind the limits of its own scientific knowledge and the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof. More importantly, the Kreuziger panel pointed out the need for an unprejudiced review expert report which would evaluate the validity of the different conclusions reached. In ABP cases, therefore, where experts and arbitral panels go hand in hand, it is crucial that ABP results be made more comprehensible, and that scientists get more involved in evaluating ABP evidence rather than obtaining it.[24]

2)        The inherent tension between national federations and the UCI

It is remarkable that the Kreuziger award reflects the furious debate between national federations and the UCI with regard to the legitimacy of finding cyclists guilty of doping based on the ABP evidence. As noted above, the panel strongly criticized the UCI ADR proceedings, which due to their short deadlines are far from guaranteeing a fair trial to the parties. Considering the critically important rights at stake for cyclists, the panel’s remark on the short and expedited proceedings of UCI ADR in assessing ABP evidence sets an important threshold: the crucial need for sufficient safeguards of due process for cyclists accused of doping on the basis of indirect evidence alone. This criticism on the excessively short UCI ADR proceedings becomes even more controversial in view of recent developments. The UCI, obviously worried about the delays in ABP cases, recently announced that it will treat incidents of ABP abnormalities as if a rider had failed an A-sample drug test. This rather aggressive approach of the UCI, however, seems to further undermine the cyclists’ right to due process, raising the inevitable question whether the quest to eliminate doping from cycling outweighs the fundamental rights of cyclists.[25]

Furthermore, considering that the appeal before the CAS is pending, it is noteworthy that the tension between national federations and the UCI has resulted in creating two competing lines of jurisprudence. The Kreuziger award comes in line with a series of national governing bodies’ arbitral panels which have cleared the suspected athletes in view of insufficient proof to establish an anti-doping violation on the basis of the ABP evidence alone. The Slovenia National Anti-Doping Commission panel in the Valjavec case as well as the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI) Anti-Doping Tribunal in the Pellizotti case did not hesitate to exonerate the cyclists of a doping infraction. However, the CAS has been consistent in overturning such decisions[26], showing its broad willingness to accept the indirect ABP evidence in finding cyclists guilty of ADR violations[27] and it seems highly unlikely that the CAS will deviate from this approach in the Kreuziger case. Remarkably, the wake of Kreuziger’s case and the outlined jurisprudential inconsistency led the UCI to announce the creation of an international anti-doping tribunal. The new tribunal, which will be made up of judges specialized in anti-doping and independent of the UCI, will disempower the national anti-doping organisations and aims to guarantee uniform, consistent and timely decisions. In view of this development, it is expected that a jurisprudential middle way in ABP cases will be followed. However, the question remains whether the criticisms expressed by the national federations undermining ABP’s legitimacy will be fully addressed.

Although promising, the ABP still raises vexing legal and scientific concerns. The Kreuziger case has added to the concerns that anti-doping authorities still need to address. In light of this, the CAS decision is eagerly awaited. It remains to be seen whether the arbitrators will follow the strikingly consistent path of supporting the use of ABP evidence, or whether the Kreuziger case will be a turning point for the CAS to acknowledge the limits of this detection method.

[1] R Rosen, ‘Breaking the Cycle: Balancing the eradication of doping from international sport while holding the rights of the accused athlete’ (2007) 25(3) Entertainment & Sports Law 3

[2] J Macur, ‘As scandals arose, Armstrong just rode on’ (2 January 2010) New York Times

[3] N Hailey, ‘A false start in the race against doping in sport: Concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal, 393.

[4] P-E Sottas, ‘On the evaluation of doping evidence’ (2010) Paper delivered at the Seminar for CAS Jurisprudence and New Developments in International Sports Law, September 17 and 18 2010

[5] http://www.uci.ch/clean-sport/the-athlete-biological-passport-abp/

[6] J Macur, ‘Cycling Union takes leap in fight against doping’ (October 24, 2007) New York Times

[7] TAS 2010/A/2178, Pietro Caucchioli c. CONI & UCI, para 5 and CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia

[8] The World Anti-Doping Agency, ‘The World Anti-doping Code Athlete Biological Passport Operating Guidelines and Compilation of Required Elements’ Article 6.1 Introduction

[9] R McLaren, ‘ Athlete Biological Passport: The juridical viewpoint’ (2012) 4 International Sports Law Review, 81

[10] G Banfi, ‘Limits and pitfalls of Athlete’s Biological Passport’ (2011) 49 (9) Clin Chem Lab med, 1418

