Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

What Pogba's transfer tells us about the (de)regulation of intermediaries in football. By Serhat Yilmaz & Antoine Duval

Editor’s note: Serhat Yilmaz (@serhat_yilmaz) is a lecturer in sports law in Loughborough University. His research focuses on the regulatory framework applicable to intermediaries. Antoine Duval (@Ant1Duval) is the head of the Asser International Sports Law Centre.


Last week, while FIFA was firing the heads of its Ethics and Governance committees, the press was overwhelmed with ‘breaking news’ on the most expensive transfer in history, the come back of Paul Pogba from Juventus F.C. to Manchester United. Indeed, Politiken (a Danish newspaper) and Mediapart (a French website specialized in investigative journalism) had jointly discovered in the seemingly endless footballleaks files that Pogba’s agent, Mino Raiola, was involved (and financially interested) with all three sides (Juventus, Manchester United and Pogba) of the transfer. In fine, Raiola earned a grand total of € 49,000,000 out of the deal, a shocking headline number almost as high as Pogba’s total salary at Manchester, without ever putting a foot on a pitch. This raised eyebrows, especially that an on-going investigation by FIFA into the transfer was mentioned, but in the media the sketching of the legal situation was very often extremely confusing and weak. Is this type of three-way representation legal under current rules? Could Mino Raiola, Manchester United, Juventus or Paul Pogba face any sanctions because of it? What does this say about the effectiveness of FIFA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries? All these questions deserve thorough answers in light of the publicity of this case, which we ambition to provide in this blog.


Paul Pogba: From Manchester to Juventus…and back 

On 3 August 2012, 19 years old Paul Pogba moved from Manchester United to Juventus on a free transfer. Four years later, his comeback to Manchester United was the most expensive transaction that the history of football ever recorded. Interestingly (and controversially), the latter transfer involved only one agent, Carmine “Mino” Raiola, acting on behalf of the three parties involved in the transaction. Indeed, on 20 July 2016, Raiola signed an agreement with Juventus stipulating that one of his companies, Topscore Sports Ltd, was contracted to find a suitable acquirer for the player before 31 August 2016 in return of a hefty commission payable by Juventus if Pogba was transferred for a minimum fee of €90,000,000 below which the club was not prepared to sell the player and the company was not entitled to any remuneration. A year before, one of Raiola’s many companies, Topscore Sports Ltd, had already been appointed by Juventus as of 1 March 2015 to facilitate the transfer of Pogba. The 2016 contract acknowledged that Topscore Sports Ltd succeeded in “creating hype around the future transfer” and triggered “a bidding war” to recruit the player. Hence, pursuant to the 2016 agreement, if Topscore managed to secure a transfer above the minimum fee, Juventus would pay to Raiola’s company €18,000,000. Furthermore, Raiola would earn €3,000,000 more for each €5,000,000 increase above the minimum fee of the final amount.

Simultaneously, on 27 July 2016, Mino Raiola signed a representation contract with the player through the Monaco based company Uuniqq Srl. The contract provided for a commission “amounting to 5% of the Player’s Basic Gross Income as result of any employment contract negotiated or renegotiated by the Intermediary”. While, on 8 August 2016, Raiola concluded, again through Uuniqq Srl, an agreement with Manchester United. On 9 August 2016, Juventus and Manchester United agreed to the transfer of Pogba for a compensation of €105,000,000. Pogba obtained a salary of €10,200,000 in 2016/2017, reaching €13,800,000 in 2017/2018. On top of that, he also secured a €2,200,000 bonus every time Manchester United qualifies for the Champions League and a €1,160,000 one in case he wins the ballon d’or. According to the agreement with Manchester United, the agent would be paid for his intermediary services five installments of €3,883,658 each, payable every 30 September from 2017 to 2020. In addition to that, Manchester United was undertaking the duty to pay the player’s fee to the agent. Consequently, Uuniqq Srl was also due to receive five installments of €516,342 each, payable on the same dates.