[11] R McLaren (n 9), 81

[12] H Findlay, ‘ Athletes’ Biological Passport: Some legal issues’ (May 17, 2012) Lecture delivered at the Conference on Law, Policy and the Olympic Movement at Ithaca College London Centre cited in N Hailey, ‘ A false start in the race against doping in sport: concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal

[13] Arbitration Committee of the Czech Olympic Committee Ref No. 3/2014, Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (22.09.2014), para 5.2

[14] Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 4.10

[15] Ibid,  para 4.11

[16] Report of Dr Boer of 25 Auguat 2013, report of Dr Locatelli of 24 June 2014 and report of Dr Hampton

[17]Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 6.2

[18] Article 3.1 of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) 2009

[19] Roman Kreuziger v the Czech Cycling Federation (n 13), para 6.5

[20]Ibid, para 6.7

[21] R McLaren (n 9), 77.

[22] D Mavromati, ‘Indirect detection methods for doping from a legal perspective: the case of the Athlete Biological Passport’ (2014) 6 International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2, 255.

[23] CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia

[24] P-E Sottas, ‘On the evaluation of doping evidence’ in A Rigozzi and M Bernasconi (eds) CAS jurisprudence and new developments in international sports law (2010 3^rd CAS & SAV/FSA conference Lausanne)

[25] N Hailey, ‘ A false start in the race against doping in sport: concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal, 427

[26] CAS 2010/A/2235, UCI v/ Tadej Valjaveo & Olympic Committee of Slovenia and Press Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Imposes a Two Year Ban on the Italian Cyclists Pietro Caucchioli and Franco Pellizotti 1–2 (Mar. 8, 2011)

[27] N Hailey (n 25), 419

Editor’s note: Chuck Blazer declined our official interview request but thanks to some trusted sources (the FIFA indictment and Chuck’s testimony) we have reconstructed his likely answers. This is a fictional interview. Any resemblance with real facts is purely coincidental.

Mr Blazer, thank you for agreeing to this interview, especially considering the circumstances. How are you doing?

I am facing ten charges concerning, among others, conspiracy to corrupt and money laundering. But apart from that, I am doing great (laughs)!

It is good to know that you have not lost your spirit. And since you’ve been involved in football, or as you call it soccer, for years could you please first tell us what was your career at FIFA and its affiliates like?

Let me see… Starting from the 1990s I was employed by and associated with FIFA and one of its constituent confederations, namely the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF). At various times, I also served as a member of several FIFA standing committees, including the marketing and television committee. As CONCACAF’s general secretary, a position I proudly held for 21 years, I was responsible, among many other things, for negotiations concerning media and sponsorship rights. From 1997 to 2013 I also served at FIFA’s executive committee where I participated in the selection process of the host countries for the World Cup tournaments. Those years at the helm of world soccer were truly amazing years of travel and hard work mainly for the good of the beautiful game. I might add that I even managed to document some of my voyages on my blog. I initially called it “Travels with Chuck Blazer” but Vladimir (Putin) convinced me to change the name to “Travels with Chuck Blazer and his Friends”. You should check it out.

Sure, but you ended up facing corruption and tax fraud charges in the US. What happened?

Concerning the charges I am currently facing, I pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to corrupt FIFA and its related constituent organizations through various bribery schemes. In addition, I acknowledged taking part in money laundering process, violation of certain financial reporting laws, and tax evasion. But please keep it quiet. My family was devastated when they heard about this. After all, they know me as a kind-hearted and giving type, especially if you consider that, given my appearance, I’m always Santa Claus when Christmas time is around.

Concretely, around 1992 and together with other representatives of the soccer world, I agreed to accept a bribe in connection with the selection of the host nation of the 1998 World Cup. Together with other FIFA executive committee members I also accepted illegal payments concerning the selection of South Africa as the 2010 World Cup host. Simultaneously, since approximately 1993, still with the same bunch of soccer executives, I accepted bribes connected to the award of broadcasting and other rights to the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2003 Gold Cup, a tournament analogue to the Copa América, featuring member associations of CONCACAF.

I know it’s wrong. But at FIFA a lot of people were doing it and it was just a common practice at that time. Money was flowing in my bank accounts and it felt right. We were working so hard to organize those tournaments, you know.

How come the US authorities’ ended up investigating you and FIFA?

I am not completely sure. When I testified back in 2013 the judge indicated that FIFA and its attendant or related constituent organizations were identified as a RICO enterprise, that is, a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization if I remember correctly. I was terrified, it sounded very intimidating at first. Now I guess I got used to the sound of it. I am even thinking about calling my next cat Rico (laughs). I also recall that the Department of Justice’s involvement in the case was due to the fact that we used the US financial system to funnel the money. In hindsight, it was a very bad idea.