To sum up, as a consequence of Pogba’s transfer from Juventus to Manchester United, Topscore Sports Ltd collected a total commission of €27,000,000 from Juventus, consisting of the agreed minimum of €18,000,000 plus an additional €9,000,000 for overshooting his targeted transfer fee. Uuniqq Srl got a total commission of €22,000,000, resulting from the €19,420,000 (5 instalments of €3,883,658 each) paid by Manchester United as “club services” and €2,580,000 (5 instalments of €516,342 each) paid by the club as “player’s services” on behalf of Pogba. This is the contractual set-up leading to the headline number of € 49,000,000, but is it actually legal?  

 

Three key questions on the legality of Mino Raiola’s role in Pogba’s transfer

There is a tremendous amount of confusion in the press regarding the legality of the above-explained contractual arrangements. For example, FIFA might be investigating the transfer, but in practice it is not in a position of enforcing any direct sanctions, besides a fine for any misleading declarations of Manchester United or Juventus to the FIFA TMS, against the clubs, the player or the intermediary. Indeed, since the entry into force of the new FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (RWI) in 2015, the responsibility to police intermediaries has been delegated to national federations, in the present case the English FA and the Italian FIGC. It means in practice that the key question is whether Raiola, the clubs or the player complied with the obligations enshrined in the federations’ regulations. The Italian FIGC has not fulfilled its basic transparency obligations under the new FIFA rules, and should be sanctioned by FIFA for not doing so, thus it is impossible to assess whether Raiola and Juventus have complied with the FIGC’s rules. However, the FA has done his regulatory homework well and we believe that the case will raise numerous questions with regard to the compatibility of the behaviour of the parties with the FA’s Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (FA RWI).

  • Is Mino Raiola's total fee/commission in breach of the FA RWI?

The fees payable to Mino Raiola by all parties involved in the transfer (Manchester United as “the registering club”, Juventus as “the former club” and Pogba as “the player”) seems to be the most controversial, and peculiar, aspect of the transfer. Mino Raiola is to receive almost 38% of the total value of Pogba’s contract from Manchester United and only 5% from Pogba directly. Despite the fact that the amount of these fees seems excessive in comparison to market standards under which the level of intermediary commission varies between 5% to 10% and in some of the most extreme cases 20% (see here and here), they do not as such breach the FA RWI. The English FA regulates remuneration payable to intermediaries under section C of its regulations and the indicative level of commission is at 3% (regulation C11). However, this is only a “recommendation” and is aimed at providing guidance to the market and not at constituting an absolute requirement. The non-binding nature of this restriction on the level of commission means that the parties to the transfer are free to negotiate a higher level of commission and this seems to be the case for the representation contracts between Manchester United, Pogba, and Mino Raiola. Additionally, the level of commission, if payable by the player, is to be calculated in accordance with the player’s gross annual income for the entire duration of the relevant employment contract (Article C11.a) whereas the Club’s fee is either based on the player’s gross annual income for the entire duration of the relevant employment contract (Article C11.b) or on the transfer compensation (transfer fee) paid in connection with the transfer (Article C11.c). Both the club and the player are entitled to make the payments to the intermediary in a lump sum or periodic instalments (Article C3 and C7). The club can also make the payments to the intermediary on behalf of the player, if a written request made by the player to do so, and periodic deductions from player’s salary can be made by the club to sanction those payments (Article C2.b). In the light of these provisions of the FA RWI,  the representation contracts published by the Danish news outlet, Politiken (see here) clearly prescribe the remunerations and payment schedules to Mino Raiola by both Manchester United and Pogba  and these contractual arrangements seem to be in compliance with the regulations.

  • Can Mino Raiola represent all parties to the transfer?

The other controversial aspect of the transfer is the representation arrangements by Mino Raiola in respect of Manchester United, Pogba and Juventus. According to the documents published by Politiken and Mediapart, Mino Raiola represented both Manchester United and Pogba under the same transaction. At this point, distinction needs to be made between the dual representation (the intermediary represents the player and either the registering or the former club) and the multiple representation (the intermediary representing the player, the registering club and the former club) as the FA RWI uses both terminologies interchangeably. However, the distinction between the dual and the multiple representation becomes clear under the Intermediary Declaration Form IM1 (see here), the document that must be completed by all parties to the transfer and lodged with the English FA. The document clearly outlines declaration requirements in respect of representation of the player, the registering club and the former club. The representation arrangements between Manchester United, Pogba and Mino Raiola is a dual representation, which is clearly acknowledged by the English FA in its annual disclosure of individual transactions registered, where Mino Raiola and his company, Uuniqq Srl, are listed as the representative of both the Club and the Player (see here). Additionally, as mentioned above, Mino Raiola had also a representation contract with Juventus for the sale of the player. Under the circumstances, it seems the representation contract with Juventus adds another layer to the representation arrangements and constitutes the element of multiple representation with regards to the FA RWI. These arrangements clearly raise the possibility of a conflict of interest, therefore, the English FA allow dual/multiple representation only if the intermediary and the other relevant parties to the transfer strictly comply with the consent requirements of its regulations (Article E1). Otherwise the intermediary may only act for one party to the transfer (Article E1) and cannot receive any remuneration from other parties (Article E3).

Firstly, if the intermediary has a pre-existing representation contract with one party (“the first party”) to the transfer, then that contract should be lodged with the English FA (Article E2.a). In this case, the extracts of representation contract refer to “the player representation contract” between Pogba and Mino Raiola which seems to indicate the existence of a representation contract prior to the multiple representation arrangements. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Pogba could be “the first party” to the transaction and the existing representation contract can constitute a pre-existing representation contract under the FA RWI which should have been lodged with the English FA prior to the other representation arrangements. Secondly, the intermediary should obtain all parties’ (emphasis added) prior written consent to provide services to any other party to the transaction (“the other party(ies)”) (Article E2.b) meaning that Mino Raiola should have obtained the consent of Manchester United, Pogba and Juventus to enter into the multiple representation arrangements. Then, once the intermediary and the other party(ies) agree on the terms of representation, prior to entering into actual representation contracts, the intermediary must inform all parties of the full details regarding the proposed fee to be paid by all parties to the intermediary (Article E2.c). Mino Raiola, should not only have sought the consent of all parties to the multiple representation but also disclosed them the level of fees payable to him by each party. Finally, all parties to the transfer should be given opportunity to seek independent legal advice on the proposed arrangements and provide their written consent for the intermediary to enter into dual/ multiple representation arrangements with other parties (Article E2.d, E2.e).

 As a result, the key focus of the investigation initiated by FIFA but which will inevitably move to the English FA seems to be whether Mino Raiola complied with the regulatory requirements imposing written consent prior to entering into the multiple representation arrangements. Due to the involvement of different companies located in multiple jurisdictions, it is particularly important that the representation contract with Juventus was disclosed to other parties of the transfer, i.e., Manchester United and Pogba and included under the IM1 form. A potential non-compliance with these requirements would constitute a regulatory breach. The omission of information under the relevant paperwork by the parties might be considered as the concealment or misrepresentation of reality and/or substance of any matters in relation to the transaction which is also regulatory breach (Article A3). Any regulatory breach shall be misconduct and sanctioned accordingly (Article F1). All parties involved have potentially, if a multiple representation agreement was not disclosed to the FA, breached the FA rules. However, only Juventus and Raiola knew with certainty about this multiple heads. It is doubtful that the FA could sanction Juventus, which is out of its jurisdictional reach (one could potentially envisage a transfer ban to the FA). Yet, Raiola’s multiple companies must be registered with the FA to conclude transfers with Premier League clubs, thus if he fails to demonstrate that he obtained prior written consent from all the parties to the multiple representation, one could envisage that the FA would suspend their registrations.

  • Who has authority to investigate and sanction Mino Raiola for regulatory breaches (if there is any)?