Could you give us some more details on how the corruption mechanism actually worked in practice?

In general terms there were media and marketing rights to be sold. Those rights, and often their extensions, were awarded in exchange for bribes, sometimes via intermediaries. The sports marketing companies engaged in the schemes were then able not only to profit from the acquired rights themselves, but also to accept illegal payments for passing on some of those rights to sponsors.

(Long pause) Take for instance Copa Libertadores. The tournament developed and gained popularity which sparked sports marketing companies’ interest in acquiring marketing rights to the competition. Around 2000 an entity affiliated with one of the sports marketing companies was awarded sponsorship rights for the tournaments which took place between 2001 and 2007, with a subsequent renewal of the contract in 2007 and 2012. In the early 2000s Nicolás Leoz, acting as the president of Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL) and a member of its executive committee, sold his support to award the rights to a specific company. What is more, not only did he receive the money, he also gave instructions to forward approximately $2 million to his personal bank accounts, a sum which was owed to CONMEBOL itself based on the awarded sponsorship rights’ contract. The Copa Libertadores was only one of the many affected soccer competitions.

And what were the other tournaments affected?

I am American so please excuse my accent, but besides Copa Libertadores, also Copa América, Copa do Brasil, Gold Cup, and the World Cup qualifiers games. I might also add that corruption affected at least the FIFA 2011 presidential elections, the voting process concerning the hosts of the 1998 and 2010 World Cups, and Brazil’s national team’s sponsorship.

Who would you identify as the main players in the corruption schemes?

Except myself you mean (laughs)? Well, definitely a number of FIFA officials that you hear a lot about in the news lately. I can easily mention a few of my colleagues, like Rafael Esquivel who served as the president of the Venezuelan soccer association and a vice president on the CONMEBOL executive committee. There was also my good friend Eugenio Figueredo, a former president of the Uruguayan soccer association who was a member of FIFA’s executive committee, a vice president at FIFA, a member of various FIFA standing committees, and a vice and then president of CONMEBOL. Surely you know of José Maria Marin and Jeffrey Webb. The former was the president of the Brazilian soccer association, and sat on several FIFA standing committees. The latter was the president of Cayman Islands Football Association and a member of the Caribbean Football Union’s (CFU) executive committee. He was also appointed as the president of CONCACAF and a FIFA vice president. The funny thing is that Webb took these positions in order to clean up after the corruption scandal which led to the resignation of Jack Warner.

Jack Warner, you mean the former president of CONCACAF and the vice president of FIFA?

Correct. But do not forget that he was also the secretary and then a special advisor to the Trinidad and Tobago Football Federation (TTFF), and the president of the CFU. Jack is probably the most corrupt soccer official I ever met.  Personally I did not like him, he just couldn’t get enough. Already in the early 1990s he began exploiting his position for personal gains. In this regard, he did not only treat the assets of the organizations he served as his own, but also actively solicited bribes in connection with for example the 1998 World Cup. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes were also paid to him with regard to the award of commercial rights to several editions of the Gold Cup. Moreover, acting as the president of the CFU and a special advisor to the TTFF he orchestrated the sale of media rights to World Cup qualifying matches which the national members of the CFU decided to sale as a bundle. Following negotiations Traffic, a sports marketing company, acquired the rights to 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 World Cup qualifier matches. A substantial part of the value of the contracts concluded by Warner on behalf of the CFU was automatically transferred to accounts under his personal control. He was also involved in a $10 million bribe related to the award of the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. I could go on and on.

You mentioned Traffic. Could you tell us more about it?