The final central question is: which governing body, in this case either the English FA, the Italian FIGC or FIFA, has the authority to investigate and sanction potential regulatory breaches in the transfer? The jurisdictional nexus derives from the international dimension of a transfer involving two different associations, (English FA and Italian FIGC) and the application of FIFA Regulations on Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP). It gets even more complicated if Raiola’s original intermediary registration with the Dutch FA is taken into consideration. Against this background, the FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries (FIFA RWI)’s fundamental aim was to bring some transparency in an opaque market and Article 9.1 FIFA RWI authorises associations to hand out sanctions on any party under their jurisdiction that commits regulatory breach of FIFA regulations as well as their statutes or regulations. The article implies therefore that either the English FA or the Italian FIGC (or the Dutch KNVB) may have the authority to sanction Raiola if he falls under their jurisdiction. In the case of intermediaries, the jurisdiction is generally inferred by the registration and the English FA obliges any applicants to submit to its jurisdiction through the declaration under its intermediary registration process. A close scrutiny of the English FA’s intermediary disclosures reveals Mino Raiola’s intermediary registration as natural person (see here). He has also registered his five companies as legal persons including Uuniqq Srl (see here) which is the one used for the transfer of Pogba with the English FA. These registrations could provide the English FA with jurisdiction over Mino Raiola to investigate the transaction and, if any regulatory breach is proven, to impose any sanctions. The investigative power of the English FA over Minor Raiola also derives directly from his registration under which he consented to communicate to the English FA , for the purposes of investigation, all contracts, agreements and records in connection with his activities as an intermediary. Moreover, if for any reason Mino Raiola gets eventually sanctioned by the English FA, FIFA would have the authority to extend the sanction worldwide (Article 9.2 of FIFA RWI). 


Conclusion: Regulating intermediaries without FIFA 

What are the broader lessons we can learn from this case?

  • First, the transfer market remains, despite the recent TPO ban and FIFA RWI, an opaque market on which conflicts of interest are routine. In this regard, FIFA’s decision to retreat from any direct involvement in the regulation of intermediaries, despite the obvious shortcomings of the old licensing system, has proven to be a relatively poor and to some extent incoherent choice. The legitimate objectives invoked to ban TPO are in turn betrayed by the decision to let go of any supervision of intermediaries. In general, the cognitive dissonance of FIFA vis-à-vis the transfer system is striking, it attacks on the one hand (rightly in the view of one of us) the financiarization of football through TPO, but supports it on the other by maintaining in place a system that transforms players into speculative assets.
  • Second, the scope of regulation of intermediaries is now exclusively dependent on the decisions of national federations. If the English FA decides to crack down on conflicts of interest in the transfer market, it will have a tremendous impact on the way intermediaries operate. The English market represents a huge share of the whole transfer market and is hardly avoidable for major intermediaries. Further, if the federations of the so-called big five (England, France, Italy, Germany, Spain) leagues would accept to coordinate their intermediaries’ regulations, they would have such a dominant market position that in practice they would very much define how the transfer market operates. In this regard, the Pogba case will be decisive (and symbolic) to determine whether the English FA is ready to lead the way down a stricter regulatory road.
  • Third, fans (and their clubs) are the ultimate losers of this state of play, they should rebel! The intermediaries’ fees are a consequence of the structural lack of competition and transparency in the transfer market. In the end, those who are going to the stadium every week or have an expensive subscription to watch the Premier League are paying the intermediaries. We the consumers of football are the ones on the losing end of this masquerade of a market. If clubs are unwilling to assert their contractual rights against ruthless intermediaries, it is unlikely for example that Manchester United will ask compensation from Mino Raiola if he omitted to inform them of the obvious conflicts of interest in the Pogba transfer, their supporters (and shareholders) should try to force them to do so.

 

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Asser International Sports Law Blog | Mega-sporting events and human rights: What role can EU sports diplomacy play? - Conference Report – By Thomas Terraz

Asser International Sports Law Blog

Our International Sports Law Diary
The Asser International Sports Law Centre is part of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut

Mega-sporting events and human rights: What role can EU sports diplomacy play? - Conference Report – By Thomas Terraz

Editor’s note: Thomas Terraz is a fourth year LL.B. candidate at the International and European Law programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences with a specialisation in European Law. Currently he is pursuing an internship at the T.M.C. Asser Institute with a focus on International and European Sports Law.

 

1.     Introduction

 On March 05, the T.M.C. Asser Institute hosted ‘Mega-sporting events and human rights: What role can EU sports diplomacy play?’ a Multiplier Sporting Event organized in the framework of a European research project on ‘Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sports Diplomacy’. This project funded by the European Commission through its Erasmus+ program aims to help the EU adopt a strategic approach to sports diplomacy and to provide evidence of instances where sport can help amplify EU diplomatic messages and forge better relations with third countries. In particular, Antoine Duval from the Asser Institute is focusing on the role of EU sports diplomacy to strengthen human rights in the context of mega sporting events (MSE) both in Europe and abroad. To this end, he organized the two panels of the day focusing, on the one hand, on the ability of sport governing bodies (SGB) to leverage their diplomatic power to promote human rights, particularly in the context of MSEs and, on the other, on the EU’s role and capacity to strengthened human rights around MSEs. The following report summarizes the main points raised during the discussions.

 

2.     Context to the Event

Before diving into the panels, the scene was set by a few speakers who described the background and some of the main issues encircling the event. First, Antoine Duval (Asser Institute) kicked the day off by describing the general goal of the project and his role within it. Specifically, Duval strives to explore key questions such as: to what extent are SGB’s diplomatic actors and do they have human rights responsibilities? Also, what is the role of the EU’s sports diplomacy with regard to human rights at MSEs? Can it and should it get involved and if so, what could it do to be most effective?

Having laid the foundation of the event, Richard Parrish (Edge Hill University) described the background to the project ‘Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sports Diplomacy’. Parrish explained that while many countries have a clear sports diplomacy strategy, the EU has been rather ‘late’ to the party. He explained that there may be room for a soft power approach to EU sports diplomacy. The project aims to continue the political momentum gained from a 2016 report on EU sports diplomacy and has now held several events across Europe that analyze this subject from different lenses. Parrish concluded by explaining that the EU has started to be more conscious of this issue and has, for example, now included sport in its dialogue with China for the first time.

Simon Rofe (SOAS) then brought some introductory remarks to help frame the discussions that would follow. Rofe started by pointing out how human rights and diplomacy have not exactly gone hand in hand and that many diplomatic instruments are rather silent on human rights, which often has been intentional. Furthermore, there are also issues when trying to identify which and what form of human rights should be promoted, although the UN has played a leading role in this regard. There are also questions regarding what capacity for change there is within SGBs. Rofe also gave the example of how human rights have already been disseminated through sport, such as during apartheid in South Africa. Nevertheless, as SGBs gain greater roles in non-sport matters, their responsibility to respect and further human rights is significantly increased.

3.     The Panels

a.     Panel 1: Leveraging the Diplomatic Power of the Sports Governing Bodies for Human Rights

Now that the stage was set, the first panel took the floor with Antoine Duval acting as chair. Claire Jenkin (University of Hertfordshire) was the first to speak and examined the concept of legacies, especially in terms of children and young people. In other words, how can SGBs help leave positive human rights legacies in the MSEs host nations? Jenkin took the example of the International Inspiration Programme from the London 2012 Olympics, which was the first ever international legacy initiative linked to the Olympics and ran from 2007-2014. Its goal was to reach out to young people and bring sport to the youth beyond the context of the Games. In the end, it helped influence 55 national policies, strategies and legislative amendments. Jenkin highlighted, once more, how defining which human rights values to promote can be challenging. There are also many in a position that can promote human rights through sport but are simply not aware of their position as a ‘sport diplomat’. Hence, creating awareness, defining the appropriate human rights perspective and ensuring that young voices are heard in this process are essential to developing the SGBs’ human rights diplomacies.