Of course. Several of these sports marketing companies were involved, but to my knowledge Traffic was one of the biggest players. This multinational company was based in Brazil and comprised of subsidiaries operating around the globe including the US where it commenced its operations around 1990. The US branch alone was engaged in a number of bribery and fraud schemes in connection with their efforts to obtain various rights from soccer organization and federations in the region. The beneficiaries of these schemes included, among others, Jack Warner, Nicolás Leoz, and Rafael Esquivel. Traffic’s main goal was to expand its operations through developing ties with soccer governing bodies. I remember that in 1991 during Nicolás’ term as CONMEBOL’s president Traffic acquired exclusive commercial rights to three editions of Copa América. Nicolás then threatened to walk away. He claimed that Traffic was about to make a lot of money out of the deal and that it was only fair for him to get his share of the pie. With each of the new editions of the Copa América, Nicolás would demand fresh bribes, a personal business of his which, to my knowledge, went on until 2011. Additional payments were made by Traffic based on their subsequent profits. Esquivel also benefited by requesting bribes in exchange for his ongoing support for Traffic’s position. As I said, bribery at FIFA was often the result of the initiative on the part of its officials. But coming back to Traffic, their involvement is best described in numbers. Out of the twelve bribery schemes I know of, Traffic was involved in nine of them. However, if we disregard the schemes concerning FIFA elections and the voting process for the World Cup hosts the share is nine out of ten. You also need to keep in mind that a former employee of the US branch of Traffic involved in the corruption scheme went on to serve as a general secretary of CONCACAF. On a side note, I think I was a much better general secretary than he ever was. I still receive birthday cards from my former colleagues at CONCACAF.

You stated that several companies were involved. How did they share the rights acquisition between themselves?

I’m not entirely sure about the exact mechanisms involved. What I know, however, is that sometimes conflicts emerged between the different companies seeking to secure contracts for themselves. On other occasions they were able to join forces, for example with the media and marketing rights to Copa América. At first, CONMEBOL entered into a contract with Traffic on the basis of which the latter was awarded the exclusive rights to, among others, the 2015 edition of the tournament, and an option to retain those rights for the next three editions. But in 2010 CONMEBOL signed another agreement, this time with Full Play, on the basis of which Full Play was granted media and marketing rights to several editions of the tournament, including the 2015 edition already sold to Traffic. As you can imagine, Traffic was not happy. They decided to sue CONMEBOL and Full Play. In the end the companies came to an understanding and formed Datisa, a new entity which was to obtain and exploit the commercial rights to the Copa América. In return, Traffic was to shoulder a share of the bribes offered to CONMEBOL officials.

I also recall that there were tensions between Traffic and another company established by a former employee of Traffic who, after bribing Brazilian federation’s officials in order to acquire a contract for the rights to Copa do Brasil, was accused by Traffic’s owner of stealing his business. But they also managed to solve the issue by combining their “efforts” and by sharing the financial burden of the “investments” made to acquire the rights.

And what sums are we talking about?

Not so much, really (laughs). Concerning Datisa the company agreed to pay between $100 and $110 million in bribes to CONMEBOL officials all of whom worked also at FIFA. The FBI told me that they estimated that the “business” generated approximately $150 million in bribes, an amount which may increase if new information come to light. In the end, I did not get so much out of it compared to some of my dear colleagues. Sometimes I think that I should have been more firm during the “negotiations”. For a long time I have been dreaming about having an additional apartment in the Trump Tower. I remember that when I got the first one it almost seemed as it came from some divine intervention.

Wow, that’s a lot. How did they manage to conceal it?

As I already mentioned the “business” was sometimes conducted via intermediaries. Jose Margulies was one of the prominent ones. He was the brother of an old friend of the owner of Traffic, and often used accounts in the names of offshore corporations in order to makes payments on his behalf. In addition, he tried to conceal the bribes by using accounts at Swiss banks, made recourse to currency dealers, destroyed documentation, and discouraged the corrupt soccer officials from using accounts in their own name in order to avoid detection from law enforcement bodies, an advice which was not always taken seriously. People like Nicolás Leoz for example did not hesitate to have sums being paid to their personal bank accounts on the basis of “consulting contracts”. As I already mentioned, Jack (Warner), for his part, concluded a double agreement in the name of the TTFF concerning rights to World Cup qualifier games. He first sold the TTFF’s rights as part of a bundle, and later on sold them again, but this time separately. There was also the famous $10 million paid by South Africa’s authorities to the CFU in order to “support the African diaspora”, a payment which was in fact made in exchange for votes regarding the 2010 World Cup host. This money was diverted back into Jack’s pockets via a number of tricks. Using family members’ accounts was another way of deception. Lately, the business of taking bribes was getting more and more complicated, prompting officials to look for new complex schemes. In fact, the attempts to conceal illegal payments made in connection with the rights to the World Cup 2018 and 2022 qualifiers caused a lot of headache to Jeffrey Webb in his capacity as a high level CFU official. One of the companies with whom Traffic was to make payment to Webb had difficulties finding the right way to discretely transfer the money to him. This led to long negotiations between Webb’s associate and the company’s executives in order to find a clean method to make the outstanding payment.

Thank you so much Mr Blazer for your time and your invaluable insights!

You’re welcome. I am a big fan of the ASSER International Sports Law Blog so anything for you guys.