Next up was Florian Kirschner (World Players Association/UNI Global Union) who looked at how SGBs have exercised their human rights diplomatic role. Kirschner illustrated how sport has a fundamental role in our society and is naturally connected to several human rights. The sports movement also clings to principles such as fairness, solidarity, equality and inclusion. However, Kirschner argued, SGBs have not always upheld these principles and pointed to several examples, such as widespread corruption, the award of MSEs to countries with questionable human rights records, suppression of free speech and violations of worker’s rights. There have also been instances of ‘sportwashing’, where states use sport events to try to give the impression that they are compliant with human rights, while coming short of their obligations in practice. The World Players Association, NGOs and other trade unions have come together to push SGBs, under the UN framework, to take greater account of human rights. Kirschner closed with the case of Hakeem al-Araibi and highlighted how many actors, including FIFA, were able to use their influence to push for his release.

Lucy Amis (Unicef UK/Institute for Human Rights and Business) then explained to the participants the importance of transferring the policies SGBs have adopted in relation to human rights into actual practice. This means developing strategies that enforce the values SGBs claim to uphold. There are numerous cases where sport has not lived up to these values: including cases where migrant workers are exploited to build MSE sport facilities, cases of child labor, and various instances where fans chant homophobic and racist slurs. Amis highlighted that SGBs must be especially diligent in cases affecting children because they face the highest risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sports diplomacy has helped initiate positive changes in some countries. In Rwanda, sport was used to help rebuild its society amidst significant adversities. There have also been encouraging developments in Qatar. Despite many calls to cancel the World Cup, FIFA’s persistence to hold the World Cup there has helped bring an end to the kafala system. All in all, challenges do remain. For instance, many national SGBs are limited to a very small and amateur staff, which creates greater challenges in creating, implementing and enforcing human rights strategies.

Finally, Guido Battaglia (Centre for Sport and Human Rights) closed the panel and began by giving an overview of the Centre for Sport and Human Rights’ goals and work. Battaglia described how the Centre’s main priority is helping those who are most affected by sports - the athletes, workers, and fans, among others - based on international human rights standards. The Centre promotes and fosters human rights in sport by bringing a wide variety of actors together, including SGBs, local organizing committees, governments, sponsors, broadcasters, international organizations, civil society and trade unions. The aim is to help these groups share best practices, increase their capacities and improve accountability on human rights issues. Battaglia then shared examples of how the Centre has been active in the field. One of these cases concerned Semyon Simonov, a human rights activist in Russia, who had been arrested while interviewing workers building World Cup stadiums in Volgograd. During this time, the Centre held a conference during which Human Rights Watch directly requested FIFA to monitor the situation. This eventually prompted FIFA to attend one of Simonov’s court hearings, acting as a sort of diplomatic pressure and signaling the sports world was watching. Battaglia concluded that pushing human rights through sports diplomacy, while still in its infancy, is gaining momentum and that there is enormous potential to help unite society through sport.

 

b.     Panel 2: A Human Rights Dimension for the EU’s Sports Diplomacy?

The second panel, chaired by Carmen Perez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), then directly confronted the central question of how the EU could develop a human rights-based sports diplomacy. Arnout Geeraert (Utrecht University) launched the panel with a purposively provocative statement that EU sports diplomacy is ridiculous and that fundamentally there should be a deepening rather than a widening of its action in this matter. Since the EU has limited resources to focus on its sports diplomacy, it should work to strengthen its current efforts. Generally, the EU promotes liberal norms such as liberty, anti-discrimination, democracy, human rights and good governance in its actions. In the sports sector, the EU has had the greatest success in steering SGBs through negative integration and soft power measures, and SGB usually comply because they seek to be on good terms with the EU. In the end, Geeraert contends that the EU’s sport diplomacy should be to place more pressure on SGBs through a variety of existing channels, including coordinating EU member state positions in international organizations like the Council of Europe, and forming alliances with non-member states. The EU could then push human rights through these various relationships, which would indirectly compel SGBs to respect human rights.

Agata Dziarnowska (European Commission) took a different view from Geeraert and argued that a widening of the EU’s sport diplomacy should also be a part of the EU’s strategy in this field. Fundamentally, Dziarnowska argued, soft power is the EU’s most effective tool, and when you add the fact that Article 165 TFEU gives the EU the ability to cooperate with third countries on issues related to sport, there is a clear path for the EU to act. When it does so, it should be promoting EU values, including those related to human rights. In this context, the EU has already begun to take action within this strategic framework. For example, promoting the aforementioned values will be part of the new Erasmus programme. Additionally, the Council relatively recently adopted Conclusions related to sports events to ‘enhance integrity, transparency and good governance in major sport events’. These Conclusions specifically addressed business and human rights principles and highlight the importance of the selection process. Dziarnowska closed by underlining that EU action will greatly rely on strong political support, particularly from the Member States.

Alexandre Mestre (Sport and Citizenship) built on Dziarnowska’s contention that there is indeed an avenue for the EU to intervene on human rights. Given the wording of Article 165 TFEU, there are a multitude of areas for EU action. Mestre explained that crucial issues such as fighting against human trafficking, doping, child labor, sexual abuse of athletes, excessive commercial/economic exploitation of athletes are matter that deserve the EU’s attention. Furthermore, recent cases, such as Caster Semenya’s dispute with World Athletics, has shown how the SGBs’ eligibility rules could be another area where the EU could add value, given its previous experience with eligibility. Moreover, the EU has tremendous experience dealing with cases of discrimination and could use this expertise as a basis to promote human rights issues. Like Geeraert, Mestre also sees the EU increasing its cooperation with other entities, such as with the Council of Europe, civil society and third countries hosting MSEs. Mestre, nevertheless, also envisages direct cooperation with SGBs as part of the EU’s sports diplomacy strategy.

Lastly, Christian Salm (European Parliamentary Research Service) gave a historical perspective on the EU’s sports diplomacy, emphasizing the European Parliament’s role. Salm described how the 1970s were truly pivotal in this story, especially since it was the ‘decade of breakthrough’ for human rights. There were two events that placed human rights as a top priority: the World Cup in Argentina in 1978 and the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Concerning the first, the European Parliament’s Political Affairs Committee decided to have a hearing concerning human rights to counter political propaganda from Argentina’s right-wing military regime. While the hearing was blocked by a vote, the socialist group decided to hold its own debate, which created a significant media interest. The hearing generated calls for the release of the opposition leader in Argentina and led to a wider debate concerning sport events, specifically with regards to boycotts. Salm then described how leading up to the 1980 Moscow Olympics the international situation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the wave of oppression on human rights activists stimulated majority support amongst the European Parliament to boycott the Olympics. While the European Parliament was in many ways limited, it understood its role as a guardian of human rights and was able to generate significant attention to these issues. More recently, in February 2014 the European Parliament also held a public hearing on migrant workers building stadiums. With this perspective, Salm explained, the European Parliament can definitely play a part in developing a human rights dimension to EU sports diplomacy.

 

4.     Conclusion

After each of the panels, participants were able to ask questions which stimulated many fruitful discussions, such as the importance of including human rights considerations in MSE bidding processes and defining an overall EU diplomatic strategy that would effectively use the EU’s leverage on these questions. On the latter issue, to prevent a fragmented diplomatic approach, the second panel concluded that coordination between all EU actors and informal policy making – such as raising awareness through public hearings and conferences – can help create a cohesive and effective EU sports diplomacy scheme. In any event, from all the discussions, it is evident that human rights will need to play a greater role in any EU sports diplomacy strategy given the inherent human rights concerns that MSEs carry.

On behalf of the organizers, we would like to thank all the speakers and participants for ensuring a remarkably productive and rich event in difficult times. We look forward to seeing you at the Institute again soon!


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